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Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions
Act?
Ronald Benton Brown*
"The report of my death was an exaggeration."
-Mark Twain
Cable from Europe to the Associated Press'
The Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA")2 was approved by the
National Conference on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in 1975.' The
Conference proposed that every state enact it. The Act was designed to
simplify, clarify, modernize, and make uniform nationwide the real estate
sales and sales financing law like the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
had done for the law of transactions in goods. Article 1 of the ULTA
paralleled Article 1 of the UCC covering general provisions. Article 2 of
the ULTA covered the sales of land in a manner similar to the way Article
2 of the UCC covered the sales of goods. Article 3 of the ULTA and
Article 9 of the UCC covered secured transactions. In the late 1970s, the
ULTA appeared to be the wave of the future for real estate, ready to
duplicate the widespread acceptance accomplished by the UCC. When I
began to teach property in 1976, that was the way I presented the ULTA to
students. I also remember advising an even more junior colleague to focus
her scholarly efforts on the ULTA so she would be on the leading edge of
Real Estate Law.4 In the early 80s, my representations seemed to be
justified. Law students and recent graduates eagerly anticipated the
replacement of the confusing rules of the common law and maxims of
equity with an easily understood code.5
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
B.S.M.E., 1970, Northeastern University; J.D., 1973, University of Connecticut; LL.M., 1976,
Temple University.
1. THE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 554 (3rd ed. 1979).
2. 13 U.L.A. 539-714 (1980).
3. See Norman Geis, Introduction to UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY AcTs (1990); U.L.S.I.A.
prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 220 (Supp. 1995), reprinted in UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY Acrs
558-65 (1990).
4. Amazingly, this advice was followed, a fact which this author has never been allowed
to forget. See Barbara J. Britzke, Residential Real Estate Transactions: Comparison of
Uniform Land Transactions Act and Maryland Law, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 43 (1983).
However, Professor Britzke suffered no ill effects from the advice other than developing a
severe antipathy to Real Estate Law.
5. For example, students were delighted to read, at the conclusion of a section of text
explaining that under traditional doctrine the contract of sale merged into the deed, that:
4
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But widespread enactment never happened. In fact, no enactment ever
occurred. The ULTA was not adopted by any state. Fifteen years later, in
1990, the NCCUSL withdrew it. Before that happened, the mortgage part,
Article 3, had been extracted and fashioned into a new act of its own, the
Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"), which was presented to the
states. But ULSIA has not been enacted either. The most recent attempts
to convince a state legislature to adopt the ULSIA that I know of occurred
in Connecticut and Minnesota last year. In Connecticut, the bill failed to
emerge from committee.' In Minnesota, an active bar committee, having
developed a modified version ULSIA to deal with local concerns, is
optimistic for its chances in the next session.7 For simplicity sake, I will
refer to both the ULTA and ULSIA as being included in the term ULTA for
the remainder of these remarks.
Whatever happened? I wanted to know. So did many lawyers, law
students, and other law professors. I proposed to the editors of the Nova
Law Review that we try to find out and print the results in the form of a
symposium. I solicited the information by writing8 directly to everyone
listed in the Uniform Laws Annotated as having been involved at any stage
with the ULTA or ULSIA. I also sent the solicitation letter to the Internet
discussion groups for law professors9 and real estate professionals.'" I
followed up leads, no matter how remote. The responses varied. I
anticipated post mortems analyzing the causes of the ULTA's untimely
death. Many of the responses, especially the brief ones fit my expectations.
Based upon those, I compiled a list of what seemed to be the '"Top Ten
Reasons for the Demise of the ULTA" (with apologies to David Letterman).
In reverse order they are:
"Uniform Land Transactions Act sect. 1-309 abolishes the doctrine of merger. Acceptance
of a deed does not relieve any party of the duty to perform all of his obligations under the
contract." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 580 (2d ed. 1988). The
students concluded they no longer had to worry about the doctrine because it no longer
existed. Great was their disappointment at being reminded that the ULTA was not yet the
law anywhere.
6. This information was obtained from attorney William Breetz, an NCCUSL
commissioner from Connecticut and an advisor to the ULSIA Drafting Committee, and Mr.
David Biklen, the executive director of the Connecticut Law Review Commission.
7. See John D. Healy, Jr., ULSIA-Modified for Minnesota, 20 NOVA L. REV 1063
(1996).
8. See Appendix C for a copy of the solicitation letter.
9. The LawProf discussion group.
10. The Dirt discussion group.
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10. Almost no one understood it.
9. It would not do for real estate what the UCC did for the sale and
sales financing of goods.
8. It would do for real estate what the UCC did for the sale and sales
financing of goods.
7. It was drafted by commercial law people rather than conveyancers.
6. No one ever heard of it.
5. It was only another boondoggle by law professors.
4. It was almost totally ignored by law professors.
3. Real property lawyers did not want to learn something new.
2. Real property lawyers were afraid that it might hurt them
economically.
1. Real estate is too local in character for the nationwide uniformity.
Each of these had some immediate appeal to me. The responses from our
distinguished panel of commentators have placed them in the proper
perspective.
I start the discussion with reason number 10, that almost no one
understood the ULTA. I have taught the UCC courses in Sales and Sales
Financing. In many law schools, Sales and Sales Financing are two separate
courses, each getting three credit hours. That means each course meets a
minimum of three hours per week over a fourteen-week semester for a total
of eighty-four class hours. Some schools combine the two topics into one
four-credit course for a minimum of fifty-six class hours. It is apparent that
law school faculties believe that it takes upper level law students, under the
skilled guidance of a law professor, at least fifty-six hours to understand
these acts. Of course, a prior understanding of the UCC might make it
easier for a lawyer or law student to figure out the parallel parts of the
ULTA, but it also might lead to confusion because the provisions are not
exactly the same. Besides, not every lawyer or law student understands
Articles 2 and 9 of the UCC, not even if he or she has taken the course(s).
So a significant obstacle to adoption would be the time and effort required
for the critical parties (e.g., study committees, legislative staffs, legislators,
and interested members of the public, such as, potential lobbyists) to figure
out what these acts would do.
This obstacle was probably magnified by the fact that the NCCUSL
promulgated another act, the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
("USLTA"), 1" at the same time as ULTA. The USLTA covered the
mechanics of transfer, liens, recording, and priorities. As originally
11. This Act is also referred to as "USOLTA."
1996] 1019
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formulated, these were included in the ULTA but they were moved to a
separate act to prevent the ULTA from becoming unwieldy. Professor
Maggs points out that the USOLTA generated political and economic
opposition of its own. I speculate this opposition might have inured to the
detriment of the ULTA. Moreover, figuring out the USOLTA would have
been just as big a study project as figuring out the ULTA and would also
have generated questions as to how the acts would interrelate. Being created
at the same time, they were probably viewed, at least on a subliminal level,
as a package since many of the authors in this Symposium discuss them
together. 3 That should not have surprised me considering how often they
were lumped together in prior academic discussions. 4  Perhaps this
package was simply too big for any legislature to swallow, particularly when
one remembers that being a state legislator is only a part-time job in many
states and there was no emergency pressing legislators to deal with these
proposals.
Reason number 9 reflects the idea that the UCC was intended, inter
alia, to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law.' 5 The ULTA was
intended to do the same thing 6 but doing that for real estate law would be
more difficult than it was for transactions in goods. Probably, this is
connected to reason number 1 (i.e., real estate law is too local in nature to
be suitable for a uniform act). Perhaps it is connected to the historical
12. The original vision was to have one uniform act which would cover all aspects of
real estate law. Other topics which were removed and eventually became the subject of
separate acts were condominiums and common interest ownership.
13. See Richard B. Amandes, The Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act Twenty Years Later: Why Have There Been No
Adoptions?, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1033 (1996); Peter B. Maggs, The Uniform Simplification of
Land Transfers Act and the Politics and Economics of Law Reform, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1091
(1996); Barbara Taylor Mattis, ULTA and USLTA in Coursebooks and Classrooms, 20 NOVA
L. REV. 1095 (1996).
14. The 1981 symposium in the Southern Illinois University Law Journal included six
articles of which three focused exclusively on USLTA and two others involved both USLTA
and ULTA. The symposium in the Stetson Law Review was divided almost equally between
USOLTA and ULTA.
The Uniform Land Security Interest Act suffered similarly by being grouped with other
Uniform Real Property Acts in the Symposium on Uniform Real Property Acts, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 325 (1992), with the stars of the show being the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act and the Uniform Construction Lien Act. However, the ULSIA was the sole
focus in a 1992 symposium in the Connecticut Law Review.
15. UCC § 1-102.
16. ULTA § 1-102(1).
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nature of land law. 7 Even the name "real estate" has medieval roots that
lawyers both enjoy and hate. It takes on an almost mystical aura which
lawyers hold in awe and, deep down, may not want to exorcise with a
sanitized "land" law.
Reason number 8, doing for real estate law what the UCC had done for
the sale of goods, was supposed to be one of the reasons for states to adopt
the Act. But many lawyers still remember the negative side of the process.
It was not easy for lawyers and judges to learn the newly enacted UCC.
Some lawyers and judges could afford to simply hire recent graduates who
had taken one or more UCC courses to be their clerks or associates. Others
struggled to understand the new code, but the struggle was often made
worse by confused judges who produced tortured and baffling precedents.
I remember being a very young lawyer in Connecticut in 1973 and
winning my first "big" case because the outcome was based upon the UCC.
My client was being sued for failing to pay for a set of encyclopedias.
Upon reading the complaint I noticed that the encyclopedias had been
delivered almost six years earlier. Eureka! The statute of limitations on a
contract for the sale of goods under the UCC was four years. I filed my
notice of affirmative defense. My motion for summary judgment was in the
typewriter when the plaintiff's attorney called. "How can you say the
statute of limitations has run when the six years aren't up?" he demanded.
I replied that under Article 2 of the UCC, the statute of limitations was four
years. "What's the UCC?," he asked, although it had been the law in
Connecticut for over twelve years (TWELVE YEARS!). 18 Either embar-
rassed or, perhaps more likely, just unwilling to look up the statute for the
amount of money at issue, he agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice. He
went on to explain that he had a large collection practice and the UCC had
never come up before in any case. I am certain that he did his best to forget
about it immediately. I heard similar stories from contemporaries who
encountered lawyers and judges who neither knew nor cared that the UCC
existed. Remembering or just having heard of these times, lawyers and
legislators might be justified in not wanting to repeat the experience. Others
might justifiably interpret this as proof that lawyers do not want to be
bothered learning something new (i.e., reason number 3).
Reason number 7 was that it was drafted by commercial law people
rather than conveyancers. Perhaps that was true but it sounds like an ad
hominem argument. A number of the ULTA draftsmen had worked on parts
17. See Geis, Introduction, supra note 3, at 3.
18. 1959 Conn. Acts 133 (Reg. Sess.) (effective 1961) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42a-1-101 to -10-109 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996)).
1996] 1021
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of the UCC,19 but why should that disqualify them or diminish the
product? The notes to the Act indicate that they received input and advice
from what appears to be every facet of the real estate community.20
Moreover, the act itself was approved by the NCCUSL and I have found
nothing to suggest that the Conference was the captive of commercial law
interests.
As indicated above, I communicated with everyone whose name I
found mentioned in any reference or cross reference to the ULTA. I was
pleasantly surprised by how nice people were about replying, but I was also
quite surprised by how many responded that they either had not heard of it
or could not recall anything about it. Land sales and financing may be an
eminently forgettable topic and it was twenty years ago, but the degree of
nonrecognition was astonishing. Perhaps reason number 6 does have some
validity.
Reason number 5 blames the law professors, something we have
learned to bear. Law students frequently respond to new assignments by
asking, "Why do we have to learn this?" or "Do we really have to learn
this?" (although the favorite question is still, "Will this be on the exam?").
They suspect that law professors invent the unpleasant and difficult material
simply to torture them. Reason number 5 may be an extension (logical or
not) of this syndrome, i.e., it was simply something dreamed up by law
professors because they have nothing better to do with their days in their
ivory towers than to dream up miseries for law students. I assure you that,
based upon my experience, it is not so. In fact, if the ULTA had been
adopted, it would eventually have made life far easier for everyone, but
admittedly the transition period would have taken some enduring. Besides,
if one examines the list of people involved in the drafting and consideration
of the ULTA, it becomes readily apparent that these were busy, successful
professionals who had no need to invent busywork to fill up their days.
Reason number 4, that professors ignored the ULTA, is in some ways
the converse of number 5, but it has more basis in fact. Law professors
19. Some of these draftsmen included: professors Marion Benfield, Peter Maggs, and
Fairfax Leary.
20. The prefatory note to the ULTA in the 1986 edition of the Uniform Laws Annotated
reveals, inter alia, a list of advisors from the following associations: the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the National Association of
Home Builders of the United States, the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
American Bar Association, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, the American
Land Title Association, the Public Interest Research Group, and the American Subcontractors
Association.
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wrote a surprisingly small number of law review articles about the ULTA
despite the considerable efforts of Dean Richard Amandes to drum up
scholarly interest.2 Only ten articles and five student comments focused
on the ULTA during the fifteen years between the Act's approval and
withdrawal.Y Even counting student notes, this symposium will almost
double that number! Why were there so few articles on such an important
subject and did that have a negative effect? Dean Amandes, in his article,
explains his theories noting that the most important factor may have been
that the UCC, in contrast to the ULTA, had predecessor acts to set the stage
for its enactment.
Casebook authors did not ignore the Act. As Professor Mattis explains,
all of the basic Property casebooks included discussions of the Act, and, as
she explains, the act was used as an educational vehicle in her class. If
students could have been won over to the cause of the ULTA, eventually
they would have been the lawyers who would control the growth of the law.
However, the Act was withdrawn before many law student who had learned
about it in class could have achieved positions where they could have a
significant impact. Moreover, there is no way to know how many
professors gave attention to the Act in class or in reading assignments, or
whether the attention was positive or negative.
Finally, reason number 2 is that many real estate lawyers were against
the ULTA because it might hurt them economically. It might, for example,
decrease the need for lawyers through the use of power of sale rather than
judicial foreclosure. It would also involve a significant retooling of their
practices. Mr. Pedowitz supports this view." He was actively involved
in what happened, so he must know.
Reason number 2 might explain why the Uniform Land Security
Interest Act did not meet with success after it was spun-off from the ULTA.
The ULSIA was smaller, more focused, and easier to learn than the ULTA,
but even the attempts to modify it to meet local needs and expectations have
21. The author still has in his possession a letter he received from Dean Amandes which
was typical of his efforts to find law professors interested in writing about the ULTA and/or
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act.
22. See Appendix A, infra, for articles in which the focus was the ULTA. Appendix
B lists articles in which the Uniform Security Interest Act, a derivative of the ULTA, was
the focus. See also Mattis, infra, for a complete list of articles in which the ULTA, ULSIA,
and USLTA were discussed. The latter, commonly referred to as the USOLTA or USLTA,
concerned recording and priorities, a subject which was part of the original concept of the
ULTA but made into a separate act before the ULTA was approved by the NCCUSL.
23. See James M. Pedowitz, Letter to the Editor, 20 NovA L. REv. 1029 (1996).
1996] 1023
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yet to produce adoption. 4 Perhaps the ULSIA had been tainted by its
connection with the ULTA and USOLTA, or it is simply too late to regain
the necessary momentum.
But the fact that the ULTA was never adopted by a state does not
necessarily mean that it was a failure or that it had died. It has performed
and continues to perform some important functions. The Act stimulated
discussion over what the law should be. Professors Walsh and Siebrasse
explain that it is a major influence on the Proposed New Brunswick Land
Security Act.25 Professor Maggs mentions it in his attempts to help
Armenian jurists in their efforts to draft a civil code explaining that it has
been useful in the education of an entire generation of law students and, I
would add, law professors. Professor Korngold demonstrates that the Act
has played a role in the process of law reform in the courts.26 Some state
legislatures have enacted small parts of it.27 Professor Randolph explains
that the Act will play a role in the next generation of legislative proposals
being developed by the NCCUSL. The Act may even pave the way for
eventual adoption of that next generation of uniform real estate laws.28 It
is obvious that we owe a great debt of gratitude to the pioneers who
invested so much time, effort, and thought into the creation and presentation
of the ULTA. Their dedication to the orderly development of the law and
through it our common welfare is truly remarkable.
Personally, and on behalf of the Nova Law Review, I want to thank the
commentators who have participated in this Symposium. I have enjoyed
learning from them and I appreciate their efforts and insight. Thanks to
them, I now have the answers to my questions and the opportunity to share
this knowledge with our readers.
24. See Healy, infra, for a discussion of attempts to modify the act for adoption in
Minnesota.
25. Norman Siebrasse & Catherine Walsh, The Influence of the ULSIA on the Proposed
New Brunswick Land Security Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1133 (1996).
26. See also Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform Real Property Acts Have Played in the
Development of American Land Law: Some General Observations, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 331 (1992).
27. California and Virginia have "cherry-picked" the anticlogging section and enacted
it. See Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security Interest
Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289, 315 n.99, 317 (1995).
28. See Amandes, infra, regarding the role played by the Negotiable Instruments Law,
Bulk Sales Act, and Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act in paving the way for the adoption
of the UCC.
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Appendix A
Law Review Articles about the Uniform Land Transactions Act
Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Future Advances Lender: Status Under Present
Illinois Law and Under ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 So. ILL. U. L.J. 451.
Barbara J. Britzke, Residential Real Estate Transactions: Comparison of
Uniform Land Transactions Act and Maryland Law, 13 U. BALT. L. REv.
43 (1983).
Ronald Benton Brown, Article I of the Uniform Land Transactions Act: Is
Inconsistency with the U.C.C. an Unnecessary Obstacle? 1981 SO. ILL. U.
L.J. 585.
Jon W. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976).
Jon W. Bruce, Overview of Uniform Land Transactions Act and Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1980).
Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform Real Property Acts Have Played in the
Development of American Land Law: Some General Observations, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 331 (1992).
Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Statutory Draftsman: Land Transaction
Acts, 1981 So. ILL. U. L.J. 549.
William H. Henning, Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and
Personal Property Foreclosures, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1985).
Gerald Korugold, Construction loan advances and the subordinate purchase
money mortgagee: An appraisal, a suggested approach, and the ULTA
perspective, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 313 (1981).
Student Notes or Comments:
Comment, Real Property-Warranties in Uniform Land Transactions Act of
1975, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 162 (1975).
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Meredith Craig, The Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10
STETSON L. REv. 21 (1980).
William J. Fields, Housing Defects: Homeowners' Remedies-A Time For
Legislative Action, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 72 (1981).
Patricia E. Rant, ULTA and Non-judicial Mortgage Foreclosure in Texas,
12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1104 (1981).
Maureen M. Rayburn, The Uniform land Transactions Act: Pennsylvania
Property Law and Sellers' Remedies for Breach of Contract for Sale of Real
Estate, 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 577 (1982).
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Appendix B
Law Review Articles about the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected Party: Evolution or Revolu-
tion, 24 CONN. L. REv. 971 (1992).
Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's Remedies on Default-Worth the Effort, 24
CONN. L. REv. 1001 (1992).
Marc B. Friedman, Rentals Roulette: The Mortgagee's Rights to Rent
under Connecticut Law and the ULSIA, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1093 (1992).
Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Securi-
ty Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289 (1995).
Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Uniform Land Security Interest Act and the Bank-
ruptcy Courts: Bivergent Policies, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1992).
Michael E. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial
Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1991).
John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed
Homeowners: ULSIA section 511(B), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455
(1992).
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Appendix C
The Letter Soliciting Participation in this Symposium
Dear
Whatever happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act (and its
offspring, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act)? What can be learned
from its uniform lack of enactment? Did it produce any lasting effects?
The answers to these questions are not currently available.
Because I would really like to learn the answers to these questions, I
have convinced the editors of the Nova Law Review to schedule a
symposium issue on the ULTA. We would like the people with the
information to share it with us and the legal community. Contributions
could be in the form of traditional law review articles or could be in the
form of reminiscences, essays or whatever.
The editors need to plan, so please let me know no later than September
15, 1995 if you would like to participate. You may contact me by E-
mail, fax, letter or telephone at the numbers listed below.
If you would like to discuss the possibility before making a commitment,
feel free to call me.
Please share this information with your colleagues. If you know someone
who is not on this list who was involved with the ULTA (or ULSIA) at
some stage, e.g., drafting or legislative consideration, please alert them of
this project.
Thanks,
Ronald Benton Brown
Professor of Law
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center
3305 College Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
tel: 305-452-6165; fax: 305-452-6227; Internet: brownr@law-lib.law.no-
va.edu
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Letter to the Editor
James M. Pedowiti
September 1, 1995
Professor Ronald Benton Brown
Nova Southeastern University
3305 College Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
Dear Professor Brown:
I read your letter of August 14, 1995 with extreme interest. As you
may already know, at various times I acted as an advisor to the Commis-
sioners on behalf of the American Land Title Association and later on behalf
of the Real Property Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar
Association. In addition, I was an original member of the Joint Editorial
Board and remained active thereon until a couple of years ago.
I am fairly sure that all or almost all of the people that you may
intereview or hear from who actually worked on the promulgation of these
Acts will assure you that they are both excellent products and worthy of
uniform adoption. You may have some dissent with respect to portions of
the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA") on the ground that it was
patterned too closely to the Uniform Commercial Code and that it did not
sufficiently appreciate the differences between real and personal property.
As you probably already know, the original Uniform Land Transactions
Act encompassed not only what was ultimately adopted under that name but
also the provisions that subsequently were spun off into the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transactions Act ("USLTA"), the Uniform Condo-
minium Act, the Uniform Common Interests Ownership Act, the Uniform
Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"), the Uniform Construction Lien Act
and the Uniform Marketable Title Act.
* Of counsel, Berkman, Henoch, Peterson & Peddy, P.C., New York, New York. B.A.,
1935, New York University, J.D., 1938, New York University School of Law.
Mr. Pedowitz was a Board member of the Joint Ediotrial Board for the Uniform Land
Transactions Act/Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act. He has also acted as an
advisor to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on behalf of
the American Land Title Association and the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section of
the American Bar Association.
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In my opinion, both from working with the American Bar Association
and the New York State Bar Association, the basic underlying resistance to
ULTA and USLTA was that it made academic and practical sense but was
not conceived by the Bar and other interest groups as being in their
economic best interests.
Except for the Condominium Act, which found favor mainly because
there was an urgent need for some guidance in this new and burgeoning
field, those attorneys who practice real estate law, either as their primary
practice, or as incidental to their other practice, were reluctant to discard the
"old shoe" of their current practice and knowledge and undertake the
learning of new terminology and new concepts, notwithstanding that they
were better. As an example, when attorneys who specialize in mortgage
foreclosure in New York State were approached with respect to ULSIA, the
typical response was that they were far less interested in improving the
antiquated process than their concern about what it might do to their income
stream under the existing procedures.
Real estate law is single-stat oriented. Each of the states and local bar
groups are jealously protective about their own forms, procedures and
customs. The Bar, with very few notable exceptions, has been far less
interested in reform and improvement than in the effect of those changes on
their income.
Perhaps the best answers could be obtained from the various Commis-
sioners who failed to arrange for the introduction of any of this legislation
into their state legislatures. Many of them may tell you that they did not
vote for many of these uniform Acts, and if my recollection serves me
correctly, some of them passed by only narrow majorities. The plain fact
seems to be that no matter how worthwhile this legislation, there never was
a groundswell of support for it, nor a generally recognized need for it. Both
the Bar and the business community seem to be content to leave well
enough alone.
In retrospect, I have no regret with respect to all of the time and work
that I put into working on and supporting these acts. If our various state
legislatures and those interests that influence them could be convinced to set
aside their parochial prejudices and the self-interests of certain groups, the
widespread adoption of these Acts would ultimately be proved to be of
tremendous benefit to a 21st century economy.
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At my stage in life, I am disinclined to sit down and attempt to write
a more comprehensive analysis of why these Acts were not adopted. You
will certainly find literature both in support of these Acts, and critical of
them. Many of the critical comments were certainly made in good faith and
out of sincere conviction. However, I remain of the opinion that most of the
reasons for the failure to adopt these Acts is a combination of natural inertia,
and what the various bar groups conceived as their individual self-interest.
You have my permission to utilize this letter as part of your sympo-
sium.
Very truly yours,
James M. Pedowitz
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The Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act Twenty Years Later:
Why Have There Been No Adoptions?
Richard B. Amandes"
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") has been in existence since 1892. It has drafted more than
200 uniform laws during that period.2 Some are major in scope, the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") being the outstanding example. Others
cover almost infinitesimal, and many would say inconsequential, areas of the
law. Some achieve a significant number of adoptions; others obtain none.
The uniform laws that are expected to have a broad scope and impact tend
to have a larger number of commissioners and staff appointed for their
development and ultimate promulgation by the NCCUSL than is true for
subject matter of more limited scope or prospective interest.
All states are entitled to have at least three commissioners, and larger
states are entitled to more. Each state must fund its own commissioners at
whatever level it deems appropriate. Commissioners usually are appointed
by state governors. Governors vary in their zeal in obtaining and appointing
the most competent, diligent, and politically effective commissioners. The
funding available for commissioners must be appropriated by state
legislatures, and the sums and rates of support vary greatly from state to
state. Understandably, states with long term, strong, well funded commis-
sioners tend to adopt more uniform laws than do states without such
individuals. Clearly, states vary in the degree to which they believe in the
uniform laws process.
Inherent in the variances alluded to in the opening paragraphs is the
fact that personalities and politics play a significant part in whether and to
what degree uniform acts, like any other legislation, is enacted. Advocates
are at least as necessary for uniform acts as for legislation which is
developed within each state. The likelihood of finding strong advocates for
* Mr. Amandes is currently in private practice concentrating in the areas of estate
planning, probate, and real estate law in Visalia, California. A.B., 1950, University of
California (Berkeley); J.D., 1953, University of California Hastings College of Law; LL.M.,
1956, New York University School of Law.
Mr. Amandes was the Educational Director for the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Land Transactions Act/Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act.
1. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NNETY-EIGHTH
YEAR at 395 (1989) (July 28-Aug. 4 1989 meetings).
2. Id.
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any uniform act in a large number of states is small, unless the subject
matter of the uniform act has significant impact across state lines.
The UCC was such an act. It encompassed the entire field of transac-
tions involving movable property. The development of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act ("ULTA"), before and after parts of it were split off into
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"), was
conceptualized as the equivalent for immovable property. Both the UCC
and the ULTA/USLTA went through numerous drafts and many years as
they made their way through the legislative process within the NCCUSL.
The UCC has been adopted in all fifty states to some degree, in one form
or another. Uniform acts do not necessarily remain in their original
form-they are revised and amended, just as is other legislation.
Although the UCC now has at least partial adoption in all fifty states
(Louisiana was the last state to adopt parts of it, in four steps between 1974
and 1988), its early years were not encouraging. Promulgated by the
NCCUSL in 1951, it was first adopted by Pennsylvania in 1953, effective
in 1954.2 The New York Law Revision Commission declined to propose
it in 1956,' a stop that was then said to be the death knell of the UCC.
However, Massachusetts came aboard in 1957, Kentucky in 1958, Connecti-
cut and New Hampshire in 1959. By 1967 when Arizona and Idaho
adopted the UCC, every state but Louisiana had adopted it.
Although it took several years for the UCC to take hold, what is there
in its background that enabled it to become a truly uniform law that has
eluded ULTA and USLTA? One need look no further than the predecessors
of the UCC. The Negotiable Instruments Law ("NIL"), the Bulk Sales Act
and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, containing substantial areas of
law of what later were included in the UCC, had been adopted in every state
and some territories for many years.5 Other acts, uniform or common,
whose areas were included within the UCC, also had been enacted in more
than thirty states. Thus the concept of the UCC was not wholly new. It is
merely an updated and revised version of uniform and common law and
principles with which those who operated in the commercial community
were familiar and comfortable.
3. GENERAL COMMENT OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, reprinted in 1 U.L.A. at xv (1989).
4. WILLIAM A. SCHADER ET AL., REPORT No. 1 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, reprinted in 1 U.L.A. at xxxvii (1989).
5. See ROBERT BAUCHER & ARTHUR SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS at x-xi
(1968).
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Such a commonality did not exist in the area of real property or
immovable property. There was no common body of similar uniform laws
with which those who dealt in the area were familiar. True, there was the
essentially uniform secondary security market, but there also were communi-
ty as distinct from common law property; mortgages vis a vis deeds of trust;
title insurance and abstracters; and even significant parts of the law going
back to feudal times. There were many vested interests who did not wish
to see change.
At the law school level, there were individuals who were interested in
the implementation of ULTA and USLTA,6 but they were relatively few
and far between. Professors did attend panel discussions on ULTA and
USLTA at annual and regional meetings of the Association of American law
Schools, but impetus from the law schools also requires student support.
Real property does not rank high on the interest level of most law students.
Of course, commercial law does not either, but the UCC did have the
impetus of the NIL and the Uniform Sales Act to get it by without
significant law faculty and student assistance. Students and faculty can get
much more excited about constitutional law, criminal law and procedure,
and race or sex discrimination.
As suggested earlier, the uniform act process, just like any other
legislation, is political. The brief thoughts and beliefs presented here were
multiplied many times over, by objections from vested interests in each
state, when ULTA and USLTA were tendered by the various commissioners
to their respective legislatures for consideration and adoption. The necessary
support groups have not been present to overcome the objections and
achieve any adoptions.
6. See Barbara J. Britzke, Residential Real Estate Transactions: Comparison of Uniform
Land Transactions Act and Maryland Law, 13 U. BALT. L. REv. 43 (1983); Jon W. Bruce,
Overview of Uniform Land Transactions Act and Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers
Act, 10 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1980).
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Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts
Failed
Marion W. Benfield, Jr.*
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years from 1969 to 1978 the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ("Conference") engaged in a massive project,
the drafting of uniform laws covering the selling of, and creation of security
interests in, real estate, and most of the public record and priority aspects of
real estate conveyancing. The initial result of that project was three acts:
* Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
A.B., 1953, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; LL.B., 1959, Wake Forest University;
LL.M., 1965, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Professor Benfield was Commissioner
from Illinois to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws from
1973-1990 and from North Carolina since 1990. He was also co-reporter for the Uniform
Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act 1970-1977.
The author thanks Normak Klick, Jr., who provided research assistance for the article.
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the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA"),' the Uniform Simplification
of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"), 2 and the Uniform Condominium Act
("UCA"). 3 The ULTA covers sales and the creation of security interests.
The USLTA covers various aspects of the conveyancing system including
formal requisites for land transfers, recording and priority rules, marketable
title, mechanics liens, and provisions concerning the operation of the
recording office. Later, in the face of massive indifference of legislatures
to the ULTA and the USLTA, the Conference separated from the ULTA the
part on security interests and promulgated it, with some changes, as the
Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"), 4 and separated from
USLTA the mechanics lien provisions as the Uniform Construction Lien
Act,5 and the provisions on marketable title as the Uniform Marketable Title
Act.6 The Uniform Condominium Act project led to three other related
acts: the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act, 7 the Uniform Planned
Community Act,8 and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.9
After promulgation of the three original acts, the Conference and the
American Bar Association established the Joint Editorial Board for the
Uniform Real Property Acts ("Board"). The Board is now composed of
members from the Conference, the American Bar Association, and the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers. The Board was largely
responsible for the promulgation of Article 3 of the ULTA as the Uniform
Land Security Interest Act and of Article 5 of the USLTA as the Uniform
Construction Lien Act ("UCLA"). 0 With the exception of the UCLA and
related acts which have been adopted in a total of fourteen states,' the
1. 13 U.L.A. 469 (1975) (amended 1977).
2. 14 U.L.A. 249 (1975) (amended 1977).
3. 7 U.L.A. 421 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
4. 7A U.L.A. 220 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
5. 7 U.L.A. 330 (1987 & Supp. 1995).
6. 13 U.L.A. 112 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
7. 7B U.L.A. 225 (1981).
8. 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980).
9. 7 U.L.A. 231 (1982) (current version at 7 U.L.A. 171 (1994 & Supp. 1995)).
10. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1995-96 REFERENCE BOOK [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]
(naming current members of the Joint Editorial Board).
11. These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 35-8A-101 to -417 (1990); Arizona,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1270 (1985); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 33,
§§ 47-200 to -293 (1983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1601-101 to 1604-118
(West 1981); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 515A.1-101 to .4-117 (1980); Missouri, MO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 448.1-101 to .4-120 (Vernon 1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 §§ 47-
7A-1 to -7D-20 (Michie 1982); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120
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other land acts have had only one adoption, Article 5 of the USLTA
(Construction Lien Act), in Nebraska," and little legislative activity in the
other states. 3
During the years from 1970 to 1975, the participants in the process
spent a collective total of tens of thousands of hours drafting, re-drafting,
reading, and debating the acts. The result was one enactment of one spin-
off act. If the hours spent on the project had been billed at lawyers' average
hourly rates, they would have cost, no doubt, millions of dollars. That
extensive effort made a tiny impact on the law in this country. Since the
author was a major participant in the process and a disproportionate number
of those hours were his, it is with particular pain that he recalls those
"wasted days and wasted nights."
This article will review the background and drafting of the uniform
land acts, summarize briefly the major provisions of the ULTA and the
USLTA, and discuss the reasons for the failure of those acts, and the
separately promulgated Uniform Land Security Interest Act and Uniform
Construction Lien Act, to receive legislative acceptance. 14
II. BACKGROUND
The Conference was organized in 1892 and is composed of commis-
sioners from all the states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District
of Columbia. The commissioners are appointed by the governor or other
officials of the jurisdiction, the number of which are left to the appointing
(1986); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101-3414 (1980); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 34-36.1-1.01 to -4.20 (1982); Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.164 (West 1993);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to .103 (Michie 1974); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 64.34.010 to .950 (1989).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-125ff (1984). Nebraska adopted Article 5 of the USLTA
before the separate promulgation of Article 5 as the Uniform Construction Lien Act.
13. In the early 1990s the Connecticut Law Revision Commission attempted to achieve
a consensus among borrowers and lenders regarding modifications to the Uniform Land
Security Interest Act which would make it acceptable in that state. The effort failed because
of inability of lenders to agree among themselves. Interview with William Breetz, Chair of
the Connecticut Law Revision Commission, in San Antonio, Tex. (July 12, 1993). There
have also been Bar Association study committees in Illinois, New York, Minnesota, and
Oregon studying the possibility of introducing a form of the ULSIA in their states. See
Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 30
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289, 314-17 (1995) (discussing the efforts in Illinois, Minnesota,
and New York).
14. This article will not further discuss the Uniform Condominium and related acts.
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jurisdiction. Currently, the Conference has over 300 members. 5  The
stated purpose of the Conference is to "promote uniformity in the law
among the several States on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and
practicable."' 6 The Conference strives for that goal through the drafting
of uniform or model acts which are then offered to the states for adop-
tion. 7 Since 1892, the Conference has drafted hundreds of uniform or
model acts, many of which have received widespread adoptions. 8
However, many other acts have had few or no adoptions. 9 Acts in the
areas of commercial law, judicial procedure, and interstate cooperation have
had the most success. The first product of the Conference, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, promulgated by the Conference in 1896, just
four years after the Conference was founded, was adopted in all states.2"
The Uniform Sales Act, promulgated in 1906, was adopted in thirty-two
states.2' The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), first promulgated in
1951 (but amended a number of times), has now been adopted in all states
and the District of Columbia. The Uniform Arbitration Act has been
adopted in forty-nine jurisdictions, the Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in
fifty-two jurisdictions, and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in
forty-seven jurisdictions. There are other procedural acts with similar
records.22 On the other hand, the Conference has been least successful
15. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 6-20 (listing of present commission-
ers).
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 82. An act is designated as a "uniform act" if achievement of uniformity
among the states is a principal objective and there is reason to expect adoption in a large
number of jurisdictions. An act is designated as a "model" act if uniformity is not a
principal objective, or the act may promote uniformity and minimize diversity even though
a substantial number of jurisdictions may not adopt the act in its entirety, or the purpose of
the act can be achieved, though it is not adopted in its entirety by every state. That is, the
Conference designates acts as uniform acts only if it believes that a substantial number of
states will adopt the act. However, many uniform acts have few adoptions. The reference
table of uniform acts in the 1995-96 version of the National Conference indicates that 43
uniform acts have been adopted in fewer than 10 jurisdictions, and that 10 acts have no
adoptions. Id. at 84-88.
18. l (listing all current uniform acts and states in which they have been adopted).
19. Twenty acts promulgated more than three years ago have been adopted in three or
less states, including several which have no adoptions. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note
10, at 84-88.
20. See WILLIAM E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 10-11 (2d
ed. 1961).
21. See LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 6 n.33 (2d ed. 1959).
22. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 84-90 (listing all acts which the
conference is still sponsoring and the states in which they are adopted).
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when it proposes uniform legislation dealing with issues which are the
subject of intense public debate and disagreement or involve strong lobbying
by opposing interests. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Ace 3 for
example, was adopted in only eight states, and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code24 in only eleven.
IH. DECISION TO DRAFT A PARTICULAR STATUTE
The Conference process for approving drafting projects is careful and
thorough. Proposed drafting projects must be approved by two committees,
the Scope and Program Committee, and the Executive Committee. Under
the Conference rules, the Scope and Program Committee first considers
proposals for drafting projects. If it approves, the proposal is then presented
to the Executive Committee. Some drafting projects approved by the Scope
and Program Committee are rejected by the Executive Committee, either
because the Executive Committee disagrees with the Scope and Program
Committee evaluation of the proposal, or because the Conference has other
more pressing projects. 25 The committees act on proposals made either by
members of the Conference, or by groups or persons outside the Conference.
A substantial number of proposals made to the two committees are rejected.
A major criterion in deciding whether projects should be undertaken is the
likelihood that the resulting uniform law will be widely adopted.26
However, as the above review of the acceptance of conference acts indicates,
the Conference has drafted and promulgated a significant number of acts
which would not have been approved by the Scope and Program and
Executive Committees had they known the actual degree of acceptance the
acts would receive.
If a drafting project is approved, a drafting committee and a reporter
are appointed for the act. Sometimes two or three reporters (usually law
professors) serve as drafters for a drafting committee. Under Conference
procedure, the reporters to a committee prepare drafts which are thoroughly
discussed and criticized at committee meetings. The reporters then follow
the instructions of the committee in preparing additional drafts. All
members of the drafting committee must be members of the Conference.
However, the Conference makes intensive efforts to secure input from
23. 9A U.L.A. 147 (1970) (amended 1971 & 1973).
24. 7A U.L.A. 1 (1968) (amended 1974).
25. The author has personal knowledge from having been a member of both committees
in recent years.
26. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 80.
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interested groups outside the Conference. A drafting committee with seven
or so committee members will often have thirty or more observers and
advisors attending a committee meeting. Those advisors and observers will
have privileges of the floor, and often they are asked to vote on issues
before the committee, so that the committee can be advised as to the views
of those in attendance. Committees will typically meet three times a year,
for two and a half day meetings, for two or more years, before an act is
finally approved. Also, all acts have to be read line by line at two annual
meetings of the Conference before they are approved. At those readings
there is often intense debate on the floor regarding various provisions of the
act and, frequently, committee positions are rejected by the full Conference.
A. Beginning of the Land Acts Process
In the late 1960s, Allison Dunham, Professor of Law at the University
of Chicago and Executive Director of the Conference from 1963 to 1969,
proposed that the Conference undertake the drafting of a uniform land
transactions act. The Conference was celebrating its crowning achievement
and greatest success, the UCC, which by then had been adopted in fifty
jurisdictions," with only Louisiana not in the fold.28 Professor Dunham
had been, along with Grant Gilmore, the drafter of Article 9, the most
imaginative and ground-breaking article of the UCC. Professor Dunham had
for many years taught real property and mortgages courses and was author
of a casebook, Modern Real Estate Transactions.29 His dual experience as
drafter of Article 9 of the Code, and expertise in real estate transactions, led
him to believe that a national uniform law governing real estate transactions
in the way that the UCC governs sales of, and security interests in, personal
property, would encourage a national mortgage market, better protect buyers
and sellers of real estate, and modernize the law of real estate transactions.
He also believed that the UCC was a good model for a uniform law
governing real estate transactions.
In 1969, the Scope and Program and Executive Committees of the
Conference approved a proposal by Professor Dunham that a drafting
committee be appointed to prepare the Uniform Land Transactions Act.3"
27. See id.
28. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCC. See I U.L.A.
1 (1989) (table of enactments).
29. ALLISON DUNHAM, MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 1958).
30. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469.
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Approval was given even though the Conference had attempted earlier to
secure adoption of legislation in the real estate area without success. In the
1920s, 30s, and 40s, acts proposed by the Conference in the real property
area had met with dismal success (or lack thereof). In 1927, the Conference
proposed a Uniform Real Estate Mortgages Act which received no
adoptions.31 The Conference was so desperate to show action in the real
estate area that in the 1930s it listed Minnesota as adopting the Real Estate
Mortgages Act, though Minnesota in fact adopted only one of the forty-three
sections of the Act.32 The section Minnesota adopted set out a statutory
short-form mortgage.33 In 1932, a Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act was
proposed" and was adopted in Florida.35 Florida amended the Uniform
Act in 1953 so extensively that it was, in effect, replaced.36 Finally, in
1940, the Conference proposed a Model Power of Sale Foreclosure Act
which apparently had no adoptions.37 The Real Estate Mortgage Act and
the Mechanics' Lien Act were withdrawn by the Conference in 1943.3
History certainly suggested danger ahead regarding the proposed land acts,
but there was a belief that the continuing integration of the national
economy would make things different this time.
B. The Drafting Process
In 1969, the ULTA special drafting committee was appointed39 and the
following year drafting commenced. Professor Dunham, who initially
31. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 459 (1927).
32. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 66 (1943) [hereinafter 1943 NATIONAL CONFERENCE].
33. Id
34. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 50 (1932).
35. Id.
36. See Myron H. Lewis, The Recent 1953 Amendments to the Uniform Mechanics' Lien
Act, FLA. B.J., March 1954, at 99.
37. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 256 (1940).
38. 1943 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 32, at 68-69.
39. The members of the original committee include: Harold E. Read, chair, Robert
Braucher, professor of law at Harvard Law School, William Campbell, United States District
Court Judge, and attorneys Henry S. Fraser, John F. Hanson, George C. Keely, Ellsworth E.
Lonabaugh, Talbot Rain, Hiroshi Sakai, and William H. Wood.
1996] 1043
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
served as reporter, recruited the present author as co-reporter.40 As is usual
Conference practice, a large group of advisors representing various industry
groups and consumer representatives were appointed and asked to meet with
the committee.41
The reporters commenced work by using Articles 1, 2 and 9 of the
UCC as a template within which to fit cognate real estate rules. The basic
assumption of the drafters was that the UCC rules should be adopted unless
the difference between real estate and personal property required a different
rule.
In the years from 1970 to 1975, many draft versions of the Act were
prepared and reviewed by the drafting committee. The representatives of
industry and consumer groups were invited to, and attended, Committee
meetings, and offered their comments and suggestions as the drafting
proceeded. The following groups were represented: the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the American
Bankers Association, the Center for Responsive Law (a consumer group),
the National Association of Home Builders, the American Land Title
Association, the American Life Convention, the United States Savings and
Loan League, the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, the
American Subcontractor's Association, and the Life Insurance Association
of American. Representatives from the following federal agencies and
instrumentalities also attended committee meetings: Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the
40. Professor Dunham wanted a co-reporter who had Commercial Code experience and
some real estate experience. I had been teaching the Code courses at the University of Illinois
and had also taught the first year property course.
41. These representatives include: Charles Allen (Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.), Alan
L. Austin (Am. Life Convention), Ira L. Burleson (Life Ins. Ass'n of Am.), Thomas Hal
Clarke (Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.), George H. Coffin, III (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.),
A. S. Coan, Jr. (Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States), Herbert S. Colton (Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States), Robert Elliot (Dep't of Hous. and Urban
Dev.), Joseph F. Fahey, Jr. (Am. Bankers Ass'n), Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. (Am. Bar Ass'n),
Raymond A. Jensen (Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am.), Oliver H. Jones (Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n of Am.), Robert Kratovil (Am. Land Title Ass'n), David Krooth, Fairfax Leary (Ctr.
for Responsive Law, Public Interest Research Grp.), George Lefcoe, C. Malcolm Moss (Am.
Life Convention), William D. North (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.), James Pedowitz (Am.
Land Title Ass'n), William Prather (The United States Sav. and Loan League), Robert
Newton Reid (Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n), P. James Riordan (Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Sav.
Banks), Dan Sheehan (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.), John A. Spanagole, Jr. (Ctr. for
Responsive Law, Pub. Research Grp.), John M. Steinmuller (Life Ins. Ass'n of Am.),
McNeill Stokes (Am. Subcontractors Ass'n), Earl Talbot (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.),
Hobart Taylor, Jr., Louis R. Vicenti, and Adolph Zwerner.
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Federal National Mortgage Association.42 As the list of groups suggests,
essentially all relevant perspectives on the law of land transfer and finance
were represented.
It is fair to say that, with the exception of mortgage lenders, federal
agencies included in mortgage lending, and a small number of other
individual advisors, the attitude of the advisors was one of wary caution.
Some were opposed to a uniform law in the area and others were skeptical
of either the need for such an act, or of the willingness of states to accept
it, or both. All, however, wanted to keep an eye on the project to protect
what they perceived as their interests in case the Act was adopted in the
states.
C. The Content of the Acts
1. Article 2 of the ULTA
As noted above, the ULTA was patterned after Articles 2 and 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore, many provisions of the Code were
carried over to the ULTA without change. For example, section 2-202 of
the UCC on the parol evidence rule appeared in the ULTA nearly verbatim
as section 1-306. Section 2-209 of the UCC on contract modification
appeared essentially unchanged as section 1-310 of the ULTA. Other
concepts of the Code such as the right to cure (section 2-508), and the right
to demand assurances (section 2-609), were carried over to the ULTA and
modified to fit land transactions.43 The ULTA, anticipating the later
adoption of Article 2A of the UCC to cover personal property leases,
included leases within the coverage of Article 2 of the ULTA. 4 The Act
also contained express and implied warranty of quality provisions modeled
on those contained in Article 2.15 Under section 2-309:
a seller, other than a lessor in the business of selling real estate,
impliedly warrants that the real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses
of real estate of its type and that any improvements made or contracted
for by [the seller] ... and completed no earlier than 2 years before..
• [the sale of] the contract to convey is made, will be free from
42. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469.
43. U.L.T.A. §§ 2-305, -403, 13 U.L.A. at 543.
44. Id. art. 2, 13 U.L.A. at 680. In the Act, "real estate" is defined as including the
interest of a landlord or tenant, and Article 2 of the ULTA applies to contracts to convey real
estate. Therefore, leases are contracts to convey real estate under the Act. Id.
45. IaM §§ 2-308, -309, -311, -312, 13 U.L.A. at 531-39.
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defective materials; and [is] constructed in accordance with applicable
law, according to sound engineering and construction standards;-and in
a workmanlike manner/ 6
Warranty disclaimers are permitted under rules similar to those of
section 2-316 of the UCC, but with respect to home purchasers (called a
"protected party"):47
no disclaimer of implied warranties of quality in general language or in
the language of the warranty provided in this Act is effective, but a
seller may disclaim liability for a specific defect or failure to comply
with applicable law if the defect or failure entered into and became a
part of the basis of the bargain.48
Under the Act, warranties of quality automatically pass to subsequent
purchasers and disclaimers of warranties are not effective against subsequent
protected party purchasers unless the subsequent party had reason to know
of the disclaimer at the time of purchase. 49 These warranty provisions are
no doubt the most important substantive provisions of Article 2. However,
the warranty provisions were only a little different from the implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes being developed by the
courts during the 1960s and 70s.
In addition to the warranty provisions, Article 2 makes several
significant changes in the remedies rules as they exist in most states. First,
under the ULTA, if a buyer wrongfully rejects, repudiates, or otherwise
materially breaches, so that a seller is excused from conveying to a buyer,
the buyer can recover as damages the difference between the resale price
and the original contract price, if the seller conducts a resale which complies
with the statutory requirements.5 1 However, under the common law in
46. Id. § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. at 533.
47. The definition of protected party is somewhat complex; the term includes those who
buy for close relatives and corporations that buy residences for controlling shareholders, but
excludes real estate of more than three acres, or real estate which contains more than four
dwelling units, or which contains non-residential units for which the protected party is a
lessor. U.L.T.A. § 1-203, 13 U.L.A. at 490-92.
48. Id. § 2-311(c), 13 U.L.A. at 536.
49. Id. § 2-312(c), 13 U.L.A. at 538. The subsection further provides that the
subsequent purchaser has reason to know of a disclaimer if it appears in the recorded deed
in the original transaction.
50. E.F. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did
It, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 835 (1967).
51. U.L.T.A. § 2-504, 13 U.L.A. at 552.
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most states, a seller's remedy for buyer's breach is a recovery of the
difference between the contract price and the market price, and the actual
resale price is only evidence of the market price. 2 Second, under the law
in many states "earnest money" deposits made by a buyer can, on breach by
the buyer, be retained by the seller without proof of actual damages or a
valid liquidated damages clause. Under the Act, such amounts must be
returned to the breaching buyer unless they can be retained under a valid
liquidated damages clause or the seller proves actual damages. 3 Third, the
Act rejects the merger by deed doctrine under which a buyer who accepts
a deed of conveyance is treated as having waived any rights he had under
the contract of conveyance if they are not repeated in the deed.' Under
the merger by deed doctrine, if, for example, a seller promised to convey
fifty acres and the buyer accepted a deed conveying only forty, the buyer
would be precluded from asserting a breach based on the shortage in
acreage." Fourth, an unconscionability section, similar to section 2-301
of the UCC, is included. 6
The Act also liberalized the requirements for enforcing contracts with
incomplete terms by providing that a contract of sale could be enforced even
though the price was not fixed, or other terms were missing, so long as the
court could provide an appropriate remedy." The Act also contains a
modem statute of frauds which provides a new start for judicial interpreta-
tion, replacing the 300 year accretion of cases and qualifying rules under the
original real estate statute of frauds in effect in most states.5 ' There are
also other, more modest changes, from the usual common law rules. 9
52. See Zareas v. Smith, 404 A.2d 599 (N.H. 1979).
53. U.L.T.A. § 2-516, 13 U.L.A. at 565.
54. Id. § 1-309, 13 U.L.A. at 500.
55. See Weiland v. Bernstein, 192 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1959) (applying the merger by deed
rule in a shortage in acreage situation), rev'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 1961); see also
McSweyn v. Mussellshell County, 632 P.2d 1095 (Mont. 1981) (applying the merger by deed
doctrine over a dissent which argued that the rule of ULTA should be adopted).
56. U.L.T.A. § 1-311, 13 U.L.A. at 502.
57. 1l §§ 2-202, -203, 13 U.L.A. at 514-16.
58. kL § 2-201, 13 U.L.A. at 512; see ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 355-
433 (1952) (devoting 98 pages to a discussion of the original real estate statute of frauds).
The original English statute of frauds was adopted in 1677 and all states except Louisiana,
Maryland, and New Mexico have adopted a statute similar to the English statute. Maryland
and New Mexico have treated the English statute as a part of their common law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS 281-83 statutory notes (1977).
59. For example, under § 2-302, form contract provisions reading "time is of the
essence" are not sufficient to effectively provide that failure to perform on the specified day
is a material breach.
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2. Article 3 of the ULTA and ULSIA
Article 3 of the ULTA (and the ULSIA) is patterned after Article 9 of
the UCC. Because of major differences in the issues which arise in
personal property security and in real estate security, there is much less
congruence between the ULSIA sections and those of Article 9 of the UCC,
than there is between UCC Article 2 and ULTA Article 2. However, the
ULSIA adopts the basic terminology of Article 9 of the UCC. The single
term "security agreement" replaces "mortgage," "deed of trust," "contract for
deed," "installment land contract," and other terms for land security devices
in use in various states.6" Also, following Article 9 of the UCC, the
ULSIA applies the same rules to all forms of land security interests.
Therefore, there is no difference in the Act between the rights of the parties
under a mortgage and their rights under an installment land contract or deed
of trust.62 The Act's major changes from existing law are found in the
foreclosure rules.6' However, there were a few significant changes in other
areas, some pro-mortgagee and some pro-mortgagor. One pro-mortgagor
provision allows a mortgagor, after granting the security interest, to enter
into leases which take priority over the mortgage, if the term is not longer
than two years, and a reasonable rent is reserved and is paid quarterly or
more often.64 A pro-mortgagee provision gives the mortgagee a security
interest in: 1) rights which the mortgagor has against a seller for breach of
warranty or other breach; 2) any claim of the mortgagor for payment for
parts of the real estate taken by eminent domain; 3) insurance payable to the
mortgagor because of loss or damage to the real estate; and 4) any claim of
the mortgagor against third parties because of loss or damage to the real
estate.65 ULSIA also contains a provision which clarifies the law regarding
the priority of future advances over intervening parties.66 It repeals any
existing usury statute which applies to commercial loans secured by real
estate, but allows states to set usury rate for consumer transactions. 67
60. As noted earlier, in 1985 the Conference carved out Article 3 of the ULTA as a free
standing act, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"). In the following
discussion, citations will be to the ULSIA and, where there is a difference between ULTA
and ULSIA, the substantive provision referred to will be that of ULSIA.
61. U.L.S.I.A. § 111 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 220, 232 (Supp. 1995).
62. IM § 102(b).
63. See discussion infra accompanying notes 67-75 and 114-121.
64. U.L.S.I.A. § 207, 7A U.L.A. at 24.
65. Id. § 210, 7A U.L.A. at 243.
66. Id § 301, 7A U.L.A. at 245.
67. Id. § 403 alt. B, 7A U.L.A. at 249.
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By far the most important provisions of the ULSIA are those permitting
a mortgagee (secured party) to foreclose a mortgage (security interest) by
non-judicial sale.6" At the time the ULTA was being drafted, about half
the states permitted non-judicial power of sale foreclosure.69 All those
power of sale states contained a statutorily prescribed method of sale which
typically required an auction sale at some specified place, often the county
courthouse, after a prescribed series of auction announcements in the legal
advertisement section of a local newspaper." The remaining jurisdictions
required a judicial action to foreclose.7 Of the twenty-seven states which
used non-judicial power of sale foreclosure, nine permitted the mortgagee
to redeem after the sale, within periods ranging from seventy-five days to
two years." The ULSIA, as noted, permits private power of sale foreclo-
sure, but under rules very different from those that apply under the power
of sale statutes of most states. The ULSIA, does not set out in detail how
the sale is to be conducted, but, following Article 9, requires only that the
sale be held in a reasonable manner.73 The ULSIA comments say that for
a sale to be made in a reasonable manner, the foreclosing party must to
advertise in the same manner that a seller selling his own property would
advertise.74 The Act also permits sale by private negotiation, which could
include listing the property for sale through a real estate agent. Also, the
ULSIA does not permit redemption after sale.75 The ULSIA denies a
deficiency judgment after foreclosure of purchase money security interests
in homes occupied by the debtor or persons related to the debtor.76
68. Il §§ 505-508, 7A U.L.A. at 255-60.
69. A committee of the section on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association reported in 1968 that in 27 jurisdictions power of sale was the
usual method of foreclosure. In Maine, the foreclosure method was described as "public
notice" but it seems to have been a non-judicial procedure. See Committee on Mortgage
Law and Practice, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 413, 414 (1968). [hereinafter Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice].
70. GEORGE OSBORNE ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.19-.21 (1978).
71. See Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, supra note 69, at 414.
72. d
73. U.L.S.I.A. § 509(a), 7A U.L.A. at 261. The UCC requires that the sale be
"commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-504. The ULSIA requires only that the sale be
"reasonable." The drafters concluded that the addition of the word "commercially" in the
context of real estate was not helpful.
74. U.L.S.I.A. § 509 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. at 261.
75. U.L.S.I.A. § 513 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. at 266.
76. Id § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. at 264; see Id. §§ 111(18), 113-114, 7A U.L.A. at 231, 235-
36 (stating the precise transactions in which the anti-deficiency rule applies).
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The ULSIA provisions on foreclosure are based on the assumption that
it is beneficial to both the creditor and the debtor that foreclosure sales be
efficient, inexpensive, and handled in a manner that is likely to produce as
high a sales price as possible. Judicial foreclosure is expensive and is likely
to result in substantial delay. Power of sale foreclosure, with an auction sale
at the courthouse after advertisement in the legal notices section of a local
newspaper, is not conducive to creating the degree of prospective buyer
interest which a person selling her own land would wish to generate.
Giving the debtor a right to redeem the property for some period after the
foreclosure sale surely depresses the price which a buyer would be willing
to pay since possession and use must be effectively delayed until the end of
the redemption period. The ULSIA drafters believed that the Act's power
of sale provisions would minimize the cost of foreclosure and maximize the
price received.77
Foreclosure procedures which delay the time of foreclosure and periods
of redemption after the sale during which the defaulting mortgagor can
redeem the property (retain possession) are clearly advantageous to
mortgagors who default. In a partial trade-off for taking away from home
mortgagees the advantages of longer foreclosure periods and right of
redemption, the ULSIA denies deficiency judgments to home mortgagees in
the case of purchase money mortgages.78
77. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 470-71.
78. U.L.S.I.A. § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. at 264. Deficiencies are available for foreclosure
of non-purchase money mortgages because lenders may be willing to lend sums in excess of
the value of mortgaged property and there was no wish to discourage that practice.
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3. The USLTA79
The USLTA brings together in a single statute a number of provisions
relating to the land transfer system: priorities,"0 liens against land includ-
ing mechanics' liens,81 recording, 2 lis pendens notice, 3 formal require-
ments for deeds,84 marketable title, 5 and land records.8 6 Other than the
mechanics' lien provisions, there is little in the USLTA that is controversial.
The mechanics' lien article, called Construction Liens in the ULSIA,
is a detailed, relatively complete coverage of liens against real estate on
behalf of persons whose labor or materials go into improvements on real
estate. All states have mechanics lien statutes under which contractors,
subcontractors, and materialmen, even those who did not contract directly
with the owner of the real estate under certain circumstances, have a lien
against the real estate being improved for any part of the price of their work
or materials not paid for by the person with whom they contracted. 7
Under many of those statutes, the priority of the lien dates from commence-
ment of the work, a non-record event.88 Under such systems, a lender or
buyer cannot by a search of the public land records determine whether a
mechanics' lien claim might exist. Also, under many statutes, the lien of an
unpaid subcontractor or materialman attaches to the owner's land even
79. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. 249, 280-90 (1976) (amended 1977). This very
brief description of the coverage of the USLTA (and the subsequent spin-off, the Uniform
Construction Lien Act) is intended merely to give the reader a basis for understanding the
comments later made regarding the acceptability of the Acts. For fuller discussion of the
substantive provisions of the ULSIA and the UCLA see, among others, the following:
Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The Uniform Construction Lien Act: What, Wither, and Why, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 527 (1992); Peter B. Maggs, Land Records of the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 491; Taylor Mattis, The Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article 2-Conveyancing and Records, 1981 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 511; Note, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, Areas of Departure from
State Law, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 359 (1978); Symposium, The Uniform Land Transactions Act
and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10
STETSON L. REV. 21 (1980).
80. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. at 280-90.
81. Id. art. 4, 5, 14 U.L.A. at 302-63.
82. Id. art. 2, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 270-79.
83. Id. art. 4, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 305-08.
84. Id. art. 2, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. at 266-69.
85. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 290-95.
86. hia art. 6, 14 U.L.A. at 363.
87. See U.C.L.A. prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 330 (Supp. 1995); see also Benfield, supra
note 79, at 527-31.
88. Benfield, supra note 79, at 583 n.102.
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though the owner in good faith, without knowledge of the lien claim, paid
the full price of the improvement to the prime contractor.89 The drafters
of the UCLA concluded that both rules were unfair to owners and third
parties who deal with the land. Therefore, under the UCLA (and Article 5
of ULSIA) an owner is protected to the extent the owner pays the prime
contractor without notice of a lien claim by a subcontractor or material-
man, 90 and the lien claimant's priority against third parties who deal with
the owner dates from the time of a public filing, which indicates that
construction lien claims may exist.9
D. Reasons for Failure of Jurisdictions to Adopt the Land Acts
1. Generally
The drafters assumed that uniformity of land transactions law in the
various states would be beneficial to both parties in real estate transactions,
just as the near universal adoption of the UCC has been beneficial in
personal property transactions. While land does not move, people do, and
mortgage lenders often lend in more than one jurisdiction. Therefore,
uniformity of laws would simplify the operations of persons who have real
estate transactions in various states, and make the law more understandable
for those who move from state to state and buy real property. Further, the
existence of a national secondary mortgage market in which lenders who
generate mortgages can sell them, could make more money available to
finance land, particularly home purchases.92 At the time the ULTA was
being drafted, federal mortgage agencies were supportive of the effort. They
believed that uniformity of law would be beneficial to the further develop-
ment of a national secondary market in mortgages.93 Particularly, it was
believed differences in losses on mortgage foreclosure arising out of
differences in state laws would make underwriting of mortgages in different
89. Id. at 540 n.72.
90. U.C.L.A. § 207 alt. A, 7 U.L.A. at 348. There is a slightly less owner-protective
alternative offered to the states under which a subcontractor or materialman has a lien claim
against the owner for goods or services rendered within 20 days before he notifies the owner.
Id. § 207 alt. B, 7 U.L.A. at 351.
91. Id. § 208(b), 7 U.L.A. at 353.
92. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469; see also U.L.S.I.A. prefatory note,
7A U.L.A. at 220.
93. See James E. Murray, The Proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act, 7 REAL
ESTATE REV. 64 (1977). At the time he wrote the article, Mr. Murray was Senior Vice-
President and General Counsel of the Federal National Mortgage Association.
[Vol. 201052
37
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Benfield
states difficult, and would discourage lenders from lending in states with
unfamiliar foreclosure laws. Similarly, it was believed that secondary
market participants would be discouraged from buying mortgages from
states whose laws were unfamiliar.
9 4
However, after the acts were promulgated, no significant support
appeared for uniformity in land transactions law. Banks and other lenders
apparently did not consider uniformity sufficiently important to urge
adoption of the ULTA, even though the substantive provisions of the ULTA
could hardly have been viewed as harmful to lenders. In fact, nationaliza-
tion of the mortgage market occurred rapidly beginning in the 70s, without
the benefit of uniform real estate law.
Secondary mortgage market activity exploded during this period. From
1970 to 1984, the proportion of all fixed rate residential mortgage loans
sold through the secondary market increased from 32% to 61%. In the
early 1980s less than 5% of all newly originated, conforming conven-
tional fixed rate home mortgage loans were securitized. This proportion
increased to over one-half by 1987.' 5
Therefore, it appears that lack of uniformity is not a substantial
impediment to a national mortgage market. Further, it can be argued,
though this author does not agree, that the differences in economic, social,
and political conditions in the various states are so substantial that uniform
real estate transactions law in all of them would be bad public policy, and
that the costs of non-uniformity are trivial.96
In any event, no ground swell for uniformity developed, though some
lawyers continue to stress uniformity as a value to be achieved through the
adoption of, at least, the ULS]A.9 The following discussion of Article 2
of the ULTA, Article 3 of the ULTA-ULSIA, and of the USLTA-UCLA,
focuses on substantive objections to those acts which, in the eyes of many,
made them unacceptable.
94. See U.L.S.I.A. prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 220.
95. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law
in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261,
1272 (1991) (citations omitted).
96. Michael Schill makes exactly that argument. Id.
97. Geis, supra note 13, at 289.
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2. Article 2 of the ULTA
Many real estate lawyers disagree with a number of the policy choices
made in the Act, including the use of the UCC template for the legislation.
They are reasonably satisfied with existing law, believing that the costs of
learning and applying new law outweigh the benefits to be derived from the
law, and are reasonably satisfied with existing law. Disagreement with
policy choices made in Article 2 of the ULTA is well represented by a
resolution of the Real Property Law Section of the New York Bar Assoc-
iation ("Section") prepared for consideration at a Section meeting on June
19, 1976.98 The resolution proposed that the New York State Bar Associa-
tion vote against approval of ULTA at the American Bar Association's
annual meeting in July, 1976. The Section disagreed with most of the
changes in the law which the drafting committee viewed as desirable
modernization of the law. Some examples follow. The ULTA proposes to
abolish the doctrine of merger by deed.99 The Section rejected abolition
of merger by deed as an erosion of "the certainty which is desirable when
dealing commercially with substantial interests in real estate." 1" The
Section also objected to the revision of the statute of frauds,"1 the grant
to the court of the power to fill in contract terms if there is a reasonable
certain basis for giving a remedy,"° and a provision making options
enforceable without consideration. 3 They also objected to the idea in
the ULTA that warranties of quality would automatically pass to subsequent
purchasers. '1 4
In the years when the ULTA was being adopted, if there was one thing
which nearly all commentators agreed on, it was that the old caveat emptor
rules which had generally been applied to real estate sales, were no longer
appropriate. Therefore, one might have thought that the quality warranty
98. New York State Bar Ass'n, Resolution of Real Property Law Section for Action by
House of Delegates at Its Meeting on June 19, 1976, at 1 (July 21, 1976) (unpublished
resolution, on file with NYSBA, Albany, N.Y.).
99. U.L.T.A. § 2-517, 13 U.L.A. at 566.
100. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Review the
Uniform Land Transactions Act 5 (July 21, 1976) (unpublished report, on file with NYSBA,
Albany, N.Y.) [hereinafter Committee on ULTA].
101. Id. at 8-9.
102. Id. at 10. "The Committee is shocked that [ULTA] gives a judge the power to fill
in a contract where the parties have omitted terms." Id. The rule in question has been a part
of U.C.C. § 2-204 since its inception and opposition has died away.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Committee on ULTA, supra note 100, at 16; see U.L.T.A. § 2-312 (a), 13 U.L.A.
at 538.
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provisions of the ULTA would be a substantial plus factor leading to enact-
ments. However, adoption of the Act would have merely accelerated a
development which was already in progress in the courts. By the mid-
1970s, a number of courts had abandoned the traditional caveat emptor rule
in real estate sales and had instead imposed a warranty of habitability on
professional sellers of real estate, at least as to new construction.105
Therefore, a proponent of implied warranty liability in sales of real estate
might reasonably have concluded that there was a better chance of rapid
adoption of that rule in the courts, than through attempts to secure the
adoption of the ULTA, 6 or that there was no significant advantage in
adopting the Act to achieve changes which were likely to come in short
order anyway.
The Section was, however, opposed to the warranty of quality
provisions of Article 2 of the ULTA.'" But those favorable to quality
warranties also attacked the Act. Professor John A. Spanogle, speaking on
behalf of the Public Interest Research Group, a consumer oriented research
group, attacked the Article 2 warranty provisions (and the abolition of the
merger doctrine) as not being sufficiently protective of consumers." As
is not uncommon when changes in law are proposed, the ULTA quality
warranties alienated both those representing sellers and those representing
consumer buyers.
Lawyers, particularly, are understandably wary of changes in the law
which render their learning obsolete and which require that they learn new
and unfamiliar concepts with the attendant pain and possibility of error."°
105. Carlyn M. Chittenden, From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity-The Implied
Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 571 (1992).
106. As of July 1994, at least 29 states had imposed implied warranties of habitability
or similar warranties on sellers of new homes. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming. See Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other Vendor of New
Dwelling for Loss, Injury, or Damage Caused by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R. 3d
383 (1968 & Supp. 1994).
107. Committee on ULTA, supra note 100, at 4.
108. John A. Spanogle, Remarks at the Hearings of the Drafting Committee of the
Uniform Land Transactions Act (Apr. 5, 1975) (transcript available at Nova Law Review).
109.
Rightly or wrongly, there are those who are opposed to any change in the law;
[sic] however, because the existing law is known and understood, and any new
statute will take new learning and new interpretations before it can be relied
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Many lawyers, therefore, no doubt preferred the old land law which they
knew, over the new law which they did not know.
In short, there has been essentially no support for Article 2 of the
ULTA. It is worth noting, however, that the quality warranties of the
ULTA, slightly modified, appear in the Uniform Condominium Act,"' the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,"' the Uniform Planned
Community Act," 2 and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act."
13
3. Article 3 of the ULTA and ULSIA 
4
The key provisions of Article 3 (Security Interests) of the ULTA (and
of the ULSIA) are their provisions on foreclosure. The drafters of the
ULSIA strongly believed that real estate mortgage foreclosure sales should
be reasonably rapid, free from the costs of judicial procedure, and there
should be no right of redemption by the mortgagor after a foreclosure sale.
Also, the drafters believed that foreclosure sales need not be conducted as
auctions with elaborate statutory procedures which effectively withdraw
mortgage foreclosures from the usual real estate market. Therefore, the
ULTA permits mortgages to contain a power of sale clause under which the
foreclosing mortgagee need not institute a judicial proceeding, and there is
no right of redemption by the mortgagor after a foreclosure sale. At the
same time, the mortgagee's obligation is to conduct a reasonable sale using
methods which might be used in the usual, non-foreclosure sale context.
The drafters believed that foreclosing real estate lenders should not be
prevented, by rigid statutory foreclosure rules, from being able to sell in the
upon. This does not mean that any new legislation is to be rejected out of hand,
but it does mean that such new laws or proposed laws must be critically
analyzed, particularly in connection with land law. Land historically has been
so important to our agrarian economy that there is a certainty in that law in most
states that may be lacking in other law.
Stanley B. Balbach, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Articles 1 and 2, 11 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2 (1976).
110. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7 U.L.A. 421, 556-563 (1977)
(amended 1980).
111. UNw. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 4-113 to -116,7 U.L.A. at 270-73
(Supp. 1995).
112. UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7B U.L.A 1, 125-130 (1980).
113. MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATIVE ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7B U.L.A. 225, 330-
336 (1981). As noted earlier, those acts have been adopted in a total of 14 states. See supra
note 11.
114. Recall that in 1985, Article 3 of the ULTA, with some changes, was promulgated
as a separate act, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act.
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way best calculated to secure the same price that a seller, selling on the
seller's own behalf, could achieve. Therefore, the ULSIA encourages
foreclosing sellers to sell through real estate brokers and requires that they
advertise, not just in the legal advertising section of a local newspaper, but
in places in which a real estate seller selling for her own account would
advertise.115
Unfortunately for the prospects of the ULSIA, there is a sharp division
of opinion concerning whether mortgagees should be permitted to foreclose
without judicial supervision." 6 In the early 1970s, about half the states
permitted private power of sale foreclosure, and about half required judicial
foreclosure.1 7 Though there were significant variations among the power
of sale statutes, particularly regarding the time required to complete the sale
and gain possession,1 the time periods in the ULSIA were not sufficient-
ly different from those acts to create a strong incentive for adoption of the
ULSIA provisions in states which already had a power of sale foreclosure.
States which required judicial sale were not likely to be easily convinced
that power of sale was better. 9
The underlying assumption of the ULSIA was that quick, inexpensive
foreclosure procedures translated into lower costs for lenders and therefore,
into lower interest rates, or lower credit standards for borrowers on real
estate collateral. Unfortunately for the prospects for the ULSIA, there are
no good studies which controlled for other variables, and which are able to
document a clear difference in rates between states with long, expensive
foreclosure proceedings and those with short, less expensive procedures."
One analysis suggests that requiring judicial foreclosure and increasing the
time to foreclose by one year would increase mortgage costs (spread over
all home mortgages) by only eighteen basis points." Other studies have
indicated a somewhat higher figure for anti-deficiency legislation and long
(one year or so) periods for mortgagor redemption after sale." In any
115. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
116. Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection Over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1985);
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489
(1991).
117. Bauer, supra note 116, at 3 n.7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1.
120. See Schill, supra note 116, at 496-500 (discussing some of the studies).
121. Id. at 505.
122. Id. at 496-97. The studies summarized suggest a statutory right of redemption that
delayed by 11 months a buyer's right to possession of property bought on foreclosure would
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event, there are no good studies which show that states which are committed
to judicial sale or long statutory redemption periods after sale, or both, are
imposing significant additional costs on borrowers of that state.
However, in recent years, Congress has passed legislation which
preempts state foreclosure law as to certain Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") insured mortgages, and permits non-judicial sales with no
right of redemption. In 1981, such a statute applicable to multi-family
(apartment) mortgages was passed.1 3 In 1994, the Single Family Mort-
gage Foreclosure Act of 1994,24 which gives HUD the power to foreclose
some HUD related mortgages on single family homes by power of sale with
no right of redemption, was passed. The first section of the 1994 Act states,
that "Congress finds that . . . the disparate State laws under which
mortgages are foreclosed on behalf of the Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] ... increase the costs of collecting obligations; and ... generally
are a detriment to the community in which the properties are located."'
25
Further, the Act states that long redemption periods lead to deterioration in
the condition of the properties involved, necessitate substantial federal
holding expenditures, increase the risk of vandalism and waste of the
properties, and adversely affect the neighborhoods in which the properties
are located.' 26
The justifications for power of sale foreclosure given by Congress are
equally applicable to any foreclosure, but as noted, they have not led to
enactment of the ULSIA, nor in any change in the number of states in
which power of sale foreclosure is available1 27 However, there has been
some reduction in the number of states in which there is no right of
redemption after the foreclosure sale."~ In spite of the reduction in the
increase mortgage costs by 17.42 basis points.
123. See Multi Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 362,
95 Stat. 422 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994)).
124. See Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-327, § 801,
108 Stat. 2316 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3751 (1994)).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 3751(a).
126. Id.
127. Geis, supra note 13, at 321-22. This article lists 33 states in which power of sale
foreclosure is available. The number is based on a state by state summary of foreclosure
laws in SIDNEY A. KEYLES, FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES (1995). However,
an examination of the state summaries in Keyles indicates that of the 33 states with power
of sale statutes, the procedure is not used in seven. The seven are: Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. See generally id.
128. In 1968, a summary of state laws indicated that there was a statutory right of
redemption after foreclosure in 23 states. Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, supra
note 69, at 414. In 1995, it was reported that 16 states have a statutory right of redemption
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number of states which permit redemption by the mortgagor after the
foreclosure sale, the evidence is that states which have judicial sale and
redemption periods are hesitant to change their law.
In states which already have power of sale statutes, there would be a
relatively small gain from adoption of the ULSIA. The provisions of the
ULSIA permitting foreclosure by private sale, rather than at auction, and
requiring advertisement of the foreclosure sale in the real estate sections of
129newspapers, would probably tend to produce higher prices. However,
many mortgagors would still probably prefer to sell at auction and might
view the uncertainties of the requirement that their sale be "reasonable" to
be a detriment.
Other provisions of ULSIA, such as the right to take possession without
the appointment of a receiver, or the priority rules as to future advances,
might be valuable but law review comments on the non-foreclosure
provisions of ULSIA were mixed. 30
Several years ago, the American College of Real Estate Lawyers Law
Reform Committee, under the leadership of Norman Geis, a Chicago
attorney, undertook to secure adoption of the Uniform Land Security Act in
the various states.' 3 ' The effort lead to substantial studies of the act in
New York, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, and other states, but no enact-
ments. 132 Mr. Geis is still actively working for adoption of the ULSIA
and there is a current effort in Minnesota to adopt a modified version of the
ULSIA which may be successful. 33
after the foreclosure sale. Geis, supra note 13, at 321-22.
129. See also supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
130. Several articles have generally favorable discussions of the ULTA, e.g., Jon W.
Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEo. L.J. 1245
(1976); James M. Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure under ULSIA (Uniform Land Security
Interest Act), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 495.(1992); George M. Platt, The Uniform Land
Security Interest Act: Vehicle for Reform of Oregon Secured Land Transactions Law, 69 OR.
L. REV. 847 (1990). Contra Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's Remedies on Default-Worth the
Effort, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1001 (1992); Anthony B. Kuklin, Uniform Land Transactions Act:
Article 3, 11 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976).
131. Telephone Interview with Norman Geis, Counsel, Miller, Shakman, Hamilton,
Kurtzon & Schlifke, Chicago, Illinois.
132. See REPORT OF THE ACREL 1990-91 UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY Acms COMMrrrEE
(on file with the Nova Law Review).
133. See Geis, supra note 13, at 314.
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4. The USLTA
The most important part of the Uniform Simplification of Land
Transfers Act is part 5, Construction Liens. As noted earlier, in 1987, the
Uniform Laws Conference promulgated Article 5 of the USLTA as a
freestanding act, the Uniform Construction Lien Act. The rest of this
discussion will consider only mechanics liens. The other provisions of the
USLTA would make modest improvements in the conveyancing and real
estate lien law, but probably not enough to justify the inevitable disruption
caused by a wholesale revision of conveyancing and real estate lien law.'3
All states have acts called mechanics lien acts or construction lien acts,
under which persons who supply labor or materials for specific construction
on real estate can, without the owner's consent, acquire a lien against the
property to secure the money owed to them for their work on the project.
There is much diversity among the states as to exactly which parties get
liens, the extent of the lien, the liability of the owner, the priority of the lien
over third parties, the requirements for perfection of the lien, and the
foreclosure procedures. 35 Therefore, the Construction Lien Act would
have brought order out of chaos, but it would also have changed, more or
less significantly, the law of every state. The huge difference in the laws
of the various states in the mechanics lien area is the result of continual
ferment and change as the different interest groups involved (lenders, sub-
contractors, contractors, and title companies) secure legislation favorable to
the interest group. Therefore, the major impediment to the enactment of the
USLTA is the presence of the construction lien article. Since the political
power of the different interest groups varies from state to state and from
time to time, and since the interest groups are well organized and active, it
would be exceedingly difficult to secure wide enactment of a uniform
version of a construction lien law.136
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has tried to provide some answers to the question of why
the Uniform Land Transactions Act, the Uniform Simplification of Land
134. But see Taylor Mattis, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article
2-Conveyancing and Recording, 1981 S. ILL. U. L. J. 511 (arguing that Article 2 of USLTA
would be a valuable change in the law of Illinois and other states).
135. See generally Benfield, supra note 79, at 531-35.
136. In spite of the truth of the comments in the text, the UCLA provisions of USLTA
are so far the only parts of the USLTA to be adopted. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-125ff
(1984).
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Transfers Act, and their spin-offs, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
and the Uniform Construction Act, have had a total of only one adoption in
the various states. I have suggested that there is no constituency for the
acts. There is no group of buyers or sellers who are natural constituencies
for Article 2 of the ULTA. Buyers and sellers of real estate act in that
capacity so rarely that they are not likely to develop views regarding the
desirability of legal change. Consumer lobbying groups might be thought
to be interested in changes which are more protective of home buyers than
existing law. However, even though there were such provisions in Article
2 of the ULTA, no consumer group support has developed. Other than
consumer groups, the only people likely to be interested in Article 2 are
lawyers, and many lawyers do not agree with the changes in law made by
Article 2, or if they do agree with some changes, they think that the costs
of changing the legal rules outweigh any benefits.
Lenders are a natural constituency for Article 3 of the ULTA and its
spin-off, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act. The drafters believed that
the benefits of uniformity and of a rapid, inexpensive foreclosure process
would cause lenders to be sufficiently interested in adoption of the Act to
lead to an effort to secure adoptions in the various states. That has not
occurred. Perhaps the benefits of uniformity were over-estimated by the
drafters, or perhaps lenders have not yet realized that there are substantial
benefits from uniformity. In any event, a strong national secondary market
for mortgages has developed without the benefit of uniform mortgage laws.
Similarly, lenders who lend in states with expensive, time-consuming
judicial foreclosure of mortgages, have not been sufficiently interested in the
advantages of the ULTA-ULSIA foreclosure system to press for adoption of
one of the Acts. That failure may be due, in part, to the belief that states
with judicial foreclosure so strongly believe in the additional protection it
provides to defaulting mortgagors that change is not likely to be secured in
any event.
The UCLA covers an area in which there are strong competing, even
opposite, interest groups: lenders, owners, contractors, subcontractors, and
materialmen. Presently, mechanics lien laws are diverse, and frequently
changing as one interest group or another convinces a legislature to give it
an advantage. Because of the strong opposing interests, and the varying
attitudes toward those interests in the various states, mechanics' lien law is
a particularly unpromising area for national uniformity.
If the drafters had thought more about the hurdles they faced in
securing enactment of the land acts, they might have initially chosen to
undertake some more modest efforts such as a Uniform Real Estate Quality
Warranty Act or a Uniform Power of Sale Act. The Uniform Commercial
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Code, after all, dealt with areas in which there was previous piece-meal
legislation which could be modernized and unified into a single Code. The
Uniform Sales Act was the precursor to Article 2, the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act to Article 3, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act to Article 7, and the Uniform Conditions Sales
Act to Article 9. There was similar history of uniform codification in the
land area.
Perhaps the continuing efforts to secure enactments of the ULSIA will
eventually bear fruit. Passage of other parts of the land acts package seems
more unlikely. Perhaps, in another thirty years, the Uniform Laws Confer-
ence will return again to law reform and unification in the land area. I hope
someone then reads this article, or they may have "wasted days and wasted
nights."
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, a panel of the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers ("ACREL") discussed the difficulties of drafting, closing, and
foreclosing multi-state commercial mortgages. It was clear that state laws
had to be reformed to preserve and enhance the value of commercial real
estate as loan collateral. During the question period of the ACREL
discussion, Norman Geis of Chicago urged that ACREL members from each
state support enactment of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
("ULSIX').
* Retired, managing family held real estate, St. Paul, Minnesota; Former Partner and
Of Counsel, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, St. Paul, Minnesota. B.A., cum laude, 1956,
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota; J.D., 1960, University of Michigan Law
School, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Mr. Healy is a charter member of the American College of
Real Estate Lawyers, past President of the Ramsey County Bar Association, and past
Chairman of the Real Property Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association.
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Minnesota's basic mortgage law dates from the nineteenth century.
Though often patched, it has never had a comprehensive recodification.
Lawyers and lenders from other states find it difficult to comprehend. After
talking with several ACREL colleagues from Minnesota, I agreed to look at
the possible benefits of the ULSIA for our state. Preliminary review
indicated:
1. The ULSIA was very well thought out. Many of its concepts
would improve and clarify Minnesota's mortgage law.
2. Since ULSIA deals comprehensively with its subject, enactment
would be difficult.
About the same time, Daniel W. Hardy, Executive Vice President and
General Counsel of the Mortgage Bankers Association of Minnesota
("MBAM"), became interested in the ULSIA through national meetings of
the Mortgage Bankers Association. I was referred to the MBAM when I
inquired about the ULSIA in Minnesota. The MBAM was interested in the
ULSIA only for commercial and industrial real estate loans. It declined to
pursue changes in the law which governs home loans or agricultural loans.
Robert Tennessen, a former Minnesota State Senator and a Commis-
sioner on Uniform State Laws from Minnesota, caused the ULSIA to be
introduced in the 1992 session of the Minnesota Legislature. That bill was
the 1985 ULSIA proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
except that loans on agricultural and homestead properties were excluded
from coverage. Loans less than $500,000 also were excluded, so that only
major borrowers would be involved in the changeover.
The 1992 bill was introduced to focus discussion of mortgage law
reform. It was not scheduled for committee hearings.-
Late in 1992, I undertook to chair a subcommittee of the Legislative
Committee of the Real Property Section of the Minnesota State Bar
Association. The subcommittee was formed to study the ULSIA and to
report on its feasibility for Minnesota. Subcommittee members included:
Kevin J. Dunlevy, J. Kenneth Myers, William T. Norton, Jerry 0. Relph,
Mary E. Senkus, John R. Wheaton, and Constance L. Wilson-Steele. During
three years of meetings, the subcommittee concluded that the ULSIA would
significantly improve Minnesota mortgage law, and recommended several
modifications to the ULSIA.
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II. MODIFICATIONS
A. Coverage
The subcommittee's draft of the ULSIA retained broad exclusions for
loans on one-to-four family residential property and for loans on agricultural
property, as well as the $500,000 minimum for the ULSIA. These
exclusions from coverage made the "protected party" concept of the ULSIA
inoperative. All protected party provisions were deleted. The subcommittee
came to agree with the MBAM that there is a fundamental distinction
between loans to those in personal possession of homes and farms versus
loans to developers and investors who are not occupants.
B. Usury
Article IV of the ULSIA addressing "usury" was deleted. In Minneso-
ta, usury is not an issue in business loans that would be affected by the
ULSIA.
C. Foreclosure Period
The 1985 draft of the ULSIA allowed foreclosure sales to occur five
weeks after default. The subcommittee extended that time to sixty days to
conform to the cancellation period applicable to contracts for deed in
Minnesota, and to allow time for the creditor's meeting.
D. Contracts for Deed
The subcommittee recommended that contracts for deed not be covered
by the ULSIA. Minnesota has a non-judicial, statutory cancellation
procedure for contracts for deed. It provides the equivalent of strict
foreclosure; title reverts immediately to the contract vendor sixty days after
the notice of cancellation is served.
E. Creditors' Meeting
The subcommittee adapted an alternative dispute resolution procedure
from Minnesota's farm mortgage law. The secured creditor would be
required to call a meeting to be held within three to four weeks after the
notice of foreclosure is issued. All "interested persons," including the
debtor, guarantor, other senior and junior creditors, and mechanic's lienors
would be notified. Those who attend the creditors' meeting would be
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required to state the source and amount of their claims and their claim of
priority. The meeting would be most useful for defaulted construction loans.
It may be possible to salvage the project if all concerned can be brought
together promptly.
F. Priority of Nonobligatory Advances
Members of the Construction Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar
Association pointed out that the 1985 ULSIA would eliminate mechanic's
lienors' claims of priority over the secured creditor, to the extent of
nonobligatory advances made by the secured creditor. The MBAM agreed
that the lienors' priority should be retained.
G. Notice to Mechanic's Lien Claimants
Minnesota allows mechanic's lienors to file 120 days after the last labor
or material is supplied. The recommended sixty-day foreclosure period
would eliminate many mechanic's liens before they were even filed. After
consulting with the Construction Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar
Association, the subcommittee recommended that provision be made for
early notice by potential lien claimants, so that they can participate in the
creditors' meeting and in reinstatement.
H. Reinstatement
The 1985 ULSIA did not allow reinstatement of a defaulted loan after
acceleration. The subcommittee recommended that reinstatement be allowed
during the first forty-five days of the sixty-day foreclosure period.
I. Receivers
Minnesota allows the creditor a court-appointed receiver as a matter of
right. The subcommittee recommended that this remedy not be disturbed.
J. Effective Date
The subcommittee recommended that the ULSIA become effective on
January 1 of the second year following enactment. The delay would allow
time for technical corrections during the intervening legislative session, and
for continuing legal education, revision of loan documents, and orderly
negotiation of loan commitments.
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III. MAJOR CHANGE FOR MINNESOTA-ABOLISH REDEMPTION
Minnesota allows a period of redemption after foreclosure sale. For
most commercial loans, the redemption period is six months. Although the
receiver remedy enables a secured creditor to promptly curtail "milking" of
an income property, the lengthy redemption period is a problem. Ownership
and long-term management decisions are kept in suspense for a minimum
of eight months after foreclosure is commenced. This delay can be
devastating to construction contractors, apartment residents, and shopping
center and office building tenants and their employees.
IV. PROCEDURE & RESOLUTION
State Senator David Knutson, the primary legislative sponsor of the
ULSIA, sought broad support for comprehensive mortgage law reform prior
to conducting legislative committee hearings. While the recommended
sixty-day foreclosure period approximates the six weeks published notice
now required for a nonjudicial foreclosure by advertisement in Minnesota,
abolition of the six-month redemption period would extinguish the debtor's
last hope in two months instead of eight.
The subcommittee recommended a sixty-day foreclosure period in the
belief that sixty days would be enough time for the creditor to conduct a
sale at a price that would approach market value. The foreclosure statute
should provide positive incentives for a new party to purchase the troubled
property and end the involvement of the creditor and debtor. The new
purchaser will be able to make improvements, write leases, and make other
management decisions on a long-term basis. Neither receivers nor creditors
intending to resell can take the long-term approach.
At a public meeting held to discuss the ULSIA, considerable doubt was
expressed whether prospective purchasers could complete their due diligence
in sixty days. There also was a doubt whether many prospects would even
begin due diligence without control of the property through an option or a
contingent purchase agreement.
If a near-market sale to a new party is not feasible in sixty days, or if
the process of getting a defaulted property back into commerce will not even
begin until the creditor has complete control of the property, it may be
better for Minnesota to adopt a shorter foreclosure period. Must the
debtor's interest be completely eliminated before marketing to third parties
can begin?
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The MBAM has requested that hearings not be held in the 1996
Minnesota Legislative Session and that those involved in the real estate
industry consult further to develop a fair and efficient time frame for the
foreclosure process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[A] statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the common law, but
a guest to be welcomed and made at home there as a new and powerful
aid in the accomplishment of its appointed task of accommodating the
law to social needs.
-Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone'
* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, 1974,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., cum laude, editor of law review, 1977, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; Professor Korngold is an adviser for the Restatement (Third) of
Property-Servitudes. He is the author of Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real
Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes and co-authored Real Estate Transactions: Cases and
Materials on Land Transfer, Development and Finance. He has also written various articles
in the property and real estate areas.
1. The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 15 (1936).
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The Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA") 2 was initially approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1975' and recommended for enactment in all states. The drafters had great
aspirations for the Act. It would provide uniformity in state doctrine on real
estate matters, thus encouraging the growth of the secondary mortgage
market, facilitating lending across state lines, and providing a national real
estate law for a mobile population and expanding businesses.4 A second
goal was the modernization of real estate law, with the legislation striking
down hoary rules that courts were unable to abolish.5 ULTA was to be the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") of real estate law.6
The goals of uniformity and national reform through legislation were
not realized, as ULTA was never enacted by any state legislature. This,
however, is not the end of the story. ULTA, while not adopted, has been
an influential authority for various courts facing novel issues of law or
considering new rules to replace existing doctrine.7 There are various levels
of irony here. ULTA was intended to supplant judge made law with
legislation,' yet it has been used to support, encourage, and even embolden
judicial lawmakers. Moreover, only through the decisions of these courts
have portions of ULTA's substantive reforms of real estate rules become
law in some states. While this is not the script that the National Commis-
sioners and ULTA's drafters had in mind, ULTA has played a noticeable
role in law reform. The Act has proven to be, in the words of Chief Justice
Stone, "a new and powerful"-albeit indirect-"aid in the accomplishment
of its appointed task of accommodating the law to social needs." 9
2. 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986). The act was extensively amended in 1977.
3. Id. at 470-71 prefatory note.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For comment on ULTA, see Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The Future Advances Lender:
Status Under Present Illinois Law and Under ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451;
Ronald Benton Brown, Article 1 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act: Is Inconsistency
with the UCC an Unnecessary Obstacle?, 1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 585; Jon W. Bruce, An
Overview of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land
Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1980); Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Statutory
Draftsman: The Land Transaction Acts, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 549; Gerald Korgold,
Construction Loan Advances and the Subordinated Purchase Money Mortgagee: An
Appraisal, A Suggested Approach, and the ULTA Perspective, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 313
(1981); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Mortgagee's Interest in Rents: Some Policy
Considerations and Proposals, 29 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1980).
7. See discussion infra part I.
8. U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 470-71.
9. See Stone, supra note 1, at 15.
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This article examines the use of ULTA by the courts. It focuses on
Kuhn v. Spatial Design, Inc.,0 which represents the boldest use of ULTA
by a court in adopting a new rule of law. Moreover, Kuhn is an important
case in real estate transactions law since it (correctly) rejects existing
doctrine on the calculation of the seller's damages when the buyer breaches
a contract of sale. This article uncovers the underlying substantive and
policy disputes concerning seller's damages, and argues that damages should
be calculated based on the value of the property at resale, rather than the
date of breach. Additionally, Kuhn and its judicial adoption of ULTA
section 2-504 provide a context to compare the advantages and disadvantag-
es of legislative, as opposed to judicial, law reform. Although legislation,
such as ULTA may be preferable, this article argues that judicial lawmaking
of the type in Kuhn is appropriate in light of policy and tradition.
II. ULTA iN THE COURTS
Approximately twenty-five reported cases cite the Uniform Land
Transactions Act.11 These courts have treated the Act in different ways.
On one extreme, some courts reject the statute's solution or otherwise give
it little weight. For example, a number of decisions distinguish the ULTA
rule on a particular issue from the jurisdiction's position and then proceed
to apply existing state law." While not directly rejecting the Act, one
court expressed an apparent lack of enthusiasm, prefacing its summary of
the ULTA approach on future advances doctrine with the following
10. 585 A.2d 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
11. A far fewer number cite the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
("USLTA"), 14 U.L.A. 249 (1990). USLTA is cited in Volpe Construction Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 567 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Action Heating & Air Condition-
ing, Inc. v. Petersen, 429 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Neb. 1988); and Haner v. Bruce, 499 A.2d 792,
793-94 (Vt. 1985).
12. E.g., Gerdin v. Princeton State Bank, 384 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn. 1986) (noting
that Minnesota law does notice by mail or personal service in foreclosure actions as
prescribed in ULTA § 3-508(a)); Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 164-65 n.5 (N.J.
1982) (rejecting the dissent's reliance on the rule of buyer's damages in ULTA § 2-510
stating that "[n]o state has enacted this proposed law"); Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 569
P.2d 1033, 1036 (Ore. 1977) (finding that ULTA § 2-309 does not extend to defects in land
itself as opposed to construction); Tanenbaum v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 401 A.2d 809, 814
n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (rejecting the position of ULTA § 2-302(c) and holding that phrase
"time is of the essence" in and of itself indicates that failure to perform exposes that party
to default of contract interest); see American Mechanical Corp. v. Union Machine Co. of
Lynn, 485 N.E.2d 680, 684 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (indicating ULtA rule on calculation
of buyer's damages differs from Massachusetts and most other jurisdictions).
1996] 1071
56
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
qualification: "For what it may be worth, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1975 promulgated the Uniform
Land Transactions Act."' 3 The statute also has appeared in cases without
judicial endorsement as part of the court's citation of a law review article
that includes ULTA in its title.
14
Other decisions are more embracing of ULTA, but to varying degrees.
Some refer to a section of the Act to provide general background to the
legal issue confronting the court. 5 A number of cases cite the statute as
support for a proposition of law that is otherwise established in the
jurisdiction by case law or statutory provisions. 6 Several opinions cite
ULTA along with cases from other jurisdictions and secondary sources as
a basis to declare a new rule of law. These latter cases cover a wide range
of issues including the adoption of an implied warranty of fitness by a
builder-vendor of a house;'7 the analogy of installment land contracts to
mortgages subject to the protections of the law of foreclosure; 8 rejection
13. Shutze v. Credithrift of Am., Inc., 607 So. 2d 55, 65 n.20 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis
added).
14. See, e.g., In re J.B. Van Sciver Co., 73 B.R. 838, 847 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Maureen M. Raybom, Comment, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Pennsylvania
Property Law and Sellers' Remedies for Breach of Contract of Real Estate, 55 TEMPLE L.Q.
577, 591 (1982)); In re Stardust Inn, Inc., 70 B.R. 888, 892 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987);
Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 1308, 1314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Komgold,
supra note 6), vacated 813 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1991).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. Pepper, 638 P.2d 864, 866 n.5 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (referring
to statute of frauds); Armstrong v. Csurilla, 817 P.2d 1221, 1223 (N.M. 1991) (referring to
inadequacy of price at foreclosure sale); Pitchfork Ranch Co. v. Bar TL, 615 P.2d 541, 551
n.12 (Wyo. 1980) (referring to auction bidding procedures).
16. See, e.g., In re National Envtl. Sys. Corp. v. Long Pond Realty Trust, 111 B.R. 4,
10 n.3 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (discussing conduct of foreclosure sale); McHugh v. Church,
583 P.2d 210, 217 n.33 (Alaska 1978) (discussing conduct of power of sale foreclosure sale);
DeLuca v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 391 A.2d 170, 174 (Conn. 1978) (referring to statute
of frauds); Kelly/Lehr & Assocs., Inc. v. O'Brien, 551 N.E.2d 419, 425 (ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(discussing protection of tenants against foreclosing mortgagee); Egbert v. Freedom Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 440 N.E.2d 22, 27 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (regarding money due on sale
clause); Murphy v. Financial Dev. Corp., 495 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.H. 1985) (noting notice
requirements in non-judicial foreclosure); Wartux Assocs. v. Kings College, 616 N.Y.S.2d
417, 420 (1994) (discussing vendor's lien).
17. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ill. 1982); Kirk v.
Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1985); McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1289
(N.J. 1979).
18. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 648 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 921 (1974); Anderson Contracting Co. v. Daugherty, 417 A.2d 1227, 1232 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979).
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of the doctrine of merger by deed;19 permitting a party to request adequate
assurance of performance where reasonable grounds for insecurity arise;20
and elimination of the election of remedies doctrine in enforcing real estate
contracts.21
III. SELLER'S DAMAGES ON BUYER'S DEFAULT
Of all the cases citing ULTA, the court in Kuhn v. Spatial Design,
Inc.22 relied to the greatest extent on the Act as the basis for its decision.
The Kuhn court followed ULTA to break from the general rule for
calculating a seller's damages for a buyer's breach of a contract of sale.23
This section reviews the general rule and the policies for rejecting it.
A. The Cases
Courts typically declare that the measure of a seller's damages for a
buyer's failure to perform under a contract of sale for realty is the difference
between the contract price and the market value of the property on the date
of the breach.24 Commentators echo this rule. 5 However, an examina-
tion of these cases indicates that despite the general statement, the timing
question is not clearly settled in a good many of them. Similarly, the courts
fail to explain why they supposedly prefer the value at the date of breach
over the resale price.
First, in some decisions the timing of the valuation of the property is
not an issue, and timing is only mentioned as part of a general statement of
contract remedies.26 Moreover, in some circumstances it is not important
19. See, e.g., McSweyn v. Musselshell County, 632 P.2d 1095, 1103 (Mont. 1981).
20. See, e.g., Romig v. deVallance, 637 P.2d 1147, 1151 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981).
21. See, e.g., Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 311 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981), affd, 318 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1982).
22. 585 A.2d 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
23. See discussion infra part III.
24. See, e.g., Telfener v. Russ, 145 U.S. 522 (1892), rev'd, 162 U.S. 170 (1896); Separk
v. Caswell Builders, Inc., 434 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Construction Enter., Inc.
v. Schaeffer, 562 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Chris v. Epstein, 440 S.E.2d 581,
583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Olmo v. Matos, 653 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
25. See, e.g., ARTHUR CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1098A (1964); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CoNTRAcrs AND CONVEYANCEs OF LAND § 12.1(a) (5th ed. 1991); SAMUEL WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1399 (3d ed. 1968). These sources do not explain why time of breach is
preferable to resale price.
26. See, e.g., Duncan v. Rossuck, 621 So. 2d 1313 (Ala. 1993) (failing to court does not
refer to resale price); Gordon v. Pfab, 246 N.W.2d 283,288 (Iowa 1976); Brouillard v. Allen,
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which date-breach or resale-is used. Thus, where the market price on the
date of the breach is the same as the contract price and the market price
increases rather than decreases after that point, there is no issue of whether
date of breach or resale is used since in either case the seller has no loss of
bargain damages.27 Alternatively, where the value of the realty at the date
of breach is equal to the resale price, it would not matter which one a court
uses.
28
Other decisions reveal a gap between a court's statements and actions
concerning timing. Some courts claim that they follow the time of breach
rule, but actually compare the resale price to the contract amount. These
courts do not merely use the resale price as evidence of the market value at
the time of the breach; rather, they simply and without discussion, plug the
resale price into the equation as the market value at the time of breach.29
For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the general rule,
but instead of looking to the value at the time of breach, the court concluded
that the seller could recover no loss of bargain damages since the seller
resold the property two years later for the same amount as the original
contract price.30 The court appeared unaware that its action contradicted
its statement of the law.
The use of resale price, despite a statement to the contrary is illustrated
by a case which involved a contract of sale executed by a trustee in
bankruptcy for the sale of a hotel property owned by the debtor. The
contract price was $4,840,000 and closing was set for January 5, 1990. The
buyer defaulted, and on March 30, 1990, the first lienholder on the property
foreclosed. The property was subsequently sold by the lienholder, at a date
not specified by the court, for $3,455,000. .The court quoted the relevant
619 A.2d 988, 991 (Me. 1993).
27. See Turner v. Benson, 672 S.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Tenn. 1984) (noting fact that court
chose date of breach did not affect seller where contract price and market value on date of
breach were both $75,000, and the property was resold one year later at $76,000).
28. See, e.g., Duncan, 621 So. 2d at 1316 (relying on appraiser's express testimony that
the property did not change in value).
29. See, e.g., A-S Dev., Inc. v. W.R. Grace Land Corp., 537 F. Supp. 549, 558-59
(D.N.J. 1982) (stating rule but permitting seller to recover interest on its investment in land
tied up until property could be resold five years after breach), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir.
1983); Loda v. H.K. Sargeant & Assocs., Inc., 448 A.2d 812, 818 (Conn. 1982) (calculating
damages by deducting price of resale which occurred over two months after breach from the
contract price).
30. Cote v. Chesley, 577 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1978).
31. In re Gatlinburg Motel Enters., 127 B.R. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991).
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state law rule referring to "time of the breach"32 for calculating the fair
market value of the property, but then awarded the trustee-seller damages
in the amount of $1,385,000. These damages were calculated by taking the
difference between the contract price and the foreclosure sale price that took
place at least two and a half months after the breach. It thus appears the
court did not focus on the timing question, despite its embracing of the
general rule.33 Furthermore, the case may indicate that finding value at the
time of a reasonable resale is intuitively pleasing to a court dealing with
property in a soft market.34
Some courts, however, squarely face the timing issue and insist on the
date of breach rather than resale. 35 For example, in one case, Webster v.
DiTrapano,36 the court reversed the trial court's calculation of damages
where the property was resold eleven months after breach, since the trier
32. Id. at 820 (quoting Turner v. Venson, 672 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. 1984)).
33. Although some courts state that the resale price might be evidence of the value of
the property at the time of breach, e.g., Gardner v. Armstrong, 31 Mo. 535 (1862), the
Gatlinburg court gave no indication that it was using the foreclosure sales price for that
purpose. Moreover, to be useful evidence, the resale must come within a reasonable time.
See, e.g., Hazelton v. Le Duc, 10 App. D.C. 379 (1897); Kempner v. Heidenheimer, 65 Tex.
587 (1886); Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The
Gatlinburg court never stated when the foreclosure sale took place nor discussed whether that
was within a "reasonable" time.
34. Sales of distressed property by definition involve a soft market. See BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994) ("[M]arket value, as it is commonly
understood, has no applicability in the forced-sale context; indeed, it is the very antithesis
of forced-sale value.").
35. See, e.g., Brett v. Wall, 530 So. 2d 797, 798-99 (Ala. 1988) (holding trial court's
use of date of trial rather than time of breach was reversible error); Young v. Redman, 128
Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-90 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating general rule and finding that testimony of seller
and appraiser supported trial court's determination of value at time of breach); Margaret H.
Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (Idaho 1993) (holding that it was error to find
damages by comparing contract price and amount of resale that took place one year after
breach); Macal v. Stinson, 468 N.W.2d 34, 35-36 (Iowa 1991) (declaring general rule and
finding damages in amount equal to offer for resale received one month after breach and
rejected by sellers rather than amount of the actual resale, which was made over a year later);
Regent Int'l v. Lear, 732 P.2d 861, 861-62 (Nev. 1987); Mohen v. Mooney, 614 N.Y.S.2d
737, 738 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing computation of damages that used value as of May 15,
1989, rather than October 31, 1988, when breach occurred).
36. 494 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div. 1985).
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used the $55,000 resale price rather than the value of the property at the
time of breach, i.e., $57,500.37
As a further complication, even courts that calculate value as of the
date of breach will use a subsequent resale price as evidence of the earlier
value, as long as market conditions are similar and too much time has not
passed.38 Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a court is
using the resale price only as evidence of value at the time of breach, or as
part of the damages formula.
B. Policy Justifications
The courts which embrace the general rule do not explain why it is
sensible. Rather, the courts follow it without explanation, apparently on the
belief that the rule is well established. One decision relied on stare decisis
to reject a shift away from the time of breach doctrine:
Defendants propose that this Court should create a new standard of
formulation for damages which would include the resale value. We do
not deem it our place to change the formula for damages that has been
set by precedent, where there has not been a plausible argument for
such a change.39
1. Supporting the General Rule
Although the courts do not offer reasons for preferring value at the time
of breach, several policies can be offered in support of this rule. First, this
result appears consistent with general damages theory. For example, assume
the contract price is $100 and the value at the date of breach is $80, under
37. Ia at 551. Some New York courts, however, permit the use of the resale price.
E.g., Tesmer Builders, Inc. v. Cimato, 629 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding
judgment using resale price but noting that damages claim was not controverted by buyer).
38. See, e.g., Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 912 (rejecting use of resale price to show value at date
of breach because resale came one year late); Gryb v. Benson, 406 N.E.2d 124, 126 (ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (holding use of resale price at later unspecified date was appropriate
evidence); Kasten Constr. Co. v. Jolles, 278 A.2d 48, 51 (Md. 1971) (holding sale 14 months
later was not probative of value at time of breach); Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d 1230,
1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding use of price three years after default was error as
evidence was "simply too attenuated"); cf. Showalter, Inc. v. Smith, 629 N.E.2d 272, 276
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding although breach occurred in August 1990, resale price accepted
in November 1991 was not too attenuated to be admissible evidence of value at time of
breach); Gerhardt v. Fleck, 256 N.W.2d 547, 551 (N.D. 1977) (holding auction sale held after
default was valid evidence even though property listed in different manner).
39. Chris v. Epstein, 440 S.E.2d 581, 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
1076 [Vol. 20
61
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Korngold
the general rule the seller would receive damages in the amount of $20.
This supposedly protects the seller's expectation and puts the seller in as
good of a position as the seller would have been if the buyer had per-
formed.4 Under this theory, the seller is left with the expected $100,
either in the form of the land now worth $80 along with the $20 in cash or
the seller could resell the property in the marketplace at its $80 value and,
together with the $20 in damages, have $100 in cash.
Moreover, the result under the general rule would appear to be
consistent with the mitigation of damages doctrine.4' Since the seller will
only receive the value at the date of breach, the seller is at risk for further
declines in the value of the property. So, the argument goes, the seller will
act quickly to resell. In contrast, if the resale price was used for damages
calculation, the seller would have no incentive to resell in a timely manner.
Thus, the damages owed by the buyer would increase if the market
continued to drop.
Finally, proponents of the time of resale rule would claim that the
seller's concerns about a declining market are addressed by the specific
performance remedy that is available to all sellers under real estate
contracts.42 If the court orders the buyer to close under the contract, the
seller will receive the contract price in exchange for the deed and thus
obtain the full benefit of the contract.
2. Rejecting the General Rule
These arguments supporting the use of the value on the date of breach
ignore many practical concerns of disappointed sellers, as well as theoretical
considerations. The general rule wrongly places the risk of a declining
market after breach on the seller of land. A seller of fungible goods should
be able to quickly resell in the market and make himself whole since there
is a clear and active market for most commodities. However, real estate is
another matter. Realty is unique, with many complicated features, such as
location, size, architectural style, layout, and included items. Since buyers
also have their individual lists of desired attributes in a property, the process
of matching buyers to properties is, therefore, complicated.
40. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 840-41 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the
expectation interest).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979) (describing general
mitigation rule).
42. Id. § 360 cmt. e (discussing seller's right of specific performance); see PAUL
GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KORNGOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE 138-39 (3d ed. 1993).
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Moreover, the operation of the real estate market is complex. After the
buyer's breach, the seller typically must go through many steps to remarket
and resell the realty. For example, the seller usually must employ a new
broker or make a new arrangement with the original broker. This may
include consideration of various proposals, negotiations, and execution of an
agreement with a broker which may require consultation with a lawyer.43
The seller and broker must re-price the house in light of the current market,
which involves a process requiring some study. The property must be
marketed again with new advertising, multiple listings, and previews of the
property for other brokers and potential buyers.
The sales process itself takes time. Buyers typically require several
viewings of the property before making an offer to purchase. Often they
will have a professional inspector review the realty before they make an
offer, and the buyer may need other professionals, such as architects,
designers, and contractors, to examine the property before purchase.
44
Additionally, the timing of the resale effort may be disadvantageous to
the seller because of a cyclical market. For example, since many homes are
sold in the late spring and early summer in order to allow people to move
before the school year, if a buyer breaches late in that selling season there
may be only a limited number of potential new buyers in the market.
All these factors reduce the likelihood of a quick resale.4 5 As a result,
the risk of a declining market is shifted to the seller. Thus, if the buyer
breaches late in the selling season and the market value drops after the time
of breach from $80 to $70 at the time of resale, the seller will not receive
the full benefit of the bargain. The seller will end up with $90 ($20 in
damages and $70 obtained on resale) rather than the $100 provided in the
contract.
This result conflicts with basic policies of contract law. To the extent
that we enforce contracts because we believe there is a moral obligation on
43. See John Payne, A Typical House Purchase Transaction in the United States, 30
CoNV. & PRop. LAW 194 (1966).
44. For commercial properties, the review may be even more complex, since the
viability of the location and the structure for the enterprise's operations must be ascertained.
45. See cases cited supra note 38 (describing delays in resale).
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the promisor," it is inconsistent to allow a wrongdoing buyer to pass the
risk of a declining market to the innocent seller.
Moreover, using the value at the date of breach frustrates the efficiency
benefits of a contract.47 The time of breach rule creates an incentive for
the buyer to breach in declining markets. If the buyer had performed as
obligated and had then unloaded the property because of the declining
market, the buyer would have suffered a $30 loss (i.e., the difference
between the contract price and the resale amount). The general rule,
however, does not force the buyer to live with the buyer's poor prediction
of the future value of the property. Rather, it permits the buyer to limit the
loss to $20 since payment of damages is based on the value at the time of
breach. The additional $10 of loss is instead shifted to the seller. Given the
general rule, it is hard to see why a rational buyer would close in a rapidly
declining market. The general rule, therefore, appears to weaken rather than
enhance the efficient allocation of resources in the market.
Freedom of contract also permits individuals to make choices and
enables them to create a network of consensual relationships that maximize
their happiness. 8 We should not allow the acts of one party to the
46. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACr As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACrUAL
OBLIGATION 9-17 (1981); Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 4 HARv. L. REv. 553, 571-
85 (1933) (stating "common sense does generally find something revolting about the breaking
of a promise, and this, if a fact, must be taken into account by the law"); L.L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61
(1936) (protecting expectation carries a "quasi-criminal aspect, its purpose being not so much
to compensate the promisee as to penalize the breach of promise by the promisor").
47. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 1.7 (arguing that freedom of contract encourages
individual entrepreneurial activity that benefits society as a whole); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 94
YALE L.J. 97 (1989); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACr LAW 1-2 (1979) ("The fundamental economic principle with which we begin is
that if voluntary exchanges are permitted-if, in other words, a market is allowed to oper-
ate-resources will gravitate toward their most valuable resources.... The principle that
voluntary exchange should be freely permitted in order to maximize value is frequently
summarized in the concept (or slogan) 'freedom of contract."'); Richard A. Posner & Andrew
M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis,
6 J. LEG. STUDIES 88, 89 (1977) ("A law of contract not based on efficiency considerations
will therefore be largely futile.").
48. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 571-85 (stating "[a]ccording to the classical view, the
law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of the parties, for the will is
something inherently worthy of respect"); Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract
in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982) ("We may not understand
why property owners want certain obligations to run with the land, butas it is their land, not
ours, some very strong reason should be advanced before our intentions are allowed to
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contract (i.e., the defaulting buyer) to destroy the free choices of the other
(i.e., the seller). Consider, for example, that the seller in our hypothetical
transaction was counting on the $100 consideration from the sale of the
home to purchase a new house, finance a child's education, or pay for any
other lawful activity that would give the seller satisfaction. It would be
troubling if the time of breach damages rule frustrated the seller's plans by
leaving the seller with only $90 total consideration for the property after a
breach by the buyer.
The argument that the seller could avoid the harshness of the time of
breach rule by obtaining a decree of specific performance is flawed.49 If
the buyer breaches because the buyer lacks the funding to close, an
injunction action is an essentially meaningless and expensive exercise. The
seller would prefer to keep the property and obtain a judgment for the full
amount of damages, including the loss of value during the time preceding
resale. The defaulting buyer may be able to pay that amount even if the
buyer is unable to produce the entire purchase price in an injunction action.
IV. KUHN V. SPATIAL DESIGN, INC.
Kuhn v. Spatial Design, Inc."0 presented the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court an opportunity to consider this oft stated, but
logically flawed, time of breach rule for calculation of damages. Kuhn
involved a vivid story of breach by buyers in a declining market. The
Kuhns signed a contract to purchase a home from defendant Spatial Designs.
The sale was contingent on the buyers obtaining financing. The Kuhns
applied for a mortgage through a mortgage broker. Prudential Home
Mortgage Company ("Prudential") issued a mortgage commitment but later
withdrew it. The Kuhns attempted to cancel the contract of sale based on
their inability to obtain financing but Spatial Design refused to return their
deposit. The Kuhns commenced an action to recover the deposit and Spatial
Design counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract.
The trial court found that the Kuhns, and employees of the mortgage
broker, intentionally filed a mortgage application that was materially false
with respect to the Kuhns' financial picture since they believed that the
buyers' actual financial situation was insufficient to obtain the loan that they
control."); Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in
the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 454 (1984)
(discussing freedom of choice).
49. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
50. 585 A.2d 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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sought. The application indicated that Mr. Kuhn was an Air Force colonel
but did not show that he had already been approved for retirement. It also
stated that Mrs. Kuhn "had a substantial income from 'Plants-R-You,' a
florist business which existed only in the minds of the Kuhns and [the
mortgage brokers'] people."51 The Kuhns knew that other key information
was also shown incorrectly in order to make their mortgage application
stronger.
The Kuhns developed misgivings about the deal when they found a
weak market for the sale of their current home, discovered an uninviting job
market for Mr. Kuhn, and heard that Spatial Design had sold a house across
the street for much less than they were paying. Mr. Kuhn "therefore
decided to climb down from the shaky limb he was on. 52 He called
Prudential and informed them that he would be retiring from the Air Force
and would lose $40,000 in annual income.53 Prudential then canceled the
mortgage commitment because of the new information relying on an express
provision permitting withdrawal if any new material facts were revealed.
The trial judge found in favor of the seller and assessed damages
against the buyers of almost $100,000, less the retained deposit of $50,000.
The appellate court upheld this award and discussed the measure of damages
for loss of bargain. The contract price was $515,000, less $27,750 for real
estate broker commission. The property was resold for $434,000 free of
commission. The opinion does not indicate how long it took to resell, but
found that "[tihere was no reason suggested by the evidence to doubt the
reasonableness either of the time it took to resell the house or the sale price
obtained."54 The court also did not indicate the value of the house at the
date of the Kuhns' breach. From the data included in the opinion, the seller
suffered a decline in the value of the property from the time of contract to
resale in the amount of $53,250: $515,000 contract price (less $27,750 for
the commission), less the $434,000 resale price.
The buyers urged that the seller's damages should be calculated
according to the difference between the contract price and the value at the
time of breach. The court distinguished the New Jersey cases cited by the
buyers since they did not deal with damages from a breach in a falling
51. Il at 969.
52. Id. at 970.
53. This was inaccurate on two counts-Mr. Kuhn had already been approved for
retirement when he submitted the mortgage application and almost simultaneously with his
call to Prudential he wrote the Air Force seeking to withdraw his approved retirement. Id.
54. Id at 970. At one point, the opinion indicates that resale took place "many months"
after either the contract or the breach. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971.
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market.55  The court then adopted a new rule for damages in a falling
market, stating: "where the seller puts the property back on the market and
resells, the measure is not contract price less value at the time of breach, but
rather the resale price, if it is reasonable as to time, method, manner, place
and terms. 56 The court held that questions of reasonableness are for the
trier of fact, and noted that the trial court found, on sufficient credible
evidence, that the resale was reasonable. 7
The support and the sources cited by the Kuhn court to reject the
general rule and adopt the time of resale approach are most interesting. The
court made little use of precedent. The court did not cite cases from New
Jersey or other jurisdictions following the time of resale rule.5 The court
in Kuhn did refer to the New Jersey statute adopting section 2-706 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which permits a seller of goods to resell and
recover the difference between the contract price and resale amount. 9
While section 2-504 of ULTA is expressly based on that UCC provision,'
the UCC of course does not apply to sales of real estate.61
Moreover, there was no full discussion of the policy considerations.
The Kuhn court merely stated: "In the usual course of things, a $515,000
house cannot be resold the instant a contract buyer breaches, and a
reasonable time for resale must therefore be allowed. . . . In a falling
market, buyers take longer to find, and they buy at reduced prices. 62
There was no development of the competing policies concerning the timing
of damages. 3
55. The Kuhns cited Oliver v. Lawson, 223 A.2d 355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966),
and Thomas F. Ruane Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 339 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
Subsequent to the Kuhn decision, both cases were overruled, on other grounds, in Kutzin v.
Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932 (1991) (overruling on issue of seller's right to retain deposit on default
of buyer). These cases are discussed infra note 83 and accompanying text.
56. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971.
57. Id.
58. As discussed below, the attempt to distinguish the New Jersey cases following the
general time of breach rule is not convincing. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
59. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971; U.C.C. § 2-706; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-706 (1961)
(adopting UCC). See JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
7-6 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing U.C.C. § 2-706 and suggesting that a commercially reasonable
resale may be found more easily under § 2-706 as opposed to resale under U.C.C. § 9-504(3)
where secured creditor has greater power as compared to secured debtor).
60. U.L.T.A. § 2-504 cmt.
61. U.C.C. § 2-102, 1 U.L.A. 172 (1989).
62. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (discussing the policy choices).
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Instead of precedent or policy, the court relied on the ULTA to support
its decision. Unlike other cases that cite to ULTA,64 section 2-504 is
central to the court's determination in Kuhn. The court expressly adopted
that provision, and its statement of its rule closely tracks the language of the
statute.65 Thus, resale must be reasonable as to method, manner, time,
place, and terms; the defaulting buyer must have notice of the time after
which resale will take place; controls are placed on public sales; and the
seller will receive damages to the extent of the difference between the
contract amount and the resale price plus consequential and incidental
damages, less expenses avoided due to resale.
The ULTA therefore emerges as the fundamental source for the Kuhn
court. Uniform laws have been used as sources of law in other situations,
as well.66 For example, federal courts have relied on the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as a source of federal law, not only because the UCC has been
adopted in all the states (obviously not the case with ULTA) but also
because the UCC provides a modem and better approach to outdated
rules.67 Justice Traynor described the success of the UCC as a source of
law for federal courts and for state courts in dealing with issues not directly
covered by the Code:
Therein lies the key to the Code's success as a model for judicial
lawmaking. It was the culmination of years of scholarly work. The
scholars were beholden to no one and to no cause. Their project was
sponsored by the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, two groups that were likewise eminently unbehold-
en. Everyone concerned had notice of the project and full opportunity
to be heard.... The final draft was of a piece and it had the look of
having been out in the open.... Even a diehard judge, resistant to the
64. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22 (describing the use of ULTA as
background or general support for a proposition of law that is otherwise well supported).
65. Compare Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971 (beginning at paragraph starting with "[w]here a
buyer of real estate wrongfully rejects") with U.L.T.A. § 2-504. The Kuhn court also
indicated that if the seller chose to resell, the damage rule of U.L.T.A. § 2-505 would apply.
66. See Richard E. Coulson, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the Control of Law-Making-A Historical Essay, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
295 (1991) (stating the history of the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the various acts); James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 2096
(1991).
67. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV.
401, 422-23 (1968) (discussing the use of the UCC by federal courts); see Vitex Mfg. Corp.
v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1967) (noting that the UCC "embodies the
foremost modem legal thought concerning commercial transactions").
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use of statutes in the formulation of common-law rules, could hardly
ignore so rich a source of law.
68
The ULTA similarly emerged from an extensive drafting process with
representation from many constituencies including the bar, lenders, the real
estate industry, and the public, and was subject to study and comment by
various organizations. 61 Moreover, the approach of ULTA section 2-504
adopted by Kuhn is superior to the general rule that limits damages to value
as of the date of breach. The ULTA' s requirement of reasonableness in the
manner of resale meets the mitigation of damages concerns of supporters of
the general rule.70 At the same time, the resale price rule recognizes the
practical realities and timing problems of real estate sales, and is consistent
with the moral, economic, and freedom of choice theories that underpin
contract enforcement.71
V. COMPARISON OF REFORM BY LEGISLATION OR JUDICIAL
DECISION
In Kuhn, the judicial adoption of a statute, which the New Jersey
Legislature did not enact, provides an interesting context to reconsider the
ongoing debate over the comparative advantages and disadvantages of law
reform by legislatures as opposed to courts.72
A. Benefits of Legislation
Proponents have advanced various reasons for law reform by the
legislature rather than by the courts. Legislatures are better able to fully
consider an issue, engage in fact finding through testimony and study, and
68. See Traynor, supra note 67, at 424.
69. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469-75; Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform
Real Property Acts Have Played in the Development of American Land Law: Some General
Observations, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 331 (1992); Norman Geis, Preface to Symposium
on the Uniform Real Property Acts, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 325 (1992); see also Dunham,
supra note 6.
70. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing mitigation).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
72. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908)
(describing the tension between judge made law and legislation).
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then as a representative body determine public policy and priorities.73
Courts, on the other hand, are limited in these endeavors. 74
Moreover, the legislature can fully consider the broad ramifications of
a problem and craft a comprehensive solution to the larger issue.75  A
statute that sets clear and precise rules, addresses the full range of related
issues, and indicates the outcomes in various scenarios can be relied on by
people in planning their affairs.76 In contrast, courts can only decide the
particular question before them. They cannot paint in broad strokes, nor can
they address related matters and provide an overall solution.77 Because of
the dichotomy between holding and dictum and the doctrine of stare decisis,
a judicial opinion can only set the law for the particular factual situation
before it.78  It may be difficult for parties to predict the law's response
when the facts are altered.
Additionally, there are concerns of retroactivity and reliance. Usually
legislation applies only prospectively, so that people can plan future
transactions based on the new legal environment.79 However, when a court
declares a new rule of law, it may rearrange the rights of parties under
contracts executed under the prior rule, thereby causing economic realloca-
tion and dissatisfaction with the judicial system.0
73. See Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1051 (Colo. 1983) (Rovira,
J., dissenting); Maurice Rosenberg, Anything Legislatures Can Do, Courts Can Do Better?,
62 A.B.A.J. 587, 590 (noting that courts need a new institution to provide data that litigants
do not, providing information on social impact of competing rules).
74. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical
Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1570, 1579 (1991) (finding
that "fairness" and "rightness" concerns were most cited in judicial opinions to support
products liability and "efficiency" norms were not as important); Hans A. Linde, Courts and
Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VALPARAISO L. REV. 821, 827-28 (1994)
(arguing that courts do not adequately develop public policy in their opinions).
75. See Roger J. Traynor, Comment on the Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUTIoNS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48-51 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959).
76. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 471 (suggesting that benefit of reduction
of rules to statutory form). Often, however, statutes do not accomplish these broad goals.
See Traynor, supra note 67, at 402.
77. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 242, 249 (1970).
78. See Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12 (1968) ("A
court does not select the materials with which it works. It is not self-starting.").
79. See id. at 15 (describing, but questioning, the reliance argument).
80. The drafters of the ULTA noted: "In spite of the fact that the inappropriateness of
many existing rules to modem circumstances has been recognized for years, courts have been
understandably hesitant to change by judicial decision rules on which parties will have relied
in structuring the transaction before the court. Changing rules by statute, of course, does not
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Finally, some commentators maintain that legislation is the only
legitimate means to achieve law reform."1 The principles of separation of
powers and representative democracy require that the elected legislature
make important policy choices.
The Kuhn opinion does exhibit some of the limitations of judicial law
reform as compared to legislation. First, like other judicial decisions, the
Kuhn rule does not provide a comprehensive solution to the various possible
scenarios where sellers seek remedies for breach of contract.8 2 Kuhn is
ambiguous about whether its time of resale rule will apply in all types of
markets. The court attempted to distinguish two earlier New Jersey
decisions 3 that declared that damages should be based on the time of
breach by stating that those cases did not deal with a declining market.
8 4
The intermediate appellate court in Kuhn may have felt constrained or
hesitant to directly contradict another intermediate appellate decision. 5
Thus, the distinction Kuhn offered is meaningless, since a seller will only
suffer loss of bargain damages if the market is declining. 6 So, rather than
declaring a clear rule that all buyers and sellers (and their attorneys) can
recognize and make bargains, the Kuhn court left ambiguity as to whether
there may be a different rule when the market is not declining. In contrast,
have the drawback of defeating the expectation of parties to completed transactions, since the
statute will operate prospectively only." U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 471.
81. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 74, at 855 ("Unless a court can attribute public policy
to a politically accountable source, it must resolve novel issues of liability within a matrix
of statutes and tort principles without claiming public policy for its own decision. Only this
preserves the distinction between the adjudicative and the legislative function.").
82. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 42-43 (Oceana 1951) (describing
limitations on judicial opinions: "[tIhe court can decide only the particular dispute which
is before it").
83. Thomas F. Ruane Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 339 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975); Oliver v. Lawson, 223 A.2d 355 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966). Subsequent to the
Kuhn decision, both cases were overruled on other grounds in Kutzin v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932
(N.J. 1991) (overruling on issue of seller's right to retain deposit on default of buyer).
84. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 970-71.
85. Additionally, the facts of Cullere, actually indicate that the market was declining.
339 A.2d at 229. Moreover, the court awarded damages in the amount of the difference
between the contract price of $175,000 and the "market value of $170,000, the price received
.. on resale less than a month" after breach. Id. at 232. This holding looks a great deal
like basing damages on the time of resale.
Oliver, 223 A.2d at 357-58, discusses the timing of damages in what can most fairly
be described as dictum, since the issue before the court was whether a seller may retain, as
liquidated damages, buyer's deposit after buyer's default.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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a statute, such as ULTA section 2-504, states a rule of resale damages
without (misleading) qualification about rising, falling, or steady markets.
Similarly, it is unclear whether Kuhn is limited to the specific facts that
the court noted. The court, as discussed above, described in detail the
buyers' unsavory dealings with the mortgage lender, including misleading
and false information and behavior by the buyers.87 It is unclear whether
the Kuhn court's rule is limited to situations of bad actors, or whether it
extends to all defaulting buyers. What did the court mean when it referred
to a buyer who "wrongfully"88 fails to perform? A subsequent court could
find that the Kuhn court meant that any breach of contract without a defense
is "wrongful." Alternatively, a subsequent court could refuse to apply Kuhn
on the theory that, given the facts of that case, a "wrongful" breach occurs
only when the buyer has also failed to act in good faith and in accordance
with fair dealing norms.89
B. Judicial Lawmaking
Even though there may be advantages to legislative law reform as
compared to judicial efforts, this does not mean, however, that the Kuhn
court should not have reached the result that it did. Indeed, the decision
illustrates some of the benefits of judicial lawmaking over the legislative
process. Our common law reflects a long and beneficial tradition of courts
evolving innovative solutions to new factual solutions based on emerging
social needs and public policy.9" This flexibility has enabled the courts to
achieve just results in disputes among parties.9 While predictability and
87. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
88. Kuhn, 585 A.2d at 971.
89. U.L.T.A. § 2-504 also uses the term "wrongful" breach, but as a statute its meaning
is not constrained by the specific wrongdoing of a particular buyer.
90. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31-32 (Little Brown 1963)
(1881) (maintaining that common law courts have always acted in a "legislative" manner,
based on the courts' view of what is expedient for the community; courts have developed
new rules and provided new life for old ones in this manner); Schaefer, supra note 78, at 23
("If. . . [the judge] views the role of the court as a passive one, he will be willing to
delegate the responsibility for change, and he will not greatly care whether the delegated
authority is exercised or not. If he views the court as an instrument of society designed to
reflect in its decisions the morality of the community, he will be more likely to look
precedent in the teeth and to measure it against the ideals and the aspirations of his time.").
91. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103-04
(paperback version 1921) (arguing that through centuries courts have made choices as to
shape of common law based on "fitness to an end"); Linde, supra note 74, at 822 (describing
arguments for courts to make tort policy, including "courts made the law what it is, and if
19961 1087
72
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
reliance arguably may suffer at times when a decision is overruled,92
justice sometimes requires that result.9
Moreover, judicial solutions have the advantage of speed, conclusive-
ness, and focus.94 Judicial decision making has been praised as rational,
based on reason and not on polls, a majority vote of those affected, or
expediency." In fact, courts must act since legislatures often fail to enact
comprehensive statutes due to institutional and political pressure favoring the
status quo.96 It is further argued that even when legislatures do act, courts
must still make law since "statutes can never embrace within their sweep all
human activity that law is called upon to order. ', 97
Kuhn is an example of good judicial lawmaking; the court refused to
ignore realities of the situation and hide behind the existing general rule.
Rather, it declared a new rule of law, after careful consideration and
reasoning, based on emerging public policies exemplified in ULTA section
2-504.
Moreover, concerns about reliance, predictability, and retroactivity are
not triggered by Kuhn.9' It is hard to see how many, if any, people had
acted in reliance on a rule calculating damages based on the value at the
time of breach as opposed to resale price. People, especially consumer
home buyers, usually do not enter contracts with the thought of breaching
them. It is theoretically possible that there were a few buyers under
executory contracts of sale in New Jersey at the time Kuhn was decided who
had breached based on an attorney's advice that damages would be limited
to value at the time of breach. The reliance of these few, if any, people,
who after all were breaching a contractual obligation, was not reason enough
they do not remake it, no one else will. The axiom that courts make law has been American
orthodoxy for a century.").
92. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 122 (1924) (disputing
notion that overruling a common law precedent interferes with people's expectations; "The
only rules there is ever any thought of changing are those that are invoked by injustice after
the event to shelter and intrench itself. In the rarest instances, if ever, would conduct have
been different if the rule had been known and the change foreseen.").
93. See United States v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955) ("Great judges
have said that the function of the common law was the perpetual quest for justice. I should
be sorry if quest for certitude [sic] were substituted for quest of justice.").
94. Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 587.
95. Charles Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 772 (1965).
96. See Linde, supra note 74, at 835.
97. James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934), reprinted in 2 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 7, 8 (1965). Judges must also interpret statutes
where the meaning is unclear. Id.
98. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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for the Kuhn court to have refrained from its decision. Additionally, the
reliance issue would become moot in a brief time, since most contracts of
sale of land contemplate only a short time between contract and closing
(perhaps six to ten weeks), and the contracts in existence at the time Kuhn
was decided would soon expire. Bargains in contracts signed after Kuhn
would be made in light of the new damages rule.99
Finally, any ambiguity about the situations to which the Kuhn opinion
extends"° does not mean that the court should have deferred the decision
to the legislature. Attorneys are accustomed to making predictions from
prior cases, especially well written decisions like Kuhn, and judges know
their role in the ongoing evolution of the common law.
Would it have been better for the system of justice if the New Jersey
Legislature had adopted the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the court
in Kuhn had simply applied section 2-504 to reach its conclusion? Yes. In
the absence of adoption of the Act, would it have been better for the legal
system if the Kuhn court had applied the general rule and limited the seller's
damages to the value of the land at the time of the breach? Clearly, no.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Uniform Land Transactions Act was not adopted by any
legislature, the Act nevertheless has been an important law reform instru-
ment. A number of courts have relied on ULTA to declare new common
law rules. In this unintended way, ULTA serves as a means of modernizing
the substantive law of real estate transactions.
99. In Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 569 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1977), the court refused to
rely on U.L.T.A. § 2-309 to extend the implied warranty of fitness placed on builder-vendors
of new homes by prior judicial decision to the sale of developed but unimproved land. The
court stated that "[i]f this problem requires attention insofar as any serious unmet need for
the protection of purchasers or lessees of subdivided land is concerned, the legislature is
capable of correcting the situation." Id. at 1036. Other courts, however, have extended the
warranty of fitness to similar lots rather than deferring to the legislature. See, e.g., Buchanan
v. Scottsdale Envtl. Constr. & Dev. Co., 787 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Az. Ct. App. 1989); Rusch
v. Lincoln-Devore Testing Lab., Inc., 698 P.2d 832, 834 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
1996] 1089
74
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act and
the Politics and Economics of Law Reform
Peter B. Maggs*
Late in 1995 1 had the privilege of working with a group of Armenian
jurists who were preparing a draft of a new Civil Code for their newly
independent country. I remarked to them that the dynamics in the group
session were very similar to what I had experienced two decades earlier. I
was a co-reporter, first for the Uniform Land Transactions Act (UTLA),
and then for the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USLTA).2
One of them asked me about the fate of these acts. I admitted that these
uniform acts had not achieved adoption and wished them greater success
with the new Armenian Civil Code. The discussion then turned to why the
uniform acts had problems and how they might save their draft code from
the same fate. Here is what I told them.
Under the history of the Uniform Land Transactions Act there has been
significant movement. ULTA started as a grand idea of a codification of all
land law, then moved to a more limited goal of separate codification of
major segments of land law to, finally, an even more limited goal of
codification of discrete limited areas of land law. There have been three
reasons for this change. The first reason for the change was purely
technical. The rules of the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws required a reading of a proposed Uniform Act at a meeting of
the Commissioners. The draft of the Uniform Land Transactions Act grew
to the point where such a reading would have been impossible to achieve
within the limits of the agenda of a single annual meeting of the Commis-
sioners. The second change related to the drafting process. A draft of a
full-fledged Uniform Land Transactions Act would have to be completed by
a single deadline. Drafting of individual Uniform Acts on issues of land
law could proceed on independent schedules. Given the many conflicting
commitments of the Commissioners, the more flexible schedule made sense.
The third reason had to do with politics and economics. The overall reform
of land law would bring diffuse and hard-to-communicate benefits to the
general public. However, changes proposed for each subarea of the law
* Richard W. & Marie L. Corman Professor of Law, University of Illinois College
of Law, Champaign, Illinois. A.B., 1957, Harvard College; J.D., 1961, Harvard Law
School. Professor Maggs is a member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986).
2. 14 U.L.A. 249 (1990).
75
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
might upset a small, well-informed, and well-organized group. Thus, the
broader the Uniform Act, the more opposition it might be expected to create.
An initial result of these considerations was the decision to split the
Uniform Land Transactions Act into several parts, including a much
abbreviated act still called the Uniform Land Transactions Act, and a
number of other acts, including USLTA. The basic cause of the non-
adoption of USLTA was a combination of economic and political factors.
Economically, USLTA favored property buyers over construction enterprises
and holders of dormant mineral claims. Politically, the group it favored,
property buyers, was much more diffuse and unorganized than the groups
it disfavored, construction and energy resource companies. A second
political problem was the basic conservatism of land title lawyers, who
tended to be resistant to change. These problems were compounded by the
combining of the marketable title and construction lien provisions into a
single act. This resulted in consolidating two very strong opposing forces.
Some years later there followed a decision to create three new acts, the
Uniform Construction Lien Act,3 the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests
Act,4 and the Uniform Marketable Title Act,5 each covering part of the
much broader subject area of USLTA. The drafting of separate acts offered
important advantages over the USLTA projects in which I participated. It
allowed the creation of three drafting committees each having more
specialists in the relevant area of law, such as the highly technical area of
mineral interests. It gave the possibility for a second try at accommodating
conflicting stakeholders. It reduced the number of interest groups that each
act would have to satisfy. The best example of the new approach is the
Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act. This Act is based on careful
analysis of existing laws on mineral interests. It incorporates an elaborate
compromise instead of the all or nothing options offered by section 3-301(5)
of USLTA. Under USLTA, if section 3-301(5) is omitted, mineral interests
are cut off by marketable title; if section 3-301(5) is included, mineral
interests survive in full. The compromise in the Uniform Dormant Mineral
Interests Act is designed to appeal to an important interest group-owners
actively engaged in the exploitation of their mineral interests. It allows
them to move ahead without resolving all the problems of outstanding
dormant mineral interests. Another example is the Uniform Construction
Lien Act. It uses "trust funds" to try to reconcile the interests of owners,
lenders, and construction contractors. Therefore, it seeks to overcome the
3. 7 U.L.A. 330 (Supp. 1995).
4. 7A U.L.A. 60 (Supp. 1995).
5. 13 U.L.A. 112 (Supp. 1995).
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conflict of interests that prevented the widespread adoption of USLTA's lien
provisions.
Just as decades of drafting of separate uniform acts (such as the
Uniform Sales Act) preceded the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it seems likely that it will take decades of work on uniform land
legislation before the ultimate goal of a comprehensive uniform land act can
be reached. The various acts that are the descendants of the original
Uniform Land Transaction Act are a great beginning. Eventually the late
Professor Allison Dunham's 6 grand vision of a comprehensive land code
will be realized.
6. Allison Dunham was the co-reporter for the Uniform Land Transactions Act and
Chair of the Special Committee on the Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although neither the Uniform Land Transaction Act ("ULTA"), nor
the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA")2 has been
adopted by any state, both may have had an impact on the way we think
about modernizing state real property law. The Acts have been cited as
* Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in Real Property, University
of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida; Professor of Law Emeritus, Southern Illinois University
School of Law, Carbondale, Illinois. B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, 1960, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama; J.D., cum laude, 1963, University of Miami; LL.M., Sterling Fellow,
1969, Yale University. Ms. Taylor Mattis is a member of the American Law Institute,
serving as advisor to the Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) and as a member of
the Consultative Group to the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes). She also holds
membership in the American Bar Association Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law; Literature and Publications Committee; and is an Associate Articles Editor of Probate
and Property.
The author expresses thanks to her research assistant Jennifer Gomberg.
1. U.L.T.A. (1975).
2. U.S.L.T.A. (1976).
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secondary authority in judicial opinions,3 studied and analyzed in law
review articles,4 and referenced in reporter's notes in various Restate-
3. Gerald Komgold, Seller's Damages from a Defaulting Buyer of Realty: The Influence
of the Uniform Land Transactions Act on the Courts, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1069 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemp-
tion and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1993); Roger W. Andersen, Convey-
ancing Reform: A Great Place to Start, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 333 (1990); Marion
W. Benfield, Jr., The Future Advances Lender: Status Under Present Illinois Law and Under
ULTA and USOLTA, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451; Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected
Party: Evolution or Revolution?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 971 (1992); Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's
Remedies on Default--Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1001 (1992); Alan J. Blocher,
Due-on-Sale in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 49 (1981); Barbara
J. Britzke, Residential Real Estate Transactions: A Comparison of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act and Maryland Law, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 43 (1983); Ronald B. Brown,
Article I of the Uniform Land Transactions Act: Is Inconsistency with the UCC an Unneces-
sary Obstacle?, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585; Jon W. Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REV.
1 (1980); Jon W. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act,
64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976); Jon W. Bruce, The Role Uniform Real Property Acts Have Played
in the Development of American Land Law: Some General Observations, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 331 (1992); Robert D. Brussack, Reform of American Conveyancing Formality, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1981); K. Tate Chambers, Comment, A Comparison Between Article 5
of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act and Present Illinois Mechanics' Lien
Law, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 563; Caryn M. Chittenden, Comment, From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Equity-The Implied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571 (1992); Michael Cox & Michael McCue,
Comment, The Nebraska Construction Lien Act: Which Way to Lien?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 86
(1983); Meredith Craig, Symposium, The Uniform Land Transactions Act and The Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10 STETSON L. REV.
21 (1980); Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Drafter: Allison Dunham, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 569
(1982); Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Statutory Draftsman: The Land Transaction Acts,
1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 549; Allison Dunham, Statutory Reformation of Land Obligations, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Sara E. Dysart, USLTA: Article 5 "Construction Liens"
Analyzed in Light of Current Texas Law on Mechanics' and Materialmen's Liens, 12 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113 (1980); William J. Fields, Housing Defects: Homeowners' Remedies-A
Time for Legislative Action, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 72 (1981); Edwin M. Ginsburg, The
Doctrine of Merger with Respect to Real Estate Transactions: Taking the Bull by the Horns,
16 NOVA L. REV. 1171 (1992); Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Process--A Proposal to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State Law with
the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of the Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061 (1990);
William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1985); James B. Hughes,
Jr., Future Advance Mortgages: Preserving the Benefits and Burdens of the Bargain, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101 (1994); Gerald Korngold, Construction Loan Advances and the
Subordinated Purchase Money Mortgagee: An Appraisal, a Suggested Approach, and the
ULTA Perspective, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 313 (1981); Robert Kratovil, Mortgage Law Today,
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ments.5 This article focuses on the use of these proposed Acts in law
school classes and coursebooks.
Over a decade ago it was noted:
13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 251 (1980); Andrew Lance, Balancing Private and Public
Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426
(1983); Linda M. Libertucci, Comment, Builder's Liability to New and Subsequent Purchas-
ers, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 219 (1991); Peter B. Maggs, Land Records of the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 491; B. Taylor Mattis, The
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article 2-Conveyancing and Recording,
1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 511; John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title
Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 61 (1992); John Mixon & Ira
B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(B), 27
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455 (1992); Sue Ortman, USLTA: Marketable Record Title Act--A
New Title Theory and Its Effect on Texas Law, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 462 (1980); James W.
Pedowitz, Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act--A Commentary, 13 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 696 (1978); James M. Pedowitz, USLTA-ULTA Perspective, 57 TITLE NEWS
23 (1978); Patricia E. Rant, ULTA and Non-Judicial Mortgage Foreclosure in Texas, 12 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1104 (1981); Maureen M. Rayborn, Comment, Uniform Land Transactions Act:
Pennsylvania Property Law and Sellers' Remedies for Breach of Contract for Sale of Real
Estate, 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 577 (1982); Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential
Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1991); David P. Schwartz, Note, BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corporation: Critiquing the Supreme Court's Method of Determining "Reasonably
Equivalent Value" Within the Context of Bankruptcy Foreclosures, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 345
(1995); Jeff Sovem, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the
Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists
under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 13 (1993); Paul Teich, A Second Call for Abolition of
the Rule of Merger by Deed, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 543 (1994); Craig D. Tindall, The
Obligatory Advance Rule in the Construction Lending Context, 12-JAN CONSTRUCTION LAW
13 (1992); Comment, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Areas of Departure
from State Law, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 359 (1978); Note, Real Property-Warranties in the
Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975-Progression or Retrogression for Pennsylvania?,
49 TEMPLE L.Q. 162 (1975).
An interesting spin-off from an idea presented in one of these law review articles
illustrates the value of comparison of a uniform act and present state law. An article dealing
with the formalities of conveyances under USLTA made the point that under the Act, a
writing is required for an effective transfer of an interest in real estate. No such requirement
was found in the Illinois statutes. Mattis, supra, at 514-16. A 45 page law review article
thoroughly analyzed the rather startling situation that no Illinois law prohibits the oral
transfer of land or makes such transfers unenforceable between the parties. Patrick M.
McFadden, Oral Transfers of Land in Illinois, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 667.
5. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.7 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1989); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) §§ 2.4, 3.1 reporters' notes (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1991); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.5 (Preliminary Draft No.
5, 1995).
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The Uniform Commercial Code suffered the same early rejection
that now threatens the proposed uniform property laws. A large part of
the solution for the rejection of the UCC was the widespread teaching
of the UCC in law schools. The same solution is now being used to
counter the rejection of ULTA and USOLTA. Those Acts have already
been the topics of panel discussions by the drafters and other experts at
meetings of property law teachers held during the annual meetings of
the Association of American Law Schools. Many property teachers,
including the author, regularly assign sections of ULTA and USOLTA
for comparison and analysis in the classroom. The better property
casebooks and hornbooks also utilize these Acts. As a result of this
exposure, future generations of lawyers will be familiar with ULTA and
USOLTA and will readily perceive their simplicity.6
The uses of ULTA and USLTA in coursebooks and classrooms vary
from brief presentations of the history of the development of the Acts7 to
informational references to, or quotations of, various provisions.' Some-
times, the use is aimed at supporting a "better view" espoused by an author.
Sometimes, the purpose is to provoke thought on how the provision, if
adopted, would affect judicial decisions previously discussed.' Sometimes,
6. Mattis, supra note 4, at 512.
7. See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
PROPERTY LAW 456-57 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that the Acts have had an indirect impact on
the development of the law although neither has been adopted); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 978-79, 1356 (6th ed. 1990) (suggesting that the Acts
be used as supplemental material); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., PROPERTY 572 (3d ed.
1993); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 155 (1984) (discussing the costs of complexity
and noting that "states have not rushed to adopt" USLTA, among the objects of which are
to reduce the costs of title examination and the risks of title defects).
8. CURTIS J. BERGER & QUINTIN JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 580 (4th
ed. 1993) (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-302); EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA R. KWALL, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 799-801 (3d ed. 1992) (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-
201); id. at 911 (summarizing marketable record title act provisions of U.S.L.T.A. part 3, art.
3).
9. See, e.g., BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 437 (asking whether the ULTA
approach treating installment land contracts as mortgages is the best solution); RICHARD H.
CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 868 (1988) (discussing foreclo-
sure procedures under ULTA); id. at 915-17 (discussing provisions on warranties of quality);
CRIBBET, supra note 7, at 1015-16, 1020, 1031-32, 1075-76, 1207 n.5, 1279-80 (referring to
U.L.T.A. § 2-309 as strongest position so far suggested for implied warranty of quality); id.
at 1281, 1356; DONAHUE, supra note 7, at 574; SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVEN-
KAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 1081, 1099, 1171, 1180 (2d
ed. 1993).
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the Acts are used as richer and creative tools to spur students' thinking.
Examples of the latter treatment are explored in this article.
II. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
At some point during the first-year property law course, the statute of
frauds comes up. In teaching it, and the jurisprudence that goes with first-
year courses generally, I try to lead students to consider whether certain
judge-made doctrines are usurpations of legislative prerogatives.
A typical statute of frauds may provide that "[n]o action shall be
brought... upon any contract for the sale of lands... unless the agreement
... or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing ... ,"' or
"[e]very contract.., for the sale of any lands ... shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof... is in writing ....
Judges apply doctrines of their own creation, such as part performance or
estoppel, to "take" certain situations "out of' the statute of frauds. Do not
courts contradict the legislature when they create and utilize doctrines to
enforce contracts for the sale of land absent a writing? In most states, these
doctrines are not mentioned in the statute, which pretty clearly speaks in
terms of "no action" and "every contract." Here, section 2-201 of the
ULTA makes the point for me. It provides for what, if adopted, would be
a legislative pronouncement of the doctrines.
(a) [E]xcept as provided in subsection (b), a contract to convey real
estate is not enforceable by judicial proceeding unless there is a writing
(b) A contract not evidenced by a writing... is enforceable if:.
(2) the buyer has taken possession of the real estate and has paid
all or a part of the contract price;
(4) either party, in reasonable reliance upon the contract and upon
the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is sought,
has changed his position to the extent that an unreasonable result can be
avoided only by enforcing the contract ....
Students, seeing a legislative enactment of the doctrines that takes the
situation "out of' the general rule of the statute, can be persuaded that the
10. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1995).
11. MiNN. STAT. § 513.05 (1988).
12. U.L.T.A. § 2-201.
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exceptions are properly within the legislative, rather than judicial, domain.
Professor Goldstein uses section 2-201 of ULTA to make a similar point
when he asks, just before quoting the section, whether there are "better
devices than the present statutes of frauds 'to avoid perjury on the one hand
and fraud on the other' ?
' 13
In their coursebook, Real Estate Transfer, Finance and Development,
Professors Nelson and Whitman use ULTA's statute of frauds provision for
a different purpose. 4 They make the point that part performance usually
requires at least two of three acts: payment of part (or all) of the purchase
price; going into possession of the realty; and making substantial improve-
ments. The commissioner's comment is then quoted: "'Mere taking
possession of the real estate is not sufficient to satisfy the statute, but
possession with part payment or possession with the change of position
described in subsection (b)(4) is sufficient.""..5 Nelson and Whitman pose
the query whether the commissioner's comment is consistent with the text
of section 2-201(b)(4). This exercise presents an excellent opportunity for
students to consider the weight of the drafter's commentary in interpreting
uniform statutes. All the while, students may think they are merely studying
real property law. Giving students a hefty dose of jurisprudence or statutory
interpretation in the context of substantive courses can go a long way in
training future lawyers to be professionally competent.
II. OTHER FORMALITIES OF A CONVEYANCE
Section 2-201 of USLTA dispenses with the requirements of an
acknowledgment, seal, and witnesses. Having presented a problem in which
these formalities were omitted 16 and relevant cases, Professors Rabin and
Kwall quote section 2-201 of USLTA and refer to the official comments
following it. They then ask whether dispensing with these formalities takes
care of the issues in the problem posed. They discuss Brussack's arguments
supporting the USLTA position and his suggestion that USLTA would
prevent litigation from arising when these ceremonies are improperly
13. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 70 (Rev. 2d ed. 1988); GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 194-95.
14. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE
TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 38 (4th ed. 1992). These authors cite to ULTA
on 18 pages of the coursebook, and to USLTA on 2 pages, many pages of which cite the
uniform acts numerous times. These citations occur in the first 276 pages of the coursebook
in the part dealing with real estate transfer.
15. Id. (quoting U.L.T.A. § 2-201 cmt. 3)
16. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 773-74.
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performed.17 The student is then asked to consider whether, if all formali-
ties are abolished, other than the requirement of a written instrument signed
by the grantor, issues similar to those in the principal problem would be
more likely to arise."
IV. RISK OF Loss
Careful reading of statutes means learning to discern what a statute
does not provide, as well as what it does. Playing off the Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act ("UVPRA"),19 in comparison with ULTA's
provision dealing with destruction of premises,z° can work well to teach
that lesson. The former, adopted in about a dozen states, specifies the pur-
chaser's remedy when all or a material part of improvements is destroyed
after the execution of a contract of sale but before title or possession has
been transferred.2' It also specifies the purchaser's lack of remedy when
all or any part of improvements is destroyed after title or possession has
been transferred.22 I ask students for UVPRA's solution when, before title
or possession is transferred, a casualty diminishes the value of the improve-
ments only to a nonmaterial extent. Frequently, I get a non-existent
UVPRA solution. Contrasting section 2-406(b)(2) of the ULTA, which
provides for this eventuality, with the UVPRA, which does not, should
clinch the lesson.
Professor Goldstein contrasts the UVPRA's and ULTA's treatments of
risk of loss for a different purpose. The former provides that, when the loss
occurring before title or possession is transferred is material, the vendor
cannot enforce the contract and the purchaser is entitled to recover her down
payment.23 The latter gives the purchaser, under the same circumstances,
the option of cancelling the contract and recovering any down payment or
enforcing the contract and accepting the property with an abatement in
purchase price.24 Goldstein calls for students to think critically about
ULTA by asking "[clan you think of situations in which it would be plainly
17. Id. at 784 (discussing Brussack, supra note 4, at 561). Similarly, the author of this
article took the position that the formality of acknowledgment creates more problems than
it cures. See Mattis, supra note 4, at 528.
18. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 784.
19. U.V.P.R.A. (1935).
20. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b).
21. U.V.P.R.A. § l(a).
22. Id. § l(b).
23. Id. § 1(a).
24. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b)(1).
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unfair to require the seller to give up her property in return for a sharply
reduced price?"2
Professors Rabin and Kwall also compare ULTA with the UVPRA,
noting that ULTA is more comprehensive. The authors quote section 2-406
of ULTA and ask several questions about it, the most provocative of which
is whether the lack of specificity of UVPRA might make it a more attractive
alternative than the ULTA provision.26
Professor Chused quotes section 2-406 of ULTA to illustrate the trend
toward rejecting the traditional rule placing the risk of loss on the buyer
after the execution of a contract to purchase land.' He then focuses on the
buyer's option of price modification or obtaining the benefit of seller's
insurance coverage under ULTA. Chused suggests that ULTA's allocation
of insurance proceeds to the buyer, when the value of the premises has not
been affected by the casualty, may be inappropriate. This suggestion,
together with background facts Chused has uncovered 28 about his chosen
lead case,29 makes the students' critical examination of the issue irresist-
ible.
V. RMEDIES
A. Specific Performance
The old notion of the specific performance remedy was that mutuality
required the remedy to be available to sellers because it was available to
buyers. To illustrate a setting in which the old rule has become difficult to
sustain, Professor Chused uses a case in which a buyer breached a contract
to buy a unit in a high-rise condominium project. Indeed, the court denied
25. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 64; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 236. The issue is
also discussed in the hornbook by ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
743-44 (2d ed. 1993).
26. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 1040-41.
27. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 847-48.
28. Chused frequently enriches and brings reality to his material by digging up
background information concerning the lives and histories of the characters in the cases. For
example, through a telephone conversation with the buyers of a condominium unit, Chused
found out why they really breached their contract. Id. at 822 (discussing Centex Homes
Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)). Chused also discovered why
the seller of the condominium unit sought specific performance. Id. Through the transcript
of the trial testimony of the sellers' agent in Skelly Oil Co. v. Ashmore, 365 S.W.2d 582
(Mo. 1963), Chused discovered the value to the buyer of a building that was destroyed by
fire between execution of the contract and closing. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 850.
29. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 834 (discussing Skelly Oil Co., 365 S.W.2d at 582).
1102 [Vol. 20
85
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Mattis
the remedy to the seller.30 In his notes following the case, Chused quotes
sections 2-506 and 2-511 of ULTA, which treat the seller's action for the
price differently from the buyer's right to obtain title. The student, when
asked how the case would be decided under ULTA, is led to consider the
ramifications of abandoning the mutuality of remedy doctrine.
Professor Goldstein notes that "section 2-506(b) of the ULTA would
give seller specific performance only if she is unable after reasonable effort
to resell ... at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate
the effort would be unavailing. '32 Section 2-504 provides that if seller
resells the land reasonably and in good faith, her damages are measured
from the time of resale rather than from the time of breach.33 Professor
Goldstein wants the student to consider whether the two sections, taken
together, will produce results different from those produced by seeking
specific performance and damages under existing law.34
B. Seller's Obligation to Provide Marketable Title and Buyer's
Remedies for Breach of that Obligation
In their assignment about failure of marketable title, Professors Rabin
and Kwall present a problem and cases with which to solve the problem.
At the conclusion of the cases, the authors set forth the substance of the
relevant ULTA sections on seller's obligation to provide marketable title at
the time of conveyance. 35 The student is then given an opportunity to
contrast ULTA's provisions with leading case law and apply both to solve
the problem.
When a seller is unable to convey because of a title defect of which the
seller had no knowledge at the time of entering into the contract, should the
buyer only be entitled to restitution of any amounts paid on the contract
price and incidental damages; or should the buyer be entitled to loss of
bargain damages, regardless of seller's good faith? Rabin and Kwall use
section 2-510(b) of the ULTA to illustrate the former position,36 derived
from the eighteenth century English case of Flureau v. Thornhill.37 In
30. Centex Homes Corp., 320 A.2d at 194.
31. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 828-29.
32. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226.
33. U.L.T.A. § 2-504.
34. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226.
35. RABIN & KwALL, supra note 8, at 910-11 (citing U.L.T.A. §§ 2-304, -305, -510).
36. Id. at 883, 911.
37. 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 226 (discussing
ULTA position limiting buyer to restitution where seller is unable to convey because of title
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contrast, the California Civil Code provides for loss of bargain damages in
the case of a breaching seller (as well as of a breaching buyer), regardless
of seller's knowledge of a title defect when seller executed the contract.38
The authors ask the student to consider which rule is preferable. 9
Discussions about remedies can lead students to think about the
practical ramifications to plaintiffs of civil wrongs, the proper role of
defendants' culpability, and where theoretical consistency fits into the
picture.
VI. RECORDING
Property law teachers sometimes use recording acts to emphasize the
nature of acquisition of title by adverse possession. Recording acts usually
provide that "instruments" or "conveyances" must be recorded in order for
the taker of an interest in real property to maintain first-in-time priority
against subsequent takers. If A's interest is acquired by possession adverse
to 0, it is not derived from an instrument or conveyance; rather it is an
original title. Hence, it is not affected by the recording act. If 0 later
conveys to B, even though A is no longer in possession, B is not protected.
Rejecting that result, USLTA provides that "a purchaser for value who has
recorded his conveyance [B] also acquires the real estate free of any
subsisting adverse claim, [e.g., that of the adverse possessor A] ... unless
the adverse claim is ... inconsistent with the record title to the extent the
use or occupancy would be revealed by reasonable inspection or inquiry."'
This would mean that the adverse possessor not wishing to remain in
possession would have to bring a quiet title action to place her title on
record to avoid the possibility of a recording subsequent purchaser's
prevailing over her. Professors Rabin and Kwall use this context to
stimulate the discussion of whether the USLTA rule should be generally
adopted. In the process, students revisit the basic difference between
derivative title, acquired by an instrument or conveyance, and original title.
Sailing on a different tack in the sea of recording, Professor Browder
and coauthors explore the mechanics of recording.41 They quote from the
prefatory note of USLTA, indicating that USLTA gives "[c]onsiderable
defect unknown to seller at time of entering into contract).
38. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3306, 3307 (Deering 1996).
39. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 883.
40. U.S.L.T.A. § 3-202(a)(2) (emphasis added).
41. OLIN L. BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 846-47 (5th ed. 1989).
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attention... to the mechanics of the recording system and to the division
of functions among the various participants in the process." 42
The recording officer is given discretion in the development of systems
for modernization and automation of recording operations and is given
the responsibility for moving toward a system of at least limited
geographic indexing. At the same time, in anticipation of the eventual
computerization of the recording system, the recording office is relieved
of all responsibility for making conclusions about the legal effects of
documents submitted for recording. The office of state recorder is
created to allow for coordination and sharing of experience in the
modernization of recording practices.43
After stating that, unfortunately, state legislatures have shown little
interest in USLTA or its concepts,44 the authors imply a possible rea-
son-at least for the lack of interest in modernizing the mechanics of the
recording system. In many areas of the nation, there is little search activity
in the average recorder's office. Title plants, owned by abstract or title
insurance companies, have taken over most searches. They arrange their
records on a tract-index basis, obviating chain-of-title problems that so
plague first-year law students trying to understand grantor-grantee searches.
The importance of expensive reform of public records is diminished by
computerization and tract indexing in the private sector.
VII. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACTS
One topic usually introduced in first-year property law courses is the
various marketable record title acts adopted in some eighteen states.
Informing students about the attempts to limit title searches to a reasonable
period of time can be a daunting task. Some coursebooks attempt to do this
by presenting a case or two discussing one or more particular provisions of
a particular state statute. At least three coursebooks make efficient use of
USLTA as a teaching device by setting forth Article 3, Part 3, "Marketable
Record Title," in its entirety, or virtually in its entirety.45 In the clearest
42. Id. (quoting U.S.L.T.A. prefatory note).
43. U.S.L.T.A. prefatory note.
44. The authors note that § 119.07 of the Florida Statutes is an exception. It provides
for protection of computer software developed by public agencies to facilitate access to
records. BROWDER, supra note 41, at 847.
45. Id. at 895-99; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 581-85; DONAHUE, supra note 7, at
622-24. The Donahue coursebook also sets forth USLTA curative provisions. Id at 620-21.
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form of statutory exposition, this part of USLTA gives students a model
marketable title act, which is derived from legislation originally adopted in
Michigan,46 and subsequently in several other states. The Donahue
coursebook follows quotation of the relevant provisions of USLTA with four
problems exploring whether the Act would render a title marketable and
whether a searcher could safely rely on a search back to "the root of
title."'47 The coursebook by Bruce and Ely asks questions to test the
students' understanding of the Act and to explore possible constitutional
problems.48
A fourth coursebook sets forth the prefatory note to USLTA's
marketable record title provisions, describing what the Act attempts to
accomplish.49 In notes following the quotation, the authors then discuss
whether a thirty or forty-year time period is preferable, who benefits and
what interests are protected under the Act, and exclusions from the Act.50
VIII. EXCEPTIONS AND RESERVATIONS
Distinctions between exceptions and reservations in deeds have long
been arcane. Cases dealing with whether an exception or reservation can be
made in favor of a third-party are grist for the mill of study about the
creation of servitudes. In Rabin and Kwall's first-year property law
coursebook, the authors present a problem containing such an issue,51
followed by relevant cases. 2 The clear solution of section 2-204(b) of
USLTA is quoted: "An exception or reservation of an interest in real estate
may be made in favor of a person not a party to the conveyance or who has
no other interest in the real estate."53 The authors follow with the ques-
tion, provocative to a first-year law student: "If a court faced with the
46. See U.S.L.T.A. § 3 pt. 3, cmt.
47. DONAHUE, supra note 7, at 624-25.
48. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 585. This coursebook also contains excerpts from
Report, Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper Role - Services -
Compensation, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 581, 595-98 (1979), referring to USLTA's
marketable title act as deserving "serious consideration by the organized bar and state
legislatures." BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, at 577, 579.
49. BERGER & JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 947-48.
50. Id. at 950-53.
51. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 362.
52. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972)
(holding that a "reservation" can be made in favor of third-party, but an "exception" cannot
vest part of grantor's interest in third-party); Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309
(N.Y. 1987) (finding no reservation in favor of third-party).
53. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 8, at 378 (quoting U.S.L.T.A. § 2-204(b)).
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Principal Problem wanted to follow the rule of section 2-204(b), could it
draw any support from this section even if the legislature has not adopted
this section?"'54 Indeed, courts have drawn support from the ULTA and
USLTA sections, even though the Acts remain unadopted by legislatures.
55
IX. RECASTING LAND FINANCING DEVICES
Professor Goldstein uses ULTA's goal in its secured transactions
sections to kindle students' thinking about whether the immense variety of
land finance devices could be unified and made more coherent. Goldstein
leads students through the history of mortgage law from the dead pledge
through the equity of redemption and foreclosure developments and
discusses the deed of trust, the installment land contract, the lease with
option to buy, and the equitable mortgage. Doctrinal distinctions, such as
title, intermediate, and lien theory of mortgages, with little practical
consequence, further complicate the picture. At the conclusion of this
section in his coursebook, Goldstein's discussion of ULTA's Article 3, "Se-
cured Transactions," is refreshing. Article 3 is aimed at consolidating the
various forms of land finance into a single, integrated system. A simple and
unified structure would "'go forward with greater certainty and less
transaction costs,"' than the present variety of land finance forms, often used
to obscure their intent to create security interests in real estate.56 The fact
that the ULTA has not been adopted by any state should not obscure the
drafters' vision that the proposed law could provide a better way.57
54. Id. A similar question is posed with regard to the ULTA provision that all
covenants of title, whether present or future, run in favor of remote grantees. U.L.T.A. § 2-
313(a). Can this provision be used for the benefit of a remote grantee even though no
legislature has adopted it?
55. Korngold, supra note 3, at 1071-73.
56. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 419 (quoting introductory comment to Article 3 of
ULTA).
57. Goldstein uses other sections of ULTA to describe, clarify, summarize, or compare
various approaches. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 96 (citing U.L.T.A. § 2-301-re-
jection of time is of the essence enforcement); id. at 128-29 (citing U.L.T.A. §§ 2-504, -506
-innovations in vendors' remedies); id. at 178-79 (citing U.L.T.A. § 1-309--abolition of
doctrine of merger, U.L.T.A. § 2-402-possibilities that preclosing undertakings may govern
post-closing rights; U.L.T.A. § 2-306-implication of title warranties in deed; U.L.T.A. §§
2-308, -309-warranties of quality); id. at 397 (citing U.L.T.A. § 3-208-prevention of lender
double-dipping by exercise of due-on-sale acceleration and collection of prepayment penalty
from protected party); id. at 405 (citing U.L.T.A. § 1-313-exception to holder in due course
status favoring protected parties executing second or more junior liens); see also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 280-81 (discussing abolition of merger doctrine and implication of title
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Professor Chused compares the holding of a leading Indiana case"8
with ULTA's definition of "secu'rity interest," requiring the use of foreclo-
sure in installment land contracts and all settings in which land is used as
collateral for credit.59
X. CONCLUSION
This author is not so optimistic as she was in 1981' about teaching
ULTA and USLTA in law schools as a method of countering their rejection
by state legislatures. The use of the uniform acts in law classrooms and
coursebooks has achieved admirable goals tangential to the purpose of the
Uniform Commissioners in undertaking their task.
The use of ULTA and USLTA in classrooms and coursebooks has
provided a context for thinking about the proper roles of the legislative and
judicial branches; for preventing or curing caseblindness (perhaps better
termed "statute blindness") as students learn to read statutes; for interpreting
statutes, including considering the weight of drafters' commentary; for
thinking about the efficacy of proposed solutions to solve perceived
problems without creating worse ones; and of practical or economic
ramifications of civil wrongs and remedies. If the uniform acts, though
unadopted, facilitate these and other opportunities for learning, good for
them and the coursebook authors and classroom teachers who use them.
warranties in deeds).
58. Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974)
(holding a conditional land sales contract to be in the nature of a secured transaction, the
provisions of which are subject to all proper and just remedies at law and in equity).
59. CHUSED, supra note 9, at 854, 863-64. Chused analyzes the ULTA's definition of
"security interest," recognizing that legal arrangements established under one legal construct,
like a lease, may actually serve the purposes of a quite different legal construct, like a
mortgage. Id. at 870. "But [the ULTA] is very indefinite about the circumstances in which
the language used in the documents will be 'pierced."' Id.
60. See Mattis, supra note 4, at 512; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA)' is an idea whose
time has come. Political and market conditions now indicate that we will
have universal private foreclosure laws across the nation in the relatively
near future. There will be increasing pressure to have these laws "relative-
ly" uniform. In fact, ULSIA is likely to be the "least uniform" approach to
responding to the pressure for reform. If ULSIA is not seriously pursued
by states with existing foreclosure practices that require judicial sale, it is
quite possible that the Congress will make the change for them. Federally
preemptive legislation likely will deprive the states of the discretion to tailor
a private foreclosure bill that effectively balances political and economic
interests in the given state or region. ULSIA, although written as a Uniform
Act, need not be adopted precisely in uniform language. It should be the
preferred alternative.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR UNIFORM LENDING PRACTICES
The basic argument for a uniform approach to foreclosures and other
secured lender's remedies has existed for a long time. It can be stated in
two words: "Money talks." It is the same argument that led every
American state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code, including Article
9, the Personal Property Financing Act. One wonders what is so special
about real estate finance that the argument, to date, has not prevailed.2
I. U.L.S.I.A., 7A U.L.A. 220 (Supp. 1995). ULSIA is similar to provisions appearing
as Article 3 of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, but in 1985 NCCUSL elected to establish
a separate land security act and made certain amendments to the original Article 3 in
formulating ULSIA. While the Uniform Land Transaction Act was initially intended to be
a single, uniform statute embracing the whole of land law, by 1975 it was clear that a series
of discrete statutes would better serve the states' interests. In 1978 the National Conference
created a Joint Editorial Board on Real Property Acts to provide coordinated oversight.
Uniform regulation of real property acts was driven by the need to modernize and simplify
the laws applicable to secured real property transactions consistent with the growth of the
secondary market for real estate mortgages, to encourage increased primary lending, to bene-
fit borrowers in our increasingly mobile society by providing uniformity, and to reduce cost
to all elements of society upon foreclosure. U.L.S.I.A. prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 208-09;
see also James M. Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure Under ULSIA (Uniform Land Security
Interest Act), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 495 (1992).
2. Although ULSIA has largely been enacted as the land security law of British
Columbia, Canada, it has not been enacted in recognizable form in any American jurisdiction.
It has influenced revisions of real estate laws in a number of states, particularly California
and Virginia. It is now under active consideration by law reform groups in a number of
states, including Connecticut, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, and Kansas.
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The argument is one of competitive advantage for available capital.
Money for real estate projects comes from national and international sources
unrelated to the location of the project. Lenders who supply this money are
more likely to lend it if they can readily predict the performance of their
investment. The "babble" of real estate foreclosure provisions in American
law is a significant impediment to making these predictions.' One would
assume, therefore, that fewer lenders would be willing to commit large sums
to real estate lending, making the supply lower and thereby raising the
cost.
4
One would further assume that parties interested in attracting capital
into the real estate marketplace and, necessarily, away from other investment
choices, would work to provide the most uniform and predictable system of
legal controls possible. There are other good arguments for uniformity:
overall fairness, predictability of title, avoidance of misunderstandings, and
application of collected wisdom. But the argument that this author expects
will ultimately carry the day is the basic argument of economic efficiency.
Why then, have we not seen uniformity develop to date? One answer
is, of course, that we have. There has been creeping uniformity in real
estate lending practices over the past twenty-five years, ever since the
private secondary market for housing loans got a "kick start" with the
establishment of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC")
and the reorganization of the Federal National Mortgage Association
("FNMA") in the early 1970s.
But complete uniformity, similar to the UCC model, has not arrived.
The explanation as to why development in this area is slower than in the
areas regulated by the UCC lies in a whole variety of social institutions
affected by real estate and not affected by other investment choices.
Although there may be some argument as to the future, there is general
agreement that in the past, land meant something special in our legal system.
Beginning in 1066, the ownership of land meant holding of status in society;
land ownership, seizin, was the essence of nobility. Since that era, and to
3. For a summary of the widely varying real estate foreclosure laws state-by-state, see
SIDNEY A. KEYLES, FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES, A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST
(1995).
4. As most commercial real estate lenders are also insurance companies who do business
in various states, they are understandably reluctant to publicly criticize borrower-protective
foreclosure laws in these states. They have voiced their concerns privately to the author,
however, and have admitted that in some cases they either devalue a proposed loan or avoid
making it at all because of the foreclosure laws that would govern a default. Some lenders
have policies (again, unstated) of refusing to lend in given states for the same reasons.
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some degree because of it, our legal system has treated land ownership and
land transactions with special rules. Land today is more than a commodity;
it is a home, a place; it is raw potential. It is privacy. To some, it is
freedom.
As our country spread across the continental landscape, land laws in
individual states developed to reflect the special political values that the
citizens of those states held.5 Because they were pioneers, who chose to
leave their homes to strike out to new territories, these citizens often had
values that differed markedly from the values held by those who remained
at home. Needless to say, the special economic needs of a developing
frontier created the need for other unique laws, and as individual states
developed, the interaction of these specialized laws, together with accidents
of time and place, created other legal institutions and approaches that
differed not only from the eastern states, but from those of other states in
the same region as well.6
These specialized state laws spawned social conditions that made them
resistant to out of state pressures for change. Specialized institutions grew
to deal with transactions in land according to the special needs of individual
state legal systems. Today, these institutions, including title insurers, local
lenders, appraisers, and brokers, regard with suspicion and distrust proposals
for sweeping reforms that would do away with the many specialized rules.
Although, job security is an issue, one need not ascribe such crass
motivations to those who oppose conversion to a uniform system. Even
those who are most secure are nevertheless comfortable with what they have
and suspicious of the unknown. Unlike UCC-style transactions, when
people think of land, they do not just think of commerce. They have
deeper, richer values at stake, and they are much less likely to accept change
for the sake of commerce alone.
Nevertheless, change has come, and change will continue. The
demands of commerce simply are too strong. In fact, perhaps the special
nature of real estate in our society also is disappearing. Both as a cause and
effect of the securitization movement described below, land increasingly is
becoming regarded as a commodity.
5. See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption
and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 299-307 (1993).
6. See Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection Over Credit, 71 IowA L. REV. 1, 6, 12-14
(1985).
1112 [Vol. 20
95
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Randolph
IRI. UNIFORM LENDING INSTRUMENTS: THE FIRST PHASE
Faced with the reality that vested interests in every state had strong
reasons to "protect their turf' and resist changes in their individual
jurisdiction's real estate practices, and lacking, at the time, the convincing
economic evidence of an established investor's pool, the "true believers"
who started the private secondary market worked instead to bring about
uniformity of contract.
The story has been told many times,7 and the punch line is something
that we all know quite well. Almost ninety percent of the home mortgages
written in the United States today are written on the uniform mortgage
instruments promulgated jointly by FNMA and FHLMC. These instruments
spurred the development of a vast international financial web that delivers
money from, say, an Arab oil sheikdom to the buyers of a two bedroom
cottage in Peoria, all because uniform instruments make it possible for
financial intermediaries to assure the sheikdom of a reasonably predictable
(and therefore secure) investment performance. Because the sheikdom is in
the market, the Peoria buyers gets money when they want it at terms they
can afford. They lose their right to bargain over various contract terms they
probably do not understand anyway and likely would not have bargained
over if they could!
Why did we not see a development of uniform lending practices in the
commercial lending market parallel to those in the housing market during
the same time frame? Initially, it could be said that the commercial loans
were more difficult to standardize. However, the difference probably was
due to the involvement of the federal government in housing loans. As part
of the New Deal, the federal government became deeply involved in housing
finance, with the objective of maintaining stability in housing opportunity,
7. See, e.g., Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of
Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397
(1972); James E. Murray & Henry L. Judy, The Federal National Mortgage Association and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Uniform Multifamily Mortgage Instruments, 33
Bus. LAW. 2302 (1978); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Home
Improvement Loan Instruments: A Commentary and Critique, 16 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.
546 (1981); Robin P. Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market: A Catalyst for Change in
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986).
8. See generally, Arthur W. Liebold, Jr., Uniform Conventional Mortgage Documents:
FHLMC Style, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435, 436 (1972); James E. Murray, The
Developing National Mortgage Market: Some Reflections and Projections, 7 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 441, 443-45 (1972); Diana G. Browne, The Private Mortgage Insurance
Industry, the Thrift Industry and the Secondary Mortgage Market: Their Interrelationships,
12 AKRON L. REV. 631, 644 (1979).
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which it saw as a key to a healthy and optimistic consumer class. First, the
Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), and later the Veteran's Adminis-
tration ("VA"), loan programs became dominant factors in housing finance.
In fact, the federal government even established the "thrift" industry as a
vehicle to carry out these housing subsidy programs. Later, of course, the
thrifts and the banks moved to conventional lending as well. It is likely that
private lenders, the banks and thrifts that processed insured loans with
relatively standard provisions, tended to follow the same basic contract
format in preparing documents for conventional housing loans. They
therefore were receptive to the development of uniform lending instruments
for use in the secondary market.
The government has not been involved with commercial loans in the
same way it has been involved with housing. Consequently, different
lenders, primarily major commercial banks and insurance companies, made
most of the commercial real estate loans. Each individual loan represented
a significant economic risk to the lender, and therefore, the lender worked
hard to limit risk and adopted lending practices with which it felt most
comfortable. There was no particular need for uniformity, and there were
no established formats to use as guides. Consequently, the commercial real
estate market was not as readily adaptable to the requirements of the
"money talks" argument as the housing market.
Many commercial lenders in the late 70s and early 80s argued that
commercial real estate lenders were too idiosyncratic to ever be bottled in
standard formats. There really was nothing about the variety of laws among
the various states that prevented commercial lenders from doing the same
thing that housing lenders did. They just did not see it in their individual
interests to do so.
Another important obstacle to the development of the commercial
secondary market was the lack of data about the performance of commercial
loans. Major lenders regarded this information as proprietary, as it gave
them the ability to make risk/return decisions in a competitive market that
others, lacking the same data, might not be able to make. In the housing
arena, of course, the dominance of FHA and VA lending, and the readily
available data as to the performance of those loans, made it possible for
market makers to predict performance more readily.
Then came the late 80s, and the cozy, closeted world of commercial
lending came tumbling down. Whether the root cause was deregulation,
economic "cowboys," tax reform, or just endemic carelessness finally
showing through, all lenders in all segments were devastated. The good
projects were taken down by the bad ones. No one survived unscathed. In
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this bleak landscape, there was room for new ideas to bloom. And we saw
the development of the "securitized" commercial mortgage.
One important source of product in the securitized lending market was
the very economic devastation that gave it room to grow. The Resolution
Trust Company ("RTC") came to market with major securitized lending
packages as a strategy to liquidate its far flung inheritance of commercial
loans. The huge RTC offerings both defined and legitimized the securitized
mortgage market by providing enough economic activity to permit trading
institutions to develop. Once they developed, these institutions were able
to approach other institutions who had survived the 80s, but only barely, and
had a surfeit of loans, many of them under-performing, that they needed to
"cash out" in order to move ahead whether or not they intended to remain
in real estate lending.
Due to the special nature of the circumstances which gave the
securitized lending movement its greatest push, the mortgage loans that
traded in these transactions have not been written on uniform documents.
But now that market institutions have been formed, the push for predictable
performance has taken over. The "securitized" mortgage permits far less
negotiation. There probably is less uniformity at present than there will be
in the future because market factors have yet to work completely. But
securitized loans are more and more meeting uniform standards. Perhaps
securitized loans would not have been able to compete effectively with the
comfortable relationships and well-established and varied practices of
traditional commercial lenders. But many of those lenders are out of the
business, and others are just returning. There has been adequate time for
growth of an independent securitized commercial mortgage market, even
without the significant presence of the federal government that sheltered the
securitized home mortgage market in its infancy.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR PRiVATE FORECLOSURE REMEDIES
The arguments in favor of private, non-judicial foreclosure are many
and have been made before.' All four arguments can be summarized as
follows. First, the cost of private foreclosure is about one-tenth the cost of
9. See, e.g., Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security
Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289 (1995) (attacking on what the author views
as ill conceived and antiquated state mortgage laws); Jo Anne Bradner, The Secondary
Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J. 971, 993-
1003 (1987).
1996] 1115
98
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
judicial foreclosure."° We should evaluate this argument carefully from the
perspective of practical reality in the marketplace. Most real estate defaults
are "worked out." Either the borrower transfers the property "in lieu of
foreclosure" in exchange for avoidance of deficiency, or the borrower
actually avoids loss of the property entirely by restructuring the debt. This
is true of both commercial and residential financing. In the "bad times" of
the 1980s, however, actual foreclosure of troubled real estate investments
became necessary in far greater numbers than had been the case for some
time. Lenders started to take a serious look at the additional cost such
foreclosures added to the bottom line. Judicial foreclosures require far more
of an attorney's time and, of course, generally take longer. Both of these
tend to run up costs.
Lenders complain that these increased costs of foreclosure are
ultimately passed on to borrowers." The author candidly doubts that this
is really the case.'2 The number of foreclosures is really a very small
percentage of real estate loans in place, and surely many other factors
control the pricing of these loans to a far greater degree than the tiny
increment of costs associated with foreclosures. Further, in many jurisdic-
tions, costs of foreclosure are recoverable as part of the debt. Finally, the
preforeclosure sale cost is probably only a relatively small factor in the
overall cost of dealing with defaulted property. Cost of management of the
"real estate owned" department and costs of resale, which would be the
same either in a judicial foreclosure or nonjudicial foreclosure state,
probably are far greater than foreclosure costs themselves.
Although lenders may not be able to pass the costs of judicial
foreclosures directly to borrowers, there is little doubt that they exist, and
the costs are borne by more than the lenders. All of us, through our support
of the court system, are called upon to supply the judges, bailiffs, clerks,
sheriffs, and courtrooms involved in the judicial foreclosure practice. Again,
these costs may be small when compared to court costs overall, but they
10. See Geis, supra note 9, at 300 and authorities cited.
11. Kahn & Yavas, Office of Real Estate Research, The Economic Role of Foreclosure
(ORER Paper No. 90) (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
12. For an economic analysis consistent with the author's views on this issue, see
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489
(1993). The author does not necessarily endorse Professor Schill's conclusion that strong
mortgagor protections serve the salutary function of driving risk averse lenders to acquire
mortgage insurance - thus more properly distributing the risk of a borrower's default among
all participants in the mortgage market. The author believes that borrowers should be held
responsible for the payment of their contracted debts.
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clearly exist. And they may in fact be paying for a system that is unneeded
and leads to greater economic waste of other kinds.
Second, judicial foreclosure takes more time than private foreclosure,
leading to waste.' 3 In most jurisdictions, judicial foreclosure will take four
months at a minimum, and often as long as eight months to a year.
14
Delays arise primarily due to calendaring difficulties at the courthouse, not
because the issues at stake require elaborate discovery and motion practice.
The "waste" concern here represents more than economic waste to the
lender itself, although that is certainly part of the lender's concern. The
community at large has a significant concern about the economic viability
of each plot of real estate, as each plot represents an important piece of the
overall capital available to the economic society in the community. If
buildings deteriorate, if landscaping disappears, if fires occur, if "crack
houses" arise, the community at large is directly affected. The longer a
foreclosure property languishes in the hands of a defaulted borrower, the
more likely it becomes that these kinds of things will happen.
Lenders have the option, of course, of seizing property through
receivership to prevent this kind of waste. But receiverships add additional
costs that lenders might not be willing to incur. And the concern here is not
simply about lenders. It is more difficult for society at large to protect itself
from deterioration, even though it may pay the ultimate price.
We should remember that, typically, a borrower faced with foreclosure
has already exhausted many avenues that might lead to the cure of the
problem. The borrower is virtually at the end of the rope. Shortening the
remaining length of the rope is unlikely to make a dramatic difference to the
borrower, but it may make a significant difference both to the lender and
others with an interest in the property. If the borrower truly had a
significant chance at rehabilitation, it is very likely the lender would not be
foreclosing. Lenders do not want foreclosure property, they want healthy
borrowers.
Third, where there is a significant borrower's interest, the borrower can
force a judicial proceeding. Persons supporting judicial foreclosure
frequently make the argument that borrowers who are concerned with
uncertainty as to the appropriateness of foreclosure, or other parties who
wish to challenge priorities, are deprived of a significant opportunity to do
so because of the rapid and summary nature of the foreclosure process.
13. This has been a particularly popular argument with parties supporting preemptive
federal foreclosure legislation. See, e.g., Bradner, supra note 9, at 995-1000.
14. See Geis, supra note 9, at 321-23.
1996] 1117
100
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
Lenders respond that such borrowers have the right to enjoin the foreclosure
and raise the issues in a lawsuit.
In fact, the process of enjoining a private foreclosure can be a very
expensive process in many jurisdictions.15 Sometimes a borrower is
required to post a rather extensive bond. As the borrower may also be faced
with attorney's fees, and as the borrower likely would not be in the situation
in the first place if the borrower had extensive assets, an injunction likely
would be impossible as a practical matter even in cases where it would be
appropriate.
The author believes that states moving toward private foreclosure may
want to rethink the standards for injunction of such foreclosures in order to
provide a more realistic right to contest foreclosures when there is just
cause. But there is another "brake" on inappropriate foreclosures, the right
of a borrower to sue a lender for wrongful foreclosure or even to contest the
validity of the title created by the foreclosure sale.
States considering enactment of private foreclosure statutes might give
consideration to these adjustments to the current state of affairs relating to
injunctions and other remedies for wrongful foreclosures. Although justice
would be served by providing reasonable remedies here, the number of cases
in which a wrongful foreclosure is likely to arise is a small percentage of
overall foreclosures, most of which are uncontested as a practical matter.
Consequently, concerns in this area should not justify avoiding the private
foreclosure remedy altogether.
Fourth, private foreclosure can be tailored to avoid inappropriate
deficiency claims. We should differentiate between a rightful foreclosure,
where title is sold in satisfaction of a debt claim, and the deficiency claim
that follows such a foreclosure. The real concern of many who support
judicial foreclosure is the concern that borrowers may be exposed to an
inappropriate deficiency judgment by a rapid, inadequately noticed or
managed sale, without appropriate judicial supervision.' 6  When such
persons resist moving to private foreclosure formats entirely as a response
to concern about deficiency judgments, their aim is askew.
Most lenders who foreclose on real estate have little or no expectation
of having meaningful deficiency claims, and, in states where the law so
requires, cheerfully forfeit deficiency rights in exchange for the opportunity
15. The procedures are summarized and criticized in GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 535-38 (3d ed. 1994).
16. See Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price
Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosures Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843 (1980).
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to have a fast, final, and inexpensive private foreclosure.17 If lenders
believe that the borrower has the capacity to respond to a deficiency claim,
they always have the option to foreclose judicially. No state requires private
foreclosure as the sole remedy available to lenders. Judicial foreclosure is
always available."
Certainly, any state moving to a private foreclosure format would have
the option, consistent with ULSIA or any other statutory format, to restrict
deficiency judgments by requiring judicial review of any proposed judgment
to ascertain that the property sold at private foreclosure for a "fair value" or
to even prohibit deficiency judgments. 9 ULSIA, for instance, prohibits
deficiency claims against homeowners who are foreclosed privately," as
do many private foreclosure statutes around the country.
Although lenders have lobbied in some states to protect their deficiency
rights in private foreclosure situations,2' the fact is that the trade of
unlimited deficiencies for private foreclosure is a political exchange that
most lenders would find quite palatable.?
In short, looking at the overall pattern of mortgage loan failures and the
practices of mortgage lenders nationwide, the cost of judicial foreclosure is
17. See Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in
Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151 (1982); John Mixon, Deficiency
Judgments Following Home Mortgage Foreclosure: An Anachronism That Increases
Personal Tragedy, Impedes Regional, Economic Recovery, and Means Little to Lenders, 22
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1 (1991). Examples of statutory schemes that bar deficiency judgments
following private foreclosure include: ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1990); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33-814(E) (1990); CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 580(d) (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 33 61.24.010, .040 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
18. It should be noted that a few states, like ULSIA, bar deficiency judgments absolutely
in the case of purchase money mortgages against owner occupied residential property, see,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45.21.38 (1991); OR.
REv. STAT. 88.070 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 44-8-20 to -25 (1983 & Supp.
1995), or in cases of purchase money mortgages of any kind, CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 580(b).
19. For an exhaustive summary of the many devices used to control deficiency
judgments, most of which do or could apply to private or judicial foreclosures equally, see
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 579-609.
20. U.L.S.I.A. § 511(b); see John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antidefieciency Relieffor
Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455 (1992).
21. In a recent attempt to adopt ULSIA in Connecticut, for example, an important
stumbling block was the last minute opposition by mortgage lenders who were unwilling to
accept even the limited restrictions on "protected party" deficiency judgments provided for
under the Act.
22. Such a "trade" has already been made in a number of states. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. 34.20.100 (1990); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(E) (1990); CAL. CIV. P. CODE §
580(d); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 61.24.010, .040.
1996] 1119
102
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
far out of proportion to the number of borrowers truly protected from unfair
or overreaching foreclosure practices. The interests of these borrowers could
be protected adequately by "fine tuning" private foreclosure practices to
permit practical injunctions, suits for wrongful foreclosure, and meaningful
protection against unfair deficiency claims.23 With these protections in
place, there are few policy grounds justifying the continued cost and delay
to the system of judicial foreclosure.
V. FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THE INTERESTS OF UNIFORMITY
A. Early Intervention
Federal involvement with private finance dates back to Alexander
Hamilton. There has always been a strong government interest in the well
being of the lending climate in the nation. In recent history, however, the
most dramatic federal intervention in private money markets occurred in the
1930s with the "New Deal" activity.24 As described above, the primary
involvement of the federal government in private real estate markets at this
time was in the housing finance area. Institutions created at that time have
continued to influence the character and development of the private real
estate economy ever since.
B. 1980s Preemption Activity
As the secondary market became more of a success in delivering
housing money across the nation, it became apparent that certain state laws
were not only a drag on the system, they became actual bars to its
functioning. The answer was simple. The federal government had already
committed hugely to the development of a successful housing finance
market, so it was easy to make the argument to Congress that it should
preempt inconvenient local laws that were major impediments. After all, the
"American Dream" was at stake.
The "breakthrough" legislation was certainly the Depositor Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDIMAC"), 5 which
23. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 579-609.
24. For a summary of the twentieth century history of federal intervention, see
Alexander, supra 5, at 310-23. Alexander contends that there was virtually no direct federal
involvement in real estate lending until the Twentieth Century. There has, of course, always
been a profound federal presence in banking regulation, from which most real estate finance
sources emanate. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161-62 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a).
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preempted dramatically all state usury laws on institutional first lien
residential mortgage loans and made significant changes to other usury
restrictions as well.26
DIDIMAC "opened the floodgates" in many jurisdictions for secondary
market money to flow in. It was enacted at an historically high point in
interest rates, caused at least in part by the Arab Oil Embargo of the 70s.
Money simply was not available within the limits set by many state statutory
and constitutional lending limits. But money was certainly available to be
loaned at higher rates, vast stores of it resting in bank accounts controlled
by foreign beneficiaries of the oil crisis, among others, who were looking
for new investment opportunities.
Although local lenders might have been able to "stunt," to develop
special devices to get around the usury laws to keep money flowing, or to
partially rollback the usury laws to a level they could work with, they
lacked the funds to service the need. And the money straining for release
from secondary market sources could not be loaned through "stunts." There
had to be a uniform, predictable flow to make the market work.
The argument worked with Congress, which in one fell swoop did
away with a century of carefully worked out state debtor protections in the
housing market. Of course, Congress was told that this really was the will
of the state legislatures, but they lacked the political will to cast what might
be seen as an "anti-consumer" vote. But they welcomed Congressional
intervention. Although states had the power to "re-preempt" DIDIMAC's
limitations, few, if any, did.27
Flushed with that success, the national and international managers of
the American housing finance markets then turned to another set of nagging
problems, the infamous state regulation of the "due on sale" clause.
Lenders, of course, hated the "anti-clause" state statutes and cases because
they cost lenders valuable opportunities to upgrade their mortgage return
when property turned over. But the variety of enforcement practices
concerning this clause was a problem in and of itself. Loan "packagers"
26. It has been argued that DIDIMAC was in turn influenced by Congress' earlier
intrusion into the real estate finance market in the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act and
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Alexander, supra note 5, at 313-15. Although
DIDIMAC, in fact, uses for convenience some definitions adopted in those acts, DIDIMAC
represents an economic control designed to assist lenders, not borrowers, and as such
represents a distinct new move in federal legislative policy concerning real estate.
27. For a summary of the impact of federal preemption of mortgage laws, with an
identification of the remaining "loopholes," see Patrick A. Randolph, Home Finance in the
Shadow World: Unsolved Missouri Usury Problems Affecting Adjustable Rate and
Wraparound Loans, 51 U. Mo. KAN. CrrY L. REv. 41 (1982).
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were unable to combine loans from "pro-clause" states and "anti-clause"
states. Again, in one deft stroke, Congress rewrote the law of a score of
states to clear out the impediment. As part of the omnibus Garn-St.
Germaine Act,28 Congress again established uniform federal lending laws
to serve secondary market needs.29
A less noticed, but potentially equally important aspect of the Gain-St.
Germaine Act was the Alternative Mortgage Instruments Parity Act,
30
which created the possibility of uniform federal regulation of "economic
factors" of adjustable rate loans and virtually every other variety of housing
loan other than long term fixed rate loans.
The crisis of the late 1980s and the infamous "bail out" of the lending
industry caused Congress to be a bit more circumspect about assuming what
was good for lenders was good for the country. Therefore, other efforts to
get helpful new legislation have not been as successful. But in another
quarter, tracks were being laid for an additional Congressional intrusion on
state laws: preemptive federal foreclosure statutes.
C. Federal Intervention in Mortgage Foreclosure
The arguments favoring national uniformity in private housing finance
were not lost on federal policy makers involved in more direct federal
lending activities. The same impediments to efficient collection processes
that many state foreclosure statutes imposed upon private lenders were also
a thorn in the side of the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") and the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and
other federal agencies when they attempted to foreclose on direct mortgage
loans made to carry out discrete federal policies, such as low income
housing.
These lenders commonly argued to local courts that inconvenient local
foreclosure protections got in the way of "uniform" federal lending
programs, and therefore should be brushed aside under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. They enjoyed some limited degree
of success with this tactic. But in 1979, in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.,3" the United States Supreme Court concluded that a government
agency, without express Congressional authority, could not preempt local
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1994).
29. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 311-26.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 3801-3806 (1994).
31. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a thorough discussion of Kimbell Foods and its somewhat
unpredictable progeny, see Alexander, supra note 5.
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laws just because they made government lending activity more expensive.
The government would have to demonstrate in the particular program a clear
need for national uniformity and demonstrate how this need outweighed
state concerns.
Perhaps it was due to this decision that HUD was able to push through
Congress the following year a preemptive federal foreclosure statute for
multi-family low income housing projects.32 This statute, of course,
threatened to be a template for other uniform federal foreclosure provisions,
but in and of itself, did not implicate too many adverse local interests.
Subsidized low income housing projects were the unique province of the
federal government, which fed them from many directions, and closely
regulated their behavior. Although private interests were involved, these
interests had clearly entered the "federal kitchen" and ought to "stand the
heat." Further, it took the federal government many years to develop
regulations to carry out the statute, and many simply forgot that it existed.
After HUD got around to issuing its regulations and conducting a few
foreclosures under them, and after a few test cases were resolved "blessing"
the federal procedure, federal policy makers decided to reach further.
In 1994, HUD again shepherded through Congress a preemptive federal
foreclosure bill, this time for all HUD single family mortgages.33 Again,
the bill passed the Congress with barely a word from the real estate industry.
Most, perhaps, assumed that HUD was focussing on that relatively small
group of direct loan mortgages that represent a healthy government subsidy
to low and moderate income owners. The federal interest in such loans is
strong. The borrowers are not part of the conventional finance marketplace,
and represent a small number of people who likely otherwise would not own
a home at all. This may have explained the lack of interest in the national
real estate community.
What few realized (outside of the select federal regulators who drafted
the bill), however, was that the 1994 Act potentially could reach a wide
range of conventional housing borrowers. One group of loans covered by
the 1994 Act includes FHA guaranteed loans. Although FHA does not
guarantee the high proportion of the American home loans that it once did,
it necessarily is a significant factor in the first loan market. Further, it is a
major guarantor in home improvement loans. The borrowers in these cases
were standard "Joe and Jill America." They could afford to buy their own
home and, although they likely benefitted from the presence of FHA
32. Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 422
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1994)).
33. Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768 (1994).
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insurance, they would not have viewed themselves as "federally subsidized."
More to the point, they represented a substantial segment of the home-
owning public; a segment that did not really expect that it would be treated
any differently from other citizens of the state if and when they should have
difficulty paying their mortgage.
But, in fact, in most states, the treatment would be radically different.
The 1994 Act provided for preemption of all state foreclosure requirements,
beginning with the requirement for judicial foreclosure, but hardly ending
there. All statutory redemption34 was preempted, as well as many impor-
tant notice and cure provisions, which are particularly common in consumer
statutes addressed to junior lien home improvement loans. Under the 1994
Act's provisions, Joe and Jill could be out of their house, without recourse,
and with only minimal notice, within less than a month of the day they
missed their loan payment.
Of course, federal regulators point out that the foreclosure statute is
only the "endgame," that HUD mortgage loan procedures in fact involve a
heavy dose of counseling, notice, and various other devices. In the typical
case, HUD would foreclose only as a last resort. Unfortunately, anyone who
has ever been swept up in a blind bureaucratic net can testify that there is
scant guarantee that one will be treated as "the typical case." Consider, for
example, the experience that many individuals have had dealing with
federally guaranteed student loan programs, not to mention the IRS. If Joe
and Jill are not ready to believe that the government is simply "here to
help," they may be very unhappy to know that the government will not be
kept under the same controls that other mortgage lenders face if and when
there is a mortgage default.
Buoyed by their 1994 success, in late 1995 the Department of Justice
attempted to engraft another statute to the federal budget bill that would, in
essence, create a single federally preemptive foreclosure law for all federal
agency mortgages. This bill retroactively preempted all anti-deficiency
legislation, provided limited notice to junior lenders, and as before, a token
notice period (by the standards of most state laws) prior to foreclosure. This
34. Statutory redemption laws appear in about twenty states, and generally extend the
period of foreclosure following judicial foreclosure. The primary purposes were to give
farmers a "third chance" to salvage their property from redemption and to prevent "cheap
foreclosure sales" that created unfairly large deficiency judgments. The statutes arose from
the depressions of the late nineteenth century, largely in agricultural states. Modernly, many
such statutes have been amended to apply to residential and farm property only, and can be
avoided by waiver of deficiency (i.e., California) or use of a private foreclosure device that,
by terms of other statutes, does not result in a deficiency.
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time, however, someone was watching, and at present, the new federal
foreclosure law is not in a "live bill." It has, however, passed the House of
Representatives and is likely to be the subject of Senate hearings this spring.
Numerous organizations, including the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers and the American Bar Association Section on Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law, have requested the opportunity for review and
comment.
VI. EVALUATING FEDERAL PREEMPTION AS THE PROCESS OF
UNIFORMITY
There are only a few in the home finance industry who would criticize
the federal preemption of home mortgage usury limits under DIDIMAC.
Clearly, usury laws at the time were an obstacle to the efficient flow of
funds across state lines and the operation of the secondary market. Also, it
was clear that state legislatures would have difficulty expunging these laws
entirely. Even if they had altered the laws, they likely would have enacted
piecemeal modifications that would have created similar obstacles to the
marketplace.
As discussed above, there is increasing pressure for a movement toward
private foreclosure procedures. If we accept the notion that the national real
estate market would benefit from a non-judicial foreclosure, is it also
appropriate to conclude that the federal preemption of mortgage foreclosure
laws is also the best way to get to a desired result? Certainly existing and
proposed federal agency foreclosure laws would provide a template for a
uniform preemptive foreclosure statute. In fact, if the most recent proposed
legislation passes, and federal agency foreclosures are conducted pursuant
to its requirements, then state institutions dealing with real property might
be forced to realign their procedures to deal with the federal model, making
it easier for them to convert the balance of their practices to that model as
well.
The author concludes that federally preemptive foreclosure laws are not
the answer. There are better ways to reach the goal of a uniform private
power of sale procedure that will satisfy the needs of the developing
secondary market and remain consistent with the diversity of views that
states may have regarding the appropriate balance of mortgage lenders and
borrowers. The authors even conclude that the proposal for federal agency
foreclosures should not be enacted, in part because of the disruptive impact
such an enactment would have on title and other real property issues in
many states.
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Although the United States is no longer an expanding frontier, with
dramatic differences between developed and undeveloped states, it is still a
country with a vast geography that compels distinct differences in values.
Diversity of state laws is not something that ought to be abandoned easily.
The differences in state laws continue to reflect not only value differences
but differences in the way in which business is conducted. Massive change
to a uniform foreclosure approach will create dissonances in systems which
have grown up around established foreclosure methodologies. It is
impossible to anticipate, and therefore to resolve, all of the conflicts that
might arise. What is the relationship, for instance, of foreclosure practices
to homestead laws? What is the relationship to marital property laws? Or
to probate laws and practices?
Perhaps even more significant from a policy standpoint, one might ask
why the federal government should be in the business of forcing all
borrowers and lenders in all states into a common mold. If there is a
likelihood that gross differences in foreclosure practices can be resolved, so
that private foreclosure becomes the norm, and the time and cost of
foreclosure is substantially the same throughout the land, does it matter
whether all states march in lockstep?
If the Kansas Legislature believes that there should be judicial review
of a foreclosure sale before a deficiency judgment is ordered, this may be
because Kansas farmers, from hard experience, understand that farm
foreclosures are subject to manipulation due to massive market fluctuations,
and unsophisticated farm borrowers can easily be exposed to ruinous
judgments by inappropriate foreclosure practices even when the borrowers
have equity in their farms. These same concerns may not be true in Rhode
Island or New Jersey.
If Illinois requires foreclosure notice to junior interest holders at the
"last known address," rather than placing the burden on the interest holders
to maintain an accurate notice address of record, perhaps this reflects
conditions about the public records or the availability of address information
in Illinois that would not be true of, say, Missouri.
If Alaska believes that foreclosure title should be conclusively
presumed final, notwithstanding the danger of a failure of notice or a defect
in the sale process, but Arizona does not agree, yet is willing to make a
certificate executed by the trustee presumptive evidence of good title, why
should either state have to alter its perception of fundamental fairness?
Even if we were to establish a "lockstep" approach to foreclosure, is the best
forum in which to design this uniform foreclosure process the United States
Congress? Or the United States Department of Justice?
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The authors propose that a device exists by which differing state values
can be accommodated and even preserved, while still achieving the
uniformity necessary to meet the needs of the secondary mortgage market
in home loans and commercial loans. The device is the Uniform Land
Securities Interest Act, a product of the National Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
VII. THE UNIFORM LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT
A. Benefits of the Uniform State Law Approach
ULSIA provides for a rapid, clean foreclosure has been available for
state consideration for over a decade. No state has adopted it fully, but it
has influenced the thinking of a number of states as they have considered
and revised their mortgage laws since ULSIA was adopted. Basically
modeled after the UCC, but with significant changes to accommodate the
special nature of real estate transactions, ULSIA provides for a quick,
efficient foreclosure process, with clear notice provisions and good title. It
protects homeowners from deficiencies judgments resulting from private
foreclosures, but provides the option to lenders to proceed with judicial
foreclosure where appropriate.
The process by which ULSIA was developed insured that the
competing values of various states were taken into account. The National
Commissioners include representatives from every state, frequently persons
who themselves are or have been legislators and who are familiar with the
political values of their local legislatures. Uniform laws are designed to be
fair and balanced, but also to pass in all state legislatures.
Persons familiar with the process of uniform law adoption know that
there is a "little secret" that makes it possible to achieve widespread
adoption of many of the Commissioner's products: the secret is that states
do not really have to adopt the exact uniform language. Although, of
course, uniformity is the goal, the Commissioners recognize, as they must,
that each state has its idiosyncracies that will prevent it from accepting
every "uniform" pronouncement completely. In fact, the Commissioners
build some choice of nonuniform exceptions into their laws. ULSIA, for
instance, expressly permits states to include agricultural landowners within
the class of "protected parties" entitled to special notice and anti-deficiency
protection. It also provides for some flexibility with respect to particular
notice requirements. Further, in the process of deliberation by state
legislatures, advocates for uniform laws often propose further nonuniform
amendments to achieve substantial uniformity goals while still accommodat-
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ing special state concerns. Persons familiar with the UCC are quite aware
that there is wide variation among the states as to many provisions of the
UCC, even though we do enjoy substantial uniformity.
The process of adoption for uniform state laws takes into account the
richness and diversity of our legal system and tries to adapt that system to
the needs of the modern international marketplace without destroying
completely the fundamental fairness that each state legislature can best
provide to its own constituents.
Further, as each state legislature processes a proposed uniform law, it
is in the best position to make an evaluation as to how that law will impact
on other elements of the state's legal framework. Thus, instead of a
preemptive federal blunderbuss shredding the overall system while achieving
a limited uniform result, the uniform state laws approach permits an
evaluative process that achieves necessary compromises both in the uniform
law and parallel adjustments in other state laws and practices to insure a
workable framework.
B. If ULSIA Has Not Succeeded Yet, Why Will It?
ULSIA has succeeded in achieving significant movement in state
foreclosure laws in a number of jurisdictions, and even in Canada. A
number of state law reform groups have recommended ULSIA for adoption,
and it is under active consideration in several state legislatures today. But
no state has enacted a version of ULSIA that is similar enough to the
uniform act language to permit it to be called "uniform."
As indicated above, there is considerable resistance to reform of real
estate laws in many jurisdictions. Without a very good reason to do so, the
institutions that work with and protect the existing system of laws in a given
state will oppose change. These institutions are far more entrenched in the
real estate industry than, for example, in the areas of commerce governed
by the UCC. It is easy, therefore, to understand why ULSIA has not
enjoyed the acceptance that financing sections of the UCC enjoyed.
Further, in prior times, advocates for ULSIA in some state legislatures
pushed harder for uniform language adoption in the belief that uniformity
was a significant enough priority that ULSIA should stand or fall on its
precise language. This, of course, was a strategy that made adoption far
more difficult, even if the basic premise were sound. In recent years,
advocates of ULSIA have adopted a more moderate posture. A particular
sticking point has been ULSIA's notice provisions, which did not give
assured notice to junior interests to which practitioners in judicial foreclo-
sure states have been accustomed. A Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
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State Laws formed under the aegis of the Commissioners has devised
alternative language that states might view as an acceptable compromise in
this area.
'But the most significant new factor that may lead to many states
reconsidering ULSIA is the new pressure for movement toward private
foreclosure that the commercial mortgage secondary market will produce.
This pressure is new, far beyond any impact that might have existed when
the only true secondary market was in home mortgages. Home mortgages
have infinitesimally small foreclosure rates. Further, any one mortgage is
a tiny part of a whole mortgage package. As a consequence of these two
facts, delays in foreclosure resulting from variations in state foreclosure laws
were unlikely to have a significant impact on the overall performance of
mortgage portfolios. Secondary market purchasers were content with
uniform instruments, and not particularly concerned about uniform state laws
except in cases where portfolio performance would be directly affected, such
as in the case of the due on sale clause.
There is about to be a change, however, in the message that states
receive from commercial lending sources. Individual commercial mortgages,
of course, constitute considerably larger commitments of mortgage dollars
than home mortgages, and any one mortgage will be a more significant part
of a given portfolio. Most traditional commercial lenders have been
cognizant of the major differences in foreclosure cost and delay between
private foreclosure and judicial foreclosure states, and have taken those
considerations into account in pricing their mortgage loans. But although
insurance company loan underwriters will admit privately to these consider-
ations, and even sometimes confess that they have avoided certain states
entirely because of difficulties in foreclosure statutes, these lenders have
been unwilling to take a uniform stance in opposition to judicial foreclosure
practices. Such confrontations were "not the style" of the insurance
companies who typically made major commercial loans, particularly because
the same companies were interested in selling their insurance products in the
same states that provided difficult lending climates.
Modem "securitizers" are primarily in the business of placing and
collecting mortgage loans. They will have fewer compunctions about letting
loan originators know about the market view of their "slow foreclose"
commercial loans. Indeed, several major rating agencies even now are
developing matrices of factors to standardize the evaluation of loan
portfolios, and foreclosure delay will be a quantifiable factor in these
evaluation models. Even today, it is possible, if securitizers were willing to
disclose their practices, to identify the precise increase in interest rate that
borrowers under securitized mortgages will pay in judicial foreclosure states
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versus private foreclosure states. But to date, industry participants have
been unwilling to disclose this information, partly for competitive and partly
for political reasons.
If commercial lending follows the model of home lending, the bulk of
commercial loans will trade as securitized loans within a decade. The
economics of the industry eventually will lead commercial borrowers in
judicial foreclosure states to recognize the higher price they pay for their
special foreclosure protections. To most such borrowers, this is a price that
they will be unwilling to pay, and they will so inform their state legislatures.
Thus, market institutions in judicial foreclosure states are likely, within
the next decade, to seriously evaluate their past resistance to private
foreclosure methods. In evaluating what type of private foreclosure process
to adopt, many such states are likely to view ULSIA as a useful, integrated
approach that solves the problem and is most likely to provide the necessary
degree of uniformity with other state practices to insure the broadest
acceptance on the secondary market.
In fact, it is likely that if states do not recognize that their best interests
are served by moving to some form of private foreclosure, the United States
Congress, goaded by the same interests that persuaded it to preempt state
due on sale regulations and state usury laws, will impose a private foreclo-
sure system on them. States should view the proposals for a uniform federal
mortgage foreclosure statute, even one limited to federal agency mortgages,
as a distinct threat to their independent judgments about the best balance
between mortgage borrowers and lenders. By moving to ULSIA, tailored
appropriately to their own special needs, states can achieve a state-centered
foreclosure approach that meets the need for uniform and efficient
foreclosure, but preserves special state values and is consistent with existing
state practices.
C. The Special Problem of "State Action" Foreclosures and
Notice
One problem with ULSIA in its present form is the possibility that it
would not provide adequate "due process" notice if the statute is measured
by Constitutional standards. Although most decided cases have found that
an ULSIA-style private foreclosure would not constitute state action, there
are still some concerns. First, of course, there is the possibility that at some
future time courts would find that foreclosures involved state action.
Second, there is the reality that most courts have viewed foreclosure of
certain government owner mortgages as state action, and the uniform
commissioners ought to have a statute that would be available for foreclo-
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sure of such interests. Finally, there is a concern that notice to parties with
real interests is more than a technical requirement, it represents fundamental
fair treatment and ought to be part of any foreclosure statute.
The new Joint Editorial Board on Uniform Real Property Laws
recognizes these concerns, and has drafted a "non uniform" amendment to
ULSIA that is an acceptable amendment for states considering adoption of
ULSIA. This amendment is designed to provide full and fair mailed notice
to all parties with a significant interest in the property. The Joint Editorial
Board stands ready to work with state legislatures who are considering
ULSIA to formulate this amendment or some other amendment to address
the real concern of notice.
There is a secondary concern, of course, as to whether a "hearing" must
be required before any "due process" foreclosure. There is no definitive
answer to this question, although the author's view is that "some form of
hearing" certainly is required. ULSIA does not provide for such a hearing,
instead it relies upon the right of a borrower, or other party seeking to avoid
foreclosure, to seek an injunction. Government agencies who are foreclos-
ing their own mortgages can likely satisfy any requirement for a hearing by
providing one as part of their preforeclosure procedures. The members of
the Joint Editorial Board, like the Commissioners, have not viewed the
likelihood that private foreclosures will generally be regarded as "govern-
ment action" to be so high that a hearing provision is warranted as part of
every private foreclosure. And, unlike with respect to the notice issue, the
Joint Editorial Board does not regard a separate hearing to be necessary to
ensure "fundamental fairness" in foreclosure practice.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Private foreclosure is cheaper, surer, and ultimately better for the vast
majority of mortgage borrowers as well as mortgage lenders. The small
degree of extra protection provided by complex judicial foreclosure
provisions is not worth the increased cost and delay.
A developing international marketplace for mortgage money is going
to bring the harsh judgment of the marketplace to bear upon judicial foreclo-
sure procedures in ways that states have not experienced in the past. When
states see that lenders are likely to pass directly to their state's borrowers the
cost of judicial foreclosure delays, they will seek alternative modes of
foreclosure that make possible full participation in the secondary market.
The Uniform Laws approach afforded by ULSIA is a device that
permits states to make their own state-tailored decision about foreclosure
methods but still come to a result that fits the need for efficiency and
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uniformity dictated by the marketplace. Forces are now at work that will
drive states to accept a move to private foreclosure whether they like it or
not. Federal preemption is a real threat. Judicial foreclosure states are well
advised to consider taking control of their own destiny by resisting
politically, movements toward federal preemption and by considering a
uniform private foreclosure law like ULSIA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Land Secured Interest Act ("ULSIA")' may well be the
proverbial "prophet [which] hath no honour in [its] own country."2 Al-
though apparently not yet adopted by any of the United States, it provided
the Canadian authors of this paper with a valuable resource in the develop-
ment of our just-completed "Proposal for a New Brunswick Land Security
Act". The actual prototype for the Land Security Act ("LSA") was the
1. U.L.S.I.A., 7A U.L.A. 220 (Supp. 1995).
2. See John 4:44 (King James).
3. NORMAN SIEBRASSE & CATHERINE WALSH, NEW BRUNSWICK GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION CORPORATION, TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR A NEW BRUNSWICK SECURITY ACT
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province's recently-proclaimed Personal Property Security Act ("PPSA").4
However, the New Brunswick PPSA was derived from PPSAs previously
enacted elsewhere in common law Canada,' all of which were derived, in
turn, from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because the
ULSIA was inspired by Article 9, it was of obvious and direct relevance to
our own efforts to simplify and consolidate land security law along modem
personal property security lines.7
(Feb. 1996) [hereinafter SIEBRASSE & WALSH]. The proposal was commissioned by the New
Brunswick Geographic Information Corporation, the Crown corporation responsible for the
administration of real and personal property registration in the province. The proposal has
not yet been accepted by the government of the province, and consequently nothing in this
article can be taken to reflect official policy of the province. We owe a great debt both in
terms of conceptual inspiration and detailed advice to Rod MacKenzie, the Vice President,
Legal, of NBGIC and to Mary Kimball, Deputy Registrar of Deeds and Registrar of Land
Titles for the province. However, they do not necessarily share all of the views expressed
in this article.
4. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1 (1993), amended by ch. 22, 1994
S.N.B. I & ch. 33, 1995 S.N.B. I (Can.). For a section-by-section review of the purpose and
operation of the Act, see CATHERINE WALSH, AN INTRODUCION TO THE NEW BRUNSWICK
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY AcT (1995).
5. PPSAs derived from Article 9 are in operation currently in seven Canadian
jurisdictions: in Ontario, R.S.O. ch. P-10 (1990) (Can.); in Manitoba, R.S.M. ch. P-35 (1987)
(Can.); in Saskatchewan, S.S. ch. P-6.2 (1993) (Can.); in the Yukon Territory, R.S.Y. ch. 130
(1986) (Can.); in Alberta, S.A. ch. P-4.05 (1988) (Can.); in British Columbia, S.B.C. eh. 36
(1989) (Can.); and now New Brunswick, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1 (1995). The legislation is not
entirely uniform from one jurisdiction to the next. Note that the Northwest Territories and
Nova Scotia have both enacted PPSAs, with implementation expected sometime in 1996,
once the electronic personal property registries now under construction in each jurisdiction
are complete; differences in the computer and legal environment in each jurisdiction coupled
with the rapid pace of technological change have made it impossible for new PPSA
jurisdictions to simply import the registry software already in use in an existing PPSA
jurisdiction. S.N.W.T. ch. 8 (1994) (Can.); S.N.S. ch. 13 (1995-96) (Can.). In addition,
Book 6 of Quebec's new Civil Code establishes rules for conventional hypothecs on
movables which, while reflecting the property concepts and legal style of that province's
civilian legal tradition, also contains many substantive features that will be familiar to
lawyers versed in Article 9/PPSA law. See C.C.Q. book 6, tit. 3, ch. 2, § IV, arts. 2702-2709
(1994) (Can.). This leaves only two Canadian jurisdictions, Newfoundland and Prince
Edward Island, without a reformed personal property security law either in operation or
pending proclamation.
6. U.C.C. art. 9 (1977). For an American perspective on the Canadian counterparts to
Article 9, see Bernard J. Roth, Article 9 North of the 49th: Its Development in Canada's
Personal Property Security Acts, 27 UCC L.J. 251 (1995).
7. Another valuable resource was the ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, MINISTRY
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES (1987) [hereinafter
OLRC REPORT].
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In any law reform project, the initial gathering of political and
institutional support for change is often the greatest challenge. Therefore,
this article begins its comparative review of the ULSIA and its Canadian
relative with a brief explanation of why the drafters think New Brunswick
offered a hospitable climate for the reform of land security law at this
particular time.
II. THE REFORM CONTEXT
New Brunswick, with a population of only about three quarters of a
million people and located in the geographically and politically marginalized
Atlantic Region, is traditionally one of Canada's "have-not" provinces. In
1987, the Liberal Party swept to power under the leadership of Premier
Frank McKenna, with a strong mandate to "open the province for business,"
while increasing government efficiency and eliminating deficit financing.
But clearly, if the government was to achieve its primary goal to attract
business investment, it could not also reduce the cost of governing if this
meant a concomitant decline in the quality of the province's already fragile
business infrastructure. So while steps were taken to reduce the size of
government, they were accompanied by significant institutional changes
intended to improve the efficiency with which government services were
delivered. To a significant extent, "re-engineering government" in New
Brunswick proved to be more than a slogan to mask indiscriminate across-
the-board cuts.
The institutional change relevant to the creation of New Brunswick's
proposed LSA was the creation of a Crown corporation, New Brunswick
Geographic Information Corporation, which is responsible for operating the
real and personal property registration systems in the province.' In
Canadian legal parlance, a Crown corporation is a corporation wholly owned
by the provincial or federal government that legislates it into existence.
Legally, it remains an agent of the government but in structure and
operation it is given a significant degree of autonomy akin to that enjoyed
by a private corporation with the aim of achieving service to its clientele on
a cost-recovery basis. It is true that in any monopoly, and particularly a
publicly-owned monopoly, service to clients and cost-recovery can be
8. See New Brunswick Geographic Information Corporation Act, S.N.B. ch. N-5.01
(1989) (Can.). The corporation also has responsibility for real property tax assessment
information and for the province's geographic information database, a consolidation of
responsibilities that is meant to allow land registry information to be incorporated and
updated efficiently with the physical and fiscal cadastre. Id. § 4.
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hollow mottos, but in the authors' perhaps biased experience, they have been
taken to heart in the case of New Brunswick Geographic Information
Corporation ("NBGIC").
NBGIC's first major initiative in the secured financing area was to
contract for the construction of a Personal Property Registry ("PPR") to
support the implementation of the province's Article 9-inspired PPSA.9
However, reform of the province's cumbersome and antiquated land
registration system was also a standing item on the corporation's agenda.
Additionally, and in the prevailing atmosphere of budget and resource
constraints, it struck the vice president for legal policy that at least some
aspects of the work done on the PPSA/PPR project might well perform
double duty on the land security side.
From the corporation's perspective, perhaps the most immediately
attractive feature of the PPSA approach was its replacement of "document-
filing" with "notice-filing." Rather than having to file a copy of the actual
mortgage or other security documentation in the PPR, secured parties simply
enter a notice of the security agreement ° that contains only the bare
information necessary to alert a searcher of the possible existence of a
security interest in the described collateral. If notice-filing was carried over
to land security interests, there was no reason to think that it would not
produce the same advantages as had been demonstrated by experience in
PPSA jurisdictions. These advantages include: a reduced administrative and
archival burden on the registry; greater flexibility in the drafting, amend-
ment, and rollover of security agreements; enhanced confidentiality of the
debtor's financial affairs; and simplified informational requirements for
registration with a correspondingly reduced risk of invalidating error.
9. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1. In May 1987, the Law Society of
New Brunswick, the self-regulating professional organization that represents the province's
lawyers, recommended the enactment of a modem PPSA to the province's Attorney General.
That recommendation fit well with the new government's expressed desire to create a
positive and efficient business environment for outside investment and a PPSA proposal was
commissioned. Draft legislation, adapting the western Canadian version of the PPSA to the
New Brunswick legal and policy environment, was submitted to the Department of Justice
in August 1993 and, following approval by the department's former law reform division,
turned over to NBGIC for implementation. One of the authors of this paper, Walsh, was the
author of the PPSA proposal and worked closely with NBGIC in its implementation. The
other author of this paper, Siebrasse, has been the corporation's principal external research
and policy advisor on land law issues.
10. The agreement is called a "financing statement," in compatibility with the Article
9 terminology. See S.N.B. ch. P-7.1, § 1.
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A second appealing feature of the PPSA registry model was its
relatively sophisticated registration and searching capabilities. Registrations
in the PPR are entered directly by clients" into a computerized data-base
that is indexed and searchable according to debtor name as well as collateral
serial number in the case of 'large ticket' goods for which a reliable serial
number is universally available. 2 In contrast, although a land titles
registry indexed by parcel identification number operates in one county in
New Brunswick, 3 the principal land registry is an antiquated deed
depository system organized according to a rudimentary grantor/grantee
index.'4 While considerable developmental work had been done on the
automation of the land records through the use of scanning and optical disk
storage, it became increasingly clear to certain of NBGIC's senior adminis-
trators that a full electronic conversion of the mechanics of registration and
searching coupled with a redesign of the indexing structure was needed.
Thus, in the short term, adaptation of the PPR model to the land context
presented a welcomed opportunity to implement a geographic parcel
indexing system for the whole province, without having to make a wholesale
conversion from a deed registry to a land titles system. In the long term,
it might even be possible to adapt the PPR software design to at least the
security aspects of the land records, thereby effecting a partial conversion
11. While all the Canadian PPSA registries incorporate an electronic database, New
Brunswick has gone somewhat further than its sister jurisdictions in making the system
completely client-administered. Clients are wholly responsible for entering their own
registrations into the registry database and for conducting their own searches with direct
access made available either through computer terminals located in each of the 15 registry
offices maintained by NBGIC in the province or from the client's own premises in the case
of frequent users who have the resources and demand to establish the necessary on-line
communication links. Direct electronic access benefits both system administrators and
system users: administrators benefit because the legal responsibility for and administrative
burden of registration is transferred wholly to the client, and users benefit because the time
lag between submission of the relevant information to the registry and its entry in the
database is eliminated, enabling registrants to control the effective time of registrations and
searchers to obtain search results on "real time."
12. The general regulation under the PPSA, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1, Reg. 95-57 (1995) (Can.),
currently defines "serial numbered goods" to mean motor vehicles (including combines,
tractors, and road building machinery), trailers, mobile homes, boats, outboard motors for
boats, and aircraft (as there is no national aircraft register yet in place at the federal level in
Canada). Serial number searching is considered essential to ensure disclosure of a security
interest granted by a predecessor in title of the immediate transferor of goods-collateral since
a search according to the more usual debtor name criterion will not disclose the registration.
13. Land Titles Act, S.N.B. ch. L-1.1 (1981) (Can.).
14. Registry Act, R.S.N.B. ch. R-6 (1973) (Can.).
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to electronic registration and searching without having to incur the heavy
costs normally associated with ground-up software development.
A final important impetus to NBGIC's commissioning of the LSA
proposal was the ready availability and adaptability of the PPSA substantive
law model. The corporation recognized that it would be more efficient to
simply codify land security law along PPSA lines, using the experience and
resources it had recently developed, than to try to rewrite the existing
complex statutory and judicial rules to fit a modem registration environment,
or to develop a new substantive code from scratch. Of course, the PPSA
model was also thought to offer an appropriate model, even independent of
efficiency concerns. The legislation had already proved its substantive
worth in the personal property financing context. Moreover, prior to the
PPSA, the rules governing the relations of debtor and secured party were
practically identical in the two contexts. Thus, harmonization of land
security law with the PPSA would respect the historical identity between the
two contexts, while greatly simplifying the legal process for secured
financing. This is particularly true in the field of commercial transactions,
where real and personal property are routinely assigned as common
collateral for the same debt.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE LSA
Just as the ULSIA 5 adopts the organizational framework of Article
9,6 the proposed New Brunswick LSA"7 adopts that of the PPSA.' The
act is therefore divided into seven parts, roughly chronicling the various
stages through which a security interest may pass, from its initial attachment
and perfection through to its enforcement as against both the debtor and
third parties.
Parts I, 11, and V correspond generally with parts 1, 2, and 5 of the
ULSIA. Part I, "Interpretation and Application," defines terms, establishes
interpretation principles, and delineates the scope of application of the act.
Part II, "Validity of Security Agreement and Rights of Parties," addresses
the pre-default relationship of the secured party and debtor, including the
formality and evidentiary rules governing their security agreement, the
validity of future advance clauses and the requirements for attachment of an
effective security interest. Part V, "Default Rights and Remedies," codifies
15. U.L.S.I.A., 7A U.L.A. at 220.
16. U.C.C. art. 9 (1977).
17. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3.
18. S.N.B. ch. P-7.1.
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the procedural and substantive obligations of both parties, should the
debtor's default necessitate enforcement of the security agreement.
Although part III of the LSA and part 3 of the ULSIA both cover
"Perfection and Priorities," the LSA coverage is far more comprehensive.
19
As a model uniform act that must be integrated with individual state land
law policy and systems, the ULSIA is forced to defer to the registration
statutes of the various states on issues of perfection and priorities. In
contrast, as the law reform initiative of a single jurisdiction, the New
Brunswick LSA incorporates a comprehensive self-contained perfection and
priority regime to regulate ranking, both as among consensual security
interests and as against other classes of proprietary claims.20
Part IV of the LSA, "Registration," deals with the procedural and
substantive aspects of registering and searching land security interests,
consistent with New Brunswick's decision to effect reform of the registra-
tion framework as part of its general reform of land financing law."1 The
LSA has no equivalent to part IV of the ULSIA on "Maximum Finance
Charges and Usury." Issues under these heads were considered to be
adequately regulated by the competitive market, supplemented by existing
statutory and equitable sources, such as the provincial Unconscionable
Transactions Relief Act.
22
Part VI of the LSA, "General and Miscellaneous," addresses such
significant general issues as the applicable supplementary law, the parties'
overriding obligations to conduct themselves in good faith and in a
commercial reasonable manner, and civil liability for breach of any statutory
obligation imposed by the act.23 Part VII, "Transitional," establishes rules
to regulate perfection and priority in transitional situations involving pre-
LSA security interests.24
The balance of this paper compares the LSA with the ULSIA in a
relatively detailed fashion. In the interest of conserving space, the authors
have emphasized the differences rather than the similarities between the two
acts. In general, if no mention is made of a particular provision of the
ULSIA, it is because the LSA is substantially identical to the ULSIA on that
point.
19. See SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 33-65.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 66-84.
22. R.S.N.B. ch. U-I (1973) (Can.).
23. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 137-46.
24. Id. at 147-57.
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IV. INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION
A. Generic Functional Terminology
Like the ULSIA, the LSA adopts generic terminology consistent with
the Article 9/PPSA functionalist approach to the conceptual structure of
secured financing. Regardless of whether a particular transaction
involves a conventional mortgage or some less self-identifying form of
security, the interest created is uniformly referred to as a security interest if
its substantive function is to secure payment or performance of an obliga-
tion. Generic terminology is carried over to the identification of the parties
("secured party" and "debtor"), their underlying contract ("security agree-
ment"), and the property that is the subject of the security interest ("collater-
al").
The substitution of a functionalist approach to the characterization of
security interests in land does not constitute as radical a departure from the
status quo as the same change presented in the personal property security
area. The significantly more complex nature of personal property made the
evolution of personal property security law a correspondingly complex
process with different security devices developed over the years for different
categories of property. Thus, the PPSA introduced a rationalizing influence
into what had become an extraordinarily fragmented and confused area of
the law.26 In contrast, secured financing against land, at least in common
law Canada, is relatively straightforward and typically involves the use of
one of only two relatively well-understood transactional forms, the mortgage
or the equitable charge, the legal characteristics of which have become
largely assimilated over the years. Although not unknown, the use of other
transactional forms, such as agreements of sale and lease, is rare in
contemporary practice. This rarity reflects the dominance of the Canadian
chartered banks in the secured lending field, a dominance which is owed in
part to the privileged position chartered banks were afforded from an early
date under federal banking legislation, and in part to the diminished risk
they face in low equity financing transactions because of the ready
availability of mortgage insurance under the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation Program.27
25. See id
26. See Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1.
27. See JAMES E. HATCH, THE CANADIAN MORTGAGE MARKET (1975).
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B. General Scope of Application
The application of the LSA, like the ULSIA, is restricted to consensual
transactions that function to create a security interest in land. But while
non-consensual and non-security transactions are thus excluded from the
direct reach of both regimes, the comprehensive sweep of the LSA's part III
priority code means that the proposed legislation will nonetheless apply to
resolve ranking between a consensual security interest and all forms of
competing third party interests in the collateral, whether consensual or
secured in character.z8 Moreover, complementary amendments to existing
legislation will authorize the registration on a notice-filing basis of a variety
of non-consensual "security interests" in land (e.g., the claim of a judgment
creditor of the debtor), as well as integrate the rules governing their priority
and enforcement with the substantive and policy framework of the LSA. In
the longer term, it may become feasible to bring tax liens within the scope
of the act. At present the greatest impediment to registration of tax liens is
the administrative burden which would be involved in registering large
numbers of the liens annually. But because the records of the taxation
office are computerized, and it is anticipated that the LSA will soon be
automated, registration of a tax lien in the LSA system can potentially be
as administratively convenient as entering it in the current records of the
taxation office. In this indirect way, the LSA is intended, to a far greater
extent than the ULSIA, to establish the legislative basis and impetus for a
comprehensive consolidation of the law governing the rights of all classes
of creditors (outside of bankruptcy, which is federally regulated) against the
debtor's land.
C. Application to Security Interests in Land-Related Rights to
Payment
A significant issue in the United States has been whether an assignee's
security interest in a note and mortgage must be perfected according to local
real estate law, in addition to perfection under Article 9. This issue has not
arisen in Canada because the promise to pay and the security interest are
generally evidenced by a single document, and real property law clearly
governs its assignment. The LSA and PPSA are complementary in their
scope: the LSA applies to any instrument creating a security interest in land
or land-related interest (e.g., a right to a stream of rental payments, or
payments owing under a mortgage) where the land is specifically identified
28. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 33-65.
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in the instrument. The PPSA applies in all other cases. Thus assignment
of mortgage-backed securities is governed by the PPSA, but assignment of
a specific mortgage is governed by the LSA.
V. VALIDITY OF SECUR1TY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF PARTIES
THERETO
A. Freedom of Contract in the Making of a Security Agreement
The LSA closely tracks the ULSIA in affirming freedom of contract.29
The LSA provides that the agreement is effective according to its terms,
unless otherwise provided in the LSA or any other act. In addition, it
specifically abolishes doctrines relating to clogs on the equity of redemption
and collateral advantage. 0 Options to purchase which are not dependent
on default are specifically approved.31
The LSA provides for an obligation of commercial reasonableness as
well as an obligation of good faith in the performance of security agree-
ments,32 as there are some Canadian cases which suggest there may be a
difference between the two, with good faith being a less stringent standard.
These obligations may not be disclaimed.
B. Formal and Evidentiary Requirements for Security Agreements
The formal requirements for attachment are essentially the same as in
section 203 of the ULSIA. Namely, value must be given, the debtor must
have an interest in the collateral, and the debtor must have signed a security
agreement describing the collateral.33 The LSA has no equivalent to
section 204 (Use or Disposition without an Accounting), as Canadian law
has never had a rule similar to that in Benedict v. Ratner.'
C. Defense Against Assignee of Obligation
The LSA departs somewhat from section 206 of the ULSIA in its
treatment of defenses against an assignee of the an obligation. Under the
ULSIA, modifications are binding only if the assignee specifically empowers
29. Id. at 15, 17.
30. IM at 16.
31. Cf. U.L.S.I.A. §§ 201, 211, 7A U.L.A. at 236, 244.
32. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 137-38.
33. Id at 18-21.
34. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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the assignor to "act as a servicing agent."35 In contrast, under the LSA,
following our PPSA, modifications generally are effective, subject to
stipulations in the contract of assignment and subject to the overriding
obligation to act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.3
6
Further, to protect the tenant or obligor, who may not be sophisticated and
is generally an innocent bystander in a dispute between assignee and
assignor, the LSA provides detailed provisions governing conflicting
demands for payment.37 While the LSA allows the obligor to demand
proof of the assignment, the drafters did not wish to burden the obligor with
the obligation of correctly assessing the proof in order to be relieved of
potential liability for double payment. Therefore, the LSA provides that
when faced with conflicting demands, the obligor may pay amounts owing
into court, or, in the case of residential tenants, into the Rentalman's office.
In New Brunswick, the Rentalman's office is already set up to administer
damage deposits for residential tenants, and any interested party may apply
to the court for direction.38 In order to ensure that an obligor is made
aware of its rights, the notice from the secured party demanding payment
must inform the obligor of its rights in the case of conflicting demands.39
A notice which does not contain this information is not valid, and the
obligor is not obliged to make payment pursuant to it.40
D. Power of Debtor to Lease
The LSA does not provide a specific power to lease equivalent to that
found in section 207 of the ULSIA,4' but relies on supplementary common
law to imply such a power where appropriate. Unlike the ULSIA, the LSA
does not make a reasonable residential lease which is subordinate to the
security interest binding on a secured party.
E. Alienability of Debtor's Interest: Right to Accelerate on
Transfer
The LSA closely reflects section 208(a) of the ULSIA, in that it
provides that, while the security agreement may not prevent alienation of the
35. U.L.S.I.A. § 206, 7A U.L.A. at 238.
36. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 137-38.
37. Id. at 60-61, 63-64.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 61, 65 (stating requirements for valid notice).
41. U.L.S.I.A. § 207, 7A U.L.A. at 241.
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collateral, it may provide that transfer without the consent of the secured
party is grounds for acceleration of the debt.42 However, the policy issues
addressed by section 208(b) are dealt with somewhat differently in the LSA.
In order to preserve the debtor's ability to sell a favourable interest rate on
transfer, the LSA provides that a secured party's consent, under a purchaser
approval clause, may not be withheld simply because the prevailing interest
rate is higher than the rate in the agreement, unless otherwise specified in
the agreement.43 That is, if the secured party intends to take advantage of
a purchaser approval clause to call in mortgages which are below existing
rates, it must make this intention clear in the agreement, so that the debtor
will not be taken by surprise.
The LSA also deals much more extensively than the ULSIA with the
rights between the secured party, the debtor, and the new owner of the
collateral. In the absence of evidence of intention to the contrary, the LSA
implies an obligation by the transferee to perform the obligation of the
debtor, and to indemnify the transferor for any liability incurred as a result
of non-performance of the debtor's obligations. This reflects existing law
and practice. The LSA also allows the secured party to pursue any
transferee directly rather than being required to obtain an assignment of the
indemnification agreement. Perhaps most importantly, when the secured
party consents to the assumption by the purchaser of the transferee's
obligations, the transferee is released from all liability unless he agrees in
writing, prior to the transfer, to remain liable.'
Presently, under Canadian law, the original debtor remains liable for the
debt even after the property is sold and the new owner enters into an
assumption agreement with the secured party, unless a court is willing to
find novation, or unless the original debtor becomes a surety and a material
variation exists in the agreement. The courts are becoming more willing to
so hold, but the law remains very uncertain and the debtor may be unfairly
surprised to find herself liable for a mortgage which she believed had been
"assumed" years earlier by the purchaser of the mortgaged property.
Further, because a finding of novation or suretyship turns on the facts, and
because there is no presumption in favour of such a finding, the present law
is uncertain, and as such, difficult to take advantage of.45
Under the LSA, the debtor may consent to remain liable, but the
consent must be in writing and must specifically identify the transfer. This
42. Id. § 208(a), 7A U.L.A. at 241.
43. See discussion infra note 118.
44. See discussion infra note 118.
45. See discussion infra note 118.
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means that a clause in the security agreement, which provides that the debtor
will remain liable notwithstanding any subsequent transfers, will not suffice.
This is to ensure that the debtor will choose between remaining liable and
paying off the mortgage at the time when the property is sold.46
F. Request for Statement of Account
While section 209 is reflected in the LSA,47 the LSA's provisions
dealing with the right to obtain information about the security agreement are
much more extensive than those in the ULSIA, because the LSA is based
on notice-based financing.48 Since the Registry only provides the name
and address of the secured party and notice that there is a charge, but no
further details, the right to obtain detailed information about the debt from
the secured party is essential.
VI. REGISTRATION, PERFECTION, AND PRIORITIEs
A. Relative Scope of LSA and ULSIA
As observed earlier, the most substantial structural difference between
the ULSIA and the LSA is the comprehensive treatment afforded by the
latter to the registration, perfection, and priority status of security interests
in land.49  Because these issues are intimately connected to the more
general land registry structure and policies of individual jurisdictions, they
fall outside the reform mandate of the drafters of the ULSIA. In contrast,
the New Brunswick LSA project was commissioned by NBGIC, which is
vested with the overall responsibility for the operation of the general land
registry system in the province, at a time when reform of both the structural
and substantive incidents of that system is very much in the air.
B. Perfection by Registration
Like Article 9 and the PPSA, part III of the LSA uses the term
"perfection" to denote the publicity step necessary to make a security
interest effective against third parties on attachment.5" However, while a
46. See discussion infra note 118.
47. A small change is that the debtor is entitled to a free account only every 12 months
under the LSA, rather than every six months.
48. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 32.
49. Id. at 33-38.
50. Id. at 34.
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security interest in personal property can be perfected by either registration
or taking possession of the collateral-or even temporary perfection exists
by operation of law in limited circumstances--registration is the sole method
of perfection available under the LSA.5 This difference reflects the
elevated importance of registration in land law in light of the role of the
land registry as a record of both title and encumbrances against title.
C. Notice Filing
As mentioned earlier, part IV of the proposed LSA follows the Article
9/PPSA precedent in adopting notice-filing, popular with both system
administrators and system users, in place of the instrument-filing approach
currently used in both the Land Registry and, for most purposes, in place of
the Land Titles registration systems in the province.52 Although the
registration venue will remain the same, secured parties will no longer be
required to register a copy of the security documentation itself even in the
abbreviated form now sanctioned by the Standard Form of Conveyances
act. 3 Rather, a security interest will be considered perfected on registra-
tion of a simple "financing statement ' setting out the names and addresses
of the debtor,54 the duration of effectiveness of the registration and a
description of the relevant collateral by its parcel identification number
("PID"). 55 Those with a legitimate interest in learning the full details of
the financing arrangement can contact the secured party, either directly
(where they have an existing interest in the collateral) or through the
intercession of the debtor (in the case of prospective secured creditors and
51. Id.
52. The PPSAs do not represent the first use of notice-filing in Canadian law. Rather,
a form of notice-filing has been in operation since the early part of this century for
registration of the sui generis statutory form of security interest available to the chartered
banks under what is now § 427 of the federal Bank Act. See Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-1.01,
§ 427 (1995) (Can.).
53. R.S.N.B. ch. S-12.2 (1973) (Can.).
54. The regulations under the proposed LSA will incorporate the same rules for
determining the legal name of both corporate and individual debtors that apply currently
under the PPSA. Thus should provide welcome guidance on what is currently a controversial
question, as well as ensure, in the longer term, consistency in the electronic records in the
two contexts for the purposes of computer-based searching.
55. As is the case with registrations under the PPSA, a registrant will be able to select
a registration life expressed either as a term of whole years (with registration fees set
according to a sliding tariff that increases with each additional year) or as infinity (subject
to a single lump sum registration fee).
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other transferees) under the fully elaborated disclosure process established
by part II of the act. 6
D. Manual or Electronic Filing?
As noted at the beginning of this paper, NBGIC contemplates the
implementation of a client-administered, fully electronic environment for
registrations under the LSA similar to that currently available for PPSA
registrations.5 7 Indeed, as we have seen, it was the possibility of being
able to re-use the technology and expertise developed for the PPSA on the
land side that explains, in no small part, the corporation's support for the
LSA project. However, to maintain flexibility and to enable incremental
reform, the LSA was drafted in technologically neutral language. The
drafters anticipate that it will be initially implemented using paper financing
statements and manual filing.
E. Compulsory Amendment or Discharge
To alleviate the problem of undischarged security interests remaining
on the record and clouding title, the LSA incorporates the PPSA's
compulsory discharge and amendment policy under which a secured party
is obligated to discharge or amend a registration, on demand by the debtor,
to accurately reflect the status of the financing relationship between the
parties.5 8 If the obligations of the debtor have been performed, and the
secured party fails to comply with a demand by the debtor to register a
discharge, the debtor may register the discharge. Under the paper-based
version of the LSA, a debtor who registers a discharge is required to notify
the secured party within thirty days, to allow the secured party to challenge
the discharge. 9 If, in the worst case scenario, the debtor registers a
discharge when not entitled to do so, fails to notify the secured party, and
enters into a new security agreement with a third party, the original secured
party will lose its priority, but the debtor will be liable to the original
secured party for any harm caused by an unwarranted discharge, and will
also face criminal sanctions for fraud.' This is considered sufficient
incentive to prevent debtors from fraudulently taking advantage of the
compulsory discharge provisions. The risk of fraud under the LSA is no
56. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 15-32.
57. See discussion supra note 13.
58. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 80-82.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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greater than under the current system, where registration of a fraudulent
discharge is also possible." Thus, the compulsory discharge provisions
greatly ease the burden of dealing with undischarged security interests,
without increasing the exposure to fraud which exists under the current
system. It is anticipated that when an automated, paperless system is
implemented, the burden of sending notification to the secured party on
registration of the discharge will be shifted to the registrar rather than the
debtor, thus greatly reducing the risk of fraud.
F. Priorities Generally
In contrast to the rather complex set of priority rules found in the PPSA
and Article 9, the priority scheme of the LSA is straightforward. Regardless
of whether the contest involves competing security interests or a security
interest and some other type of claim, registration is paramount in assessing
priority.62 Thus, ranking generally turns on the order of registration; an
unregistered interest is subordinated to a registered interest, and it is only
when neither interest is registered that priority reverts to the ordinary
common law nemo dat rule of order of attachment.63 The relative com-
plexity of the Article 9/PPSA rules compared to the simple first-to-register
rule in the LSA 4 is primarily a function of the less comprehensive scope
of personal property registry systems. While a land registry ordinarily
records both ownership interests and encumbrances on ownership, a personal
property registry is usually limited to encumbrances and even then rarely
purports to be comprehensive.65 Since a first-to-register priority rule is
61. Id.
62. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 33-55. Two qualifications should be
mentioned. The first relates to the priority status of tenants of leased collateral. Although
the order of registration normally decides priority between the rights of the tenant in the
collateral and the rights of the secured party, leases for a term of less than three years need
not be registered to be valid and effective against third parties. Accordingly, in this one case,
priority under the LSA instead turns primarily on whether the tenant is in possession when
the financing statement is registered. Id. at 44-46. The second qualification relates to
security interests taken in leased or mortgaged land. The security interest in the land is
deemed to include a security interest in the payments made under the lease or mortgage,
without the need for a fresh registration, for the purposes of determining priority as against
a secured party holding an assignment of the payments as independent collateral. Id.
63. IM. at 33-34.
64. Id. at 34-35.
65. Under complementary legislation enacted at the same time as the PPSA went into
effect, the Personal Property Registry in New Brunswick was made the registration venue for
a variety of personal property interests other than PPSA security interests, most notably, the
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possible only if the competing interests are all registerable in the first
instance, the PPSA and Article 9 necessarily incorporate supplementary rules
to resolve priority between secured parties and third party claimants outside
the registry system, such as purchasers and lessees of the collateral.6
G. General Abolition of Doctrine of Actual Notice
Although the New Brunswick Registry Act on its face adopts
registration as the principal ranking mechanism for priority, actual notice of
the existence of a prior unregistered interest can still invert priority.67 The
doctrine of actual notice injects an unwelcome level of uncertainty into
property transactions and undermines the reliability of the public record as
a mechanism for ordering priority. The LSA project was therefore seen as
creating a welcome opportunity to enact a wholesale abolition of the actual
notice qualification. Complementary amendments to the Registry Act will
extend the pure first-to-register rule found in the LSA to resolve the priority
of competing land claims generally.
H. Priority of Security Interests in After-Acquired Land
Under the PPSA, the registration of a financing statement covering the
debtor's after-acquired personal property generally gives priority over
interest of an unsecured creditor who has recovered a money judgment against the debtor.
But while all jurisdictions have made similar efforts to expand the scope of the PPR, no
jurisdiction has yet succeeded in subjecting all non-possessory personal property claims to
a registration requirement in the first instance, let alone to a requirement to register in a
common venue. The most notable exclusions from any registration requirement, though this
is changing gradually, are the statutory liens created by both federal and provincial legislation
in favour of government entities to secure their tax and other revenue claims.
66. Nor can we expect greater harmony to develop over time. The establishment of a
comprehensive title registry is an impractical and even undesirable proposition in view of the
often mutable and temporary character of personal property and varied forms it takes. And
even if a title register were feasible, it would still not be possible to adopt a universal first-to-
register rule for personal property interests. Exceptions would inevitably have to be created
to give effect to other policies, such as free negotiability for instruments, securities, and the
like, or to accommodate the choice of law problems created by the mobility of personal
property, problems for which no counterparts exist in land financing.
67. A decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, in United Trust Co. v. Dominion
Stores Ltd., 71 D.L.R.3d 72 (1977), introduced an element of the doctrine of actual notice
into the theoretically pure land titles acts of some jurisdictions. However, the New
Brunswick Land Titles Act was drafted subsequently to this decision and incorporates
wording designed to ensure that the doctrine of actual notice does not apply. This wording
has not yet been tested in the courts.
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subsequently registered interests.6" However, an exception exists for serial-
numbered goods that are held by the debtor as either consumer goods or
equipment. Unless the goods are registered and searchable by specific serial
number, the security interest is vulnerable to subordination to subsequent
third-party interests. 69
In developing the LSA proposal, the drafters gave some thought to
extending the PPR data base of debtor names so as to allow the registration
of a security interest covering any land subsequently acquired by the debtor
to bind third parties. But after considerable discussion among the drafters,
and with NBGIC, it was decided that the LSA should approach land in the
same manner as the PPSA approaches serial numbered goods. Accordingly,
in order to perfect a security interest in land, the LSA requires the secured
party to register a financing statement that discloses the specific parcel index
number ("PID") of the collateral.70 In other words, the registration of a
financing statement that describes the collateral simply as "all present and
after acquired lands" will not constitute adequate perfection, and the security
interest will be subordinated to subsequent interests that are registered
according to the relevant PID.71
Several considerations supported the drafters' final decision on this
point. First, the drafters feared that the contrary rule would complicate the
process of searching title to a degree that had to be considered unacceptable
in a modem reformed registry system. Second, the drafters recognized that
to allow the first-registering secured party to take a prior-ranking security
interest in a debtor's after-acquired lands creates what amounts to a
situational monopoly over the debtor's future financing needs even if an
exception is made for purchase money financing.72 The same problem
exists of course in the personal property context, but it is less troublesome
there because the negotiable and transient character of personal property
necessitates the creation of significant exceptions to the after-acquired
property financier's priority over third parties, thereby diminishing the
monopoly problem. Finally, the drafters felt that in view of the role of the
Land Registry, in contrast to that of the Personal Property Registry, as a
record of both ownership interests and encumbrances on ownership, the law
should generally discourage the proliferation on the record of future interests
68. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1, § 35.
69. Id.
70. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 68-69.
71. See idL at 36-37.
72. See id. at 37.
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with the impediments to the integrity and operation of the system that they
inevitably pose.
I. After-Acquired Land and the Claims of Judgment Creditors
Under the Registry Act, as it presently reads, the registration of a
"memorial" of judgment binds the interest of the judgment debtor identified
in the memorial in any lands acquired within five years of registration.73
Allowing judgment creditors to bind after-acquired land in this manner
prevents judgment debtors from effectively preferring new creditors by
subjecting their after-acquired land to a security interest before the registered
judgment was amended to specifically cover the new lands.74 This policy
also encourages the voluntary liquidation of debt, since the judgment
creditor cannot deal with his or her assets without paying off the debt. At
a purely mechanical level, however, the existing land registration system
unquestionably presents obstacles to the effective registration of judgments
against a debtor's after-acquired lands. In the Registry Act context,
searchers must depart from normal practice and search the grantor-grantee
index back five years to determine whether a memorial has been registered
against a grantee named in a later conveyance of land.
The difficulty of searching for judgment liens is exacerbated under a
parcel-based indexing, such as is proposed for the LSA, because registration
can be effected only against a specific parcel or parcels of registered land,
and then only once the judgment debtor becomes the registered owner.75
To maintain the integrity of the land registry, the LSA provides that a
judgment, as any other interest, must be registered against a specific parcel
to bind the land.7 6 To maintain the advantages of self-enforcing judg-
ments, the LSA requires that a registrant who wishes to register a transfer
of a parcel of land will be required to present a current search result to the
Registrar, disclosing a search of the Personal Property Registry according
to the name of the prospective transferee.77 According to the proposed
LSA, "[i]f the name of the prospective transferee matches the name of a
debtor against whom a judgment has been registered in the PPR, notice of
the judgment must be registered against the relevant parcel of land when the
73. See id.
74. After all, as a practical matter, judgment creditors are rarely in a position to
continually monitor the debtor's estate for the acquisition of new assets.
75. See SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 67.
76. Id. at 50.
77. Id.
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transfer is registered and before any security interest in the parcel can be
registered.""8 Therefore, to fully protect its interest, the judgment creditor
must first search the land registry for parcels registered in the name of the
debtor79 and register a notice of judgment against those specific parcels,
thus preventing the debtor from dealing with his or her presently owned land
without paying off the judgment debt. Next, the judgment creditor must
register a notice of judgment in the PPR, which will indirectly bind after-
acquired land. 0
J. Priority for Future Advances as Against an Intervening
Judgment Creditor
Under the PPSA, a perfected security interest has priority over the
subsequently-registered interest of a judgment creditor only to the extent of
advances made before the secured party has actual notice of the intervening
registration of a notice of judgment." Registration constitutes constructive,
not actual notice. The adoption of this priority rule prevents a debtor from
remaining judgment proof by increasing the share of debt owed to secured
creditors even after judgments in favour of unsecured creditors have begun
to accumulate. A similar policy makes evident sense for land law; the pre-
PPSA law in relation to chattel mortgages on this point is identical to the
pre-LSA law in the land context, and has been incorporated in the LSA.82
VII. DEFAULT
A. Rights and Remedies
As with the ULSIA, the rights and remedies on default are confined to
those which are described in part V of the act or in the security agree-
ment.83 Rights granted to the debtor or obligations imposed on the secured
party cannot be waived or varied unless specifically provided for in the
act."4 The LSA recognizes and codifies five primary default remedies
available to secured parties against the collateral:
78. Id.
79. The parcel indexed land registry will also include an auxiliary name index.
80. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 67.
81. Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B. ch. P-7.1, § 14(2).
82. See SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 50-51.
83. Id at 85-89.
84. Id. at 87.
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1) right to collect rents from leased collateral and to collect payments
owing under a security agreement covering land that is collateral under
a subsequent security agreement executed by the secured party in favour
of his or her financier; 2) right to take possession of the collateral; 3)
right to dispose of the collateral by private sale or lease; 4) right to
retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the secured debt; and 5) right
to appoint a receiver to manage and realize the value of the collater-
al.85
For their part, debtors are given a non-excludable:
1) right of redemption; 2) right to reinstate the security agreement
outside of receiverships; 3) right to any surplus from a disposition by
sale or lease; and 4) right to require disposition by sale rather than
foreclosure.86
B. Reinstatement of the Security Agreement and Acceleration
Clauses
As explained in the commentary:
[s]ecurity agreements that provide for payment at fixed intervals
commonly contain an acceleration clause under which the entire
outstanding secured obligation becomes due and payable upon default
in the payment of any one instalment. Such a clause is unobjectionable
to this extent that it simply allows the secured party to realize in full
upon a debt which is non-performing. However, it could also be
invoked to allow a secured party to accelerate the entire debt as a single
late payment which occurred because of some unforeseen and unavoid-
able delay. For this reason acceleration clauses are often considered
harsh and legislation giving relief from their effect has been imple-
mented in a number of jurisdictions as well as in the New Brunswick
PPSA.
But while arbitrary invocation of the acceleration clause is possible,
it is rarely in the interest of a secured party to call in an otherwise
sound loan as a result of a single default, as this simply increases
administrative costs to no benefit. On the contrary, in general the
secured party will voluntarily make every effort to give a debtor a
chance to reinstate an agreement when the default is inadvertent or the
result of temporary cash-flow problems. In addition to calling in loans
85. Id. at 87-88.
86. Id. at 88.
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clause to call in a loan in the face of persistent defaults which are
raising the lender's administrative costs in a case where default is
ultimately inevitable. In a competitive market, such as the Canadian
mortgage market, this use of the acceleration clause will indirectly
lower the cost of the loan to the borrower. [On the other hand], if the
lender has given the debtor an informal opportunity to reinstate the
agreement, and default is in fact ultimately inevitable, then the debtor
will be unlikely to take advantage of a formal right of reinstatement.
And... some unscrupulous lenders may take advantage of the clause
to call in a loan after a single default if interest rates have risen
sufficiently that incurring the costs of calling in the loan and relending
the money at a higher rate is profitable (although reputational con-
straints make it unlikely that a major lender would resort to this tactic
regularly). Further, all lenders do not always act rationally, and in some
instances, perhaps because of bad personal relations between the debtor
and the creditor, the loan might unjustifiably be called in a the result of
an insignificant default.
The arguments for and against a right of reinstatement are therefore
fairly closely balanced. Acceleration clauses are not routinely abused,
and a right of reinstatement may simply draw out the time and expense
involved in realizing on the security in instances where the clause is
properly invoked; but a right of reinstatement is unlikely to be taken
advantage of by large numbers of borrowers, so that the price of such
a right in terms of increased lending costs is probably quite low.8
One of the drafters, Siebrasse, is not in favour of such a right, while the
other drafter, Walsh, does favour this right. In the end, the drafters decided
to include a limited right of reinstatement in the proposal in order to
harmonize the LSA with the PPSA, and with real property law in some
other major jurisdictions. A default would be curable at any time before
disposition of the collateral by tendering only the amounts past due,
exclusive of any amounts owing due to the acceleration clause, plus
reasonable expenses of the secured party. As explained in the commentary
to this section of the act:
[tihis provides protection from arbitrary invocation by the lender when
interest rates rise, for example, while retaining the secured party's right
to call in a loan which is perpetually in arrears. The contemplated
provision would not make such clauses void, but ... simply provides
for a right of reinstatement, so that if an acceleration clause were
invoked and the default is not cured, the entire debt would be due and
87. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 130-31.
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owing. A requirement that the debtor pay the lender's reasonable
expenses would deter willful abuse of the reinstatement right by the
debtor. The debtor would also be required to cure any other default by
reason of which the secured party intended to dispose of the collateral.
As additional protection against abuse of the right, the debtor would not
be entitled to reinstate more than twice annually. Finally, in the unusual
event that these protections were insufficient, the secured party would
be entitled to apply under 39 to terminate the debtor's right of reinstate-
ment.
88
The right of reinstatement is not available in the context of a receivership
in a commercial debt realization.89
In contrast, the ULSIA does not provide a right of reinstatement per se,
but provides for a notice period of fifteen days before the acceleration clause
may be invoked.9" This allows the debtor to cure an inadvertent default,
and reinstate the security agreement, while giving the secured party a certain
cut off point, beyond which the right of reinstatement will not be exercised.
However, it is unlikely that a right of reinstatement would be helpful to a
debtor suffering unusual cash-flow problems of longer than two weeks'
duration. On the other hand, the ULSIA is more favourable to the debtor
in that there is no limit to the number of times the agreement can be
reinstated, so long as the debtor acts within fifteen days.91
C. Receivership
While appointment of a receiver by the court is possible, in Anglo-
Canadian practice, a power to appoint a private receiver is invariably found
in commercial security agreements. Since the private receiver can be
appointed more quickly, more easily, and more cheaply, the appointment is
made by the secured party, and the powers of the receiver and its remunera-
tion can be spelled out in the security agreement. A privately appointed
receiver is generally preferred over a court appointed receiver throughout the
Commonwealth, except perhaps in circumstances where the secured party
anticipates a challenge to the receiver's authority, or other such difficul-
ties.92 In view of the many advantages of a private receivership it is not
88. 11. at 131-32 (citations omitted).
89. See discussion infra note 118.
90. U.L.S.I.A. § 502, 7A U.L.A. at 252.
91. See id.
92. See JACOB S. ZIEGEL & D.L. DENOMME, THE ONTARIO PERSONAL PROPERTY
SEcuRITY ACT: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (1994).
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clear why the practice has not caught on in the United States.93 The LSA
does not confer the power to appoint a private receiver, which must still be
found in the security agreement, but the LSA specifically sanctions such an
appointment, and places certain obligations on a privately appointed
receiver, primarily with regard to record keeping.94 The LSA also
specifically provides for a judicially appointed receiver.95
D. Collection of Rents
The treatment of the right to collect rents under the LSA differs from
that found in section 505 of the ULSIA in several respects.96 First, in the
provision dealing with the obligor's rights vis-a-vis an assignee, "assignee"
is defined to include a secured party.97 The effect is that the LSA implies
an assignment of rents whenever a security interest is taken in the underly-
ing property, unless the parties agree to the contrary. The rationale for this
is that the legal default rule should replicate the most commonly desired
arrangement, and in practice, an assignment of rents is almost invariably
taken.9" Further, in contrast to the ULSIA, if the debtor is in default under
a security agreement, the secured party is entitled to all rents, and not only
those accruing after notice is given.99 This includes all arrears, even if the
rents became payable before default. This simplifies the action, as there is
no need for the debtor to apportion the arrears between the secured party
and the debtor, and there is no good reason for allowing the debtor to milk
the property of rents which happened to accrue before default. The debtor
is not, in principle, disadvantaged, as the arrears are of course applied to the
debt. Under the LSA, because the secured party is deemed to be an
assignee, a demand for payment on default is subject to the notice
requirements which apply in the case of an assignment of the right to
93. See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Privately Appointed Receiver and the Enforcement of
Security Interests: Anomaly or Superior Solution, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INsOLvENCY LAw 451 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed.,
1994).
94. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 135.
95. Id. at 136.
96. The LSA follows the ULSIA in providing that a secured party need not be in
possession to collect rents. The arguments are reviewed in Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and
More Rational Approach to Rents as Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV.
349 (1993), which recommends the approach adopted by the ULSIA and the LSA.
97. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 60.
98. Id at 93.
99. Id. at 92.
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payment and the concomitant right to pay rents into court in the case of
conflicting demands."
E. Duties of the Secured Party in Possession
The question of the proper scope of the duties of a secured party in
possession raises difficult questions. The traditional duties are generally
perceived by secured parties as onerous, and as a result, possession by the
secured party is a remedy which is resorted to only reluctantly. Section
505(d) of the ULSIA addresses this issue by specifically enumerating a
number of duties, including the duty to carry reasonable insurance, to
maintain the property, and to make repairs, which amount to a partial
codification of existing law.'' However, as the commentary to this
section of the proposed act discusses, and as was also noted by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission ("OLRC"), a specific enumeration of this sort:
sacrifices the flexibility of the existing standard, cannot be exhaustive,
and may "lead to [] mechanical and therefore insufficient compliance."
Further, a non-exhaustive enumeration of duties is unlikely to satisfy
secured parties, who are more concerned about the standard required in
relation to the performance of clearly established duties, rather than the
lack of clarity as to the nature of the duties.
Consideration was given to specifically relaxing some of the
existing duties, but while the duties may be burdensome, they generally
address a real underlying concern. Some duties are not onerous in
themselves, but give rise to uncertainty and potential litigation. For
example, the duty to take reasonable care in collecting rents and
ensuring that the premises are not left vacant, is sufficiently imprecise
that it can always provide the basis for an attack by the debtor in
deficiency proceedings, and the lost rents from vacancy in a commercial
property may be very substantial, especially if considerable time is
needed to dispose of a valuable property in a commercially reasonable
manner. The obligation to make repairs, while denying the secured
party's claims for major improvements, may result in difficult decisions
for the secured party. However, the alternative, to deny the debtor the
benefit of rents lost by the mismanagement of the secured party, or to
permit the secured party to allow the property to fall into disrepair, is
a cure worse than the disease.
The LSA therefore neither enumerates the secured party's duties,
nor specifically relaxes its duties. [Rather the] LSA parallels the [New
100. See supra part V.C.; see also discussion infra note 118.
101. U.L.S.I.A. § 505(d), 7A U.L.A. at 257.
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Brunswick] PPSA in providing that a secured party in possession must
take reasonable care in the management and preservation of the
property. This is subject to the overall standard of commercial
reasonableness imposed by s. 41, so that the provision should be read
as requiring "commercially reasonable" care. This is not intended to
effect any specific change in existing law. It is nonetheless possible
that some specific duties under existing law will be held to be commer-
cially unreasonable."' 2
F. Methods of Disposing of the Collateral
Under the LSA, the debtor's interest in the collateral may be terminated
either through an agreement by the secured party to retain the collateral in
full or partial satisfaction of the debt, 3 or by the exercise of the power
of sale by the secured party. The former remedy is similar to, but more
powerful than the agreement to acquire the debtor's interest contemplated
in section 507,104 and the latter is similar to the power provided in section
509.105 There is no provision for judicial sale such as that found in
section 510 of the ULSIA,04 nor is there a provision equivalent to the
traditional remedy of strict foreclosure, that is, a judicial declaration that the
collateral is retained by the secured party in satisfaction of the debt. These
remedies have not been available in New Brunswick for a number of years
and were not thought to be sufficiently useful to revive.
G. Retention of the Collateral in Full or Partial Satisfaction of
the Debt
In a remedy modelled after the PPSA, and similar to that found in
Article 9, the LSA allows the secured party to propose to retain the
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debt. 7 The remedy is
broader than the agreement to acquire the debtor's interest which is
contemplated in section 507 because it extinguishes all interests subordinate
to that of the secured party.' Accordingly, a proposal to retain the
102. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 101-02 (citing OLRC REPORT, supra note
7, at 230).
103. Id. at 109.
104. See U.L.S.I.A. § 507, 7A U.L.A. at 258.
105. See id. § 509, 7A U.L.A. at 261.
106. See id. § 510, 7A U.L.A. at 262.
107. See SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 144 (incorporating § 69 of the PPSA);
see also discussion infra note 118.
108. See U.L.S.I.A. § 507, 7A U.L.A. at 258.
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collateral must be sent to parties who would be entitled to be notified if a
power of sale were exercised, namely all parties with a right to redeem,
including the spouse of the debtor."° Any party with an interest in the
collateral has fifteen days after the proposal is made to object."' If no
objection is made within that time, the secured party is deemed to retain the
collateral in satisfaction of that part of the debt which was specified in the
proposal. The interest of all subordinate parties is extinguished, except for
the interest of parties who were entitled to, but did not receive notice. The
interest of subordinate parties who did not receive notice will be extin-
guished by a subsequent sale to a bona fide third party, and their only
remedy thereafter will be for damages against the secured party for failure
to give notice.'
The LSA gives the secured party the option to retain the collateral in
partial satisfaction of the debt to provide additional flexibility. This option
will be particularly useful if a deficiency is anticipated and the debtor is
solvent: by agreeing to a proposal for retention of the collateral in partial
satisfaction, expenses of the sale are avoided, thereby increasing the amount
which may be credited against the debt, while the secured party retains the
right to pursue the deficiency.
This drastically simplified power to retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debt is perhaps reminiscent of the strict foreclosure which was at one
time granted by American courts, and which was perceived to operate so
harshly that it was eventually eliminated. Abuse of the remedy under the
LSA is prevented because any party with an interest which would be
extinguished has the right to object; even one objection is sufficient to block
a foreclosure proposal. However, the basis for objection must be a
legitimate one. The objector must of course have an interest in the
collateral, and the secured party is entitled to demand proof of the interest,
and can proceed as if no objection was made if proof is not forthcoming.
The objector must also be adversely affected by the foreclosure. Of course,
the party's interest will be cut off by the disposition, but this alone is not
sufficient to give a right to object, as it will not have an adverse effect on
that party if the market value of the collateral is less than the debt owed to
the foreclosing creditor plus its enforcement expenses. If faced with a
frivolous objection, the secured party is entitled to apply to a court for a
ruling that an objection is ineffective because the objection was motivated
109. See SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 144.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 107-08, 119-20.
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by a purpose other than protection of the objector's interest in the collateral.
Costs in such a motion may be awarded against a party who makes a
frivolous objection, thus providing sufficient disincentive for such objec-
tions.
H. Creditor's Power of Sale
The LSA grants the secured party the right to dispose of the collateral
by sale or lease, whether or not such a right was specified in the security
agreement. Other than this, the power of sale provisions of the LSA are
very similar to those found in section 509 of the ULSIA, with some
differences regarding timing and notice periods. The delay period between
notification that the secured party intends to exercise its power of sale, and
the earliest date at which the sale may be held, was set at five weeks under
section 509(a) of the ULSIA."' This time period was apparently set with
the goal of providing sufficient time for the debtor to obtain court relief to
control any aspect of the foreclosure.' However, the great majority of
sales will not justify judicial intervention, and it is unduly burdensome to
structure the process around an unusual event. The LSA contemplates that
challenges to the validity of the sale can be made after the sale, with
damages as a remedy. This remedy will generally be adequate, and will
ensure that the secured party realizes on the security only when it has at the
least a prima facie right to do so. The delay period in the LSA is intended
solely to give the debtor time to cure the default or refinance the property
when in a position to do so expeditiously, and the LSA therefore adopts a
somewhat shorter notice period of thirty days.
The ULSIA provides that a notice of intention to foreclose may not be
given to a protected party until payment is five weeks overdue. This
effectively doubles the time between default and the earliest possible sale.
As the OLRC points out, to the extent that the delay before the sale is
intended to allow the debtor or other parties with a right to do so to redeem
the collateral, there is no justification for longer notice periods for protected
borrowers, since there is no connection between the type of borrower and
the chance of improvement of its financial prospects in the near future."1 4
Further, secured parties typically make every effort to encourage the debtor
to pay before taking steps to realize on the security. To impose an
112. U.L.S.I.A. § 509(a), 7A U.L.A. at 261.
113. James M. Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure Under the Uniform Land Transactions
-Act (As Amended), 6 REAL ESTATE L.J. 179, 186 (1978).
114. OLRC REPORT, supra note 7, at 169.
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additional formal notification period will either add to the delay when there
is no hope of redemption, or will encourage secured parties to issue a formal
notice at the first legal opportunity, so as not to be hampered by the notice
requirement when a decision is made to realize on the collateral. This
would unduly formalize the process, and in so doing, might impede informal
attempts to reinstate the debt.
I. Effect of Disposition
As under section 512 of the ULSIA,1 5 a sale to a bona fide purchaser
for value, pursuant to the power of sale in the LSA, conveys title free of all
interests subordinate to that of the debtor or the secured party. 116 It has
been suggested that under the ULSIA, "a failure to observe significant
statutory requirements" would "undoubtedly" result in a void sale,
particularly when the secured party is not financially responsible, so that no
compensation is forthcoming." 7 Whatever the merits of this position as
an interpretation of the ULSIA, it is certainly contrary to the intended
interpretation of the equivalent provision of the LSA. Such an interpreta-
tion, by creating uncertainty in the title given under the exercise of a power
of sale, would result in a general reduction in the selling price for such
properties, thereby penalizing thousands of debtors and secured parties in
cases where all reasonable steps were in fact taken. It is preferable to apply
the general principle that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the
party should bear the loss who could best have avoided it. Only parties who
borrow from lenders who are both unscrupulous and financially irresponsible
expose themselves to the risk that they will be financially harmed by an
improper sale. Because there is no dearth of responsible lenders, a decision
to borrow from an irresponsible lender will typically be made to obtain a
lower interest rate. There is no reason why parties who take such a
calculated risk should later be compensated to the detriment of the good
faith purchaser and borrowers generally. Of course, when the purchaser is
a party to the bad faith sale, the same logic does not apply, and he or she
should not be protected.
115. See U.L.S.I.A. § 512, 7A U.L.A. at 265.
116. SIEBRASSE & WALSH, supra note 3, at 107-08, 119-20.
117. Pedowitz, supra note 113, at 194-95.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The proposed Land Security Act will soon be brought to the New
Brunswick government for approval in principle."' If the proposal is
approved, the drafters anticipate that it will be implemented in the near
future. While, for better or for worse, the drafters have deviated from the
ULSIA in a number of respects, there is no question that the guidance
provided by the ULSIA helped them in fashioning a better proposed act than
would otherwise have been possible. The drafters hope that some of the
observations and modifications that they have recommended may likewise
be of assistance to future law reformers.
118. This article was written at the same time as the final draft of the report (the
tentative act) was being prepared. After this article was completed, but just prior to the
submission of the report, NBGIC indicated that they viewed some of the drafters'
recommendations, which they intended to make, as changes to the law which are outside the
scope of their legislative mandate. Therefore, NBCIG would be unwilling to present those
recommendations to the executive branch of the government for adoption as an official policy
proposal. These aspects of the report, in particular, the detailed treatment of the rights of the
debtor after alienation of the mortgaged property in part V.E. of this paper, the right of
reinstatement of the security agreement discussed in part VII.B., and the secured party's right
to retain the collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debt discussed in part VII.G., were
therefore removed from the final report to NBGIC. Discussions are currently underway
between the authors, NBGIC, and the Law Reform Branch of the New Brunswick
Department of Justice regarding the possibility that the Law Reform Branch will assume
responsibility for bringing forward these particular recommendations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Property law is not a realm where uniform legislation has thrived.
Only a handful of efforts have impressed enough state legislatures to have
meaningful impact. Of the few successes, most are narrow in scope. For
example, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act' deals with the transfer of
property rights in cases when the sequence of deaths among multiple or
competing owners is difficult to prove, and the Uniform Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act ("UVPRA") 2 allocates losses from casualty and
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia; Former
Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law, Columbus, Ohio. B.A.,
1974, Saint Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota; J.D., 1977, University of Texas School of
Law, Austin, Texas. Professor Smith teaches courses in property law, land use planning, real
estate transactions and development, natural resources, secured transactions, oil and gas law,
and housing law and policy.
The author thanks Ron Brown, Paul Heald, Robin Malloy, and Dick Wellman for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 8B U.L.A. 267 (1993 & Supp. 1995). All states except Louisiana and Ohio have
enacted either the 1940 version or the 1993 version of the Act. Id. at 29, 41 (Supp. 1995).
2. 14 U.L.A. 469 (1990).
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condemnation that occur while real property is subject to a contract of sale,
prior to closing.
In property, success has befallen only two uniform acts that have
breadth, in that they treat an entire topic or type of legal relationship. The
Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")3 and the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act ("URLTA")4 stand alone in this regard. First, approximately
half of the states have adopted all or a significant part of the UPC. Ap-
proved in 1969, and expanded and amended several times since, it provides
comprehensive treatment for the transmission of property at an owner's
death via probate and nonprobate transfers, guardianship, and related
matters. Second, the URLTA, approved in 1972, has garnered adoption by
fifteen states.' It provides statutory rules governing all facets of the
landlord-tenant relationship for residential tenancies.
The most ambitious effort at uniform property legislation ever launched
was the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA") 6 and its companion, the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"). 7 Both measures
caught the eyes of property scholars,' including law casebook authors,9
most of whom were generally approving. Both Acts, however, met with
singular failure in the sense of uniform legislative shunning and have not
substantially influenced judges in their lawmaking roles. In published
3. 8 U.L.A. 1 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
4. 7B U.L.A. 427 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
5. During the 1970s, 13 states, beginning with Hawaii in 1972, enacted the URLTA.
Its sails have lost the wind; since then there have been only two adoptions, Rhode Island and
South Carolina, both in 1986. Id. at 60 (Supp. 1995).
6. U.L.T.A. (1975).
7. U.S.L.T.A. (1976).
8. See, e.g., Jon W. Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1980); Robert
Brussack, Reform of American Conveyancing Formality, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1981);
Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., Simplifying Land Transfers: The Recordation and Marketable Title
Provisions of the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 62 OR. L. REv. 363 (1983).
9. See, e.g., JOHN CRIBBET & CORWIN JOHNSON, PROPERTY, at xviii (4th ed. 1978)
(stating that adoption of the Acts by the Commissioners "points the way toward further
reform in the law relating to the sale of land"); GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2d ed. 1981) (stating that the ULTA
"represents an interesting and often useful alternative to existing legal rules," to which the
authors refer throughout the book). Recent casebooks generally pay much less attention to
the ULTA and the USLTA than those published in the 1970s and early 1980s.
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opinions, very few courts have relied upon the ULTA or USLTA positions
for analogous support.10
Why did a single state legislature, somewhere in America, not pass at
least one of the Acts? More than twenty years have elapsed since
promulgation, so certainly they have had time. Causation, often a prime
concern of lawyers, is tricky here. When a legislature enacts a statute, it is
often hard to pick one's way through the process to determine precisely why
the legislature acted and why it made particular drafting choices. Legislative
history for state statutes, compared to federal acts, is often sketchy. On
occasion, there is no extant written history. But at least the legislature has
spoken through its vote and the words of the act.
Here, we are investigating the legislature's refusal to speak or its lack
of interest. When the law, in its examination of human conduct, recognizes
the distinction between an affirmative act and an omission, as it often does,
the distinction typically is grounded on the difficulty of ascribing intent or
motivation to an omission. This raises an important caveat for our purposes.
We cannot tell for sure why the legislatures eschewed the USLTA and the
ULTA. There may be no single reason. In some states, there may have
been more pressing legislative business for a number of sessions; in other
states, there may have been no energetic proponents or available sponsors;
in others, a searching study may have disclosed that the Acts' principles
were not compatible with the states' perceived needs.
My purpose is not to make a comprehensive study either of the causes
for legislative rejection of the Acts or of the merits of the Acts' provisions.
As indicated above, one cannot be certain that lack of adoption is due to a
perception that the Acts' substantive principles are deficient in terms of
policy. My suggestion, however, is that one plausible explanation for the
failure to garner adoptions is that the core principles of the Acts were
rejected on their merits. The rejection occurred not because the principles
are intrinsically flawed (which may or may not be the case), but because
they embody major reforms that do not respond to contemporary market
needs. Instead, the proposed reforms ignore market changes, including
10. A Westlaw search conducted by the author on January 24, 1996, revealed 30
published opinions citing the ULTA (27 in state courts and 3 in federal courts) and 3
published opinions (all in state courts) citing the USLTA. A majority of those opinions rely
on the Acts to some extent, typically by pointing out that the rule they announce is
compatible with or resembles the Acts' rule. Given the two decades since adoption of the
Acts and the volumes of real property cases decided since, this is a small number of
citations, reflecting minimal impact on the judiciary.
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developing market-based solutions to legal problems concerning real estate
transactions.
II. MARKET CHANGES AND LAW REFORM
The real estate markets of today, as well as those of the 1970s when
the Acts were approved, are vastly different from those of the early part of
this century. Earlier, both real estate sales and loans tended to be local in
nature, with the parties often having continuing, and sometimes personal,
relationships. Seller and buyer often lived in the same community and, if
not well acquainted, they may have known of the other's reputation. The
borrower, whether commercial or residential, knew his local banker. Real
estate transactions involving local parties, just as today, sometimes fell apart
and generated disputes, but local legal rules and local norms generally
proved adequate to resolve them. Whether an outsider from a community
in another state would understand those rules and norms was not considered
to be of much importance. If an outsider chose to enter the local market,
it was at his peril to ascertain the local rules by, for example, hiring a local
agent or attorney.
This century the markets for real estate sales and finance matured,
becoming mammoth in size at the national level and much larger at the local
level in many American communities. Like other aspects of the American
economy, the parties to transactions increasingly were strangers. Growing
numbers of transactions involved parties from different communities, and as
cities expanded, fewer residents knew each other. More property transac-
tions with interstate dimensions took place.
Law evolves to respond to economic and social changes. Radically
different real estate markets raised new problems, which existing property
law and existing institutions were ill-equipped to handle. Persons entering
large, depersonalized real estate markets needed certain legal protections,
which existing law failed to provide. Buyers of new housing, who paid a
price based on the assumption that the unit was satisfactory in quality and
free of significant defects, no longer dealt with a local merchant who had
a known track record and felt a need to preserve local goodwill.
Law and markets interact in many different ways. A particular legal
problem, if and when it is solved, may be solved in any number of ways:
by judicial efforts to revamp the common law, by federal legislation or
regulation, bv uniform or nonuniform state legislation, by private ordering
accomplished by market participants, or by structural changes in markets as
institutions evolve and new institutions emerge. Such approaches are not,
of course, mutually exclusive. Responses to a given problem may include
a mix from the above list. For example, judicial decisions may spark and
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inform the drafting of legislation. In property, this combination gave birth
to the URLTA. It was a reaction to the tide of judicial decisions embracing
the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. Similarly, in
residential finance, reform came from the interplay between the private
mortgage markets and new federal laws. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
thriving secondary mortgage market created strong pressure for national
standards for residential mortgage products."
The drafters of the ULTA and the USLTA naturally believed that many
problems in real estate transactions were amenable to solution by uniform
state legislation. A person not so persuaded, of course, would not join the
effort nor expend valuable time on the project. For a number of the
problems addressed by the Acts, the drafters missed the mark at this initial
level of decision. They too readily embraced the idea that a state code,
compared to other approaches, was a useful response. In particular, they
failed to recognize that other institutions were coping with the perceived
problems and with increasing effectiveness.
Il. TENSION BETWEEN GOALS OF UNIFoRMrrY AND IDEALISM
The Acts proposed many changes to well-established property
doctrines. The drafters were not timid. They strove to fashion an ideal set
of reformed rules which would govern the entire system of real estate sales,
titles, and finance. As a general proposition, the more major changes
contained in a proposed new statute, the more difficult it is to get it enacted.
Lawmakers, legislators as well as judges, are accustomed to making
incremental, modest changes. When a proposal envisions an entirely new
scheme, a legislature must be willing to swallow the entire thing. The
broader the new scheme, the more likely it is that some part of the scheme
will prove unpalatable, leading to rejection of the whole.
This general principle has special meaning when the proposed statute
is a uniform act. Success is not achieved if one or a few states adopt it.
The overriding hope, implicit in the title "uniform," is widespread adoption
by many states. For this reason, the goal of uniformity, in the sense of
widespread state adoptions, is generally incompatible with an "ideal" code
that seeks a large number of major reforms. This is simply an application
of commonplace notion that plans imbued with an excess of idealism are not
likely to succeed. Idealism must be tempered with realism. Uniform or
widespread acceptability and revolutionary legal change inherently conflict.
11. See Robin P. Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991 (1986).
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Thus, proponents of codes and uniform laws should limit the number
of major changes they propose to a relative few, picking those changes that
are clearly merited in terms of policy and meaningful in terms of real-world
impact. It is an uphill battle unless, prior to the proposal, there already
exists a broad consensus that substantial flaws exist in the present system
that the bill targets for reform. In contrast, such a consensus attended the
success of other uniform legislation. Notably, both the UPC and the
URLTA responded to "headline causes," as did the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") years earlier.12
With respect to real estate transactions, there was no such consensus
that the system had substantial legal defects in the 1970s, nor is there one
now. The proponents of the Acts, therefore, had the burden of convincing
the legal community that the major reforms contained therein were necessary
and important. This burden they failed to carry because the Acts attempted
to reform established principles that no longer needed reformation. There
simply was not sufficient market pressure to revamp the whole system. To
the contrary, market forces were aligned to resist such drastic revision.
The remainder of this article explains the market context surrounding
four of the Acts' reform proposals, identifying two reasons why there was
(and is) relatively little need for adoption of the Acts' reforms. First, in
some subject matter areas, institutions other than courts and legislatures had
developed, or were developing, alternative solutions to the problems at hand.
Two examples, discussed below, are warranties of quality for new homes
and formal requirements for deeds. Second, in other areas, alternative
solutions were being achieved by private ordering by the parties engaging
in the transactions. Two examples, discussed below, are risk of loss and
specific performance. Both areas are alike in that the Acts' proposals were
behind the times. The major problems addressed by the Acts were serious
problems earlier this century, but when the problems had reached a
sufficient magnitude, the market responded by finding solutions that
developed in small, incremental steps. Real estate markets and institutions
had changed drastically by the 1970s, and the Acts failed to take full
account of those changes. Perhaps the Acts, in the forms they were
promulgated, would have succeeded in the 1940s or 1950s, but they were
too late to succeed today.
12. For example, Article 9 directly responded to substantial market concerns in many
states about the validity of a "floating lien" on a business' personal property. See U.C.C. art.
9, 3 U.L.A. 1 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
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IV. SOLUTIONS FROM NONLEGAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Protecting Buyers from Homebuilders
The consumer protection movement came of age in the 1970s. In
property law, one of its prime manifestations was the implied warranty of
quality, developed by courts to protect the expectations of buyers of new
homes. The implied warranty replaced the doctrine of caveat emptor, which
shielded real estate sellers from post-closing liability for housing defects,
except to the extent the seller gave an express warranty that survived
closing.1
3
Adoption of the implied warranty followed and lagged behind reforms
in the sales of personal property. Courts analogized to the protections
afforded buyers of goods under the law of sales, recently codified in the
UCC, reasoning that buyers of new housing deserved equivalent protec-
tion. 4 This legal development recognized the changes in housing markets
and methods of construction that have taken place this century. Once when
many homes were custom-built by local builders who used local craftsmen,
the typical purchaser might personally select a builder, based upon
reputation and other factors, and become actively involved in the process of
designing the house and supervising its construction. Today most homes are
sold just like other commercial products. They are mass produced on a
speculative basis, built according to stock plans, with the typical purchaser
relying not on the personal characteristics of the builder, but solely on
advertising, the salespersons' presentations, and the product appearance.
Affected by the tide of consumerism sweeping the law in the 1970s,
which included the judicial implied warranty as one facet, the ULTA set
forth an implied warranty for the sale of new housing by a merchant
13. For a comprehensive analysis of implied warranties, see Jeff Sovem, Toward a
Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates,
Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 13 (advocating system of standardized warranties, with disclosure to buyers of warranty
choices, including choice of disclaiming all warranties).
14. The nature and content of the implied warranty varied somewhat from state to state,
partially because of differences in how closely they tailored the new warranty to the personal
property analogue. Some states called the warranty an "implied warranty of habitability,"
protecting the buyer only from extreme defects such as structural flaws that threatened the
buyer's safety or made the unit wholly unlivable. Other courts conferred broader protection,
analogizing to the UCC warranties of merchantability for the sale of goods.
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seller. 5 This is not exceptional, although the scope of the warranty is
substantially broader than that developed by prevailing caselaw. What is
exceptional, however, was the ULTA's decision to make the implied
warranty incapable of disclaimer, waiver, or modification by buyers who
occupy or intend to occupy the property. 16 The home buyer, given the
ULTA moniker of "protected party,"' 7 is shielded from vicissitudes of
freedom of contract. The apparent rationale is that home buyers lack the
ability, information, and bargaining power to negotiate for express
warranties of quality, and that without a mandatory statutory warranty, home
buyers would be routinely victimized by sellers who contractually disclaim
all liability for housing defects."s In making the warranty mandatory, the
ULTA rejected the position taken by a majority of courts, which treat the
judicial implied warranty as implied in fact and thus capable of disclaimer
in accordance with general principles of contract law. 9 Courts have
tended to look at disclaimers and modifications on a case-by-case basis,
showing a high degree of deference to parties' contracts when the disclaimer
is clearly expressed and conspicuous. Instead of deferring to these evolving
judicial standards, the ULTA took the blunderbuss approach of invalidating
all waivers of implied warranties of quality by protected parties.
15. Under U.L.T.A. § 2-309(b):
[a] seller.., in the business of selling real estate impliedly warrants that the real
estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any
[new] improvements ... will be:
(1) free from defective materials; and
(2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound
engineering and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.
Id.
16. Id. § 2-311(c). The Act has a minor exception for known defects that the parties
bargain over. Id. (stating, "seller may disclaim liability for a specific defect ... if the defect
... entered into and became a part of the basis of the bargain"). It has no bearing on the
major problem, which is the allocation of risk between seller and buyer with respect to
defects that are become evident only after the time of contracting or closing.
17. Id. § 1-203 (defining "protected party" to include an individual who buys improved
residential real estate and who occupies or intends to occupy all or part of the real estate as
a residence).
18. The ULTA position treats the home buyers the same as residential tenants, which
a majority of jurisdictions protect with a nonwaivable implied warranty of habitability.
19. See, e.g., Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,
643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), overruled on other grounds by, Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987); Schepps v. Howe, 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983). The
UCC similarly permits waivers of implied warranties for the sale of new goods. U.C.C. §
2-316(2), IA U.L.A. 465 (1989).
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More importantly, the ULTA warranty of quality ignores reforms
emanating from the homebuilding industry. When the ULTA was adopted
in 1975, the industry was in the nascent stage of addressing the problem of
new housing defects by a system of standardized, express warranties. Many
builders offer their own express warranties, but more significant are
warranties given or guaranteed by third-parties. The most prominent of such
warranties, known as the Home Owner's Warranty ("HOW") Program, was
founded by the National Association of Home Builders in 1972. The
program is voluntary, and builders who meet the program's standards are
eligible to enroll.20 A buyer who purchases from a participating builder
receives a HOW policy, which insures against a range of defects for certain
time periods, which vary according to the type of defect.21 The builder
pays the HOW Corporation approximately one-third of one percent of the
sales price of the house for the policy. Over the years, the HOW plan has
covered more than two million homes, a total representing approximately
half of the market for third-party warranties.
There are three other major private warranty programs operated by the
Home Buyers Warranty Corporation, the Residential Warranty Corporation,
the Professional Warranty Corporation. 2 Since 1994, the HOW Corpora-
tion has struggled with solvency problems,23 and its competitors are as-
suming a greater share of the market. Today, the HOW program and other
warranty programs are well known, not only among real estate professionals,
but also among knowledgeable home buyers. Participation in a national
warranty program is a marketing advantage, and builders often advertise this
feature of their product. According to a recent estimate, in 1995 almost
ninety percent of new home buyers obtained an express warranty, with one-
third of them issued by warranty companies, and the rest issued by the builder2
20. The standards relate to construction expertise, financial stability, and customer
relations.
21. All defects in materials and workmanship are insured for the first year. Building
systems, such as plumbing, heating, and air conditioning, are insured for 3 years and major
structural defects are insured for 10 years.
22. See Elizabeth Razzi, Buying a Home Before It's Built, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN.
MAG., Aug. 1995, at 77.
23. In October 1994, the HOW Corporation was placed in receivership by the State of
Virginia. Apparently, the premiums it charged were too low to cover the risk of housing
defects it insured. The receiver has satisfied claims brought by insured homeowners at 40%.
See Pat Rosen, HOW Offering 40 Percent on Claims, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at Cl.
24. See Elizabeth Birge, A Warranty Is Only as Good as the Builder Behind It, CHICAGO
TRIB., Nov. 11, 1995, at HG1 (citing estimate of William Young, Director of Consumer
Affairs for the National Association of Home Builders).
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Although the HOW program has received criticism on the basis that it
over protects the builder,25 in a number of key respects, third-party
warranties better protect buyers than would the ULTA proposal. First, like
other express warranties for the sales of other products, if a defect appears
within the policy time limits, it is covered. Unlike the implied warranty, the
buyer does not have to prove that the defect existed at the time of closing
or completion of construction. Depending on the character of the defect,
proof that because something is wrong now a defect existed years ago can
be a substantial evidentiary burden. Second, under the HOW plan, if there
is a dispute concerning the warranty, the buyer has the right to submit the
matter to an arbitrator, whose decision binds the builder, but not the buyer.
Last but not least, the builder's warranty obligations are insured by the
third-party warranty company. The buyer does not bear the full risk that the
builder may become insolvent during the policy period, and in the home-
building industry, where many small businesses fail, especially during
housing recessions, this risk is material.26
The HOW program was in its infancy at the time of ULTA adoption.
The weakness of the ULTA approach lies not in its authors' lack of
prescience; who could foresee in the 1970s that the standardized warranties
would evolve to become the dominant form of quality protection for new
home buyers? Rather, the problem with the ULTA approach is that it
assumed that the private market could not solve the problem of new housing
defects, and government-mandated warranties, forced upon market
participants whether they wanted it or not, was the only viable alternative.
The rigidity of the ULTA warranty rules, had they been legislatively
enacted, would have effectively precluded development of national
standardized warranties.
B. Eliminating the Formalities of Conveyancing
Formalism has long been a whipping boy in legal circles. A dominant
theme of twentieth century private law is to eliminate formal rules, replacing
them with flexible, case-sensitive rules that look to the substance of the
25. E.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Consumer Protection and National Housing Policy: The
Problem of New-Home Defects, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 527, 533 (1979); FTC STAFF,
HOUSING POLICY SESSION BRIEFING BOOK 39 (1978).
26. The buyer reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of an insolvent warrantor, a point
illustrated by the recent receivership of the HOW Corporation. Purchasers of HOW policies,
nonetheless, are in a better position than they would be with no third-party warranty at all
because they receive part payment of claims from the receiver and retain the right to proceed
against the builder for the deficiency.
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parties' understandings and interests. The UCC exemplifies this approach.
Consider two prime examples from Article 2 and Article 9. With respect
to contracts of sale, title to the goods no longer serves as a linchpin to
define the parties' relative rights and obligations. With respect to secured
transactions, the form of the parties' security agreement is irrelevant;
regardless of form, if the substance of the parties' agreement is that personal
property secures the performance of an obligation, a single set of Article 9
rules govern their relationship.
Yet all vestiges of formalism have not disappeared from our legal
system, and modem scholars recognize that some formal rules may promote
important policies.27 The law of modem real estate transfers has worked
out an accommodation between the competing ideals of formalism and anti-
formalism. The resulting dialectic recognizes a division between the validity
of the deed as between the parties and its status within the recording system.
In the former realm, the substance of the parties' deal governs regardless of
formalities; in the latter realm, formal rules prevail.
The architects of the USLTA embraced the ideal of anti-formalism,
applying it to conveyancing practices. The USLTA codifies the modem law
of the validity of deeds between the parties since it comports with anti-
formalism ideology. Thus, under the Act, the only formal requisite for a
deed, other than an identification of the parties and the land, is a signature
by the grantor or his representative.2
When it came to recording, the USLTA also seeks to cleanse the
system of formalities. The Act starkly provides: "No signature, acknowl-
edgement, seal, or witness is required for a document to be eligible for
recording."29 Dropping the last two requisites reflects present state law and
is sound. Dropping the first two completely reverses modem real estate
practice, which bars the recording of instruments that are not both signed
and acknowledged. Instead, instruments that patently are unenforceable as
between the parties are entitled to recordation.
27. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW (1987); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Robert S.
Summers, The Fonnal Character of Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242 (1992).
28. U.S.L.T.A. § 2-201. This comports with the standard principle that, as between the
parties, an acknowledgement is not necessary. The USLTA also makes it clear that neither
a seal nor a witness is necessary. l § 2-201(c). Again, this is not a significant change, as
modem law has eviscerated the historic importance of writings under seal and only several
states require third-party witnesses for deeds.
29. Id. § 2-301(b).
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Recorded instruments under the USLTA system, provided they are
signed, carry strong presumptions of legitimacy.3" These presumptions do
not depend on whether the instrument is notarized or otherwise acknowl-
edged. Thus, the USLTA reform directly raises the policy question whether
acknowledgement of deeds and other instruments that affect title to real
estate serves a useful purpose. The drafters apparently believe acknowledge-
ment to be worthless. A comment observes: "Whatever the office of notary
public once was, other methods, in particular civil liability for slander of
title and possible criminal sanctions now appear to provide more effective
and less burdensome methods of discouraging fraudulent behavior."'" No
empirical evidence bearing on the cost of notarizing real estate documents
is offered, nor is any foundation given for the sanguine conclusion that real
estate fraud is largely a thing of the past because modem crooks are afraid
of slander of title actions and criminal prosecutions.
There are two reasons why the requirement of acknowledgement for
recorded instruments may be worth retaining. First, although it obviously
cannot stop all fraud stemming from forgery, it makes the forger's task at
least a little harder. The forger must either dupe a notary public or obtain
illegal access to the notary's tools, including his seal. Granted, a determined
forger may succeed in doing this, but it is more probable that at least some
will be deterred, diverted to other affairs. The USLTA recording reforms,
by ridding the system of formalities, ignore the real-world reliance placed
on recorded instruments and stack the cards in favor of the forger or the
forger's transferee.
Second and more importantly, acknowledgement is the only reason
whether a presumption of legitimacy makes sense. The USLTA, as noted
above, retains the well-established concept that a recorded signed instrument
is presumed to be signed by the person named as grantor and is presumed
to be delivered. This presumption makes sense under present law because
acknowledgement evidences that the instrument was apparently signed in the
presence of a disinterested third-party who is acting in an official capaci-
ty-the notary. Without this safeguard, not only is a forged unacknowl-
edged deed recordable, once it is recorded it is presumed valid under the
USLTA. The true owner who is the victim of the forgery has the burden
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not sign the
deed.
30. Id. § 2-305.
31. Id. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
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Typically, the two main problems raised when the law imposes formal
requirements upon market transactions are costs of compliance and sanctions
applied to noncompliers. Acknowledgement of deeds and other instruments
is not costless, but the costs are not high. Most deeds are prepared by
attorneys or other professionals who have ready, convenient access to
employees who are licensed notary publics. The USLTA reform would
benefit society by reducing notaries' workloads (but will this raise
unemployment?), thus marginally reducing transaction costs for sellers and
buyers of land. It is questionable, however, whether this small cost savings
overcomes the probable benefits of fraud prevention and protection of true
owners referred to above.
With respect to noncompliance with the formality of acknowledgement,
a very small percentage of recorded instruments either are unacknowledged
or defectively acknowledged. Such defects raise legal problems because the
instruments are ineligible for recording, but are recorded in fact. The
USLTA seeks to resolve the dichotomy, eliminating the need for courts
occasionally to struggle with this problem. Solving this problem by statute
is not highly important for two reasons. First, the risk is minimal in a
statistical sense for several reasons. The requirement of notarization or
another form of acknowledgement is extremely familiar to real estate
attorneys, brokers, and everyone else who regularly deals with real estate.
In most states, the risk from defective acknowledgements is substantially
reduced by title curative acts and state and local bar standards that govern
real estate titles. And even when there is a defective acknowledgement that
is not cured by a statute or another doctrine, such as adverse possession, it
is rare that loss will result. There can be a loss to the record claimant
whose chain of title includes the defect only if an innocent third-party has
stumbled upon the scene.32
Second, the minor statistical risk that remains in modem real estate
practice is handled satisfactorily by title insurance. Virtually all lenders and
most informed buyers obtain title insurance policies, which afford economic
32. For example, assume A has conveyed to B and B has conveyed to C. The A-to-B
deed is genuine (signed and delivered by A), but it is defectively acknowledged. C has no
risk from A because the A-to-B deed binds C. C is subject to some third-party risk, but it
is remote. Much must happen. C loses some or all of his property only if A makes an
adverse conveyance by, for example, selling the land to X. In this event, X may gain
paramount title versus C on the theory that the A-B deed, which should not have been
recorded, does not impart constructive notice to X. But X will succeed in almost all states
(which have notice or race-notice recording acts) only if: 1) C is not in possession of the
land and 2) X does not order a title search of the records (if X searches the records, X will
see the A-to-B deed and will be bound by actual notice).
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protection against the risk that loss will result from a defect concerning
acknowledgement of an instrument in their chain of title. The USLTA
recording reform fails to recognize that the real-world problem of parties
failing to observe recording formalities, such as acknowledgement, is
substantially solved by the institution of title insurance. Whatever vices
stem from formalism, in this arena they were already minimized by the
impact of another institution.
V. SOLUTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE ORDERING OF PARTIES
A. Risk of Loss under Executory Contracts
Under an executory contract of sale, the traditional common-law rule
is that the buyer bears the risk of loss from fire or other casualty from the
time the contract is signed. This rule is often explained as a corollary of the
doctrine of equitable conversion; the buyer has equitable title, which is the
substance of ownership, and the seller has legal title only for the purpose of
securing payment of the purchase price.
The ULTA reverses the traditional risk of loss rule, adopting the
position of the UVPRA. The UVPRAIULTA rule allocates the risk of
loss to the party who is in possession prior to closing. In other words, the
seller retains the risk of loss until closing, unless the buyer takes possession
33. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
UVPRA in 1935. There are some differences in language between the ULTA and the
UVPRA. The UVPRA shifts the risk to the seller only if "all or a material part of the
property is destroyed." U.V.P.R.A. § l(a). The ULTA, however, protects the buyer from
all destruction or damage, giving him the right to cancel if the loss "results in a substantial
failure of the real estate to conform to the contract." U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b)(1). For lesser
losses, the ULTA buyer has the right to pick either an abatement of the purchase price or the
benefit of the seller's insurance proceeds or condemnation proceeds. Compare U.V.P.R.A.
§ l(a) (1935) with U.L.T.A. § 2-406(b). The UVPRA risk allocations are overridden if the
loss is the fault of either party; the text of the ULTA is silent on the matter, but the
Commissioner's Comment states the loss should fall on a party who is at fault. Compare
U.V.P.R.A. § l(a), (b) with U.L.T.A. § 2-406 & cmt. 1. The ULTA covers escrow closings,
providing that the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the escrow conditions are fulfilled
if this happens before the buyer has taken possession. U.L.T.A. § 2-406(c)(2). The UVPRA
is silent on this matter. The UVPRA authorizes the parties to alter the statutory risk
allocations by express contract. U.V.P.R.A. § 1. The ULTA does not discuss this matter,
either in text or in the comments, although it is highly unlikely the authors meant to preclude
the parties from contracting out of the ULTA scheme.
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prior to closing. For most sales, this means the seller retains the risk of loss
until closing because most buyers do not take possession until closing.
34
Twelve states have adopted the UVPRA, beginning with South Dakota
in 1937. Long ago, the adoption process ground to a halt, reflecting the
lack of contemporary concern about risk of loss among real estate profes-
sionals.35 Why is there so little interest in the rule? The most important
facet of both the traditional pro-seller equitable conversion doctrine and the
UVPRA rule is that it is an implied rule, which the parties are free to
alter.36 And parties to written contracts of sale virtually always exercise
this freedom.
A state's baseline risk of loss rule, whatever it may be, is not very
significant because the parties' contract almost always has an express
provision that governs risk of loss. Solving the problem this way is not
expensive. With only two parties involved, transaction costs are generally
low. Whenever a buyer is represented by an attorney, the contract will
expressly deal with risk of loss. In a state following the traditional rule, an
attorney who fails to have the contract address the issue would be guilty of
malpractice. Many buyers, especially home buyers, do not hire an attorney
and, accordingly, they are more vulnerable to the traditional rule. However,
such buyers typically use a standard-form contract, often approved by a bar
association or a brokers' association. Virtually all standard contracts address
risk of loss, providing the buyer with a substantial degree of protection. In
the large majority of transactions, that provision allocates all or most of the
risk of loss to the seller. The implied rule thus applies to an extremely
small percentage of real estate purchase transactions. This is the primary
reason why so few states have bothered to change the traditional risk of loss
rule. Granted, it may occasionally disappoint an unsophisticated buyer who
is not represented by an attorney and who does not use a standard-form
contract, but this is rare.
In essence, private ordering by parties to real property sales adequately
handles risk of loss issues, making statutory reform relatively unnecessary.
34. The buyer has the right to take possession prior to closing only if both parties agree.
Conceptually, this rule (that the right to possession follows legal title) is inconsistent with
the doctrine of equitable conversion. Saying that the buyer has equitable title (the most
important thing) from the signing of the contract implies that the buyer should have
possession or its fruits.
35. Since Oklahoma became the tenth state to adopt the UVPRA in 1965, only Nevada,
in 1977, and Texas, in 1989, have passed the Act. See U.V.P.R.A., 14 U.L.A. 469 (1990).
36. U.V.P.R.A. § 1. Oddly, the ULTA is silent on the right of the parties to change the
statutory rule.
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There is little real-world need for any state to change its risk of loss rule.
Modem critics of the traditional rule have cogently stated their case.
37
They are right. The traditional rule is founded on ancient, outmoded
assumptions and in principle should be discarded, even though it harms
extraordinarily few purchasers. However, what rule should replace the
traditional rule is far from clear.38 While the UVPRA/ULTA rule is better
in principle as reflecting the parties' probable expectations, for a state to
switch to this rule is not costless, and for this reason it is debatable whether
the costs exceed the benefits.
Two major costs of switching rules are apparent. First, the UVPRA
and ULTA fail to set forth bright-line rules; their indeterminacy invites
litigation much more than the relatively crisp traditional rule. Consider two
examples of indeterminacy. Under the UVPRA/ULTA, the buyer can
terminate due to casualty loss only if it results in a substantial failure of the
real estate to conform to the contract. The term "substantial" is not defined,
and in all but the easiest cases, buyer and seller will urge different
interpretations. For losses that are less than substantial, the buyer cannot
37. See Robert L. Flores, A Comparison of the Rules and Rationales for Allocating Risks
Arising in Realty Sales Using Executory Sale Contracts and Escrows, 59 Mo. L. REv. 307,
311 n.20 (1994).
38. One substantial flaw of the UVPRAIULTA rule is that it applies only if neither party
is at fault in causing the casualty loss. This is not an innovation, but a continuation of a tort-
based fault principle customarily followed under the traditional equitable conversion regime.
This is another example of the drafters of UVPRAIULTA ignoring institutional and market
changes. In medieval England, the crucible that gave birth to the fault-modified equitable
conversion doctrine, a farmer whose barn burned did not call the "good hands people" at
Allstate. Prudent property management by a landowner did not include obtaining fire and
extended casualty insurance.
A modern risk of loss rule should take account of the fact that today casualty insurance
is widespread and its purpose is to protect the owner from all covered losses, regardless of
whether they stem from the owner's negligence or the negligence of others. Most fires are
caused by someone's carelessness. Negligence of either party should be immaterial insofar
as insurable risks are concerned.
In any executory contract of sale where the property contains a valuable building or
other improvement that may suffer casualty loss, the property should be insured and, if it is
not, the allocation of the risk of loss should turn on which party should have obtained
insurance, not which party might be found negligent. In the absence of the parties' expressly
contracting on responsibility for obtaining insurance, the preferable rule is to put the
insurance burden on the seller. In most cases the seller will have insurance at the time the
contract is signed. Indeed, if the seller's property is mortgaged, as most real estate is, the
sellers' mortgagee almost always requires casualty insurance in order to protect its collateral.
For a seller to cancel his insurance policy after signing a contract of sale but before closing
would constitute a breach under his mortgage.
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terminate, but is entitled to a price abatement equal to the reduction in fair
market value caused by the loss. Again, the parties seldom will agree on
the number, and buyer and seller will each find real estate appraisers to
support their views.39
A second major switching cost is educational. Attorneys who are
intimately familiar with the traditional risk of loss rule and how to protect
their buyer-clients from its bite will have to learn the new rule. They, of
course, will also have to learn to protect their seller-clients from aspects of
the new rule that, in the context of a particular transaction, may seem
undesirable. This perhaps is not much of a problem. Many states have
mandatory continuing legal education for lawyers, and speakers at these
affairs always need topics to address.
The need to learn the new rule is a more important concern for
nonlawyers, in particular those buyers and sellers who transact without
hiring a lawyer. Most of these parties use standard-form contracts, and in
many states the process of revising standard realty contracts is haphazard.
While, as stated above, standard-form contracts virtually always have an
express provision addressing risk of loss, it is not always the case that those
provisions replace the entirety of the traditional rule. Sometimes there is an
interplay between the express provision and the traditional rule. This
interplay, where it exists, means that the standard contract should be revised
as soon as the state legislature changes the base line rule.40 In many states,
39. Indeterminacy is also added by the ULTA's decision to retain the fault principle to
override the basic rule allocating risk to the possessor. This raises another litigable issue in
many cases. Usually the possessor is the party most likely to be charged with negligence,
but there are potential claims against the nonpossessor. For example, buyer takes possession
in January two weeks before closing and the pipes freeze and break. Is buyer at fault for not
taking precautions, such as letting the faucets drip? Is seller at fault for not warning buyer
to take this step when the temperatures fall to the teens?
40. For example, Georgia follows the traditional rule that places the risk of loss on the
buyer. See, e.g., Bleckley v. Langston, 143 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
buyer of pecan grove bears damages to trees from ice storm). A recent standard-form
contract provides:
Should the Property be destroyed or substantially damaged before time of
closing, Seller is to notify immediately the Buyer or Broker, after which the
Buyer may declare this Agreement void and receive a refund of the earnest
money deposited. In the event Buyer elects not to void this Agreement at this
time, then within five (5) calendar days after Seller receives notification of the
amount of the insurance proceeds, if any, Seller shall notify Buyer of the amount
of insurance proceeds and the Seller's intent to repair or not to repair said
damage. Within five (5) calendar days of Seller's notification, Buyer may (A)
declare this Agreement void and receive a refund of the earnest money deposited,
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standard contracts in wide use are examined and revised by legal experts
only sporadically. Consequently, after a change in the law, many parties for
a considerable period of time will use unrevised standard contracts that are
inadequate and partially obsolete.
B. Specific Perfonnance of Executory Contracts
The well-accepted baseline rule, learned religiously in first-year
property, is that either party to a real estate contract of sale is ordinarily
entitled to specific performance if the other party defaults.4' The ULTA
retains the traditional rule for buyers, but overturns it for sellers. With
respect to the buyer's remedy, a ULTA comment states that the Act
or (B) consummate this agreement and receive such insurance as is paid on claim
of loss if Seller has elected not to repair said damage.
Purchase and Sale Agreement 9 (Ga. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. 1995). With this clause under
present Georgia law, who is in possession does not matter, and Buyer retains the risk of loss
for damage that is less than "substantial" and for takings by eminent domain. The effect of
the clause on the parties' rights is reasonably clear, given the backdrop of existing law.
Were Georgia to adopt the ULTA or UVPRA risk provision, this paragraph should be
redrafted because it would create grave ambiguities in three instances. First, if the buyer
took possession prior to closing and substantial damage occurred, the buyer would argue the
clause applies. The seller, however, would argue the statute applies because the clause
assumes the seller is in possession and does not expressly provide a risk of loss rule for the
buyer pre-closing possession. See U.L.T.A. § 2-406(c)(1). Second, if the damage was less
than "substantial," the seller would argue the clause applies to place the risk on the buyer,
but the buyer would argue the statute gives the buyer the right to an abatement of the
purchase price. See id. § 2-406(b)(2). Third, if the government condemned all or part of the
property, the buyer would argue that the statute applies, but the seller would argue the clause
completely displaces the statute and permits the buyer to terminate only for physical
destruction or damage.
41. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 180 (3d ed. 1989); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 682-
83 (2d ed. 1993). A traditional principle of equity limits specific performance to situations
in which damages are inadequate. As to the buyer, the justification for making specific
performance freely available is that each parcel of land is unique. Typically, courts presume
uniqueness, with no requirement that the buyer prove his needs cannot be met by the
purchase of a substitute tract. As to the seller, the uniqueness rationale is not available
because he has bargained for money, the most fungible type of property in existence. As
noted below, there are not that many reported cases that address specific performance for
sellers. Nonetheless, the available cases generally award specific performance to sellers,
without a discrete showing of the inadequacy of damages, often based on the idea that the
parties' remedies should be mutual. A few modem courts have rejected the concept of
mutuality of remedy. E.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974).
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"continues the existing law under which a buyer of real estate is entitled to
specific performance."'42
For the seller, a comment asserts that under existing law "a seller of a
freehold interest is automatically entitled to specific performance,"43 an
exaggeration given the equitable limits traditionally imposed on the
remedy." Departing from present law, the Act restricts the seller's right
to bring what is described as an "action for the price" to the situation where
"the seller is unable after a reasonable effort to resell it at a reasonable price
or the circumstances reasonably indicate the effort will be unavailing."
'4 5
Instead of specific performance, the seller may recover expectancy damages,
based on the difference between the contract price and the fair market value
of the property,46 or the seller may resell the property and recover the
difference between the contract price and the resale price.47
The seller's right to obtain specific performance if the buyer defaults
is not very important. In modem real estate practice, it is a very rare case
where it makes sense for the seller to litigate a specific performance claim
to its conclusion. The prime remedy for real estate sellers is to terminate
the contract, retain the earnest money already paid by the buyer, and seek
another buyer.4" There is far more litigation in the courts over whether the
seller may or may not retain the buyer's earnest money than over the
question whether the seller may obtain specific performance. The ULTA
42. U.L.T.A. § 2-511 cmt. The language of the Act itself is less clear, providing only
"[s]pecific performance may be decreed against a seller," with no hint as to whether this
should happen often or rarely. Id. § 2-511(a).
43. Id. § 2-506 cmt. 1.
44. Most courts, true to the historic tenets of equity jurisprudence, retain discretion to
deny specific performance when the facts and circumstances show that specific performance
would be unfair, harsh, or inequitable. See, e.g., Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 874
(Ga. 1984) (holding that a purchaser must prove value of property so court can determine if
price is "fair, just and not against good conscience").
45. U.L.T.A. § 2-506(b).
46. Id. § 2-505(a).
47. Id. § 2-504.
48. Even though the seller's right to specific performance is seldom judicially exercised,
it may serve another role. When a buyer refuses to go forward and the seller claims the
buyer has breached, negotiation often ensues. The seller's arguable right to specifically
enforce the contract may serve as leverage for negotiation. This thought perhaps underlies
the traditional notion of mutuality of remedies; because the buyer has the right to specific
performance, on the theory that land is unique, the seller should also have that right. Mutual
rights to specific performance serves to equalize the parties' bargaining positions.
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has an important provision authorizing liquidated damages.49  This
provision codifies present law, which allows the seller to retain the buyer's
deposit as liquidated damages if it is reasonable in amount, considering facts
such as the probable harm stemming from default and the difficulty of
proving actual harm.5"
The ULTA revision may be right, as a matter of principle, in adopting
a bright-line rule that generally disqualifies sellers of real property from
obtaining specific performance. As a strategy for drafting a uniform statute
that is likely to be enacted, this reform is not advisable. The existing rule
does not have a major impact on many real-world transactions. Private
ordering by buyers and sellers, reflected in the bargains they reach and
document in written contracts, demonstrate that earnest money payment and
retention is a key contract provision and that the seller's right to specific
performance is not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the ULTA and the USLTA were ambitious, seeking to
overhaul a good many long-embedded property law doctrines. They sought
to purge the law of ancient rules perceived no longer to serve the needs of
modem markets. In so doing, they went too far. Instead of focusing on a
small number of revisions to rules that were both obsolete and harmful, they
painted with a broad brush, fashioning a code decreeing sweeping changes
to the property laws of any state that chose enactment. Uniform acts
succeed only if they respond to significant needs felt by market participants.
For the ULTA and the USLTA, this impetus was lacking. By trying to sell
a major reform package, they made nationwide adoption improbable. In so
doing, the goal of uniformity was sacrificed to the goal of legal perfection.
49. U.L.T.A. § 2-516(a) states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement, but only
in an amount that is not unreasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual
harm caused by the breach, the time the real estate is withheld from the market,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A provision for unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void.
Id.
50. It may have been more useful if the Act contained guidelines bearing on amounts
that the seller may retain. Given the tremendous variety in types of contracts, including their
duration, hard-and-fast rules probably would be unwise. Some courts, however, presume that
the seller generally may retain a deposit of up to 10% of the purchase price. A statutory
presumption along these lines would be worthwhile guidance for parties and for the courts.
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In essence, the reformers aimed at too many targets. In two categories,
ammunition was sent toward the wrong marks. First, they assumed that
direct legislative action to solve a problem is preferable to market-based
solutions, without making a careful examination as to the necessity for and
costs of market intervention. The potential for solutions by other market
institutions was overlooked. With respect to implied warranties of quality
for the sale of new homes, the Acts mandated the use of a single standard,
depriving the parties of the freedom of choosing to make their own bargain.
This choice neglected the emerging response of the home-building industry
in creating a system of private warranties, spearheaded by the HOW
program. Similarly, the Acts' call for the elimination of formalities for
recorded deeds and other recorded instruments ignored the fact that very few
private parties misunderstand the formalities and that, when they do, the
system of title insurance provides affordable protection from the risk at low
cost to the parties.
Second, in identifying problem areas, the Acts' architects disregarded
the extent to which private ordering by parties, in written real property
agreements, replace implied legal rules, greatly diminishing the importance
of the implied rules. With respect to risk of loss, buyers almost always
contract for some modification to the doctrine of equitable conversion,
which generally allocates the entire risk to the buyer. With respect to
specific performance, this remedy is generally not attractive for sellers, who
in case of buyer default, strongly prefer to retain the buyer's earnest money
as liquidated damages.
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I am not a statistic. And to reduce me to a heap of numbers is to make
of me something that is no longer human. Respect must affirm
personhood. It recognizes and communicates that I am a mom, not a
victim; a daughter, not a tragedy; a friend, not a casualty.
-Mary Fisher, AIDS Advocate, quoted in June 1992'
1. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIDS, AIDS: AN EXPANDING TRAGEDY, THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIDS 12 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COMMISSION].
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I. INTRODUCION
The medical community first recognized the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, or HIV disease,2 well over a decade ago,3 and the epidemic contin-
ues to progress worldwide! Unfortunately, legislative responses across the
nation have lagged far behind the epidemic's epidemiological growth.'
Unmotivated by the urgency of this situation, the United States government
has failed to outline a national strategic plan to combat the spread of HIV
disease and to address the needs of those affected by it.6 In the absence of
2. See Chai R. Feldblum, Workplace Issues: HIV and Discrimination, in AIDS AGENDA
271, 276-77 (Nan D. Hunter et al. eds., 1992) (noting that the term "HIV disease" refers to
the disease as it runs on a continuum from HIV-infection to full-blown AIDS). Incidentally,
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") uses this term, which reflects the current
medical view that strict categories cannot describe the disease's progression accurately. Id.
3. Helen Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAW
TODAY 18, 18 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) (commenting that a 1981 Centers for Disease
Control ("CDC") publication first mentioned the disease in a brief article about pneumocystis
pneumonia). Researchers' subsequently pinpointed the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV") as the cause of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Id. For an HIV-
carrier to transmit the virus, the infected person's blood, semen, or vaginal secretions must
come into contact with the blood or mucous membranes of an uninfected person. Id. at 23.
The virus cannot live long outside human tissue, and household cleaning agents easily
eradicate it. Id. at 24. The virus is not passed by casual contact. Il
4. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE
REPORT 5, 14 (Jun. 1995) [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE REPORT] (reporting that states have
reported bver 476,000 cases of AIDS since the epidemic began and about 290,000 of those
individuals have died); Meeting Lays Bare the Abyss Between AIDS and Its Cure, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at Al, A9 [hereinafter Meeting] (summarizing the events of the 10th
International Conference on AIDS). At the time of the first conference in 1985, the United
States had reported only 9285 cases. Id, All states have laws requiring public health
authorities to report AIDS cases, but not HIV infection. See SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra,
at 30. Public health officials estimate that approximately one million people currently carry
the virus, and may do so unknowingly. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 19.
Even if transmission ceased immediately, the epidemic's most ominous effects would take
place in the future. Id.
5. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13 (asserting that all levels of
government have shirked the responsibility of searching for legislative solutions to dilemmas
posed by the epidemic). This lack of interest is a problem of international proportions. Dr.
Jonathan M. Mann, professor of epidemiology at the Harvard Law School of Public Health,
has warned that countries all over the world have responded inadequately to the growing
pandemic. Meeting, supra note 4, at Al, A9.
6. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3 (admonishing President Clinton for
his lack of coordination of AIDS activities within the executive branch, as recommended by
the Commission in the past); Philip J. Hilts, AIDS Policy Chief Quits Clinton Post After
Rocky Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at Al, A9 (quoting an AIDS advocate who
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strong leadership at the federal level,7 state governments must lead the way
in passing Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")-related
legislation.8
In its final report, the National Commission on AIDS listed a number
of principles meant to guide future responses to HIV disease.9 Even though
these tenets cover a wide range of concerns and the legislative possibilities
are practically endless, this paper will concentrate on recommendations for
state legislation necessary to place a "human face" on HIV disease.' For
a number of reasons, states must not lose sight of the fact that individuals,
not just groups of people, suffer from HIV disease.
First, people living with HIV disease deserve special attention from
state legislators because they have endured discrimination in a number of
areas since the epidemic's beginning." Prejudice has extended from
individuals actually living with HIV disease to their friends and family, and
even to uninfected people perceived to carry the virus because of their
membership in so-called "high-risk" groups.12 Individuals in society often
discriminate against these individuals because of a fear of transmission or
expressed dissatisfaction with Kristine Gebbie's performance, based on her inability to build
the coalitions necessary to form a national program).
7. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 2 (criticizing the federal government
for its "complacent unresponsiveness" to the epidemic).
8. Id. at 13 (calling for the cooperation of leaders at all levels). The National
Commission asserted that if all leaders engaged in honest discussions about HIV disease,
their actions would profoundly affect the response of our nation as a whole. Id.
9. Id. at 12 (listing seven general principles that should guide specific steps in
developing a more affirmative approach to the HIV epidemic).
10. Id. The principle reads as follows: "The human face of AIDS should be ever
before us. Respecting personal dignity and autonomy, respecting the need for confidentiality,
reducing discrimination, and minimizing intrusiveness should all be touchstones in the
development of HIV/AIDS policies and programs." NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 12. Upon the death of Pedro Zamora, a 22-year-old AIDS activist, President Clinton noted
the importance of Zamora's progress in teaching the nation that "AIDS is a disease with a
human face." Jon O'Neill, AIDS Crusader Fought for Awareness, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
12, 1994, at Al, A18.
11. See Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 3, at 297
(lamenting that "a secondary epidemic of fear" has accompanied the HIV epidemic since it
began).
12. ld.; see also Ann Devroy & David Brown, Clinton Assails Helms's AIDS Stance:
Anti-Gay Remarks Fuel Push for Reapproval of Treatment Program, WASH. POST, July 6,
1995, at A6 (quoting Senator Jesse Helmes (R-N.C.), who expressed such prejudice by
stating that Congress should cut AIDS funding because "homosexuals get the disease through
their 'deliberate, disgusting, revolting conduct"').
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antipathy toward the groups hardest hit by HIV disease to date.13 As costs
associated with HIV disease continue to rise, government agencies and
private businesses also have engaged in AIDS-related discrimination based
on financial as well as personal reasons.
14
At the federal level, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 15
appears to protect persons living with AIDS and asymptomatic HIV carriers
from AIDS-related discrimination.16 Because the ADA does not cover all
private-sector activities, states also must offer protection from discrimina-
tion." In addition, state legislation is important because it may provide
stronger remedies than those available under federal law.' Discrimination
13. Il; see also Allan M. Brandt, AIDS and Metaphor: Toward the Social Meaning of
Epidemic Disease, 55 Soc. RES. 413, 425-32 (1988) (discussing AIDS in a cultural context).
Brandt argues that society discriminates against persons with HIV disease for a number of
reasons. First, HIV disease is the only communicable, fatal disease to surface in recent times
and, as a result, has threatened society's sense of "medical security." Id. at 425-26. Second,
many individuals morally judge those affected by the disease. Id. at 428. Society's historical
disdain for two "high-risk" groups, homosexuals and intravenous drug users, and for
promiscuity also have led to discrimination. Id. at 428-29, 431. These individuals often
react by dividing victims into categories of "innocent" and "guilty." Id. at 430.
14. Leonard, supra note 11, at 297. For example, the United States government now
requires that all service members with the AIDS virus must leave the armed services,
regardless of the severity of their condition. Dana Priest, Army Sergeant with HIV Feels
Deserted by Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1996, at A3. Representative Robert Doran (R-
Cal.), who introduced the bill, stated "that AIDS 'is spread by human God-given free will'
and that service members contract it only through intravenous drug use or unprotected sex
with prostitutes or strangers. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
16. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (asserting that
an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual is disabled, as defined by ADA). In that case, the
court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant law firm, whom Doe
contended fired him after his supervisor discovered he carried the virus. AIDS Suit Against
Philly Firm Proceeds, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at Al, A10. After three weeks of federal
district court testimony, the case ended with a secret settlement. Joseph A. Slobodzian,
'Scott Doe' AIDS Lawsuit Is Settled, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 1994, at Al, A8. In a closing
speech before dismissing the jurors, Judge Robert S. Gawthrop, III announced that "if
nothing else, this case has humanized the terrible disease of AIDS." Id.
17. See Leonard, supra note 11, at 311 (noting that the ADA does not apply to
employers with less than 15 employees and to public accommodations that do not "affect
commerce"). Further, state and local civil rights agencies historically have dealt with AIDS-
related discrimination claims and, as a result, have developed expertise and efficiency in this
area. Id.
18. Id. (pointing out that some state laws, unlike the federal scheme, do not cap punitive
damages). In cases where discrimination is particularly overt or outrageous, a plaintiff may
want to pursue a larger award under state law. Id.
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is an underlying societal factor contributing to the spread of HIV disease,
so states must act quickly to eradicate it.19
Second, states must enact legislation recognizing the individual needs
of persons with HIV disease because it is a "resource-intensive" condi-
tion.20 Recent treatments have prolonged the lives of many HIV-infected
individuals, but a disadvantage of these improvements is that they require
a great deal of time, physical and mental energy, and money.2" Much
more than medical resources is needed to cope with HIV disease. Those
infected require a host of services and forms of assistance to meet their
needs.22 HIV disease not only places demands on HIV-infected individuals
and their families but also on medical, social, and legal support systems.23
States must protect all members of society from such a drain by passing
appropriate legislation.
Some critics contend that "AIDS is just one disease"'24 and those
infected by it do not deserve special attention. State governments, however,
must consider the special characteristics of HIV disease before conceding to
this point of view. As compared to other concerns, AIDS is an epidemic for
which no cure or vaccine exists.2 ' Even though it is theoretically prevent-
able, AIDS is out of control; treatment can only slow its progression, and
death is always its ultimate outcome.26  Another way in which AIDS
differs from other diseases is that it strikes mostly young, working-age
individuals, and relative to other causes of death, it claims a disproportionate
number of young lives.27 Denial of the epidemic's urgency is an inade-
19. See Meeting, supra note 4, at Al, A9 (quoting Dr. Jonathan Mann, who stated that
discrimination, poverty, and lack of education encourage the spread of AIDS).
20. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 42. This article provides a detailed
example of the obstacles that a 40-year-old woman with HIV disease must face. Id. at 41-42.
21. Don Colbum, AIDS Patients Paying a Price for Longevity, WASH. POST, July 30,
1995, at Al, A27 (explaining that long-term survivors face medical as well as economic
hardship).
22. Id. at 42 (listing "psychosocial support, legal advice, pastoral counseling, and
someone to help with public assistance or insurance paperwork" as just a few of the needs
of an individual with HIV disease).
23. Id.
24. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 1 (observing that this contention is often
used to argue against allocating funds to HIV disease).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also AIDS Becomes Main Killer of Young Adults, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995,
at A2 [hereinafter Main Killer] (revealing that AIDS and related infections now claim more
young adult lives than accidents). A Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") official noted that
the impact of AIDS deaths "goes far beyond their absolute numbers." Id.
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quate response;28 states must consider the fact that an average of ten years
separates HIV infection and an AIDS diagnosis.29 Even if infection ceased
immediately, the system still would face enormous challenges in caring for
those already infected. 0
This paper discusses ways in which state legislation can embody
respect for the individual plight of those living with HIV disease. To
illustrate the types of laws that states must pass to meet that goal, this paper
uses the most effective provisions from states across the country. Part I
examines ways in which state lawmakers can eradicate discrimination, a
threat to those already living with HIV disease and to future prevention and
control efforts. AIDS-related discrimination can pervade many facets of life.
This paper explores those in which individuals face the largest number of
difficulties before and after learning of their status and recommends laws
that can prevent this unfair treatment. Part II surveys specific areas in
which present laws inadequately address the needs of individuals and
proposes legislation that states must pass to bridge this gap. This paper
concludes that, to help those living with HIV disease while simultaneously
encouraging prevention and control, states must mandate comprehensive
IV education programs as well as the other suggested legislation.
II. PREVENTING AIDS-RELATED DISCRIMINATION
A. Extension of State Disability Discrimination Laws to
Specifically Cover AIDS-Related Discrimination
In calling for HI/AIDS policies and programs that respect the human
dignity of those involved, the National Commission on AIDS declared that
reducing discrimination is an integral step toward this goal.3" State
governments must protect persons with HIV disease by adding AIDS-related
discrimination to the current protection offered in state anti-discrimination
or disability discrimination laws.32 Although federal disability discrimina-
28. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 1 (asserting that the effects of continued
denial include homelessness, a lack of necessary research because of underfunding, and
inadequate long-term and acute care facilities).
29. Id. at 5 (warning that AIDS diagnoses "tell a story that is out of date").
30. Id. at 5-6 (forecasting that prevention efforts must improve to prevent new
infections).
31. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 12.
32. See Leonard, supra note 11, at 298 (noting that most states have supplemented
federal disability discrimination protection by passing their own laws in the 1970s and early
1980s).
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tion laws already provide vast protection, states also must show their support
for individuals with HIV disease, and thereby fill the gaps left by federal
laws.33
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act
At the federal level, the ADA forbids disability discrimination in
employment, 34 public services, 35 and public accommodations. 36  It ap-
plies to state and local governments,37 and employment provisions cover
private employers with fifteen or more employees. 38  Additionally, the
ADA prohibits most all private businesses or individuals supplying goods
or services to the public from engaging in public accommodations discrimi-
nation.39 Although the ADA does not specifically mention HIV disease in
its text, the regulations indicate that the statute's definition of "disability"
covers HIV disease.40 At least one federal court decision has agreed with
this approach.4'
33. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (explaining that state laws often cover
more private employers and offer more extensive remedies than federal disability
discrimination laws). If an issue of sexual orientation is also involved, state law may offer
better protection in that a few states forbid discrimination based on this characteristic.
Leonard, supra note 11, at 312-13.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (forbidding state and local government discrimination in
public accommodations and services). This prohibition includes employment discrimination.
35 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1992).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (directing private entities that disability discrimination
in public accommodations is unlawful); id. §§ 12131-12165 (extending the same prohibition
to state and local governments).
37. Id. §§ 12131-12165.
38. IaM § 12111.
39. IaM §§ 12181-12189. Examples of public accommodations include hotels,
restaurants, theaters, stadiums, convention centers, museums, parks, private schools, malls,
health care providers, and hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
40. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992) (noting that AIDS and HIV seropositivity may
come within the classification). Individuals who are actually infected as well as those
perceived to be infected receive protection because the regulations define a "person with a
disability" as "(a) a person with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities; or (b) a person with a record of such a physical or mental
impairment; or (c) a person who is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 1630.2(g).
41. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that
asymptomatic HIV infection is a covered disability under federal law).
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2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Before the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 197342 ("Rehabilitation
Act") was the only federal law that covered handicap-related discrimination,
and this statute, rather than the ADA, still applies to the federal govern-
ment.43 When Congress adopted the ADA, it modeled many of its
provisions, including its definition of a "disability," after the Rehabilitation
Act." The Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, does not expressly cover
HIV disease, but courts have extended its definition of a "handicap" to cover
AIDS4" as well as HIV infection.46
3. Federal Disability Discrimination Protection
Protection under both statutes is not absolute, but it varies depending
on the situation and the particular statute.47 In an employment discrimina-
tion situation, for example, only a "qualified individual with a disability"
receives protection under both statutes.48 To become qualified, a disabled
individual may require reasonable accommodations to perform the job's
essential functions.49 Disability discrimination laws, therefore, do not offer
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (forbidding federal agencies to engage in discrimination in the
hiring, placement, and promotion of people with disabilities). The law also applies to federal
contractors. 29 U.S.C. § 793.
44. Leonard, supra note 11, at 301 (noting that the two definitions are "virtually
identical"). Court cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act may, therefore, serve as precedent
in ADA cases. See id.
45. See School Rd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (declaring that tuberculosis, a
contagious disease, is a handicap as defined by the statute). The Court refused to validate
discrimination based on irrational fears of contagion and considered such reactions
inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act's goals. l at 282. Lower courts subsequently
extended this landmark decision to the AIDS-related discrimination context. See Chalk v.
United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that AIDS is a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act).
46. See Doe v. Centinela Hospital, 57 U.S.L.W. 2034, 2034 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 1988)
(holding that a drug treatment program may not exclude an asymptomatic carrier of the HIV
virus because of his condition).
47. Leonard, supra note 11, at 302.
48. See id. (noting that the ADA adopted this Supreme Court interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414
(1979) (holding that disability law only protects those who can safely perform the position's
requirements).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Leonard, supra note 11, at 303 (pointing out that the
"essential functions" requirement first arose in Rehabilitation Act case law and that Congress
codified it in the ADA).
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protection to those who cannot perform the job's essential functions or who
present a significant risk of transmission in the workplace.50 The former
limitation presents a much greater obstacle for individuals with HIV disease
than the latter because courts have held, and medical evidence shows, that
the risk of casual transmission is minimal.5'
4. Recommendations for State AIDS-Related Discrimination
Legislation
All fifty states offer some type of disability discrimination protec-
tion.52 However, they still should pass legislation specifically covering
AIDS-related prejudice to ensure that persons with HIV disease do not
suffer "irrational and scientifically unfounded" discrimination.5 3  Florida
and Kentucky, for example, both have enacted laws that extend disability-
related employment discrimination coverage to individuals with AIDS,
AIDS-related complex, or HIV infection.5' Florida goes one very neces-
sary step further to protect those perceived as having any of these condi-
tions.5 Both laws also forbid HIV-related testing as a condition of
employment, unless the absence of infection is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the job in question. 6 If a state chooses to include such
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (allowing employers to disqualify an employee or
potential employee who may pose such a threat in the workplace).
51. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a teacher with AIDS did not pose a direct threat to students in the classroom). This paper
does not address the controversy surrounding the employment of HIV-infected health care
workers. See Feldblum, supra note 2, at 282-84 (discussing the debate about the possibilities
of health care workers posing a "direct threat" in the workplace).
52. David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer, The United States: At the Center of the Storm, in
AIDS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRAcIEs 7, 18 (Kirp et al. eds., 1991).
53. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1995). The Florida Legislature further elaborated that this
discrimination causes harm to society in general and to "otherwise able-bodied persons"
deprived of the ability to support themselves, to secure their own means of health care and
housing, and to take advantage of societal opportunities otherwise available to them. Id.
54. Id. § 760.50(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(1) (Michie 1995); see also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.174(1) (West 1993) (providing that claims based on actual or
perceived HIV infection should receive the same treatment as any other discrimination claim
based on a disability).
55. See FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2). But see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-40 to 51.5-46 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1995) (covering only actual, as opposed to perceived, disabilities).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(2). The person
requiring the test has the burden of proving that the test is necessary to determine if the
individual can perform the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or presents a significant
risk of transmitting the disease in the course of employment duties. FLA. STAT. §
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testing provisions, it must construe them narrowly to respect individual
privacy rights.
Both laws also forbid discrimination against those infected or perceived
to be infected in housing, public accommodations, or governmental
services.5 7 Such treatment is warranted only if the person or entity can
show that no reasonable accommodation can prevent transmission of the
virus in the applicable context.51 Again, states must ensure that these
restrictions are applied only in limited circumstances so that HIV-infected
individuals receive fair treatment.
To send a message of support to its citizens, states also must provide
adequate remedies to persons aggrieved under their discrimination statutes.
Florida does so in that it requires violators to pay actual damages, attorney's
fees, and other appropriate relief and provides for court-ordered injunctions
as well.59
The ADA does not preclude disabled persons from bringing suit under
another law that provides equal or greater protection,60 so passing AIDS-
related discrimination laws will serve a dual purpose. First, state legislatures
will exhibit leadership by passing anti-discrimination laws that protect HIV-
infected individuals, 6 as called for in the National Commission's recom-
mendations, 62 and also lay the foundation for prevention efforts. 63  Sec-
ond, if state laws include the necessary provisions as outlined above, they
will complement federal laws and increase the possibility that AIDS-related
discrimination will cease in all aspects of society.
64
760.50(3)(c)(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(2)(b)(1). No other reasonable accommoda-
tions short of the test may exist. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(c)(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.135(2)(b)(2).
57. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(3).
58. See FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(c); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(3)(c). Both laws
also prohibit adverse employment action against licensed health care professionals who treat
HIV-infected individuals. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(d); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(3)(d).
59. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
61. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13 (directing leaders at all levels to
speak out because they can join communities and discover solutions to the problems posed
by the epidemic).
62. Id. at 12 (identifying respect for personal dignity as an important part of AIDS/HIV
policies and programs).
63. See id. at 10 (explaining that reducing discrimination and stigmatization can increase
awareness, which will lead to more effective prevention efforts).
64. See Leonard, supra note 11, at 310 (exploring advantages of hierarchy of disability
discrimination laws).
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B. Passage of Laws Requiring Voluntary Testing and Strict
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information
One specific area in which discrimination often surfaces is in the debate
surrounding HIV testing and confidentiality of HIV-related information.
Because of the fears associated with transmission,65 and disdain for the
lifestyles of the majority of victims, 66 the public initially responded to HIV
disease by calling for mandatory testing to identify those infected.67
1. Voluntary vs. Mandatory Testing
For two primary reasons, the public health community, 6 and virtually
all state jurisdictions, 69 agree that mandatory testing is not a viable option
and that voluntary programs are more likely to increase prevention efforts.
First, test results are not always reliable. The "window period" between
infection and development of HIV antibodies usually lasts for at least six
weeks,70 and commonly extends to a period of six months.7" This latency
period makes a negative test result virtually meaningless because the
infected person may test negative even though that individual is a carrier
65. See Peter H. Berge, Setting Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing Under Rule
35 and State Independent Medical Examination Statutes, 44 FLA. L. REV. 767, 778 (1992)
(examining the history of epidemics and asserting that human responses to them are
motivated more by fear than compassion). Berge observes that:
[t]he picture of the AIDS victim is a shell of a man wasted by the opportunistic
infections, his deeply recessed eyes staring out from a death's head skull in
hopeless, disoriented pain.... This disease causes its victims to experience a
hell on earth; people are terrified out of their rational minds.
Il at 779.
66. See id. at 779-80 (arguing that, even though HIV disease has invaded the sanctity
of most societal groups, average Americans still consider it immoral and associate it with
"undesirables").
67. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Is Considering Much Wider Tests for AIDS Infection,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1987, at Al (relating that federal health officials may suggest that all
persons seeking marriage licenses, hospitalization, and treatment for pregnancy or sexually
transmitted disease undergo mandatory testing).
68. Berge, supra note 65, at 785-86 (reporting that CDC, National Academy of Sciences,
American Medical Association, United States Surgeon General, United States Public Health
Service, and most state and local public health services have rejected mandatory testing).
69. Id. at 786 (relating that most states' AIDS prevention laws center around voluntary
testing provisions).
70. See Scott Burris, Testing Disclosure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW
TODAY, supra note 3, at 115, 118 (observing that the latency period in some individuals has
lasted as long as two years).
71. See Berge, supra note 65, at 785.
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and capable of transmitting the virus to someone else.72 In addition to the
window period, human error also can compromise the reliability of testing
programs.7 3 A second reason that public health officials and lawmakers
have rejected mandatory testing is that the financial costs of such programs
are extremely prohibitive.74
2. Features of Voluntary Testing Programs
Voluntary testing programs are an integral part of any state's AIDS-
related legislative agenda75 because they can prevent discrimination and
deter the spread of HIV disease.76 While most jurisdictions already require
consent, or at least imply that individuals must consent to the test, states
differ on the degree of confidentiality offered, the type of consent needed,
and the number of exceptions allowed.' To encourage testing, all states
must provide for written and informed consent, pre- and post-test counsel-
ing, strict confidentiality of HIJ-related information, and anonymous testing,
as an alternative.
a. Written and Particularized Informed Consent
Even though researchers have not discovered a vaccine or a cure, early
detection is still vital because treatments, such as Azidothymidine ("AZT"),
can prolong the lives of those affected.7 The benefits, however, may not
72. Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses andAbuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 33, 41
(1990).
73. Ied at 40 (pointing out that human error poses a danger of false negative as well as
false positive results).
74. Ild. at 55-56 (examining the enormous costs spent in early mandatory testing
programs for all marriage license applicants). Out of the 159,000 applicants tested in Illinois
in 1988, only 23 individuals tested positive. Id The estimated total cost was $5.6 million,
which equaled $243,000 for each positive result. Id& at 56.
75. See Burnis, supra note 70, at 120 (recalling that some states joined an early 1990s
movement to encourage voluntary testing).
76. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7602(a) (1993) (recognizing that voluntary testing,
coupled with informed consent and counseling, will control the spread of HIV disease if
results are kept confidential). Confidential, informed, voluntary testing will encourage those
most in need to seek testing and treatment. I&a § 7602(c).
77. See Berge, supra note 65, at 788 n.146 (supplying list of state statutes that cover
HIV testing).
78. See Brett-Smith and Friedland, supra note 3, at 40 (explaining that, over the last five
years, treatment strategies in the United States have evolved to emphasize AZT therapy as
soon as the T4 cell count goes below 500); Philip J. Hilts, Drug Said to Help AIDS Cases
with Virus but No Symptoms, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1989, at Al (providing early report on
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always outweigh the negative consequences of knowing one's status. For
example, once an individual tests positive, he or she may face widespread
discrimination.79
Considering the costs and benefits involved, states must allow
individuals to make their own decisions about testing.s To ensure that
individuals thoroughly weigh their options, states must follow the lead of
jurisdictions such as New York, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania and require
written and particularized informed consent before anyone undergoes
testing.1 Mere oral consent is not enough because it leaves room for
misunderstanding. s2 Further, particularized consent, rather than blanket
consent to medical treatment, is necessary to prevent those administering the
tests from "tricking" individuals into having a test without their knowledge.
Connecticut protects the rights of potential test subjects by providing precise
standards for consent.
8 3
the merits of AZT therapy).
79. See Field, supra note 72, at 46 (asserting that repercussions of a positive test result
may include enduring discrimination in employment, housing, insurance, and education as
well as falling victim to random acts of violence). Field also notes that this discrimination
may originate in response to the disease's financial burden or adverse characterization as a
member of a perceived high-risk group. Id.
80. See Ronald L. Bayer et al., HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for
Evaluating Proposed Programs, 4 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL'Y 173, 177 (1988) (emphasizing
the value of respecting individual choice in the context of testing programs).
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13.A (1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781
(McKinney 1993); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7605(a) (1993). In the Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Congress expressed approval for
this approach by ordering grant recipients to seek informed, written, voluntary consent. 42
U.S.C. § 300ff-61(b) (1994).
82. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22(a) (Deering 1990) (requiring
informed consent but allowing for oral or written agreement); FLA. STAT. § 381.004(3)(a)
(1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (1995).
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(a) (West 1995) (requiring particularized
consent, which need only be written "whenever practicable"). Connecticut's statute sets out
detailed, minimum standards for the contents of an informed consent statement: (1) an
explanation of the test, including its purpose and meaning and the benefits of early diagnosis
and treatment; (2) acknowledgement that consent is not a prerequisite to health care but that
refusal may affect the provider's quality of treatment and diagnosis; (3) explanation of testing
procedures, including its voluntary nature and the fact that anonymous testing is available;
and (4) an explanation of confidentiality laws. Id. § 19a-582(b). The subject must also
receive notification that the law permits health officials to warn known partners without
disclosing the subject's identity and that HIV-related information may appear on medical
charts and records. Id. Before consenting, subjects must receive information about the
illness itself and possible risk factors. Id. § 19a-582(c).
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b. Pre- and Post-test Counseling
In addition to requiring informed consent, states must mandate pre- and
post-test counseling as an extra guarantee that individuals understand the
costs and benefits of testing. Counseling offers a number of advantages
because it can clarify misunderstandings about HIV infection; educate
people about the importance of prevention; communicate the meaning of test
results; and help people handle the vast consequences of a positive result.8 4
Pennsylvania appropriately requires counseling before testing, so that a
patient understands the test and the meaning of its results as well as the
proper measures for prevention of, exposure to, and transmission of the
virus. 5 If an individual tests positive, states also must afford him or her
the opportunity to receive immediate, face-to-face, post-test counseling.
Delaware sets an example by providing the individual with an opportunity
to discuss the result's emotional effects on the individual, its meaning, and
proper preventive measures.86  Post-test counseling also should include
encouragement to notify sexual and needle-sharing partners. 7
c. Strict Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information
A categorical rule against disclosure of HIV-related information 8 is
the last necessary element for a testing program that recognizes individual
rights. To reach this worthy goal, states must give individuals control over
the disclosure of their own HIV-related information.89 New York, among
other states, properly mandates that before release of such data occurs, the
person disclosing the information must obtain a written consent form, signed
84. See Field, supra note 72, at 48.
85. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7605(a); see also Burris, supra note 70, at 123
(summarizing the provisions of Pennsylvania's pre- and post-test counseling provisions).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(e) (1995).
87. Id.
88. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780(7) (McKinney 1993) (defining "confidential
HIV-related information" as that in the possession of one who provides health or social
services or who receives the information pursuant to a release of such information). This
definition includes not only test results but also the mere fact that the individual took such
a test and any information that could identify the individual as carrying the HIV virus or
suffering from AIDS or an HIV-related illness. Il
89. Interview with Dinah Wiley, Esq., Legal Services Director, Whitman-Walker Clinic,
in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 14, 1994). Ms. Wiley indicated that individuals must have control
over their own information and noted that, if universal precautions are used as recommended,
disclosure is seldom a necessary event. Id.
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by the subject of the data.90 It must state who will receive the information,
for what purpose, and the period of time for which the consent is valid."
Considering the effects that a disclosure may have on the individual,
states must provide strict remedies for confidentiality violations. California
distinguishes between negligent and willful disclosure and subjects guilty
parties to civil penalties, payable to the subject of the information. If
disclosure results in economic, bodily, or psychological harm, a court may
find the disclosing person guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a jail term
and/or a fine.92
3. Exceptions to Voluntary Testing and Strict Confidentiality Laws
If a state chooses to allow for exceptions, an individual's consent for
testing or disclosure is no longer necessary. Consequently, legislatures and
courts must create as few of them as possible and construe them narrow-
ly.9 3  States have created a number of exclusions, but those affecting
individual rights most often deal with "medical necessity. 94 Purportedly
for the benefit of the patients, some states, such as New York, allow for
release of information to employees within a health care institution or to a
health care provider if necessary to carry out their respective duties or to
provide appropriate care or treatment.95
Other medical necessity exceptions are for the protection of others,
rather than the patient." In a number of states, an emergency worker may
request that an individual reveal his or her HIV status if exposure may have
90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780(9) (excluding the use of a general release form,
unless it specifically reveals its dual purpose).
91. ld.
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21(a)-(d) (Deering 1990).
93. See, e.g., Field, supra note 72, at 49 (asserting that the New York disclosure
statute's exceptions could "swallow the rule").
94. Berge, supra note 65, at 790. Another area where exceptions often arise is in the
criminal justice system. Id. at 793. The consensus for voluntary testing is overwhelming in
the civil setting, but similar agreement does not exist in the criminal context. Id. This
article, therefore, will not discuss testing in that context, because the medical necessity
situations are more common for the majority of individuals.
95. See generally N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(1)(c)-(d) (McKinney 1993). The law
also allows for release of information when body parts are used in medical education,
research, therapy, or for transplantation. Il § 2782(e); see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7605(g)(1)(i) (permitting testing in such situations because no privacy issue exists once the
person is dead).
96. See Burris, supra note 70, at 125 (suggesting that these exceptions are contrary to
a doctor's ethical duty to act in the patient's best interest, rather than his or her own).
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occurred during the course of the worker's duties.97 Because the test result
will not prove whether exposure occurred, the purpose of such laws is to
give the worker "peace of mind," rather than a definitive answer to
questions or fears. 8
Instead of allowing for such exceptions, states must concentrate on
vigorously enforcing universal precautions in health care settings.99 If
states still insist on legislating such exceptions, lawmakers must require the
individual requesting the test and/or information to present evidence that
exposure actually occurred and that transmission could have resulted."°
Even in this context, states must not forget the patient's rights; he or she
must have an opportunity to give informed consent, to receive counseling,
and to decide whether he or she wishes to know the result of the test."'
4. Anonymous Testing Alternatives
Because some individuals may not consider confidentiality safeguards
enough to encourage testing, states must provide for anonymous testing
programs.1 2 An anonymous test subject does not give any identifying
information but, instead, calls for results using a number. 3 Although pre-
test counseling still occurs, anonymous testing has some disadvantages in
that post-test, face-to-face counseling is not possible, and long-term
epidemiological research is hindered." Until states can guarantee strict
97. Il (explaining that some of these laws assume that people with HIV disease pose
an inherent danger to health care providers).
98. l
99. See, e.g., Field, supra note 72, at 80 (advocating the use of universal precautions).
100. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(5) (requiring that "a health care provider
or other person, including volunteer emergency medical services, fire and public safety
personnel" show that "significant exposure" occurred during the course of occupational duties
before an individual must submit to mandatory testing); id § 19a-583(a)(7) (1995) (imposing
the same requirements to overcome confidentiality laws). But see ALA. CODE § 22-11A-39
(1990) (compelling disclosure to "all pre-hospital agencies" who had any contact with the
infected individual).
101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(e)(5) (providing for post-test
counseling but allowing the patient to choose not to know the results).
102. See Field, supra note 72, at 51.
103. Id. (adding that subjects may need to supply basic information for epidemiological
research).
104. Id. at 52.
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confidentiality of results, legislators must provide for anonymous testing 05
and widely publicize all testing sites, as Georgia has chosen to do.' °6
5. Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns
Commentators often assert that mandatory testing within certain societal
groups is necessary. 7 With the rise of HIV disease in women, recent
attention has turned to pregnant women and newborns.10 8 Some states,
including Arkansas, Missouri, and Florida, already allow mandatory testing
for pregnant women.1°9 Like all others in society, pregnant women
deserve the opportunity to decide whether to learn their HIV status, but
these mandatory testing laws disregard women as individuals."' Evidence
shows that mandatory testing will not prevent vertical transmission,"' and
105. Id. (asserting that legislators must consider ways, such as telephone counseling, to
minimize drawbacks of this type of program).
106. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-35.1(b) (1991) (instructing the Department of Human
Resources to prepare AIDS education brochures that include information about confidential,
anonymous testing sites). Georgia requires distribution of such information to individuals
applying for marriage licenses. Id. § 19-3-35.1(c).
107. See, e.g., A. Alyce Werdel, Note, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Legal, Ethical
and Practical Issues, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 155, 219 (1990) (contending
that mandatory testing among high-risk groups is necessary to protect those citizens outside
of the affected groups).
108. See generally Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402 (1993)
(examining the prospect of mandatory testing of both pregnant women and newborns and
rejecting the idea in both contexts); Nat Hentoff, AIDS Breakthroughs and AIDS Politics,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1994, at A19 (asserting that policies against mandatory testing of
pregnant women is a political one, made to satisfy AIDS advocates).
109. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(c) (Michie 1991) (allowing a physician to test
an individual for HIV infection without informed consent if the patient has consented to
medical care); FLA. STAT. § 384.31 (1995) (requiring prenatal HIV testing as part of law that
mandates testing of pregnant women for all sexually transmitted diseases); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 191.674(1) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (providing for HIV testing if "reasonable grounds" exist
to believe the patient is infected and "clear and convincing evidence" shows that the person
threatened the health of others). The Missouri and Arkansas laws differ from the Florida
statute in that the former two states do not openly screen pregnant women, but do so under
the guise of general consent. See Field, supra note 108, at 408-09.
110. See Field, supra note 108, at 409-10 (examining the social costs of learning one's
HIV status and arguing that a woman has the right to make her own individual medical
decisions).
111. But see Hentoff, supra note 108, at A19 (arguing that, in light of recent studies
about benefits of AZT, law may need to subordinate woman's freedom to newborn's health).
Research now shows that AZT taken during pregnancy has decreased transmissibility from
25.5% in women not taking the drug to 8.3% in women taking the drug. Id.
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will not necessarily result in the woman choosing to abort.' In addition,
even though AZT may slow perinatal transmission, all women may not
receive such treatment."' Mandated counseling about the benefits of AZT
during pregnancy and the dangers of having an HIV-infected baby is a more
effective option at this point in time.1
4
Considering the current state of medical technology, the benefits of
testing newborns do not outweigh the risks at this time. Testing the
newborn will reveal the mother's status, rather than that of the child, who
is born with the mother's immune system." 5 Once a child develops his
or her own immune system, the question of testing becomes more difficult
because recent studies show that treatments are now available." 6 States
have reacted to this testing issue in a variety of ways. For example, Illinois
and Oklahoma have made childbearing a crime for 1IV-infected women
while Rhode Island now requires neonatal testing." 7 A more well-
reasoned decision is to give new parents the necessary information and
allow them to make their own decisions about treatment for their chil-
dren."' States should treat pregnant women and newborns like society at
112. See Field, supra note 108, at 414.
113. See id. at 413 (contending that AZT is not available to all seeking its medical
benefits).
114. See Hentoff, supra note 108, at A19 (quoting new AIDS czar Patricia Fleming,
who favors counseling about the benefits of testing, rather than a mandatory test that violates
a person's rights). Incidentally, the CDC now recommends routine prenatal counselling about
HIV and voluntary testing for all pregnant women in the United States. John Schwartz, AIDS
Testing Urged in All Pregnancies, WASH. POST, July 7, 1995, at Al, A8.
115. See Field, supra note 108, at 423-24 (explaining that all babies born to HIV-
positive mothers will test positive but that less than one third of them will ultimately develop
the infection).
116. Id. at 430-31 (examining the treatments, including AZT and Bactrim, available to
newborns).
117. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (criminalizing
knowing exposure, rather than actual transmission, from one person to another); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West Supp. 1996) (criminalizing "knowingly engaging in conduct
reasonably likely to transfer the HIV virus"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6 (1989) (dispensing with
informed consent and allowing an HIV test if the person is under one year of age); see
generally Carol Beth Barnett, The Forgotten and Neglected: Pregnant Women and Women
of Childbearing Age in the Context of the AIDS Epidemic, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 863
(1993) (discussing laws requiring neonatal testing and criminalization of vertical transmis-
sion).
118. See Field, supra note 108, at 431 (asserting that the state must allow parents to
make decisions for their children in such situations, as long as reasonable people can differ
as to the course of treatment). Governments should only intrude upon parental choice in
extreme circumstances. Id.
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large, and not subject them to mandatory testing requirements, until the
benefits of testing clearly outweigh the costs of denying pregnant women
and new mothers their right to privacy.
C. Protection from Discrimination in Insurance
After an individual learns that he or she is HIV positive, the next step
is to seek health care as soon as possible to increase one's chances of
prolonging life." 9  Obtaining the best health care available is often a
luxury reserved for those who have insurance that will pay for these
expenses." In the United States, most individuals secure private coverage
through their employers.'' Because an individual is basically uninsurable
once HIV infection occurs," he or she must rely on personal assets and
public benefits for health care financing after leaving employment.
23
119. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 41 (giving an example of the medical
treatments needed by a typical person living with HIV disease). Basically, treatment consists
of certain antiviral therapies, such as AZT, which limit the virus' reproductive abilities, and
secondary therapy for opportunistic infections. Id. at 38-41. Treatment is usually exhausting
as it can include numerous pills each day and doctor visits no less than once a month, but
usually more. Id. at 41.
Presently, researchers are focusing on study of "long-term nonprogressors," people who
carry the virus but remain healthy for a number of years. David Brown, Survivors Offer
Lessons in Resisting HIV, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1994, at A3. The answer to their survival
is most likely found in the individual's immune system or in the strain of virus he or she
carries, rather than the treatments the individual receives. Id.
120. Mark Scherzer, Private Insurance, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 3, at 404-05.
121. See Michele A. Zavos, Right to Work: Job Protection for People with HIV, TRIAL,
July 1993, at 41, 43-44 (reporting that about 60 million individuals have employer-based
insurance, which accounts for the majority of health care financing in the United States).
The system has evolved in this manner because insurers assume that those who work are the
healthiest and that an evaluation of each person in the work force is, therefore, impractical.
See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 410.
As most individuals have employer-based insurance, this article will discuss only those
laws necessary to protect individual interests in this context. For recommendations on
reforming public programs, readers should refer to THOMAS P. MCCORMACK, THE AIDS
BENEFITS HANDBOOK 99-110 (1990).
122. See Zavos, supra note 121, at 43.
123. Id.; see Alan I. Widiss, To Insure or Not to Insure Persons Infected with the Virus
that Causes AIDS, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1617, 1620-21 (1992) (explaining that AIDS is a
"progressively debilitating" condition and will eventually leave those infected unable to work
and without health insurance).
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1. Federal Laws Governing the Insurance Industry
The primary federal law regulating employer-provided plans is the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").'2 4 This
legislation overrides all state laws regulating employee benefit plans,"z
but it specifically excludes state insurance regulations from this preemp-
tion.12' At the same time, however, ERISA exempts employer-funded
benefit plans127 from conforming to state regulation because ERISA forbids
states to treat them as insurance policies."n Notably, self-insured plans
account for over sixty percent of all employer-based coverage, so state laws
reach only a minority of these plans.129
In particular, ERISA prohibits discrimination against employees who
exercise rights to which they are entitled under their benefit plans. 3'
McGann v. H & H Music Co.'31 illustrates the degree of freedom afforded
employers using self-insured plans, limited only by ERISA. 32 In that
case, the Fifth Circuit held that H & H did not unlawfully discriminate
against McGann, an HIV-positive employee, when it replaced its group
policy with a self-insured plan.'3 3 The group plan had promised payment
of a one million dollar lifetime maximum per employee, but, when the
employer discovered McGann had AIDS, he instituted a self-insured plan
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
125. Id. § 1144(a).
126. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
127. Mark H. Jackson, Health Insurance: The Battle Over Limits on Coverage, in AIDS
AGENDA, supra note 2, at 147, 148 (differentiating a self-insured plan from a group plan).
A self-insured employer creates its own fund for paying employee claims whereas
commercially insured employers pay a premium to an insurance company, which bears the
risks of paying claims. Id.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); see Jackson, supra note 127, at 148 (explaining that
ERISA has the effect of excusing self-insured plans from compliance with state insurance
regulations).
129. See Zavos, supra note 121, at 44; Jackson, supra note 127, at 148 (noting that over
50% of employer-based coverage is self-insured).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (outlawing discharge, suspension, discipline, or discrimina-
tion against an employee to prevent him or her from taking advantage of rights under a
benefit plan).
131. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
132. See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 426 (asserting that the decision allows employers
to eliminate an employee benefit as soon as an employee takes advantage of it, as long as
all similarly situated employees are treated equally).
133. McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
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that continued to pay this maximum, unless the employee had AIDS."M
The court reasoned that the employer acted out of financial concern, rather
than a desire to personally deprive McGann of his benefits."'
The ADA's enactment most likely will change the face of federal
insurance regulation. 36 Even though the ADA prohibits discrimination in
employer-based health insurance, 137 it still allows underwriting based on
actuarial risk. 38 To prove that a distinction is valid, rather than disability-
based, an employer must show that it provides a bona fide insurance
plan. 39  Further, the employer must demonstrate that the term is not a
"subterfuge"' for disability discrimination.
At the very least, the ADA prohibits disability-based distinctions in
group plans, but application of discrimination laws to self-insured plans
remains unsettled. ERISA specifically states that it will not "alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede" any other federal law.1
4
'
However, the courts have not yet decided on the relationship between
134. Id. at 403 (adding that the new plan only paid a maximum of $5000 to HIV-
infected employees).
135. Id. at 404. This law does not, however, allow self-insured employers to refuse
claims of an HIV-infected employee when the plan does not contain caps or exclusions for
HIV-related claims. John Doe v. Cooper Investments, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 89-B-597, 766
(C.D. Colo. Apr. 18, 1989).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (forbidding an employer from "limiting, segregating, or
classifying an employee" so that his or her opportunities or status are adversely affected
because of a disability). This section prohibits an employer from engaging in disability
discrimination in the provision of health insurance. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIEs ACT OF 1990 TO DISABILITY-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER
PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE, part II, app. JJ, at 101 (Supp. Jul. 1993) [hereinafter EEOC].
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (forbidding discrimination in "other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment"); id. § 12112(b)(2) (preventing employers from "participating in
a contractual or other arrangement" that subjects an employee to disability discrimination).
These two provisions, read together, prohibit employers from discriminating in the provision
of fringe benefits, in the form of commercially-insured or self-funded plans. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.4(f) (1995).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(l)-(3) (permitting underwriting practices that are consistent
with state law, if group coverage, and part of a bona fide plan).
139. Id. § 12201(c)(2); see EEOC, supra note 136, at 104 (outlining the framework for
determining if a health-related term is actually disability-based and, therefore, a violation of
the ADA).
140. See EEOC, supra note 136, at 107 (warning that a distinction singling out a
particular disability, a discrete group of them, or disabilities as a whole violates the ADA).
The EEOC offers an AIDS-related term as an example of one that singles out a particular
disability. Id.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
1208 [Vol. 20
190
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Lovitch
ERISA and the ADA and which of the two laws governs self-insured plans.
The EEOC has interpreted the ADA to apply to these plans, rather than
ERISA, and a number of cases on the issue are currently in litigation. 42
2. Recommendations for State Insurance Regulations
As mentioned, state insurance regulations only apply to group plans,
and individual coverage outside the employment context, because ERISA
governs self-insured plans. States, therefore, are limited in their ability to
protect individual interests in the insurance context. States are somewhat
restrained in this area for the additional reason that many of these issues
were addressed in the epidemic's earlier years, and these laws are now well
settled.
a. Questions Asked During the Underwriting Process
To prevent discrimination against individuals living with MIV disease,
states must limit the types of questions asked by underwriters. In the early
to mid 1980s, many underwriters tried to totally deny coverage to high-risk
group members. 43 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
responded by announcing underwriting guidelines to prevent this prob-
lem."'4 Currently, only a few states have adopted these recommendations,
and those that have not should follow suit. 45 Florida, for one, has passed
a law forbidding underwriters to consider sexual orientation or certain other
142. See Donaghey v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Trust Fund, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
422 (N.Y. Dist. Office Jan. 27, 1993) (holding that a union health insurance plan violated the
ADA because it denied payment for AIDS-related medical expenses). Mason Tenders has
filed for a declaratory judgment in district court on whether the union's plan must comply
with the ADA, as held by the EEOC, or with ERISA. See also Zavos, supra note 121, at
43.
143. Scherzer, supra note 120, at 417 (recalling the controversy surrounding
underwriting policies in the epidemic's early years).
144. Id.
145. See generally Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, AIDS and Discrimination:
Public and Professional Perspectives, in AIDS IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 77, 79
(Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 1990) (reporting that the American public still feels no sympathy
for people living with HIV disease who contracted the virus through homosexual activity or
drug use). This survey indicates that discrimination against persons in high-risk groups still
exists and that they still need protection from discrimination in a number of areas, including
the underwriting process. Id
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factors that may allow the underwriter to draw conclusions about sexual
orientation. 46
State lawmakers also must consider whether underwriters may inquire
about an individual's HIV status. They will most likely allow underwriters
to ask such questions because all jurisdictions already let insurers use the
HIV antibody test,'47 except for California, which permits them to test the
health of the immune system.148 States may permit underwriters to inquire
about the existence of a positive result, but legislators must ban them from
considering negative test results in coverage or testing decisions because
individuals should not suffer discrimination for merely taking a test.
49
b. Use of the HIV Antibody Test in the Underwriting Process
The introduction of the HIV antibody test into the commercial market
in 1985 reduced the debate about intrusive questions to secondary sta-
tus.'" Today, insurance companies commonly use the test to predict risks,
and those who test positive are uninsurable on an individual basis.'
5
'
Those states that initially regulated the use of HIV antibody tests quickly
limited or repealed those provisions. 52 Even though states have decided
to authorize testing in this context, they still must balance the insurance
company's need to know with the individual's right to privacy. Like Ohio
and Texas, all states must ensure that testing is not requested on a discrimi-
natory basis and that insurers ask individuals to submit to testing only for
146. FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(d) (1995) (forbidding underwriters to consider sexual
orientation, marital status, living arrangements, occupation, gender, beneficiary designation,
zip code, or other territorial classification).
147. See, e.g., id. § 627.429(4)(a) (allowing the insurer to "use only medical tests that
are reliable predictors of risk"). But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.90(2) (West 1995)
(establishing that insurers cannot use an individual's HIV status in group plan underwriting).
Because insurers seldom use medical tests in the group context, these bans are "meaning-
less." Scherzer, supra note 120, at 419.
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21(f) (banning disclosure of HIV antibody
test in determination of insurability, but not expressly prohibiting others, such as T-Cell
Suppressor test); see Widiss, supra note 123, at 1684 n.180 (stating current position, as of
1992, of various state jurisdictions on testing in determining insurance eligibility).
149. FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(e) (authorizing questions about positive test results but
not about negative test results); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(4)(e) (Michie 1994)
(providing identical protection).
150. Scherzer, supra note 120, at 418.
151. See Widiss, supra note 123, at 1672-81 (asserting a number of justifications for the
use of HIV antibody testing in the underwriting process).
152. Scherzer, supra note 120, at 419.
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health-related reasons. 53 In addition, states must require insurance
companies to follow rules of written and particularized informed consent, to
provide for post-test counseling from a physician chosen by the applicant,
and to reveal the results only to the applicant, persons designated by the
applicant, and employees within the insurance company. Florida has
announced clear rules on consent, counseling, and confidentiality."5
Similarly, Texas has enacted tough penalties for violations of confidentiality
laws in the insurance context.'55
c. Excluding, Limiting, and Terminating Coverage Based on an
Individual's HIV Status
To supplement federal protection, states must enact laws prohibiting
insurers from treating HIV disease differently than other sicknesses and
illnesses.'56 State legislators must send a strong message to insurers and
individual citizens that they will not condone discriminatory limits or
exclusions." 7
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.46(A) (Andersen Supp. 1989) (instructing insurers
that they may ask individual policy applicants to submit to HIV testing "only in conjunction
with tests for other health conditions" and not on the basis of sexual orientation); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21-4(b) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring insurers to base testing on
"medical condition or medical history" or on underwriting guidelines that require all within
a risk class to submit to testing).
154. See FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4) (enumerating the specific requirements for consent,
post-test counseling, and confidentiality). Florida requires the insurer to disclose its intent
to test an individual in advance. Il § 627.429(4)(b). Written consent is necessary, and it
must include an explanation of the test, its purpose, uses, limitations, and meaning as well
as the right to confidentiality. Id The applicant may receive the results from a physician
of his or her own choosing or from the Department of Health. Id § 627.429(4)(c). At that
time, the applicant must receive post-test counseling on the meaning of the results, its
consequences, prevention of future transmission, and other pertinent information. Id. The
results must remain confidential within the insurance company. FLA. STAT. § 627.429(4)(f.
155. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21-4 (j)-(o) (enumerating the remedies for a
confidentiality breach). The applicant may bring a civil action, and damages will vary based
on whether the disclosure is negligent, willful, or criminal. Id
156. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5)(a) (banning insurance contracts
that "contain benefit provisions, terms, or conditions which apply to [HIV] infection in a
different manner than those which apply to any other health condition"). The statute also
prohibits cancellation or nonrenewal because an individual receives an HIV positive
diagnosis. l § 304.12-013(5)(b).
157. See Jackson, supra note 127, at 162 (noting that states may show this support
through statutes, regulations, or department guidelines).
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Unfortunately, neither federal nor state law can prevent termination of
coverage upon certain events, including the loss of employment. In 1989,
the federal government amended the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1985 ("COBRA")" 8 to allow continuation of the coverage period
until a disabled individual can qualify for Medicare. 159  Two practical
problems arise in conjunction with this law. First, the law only covers
employers with twenty or more employees, so individuals working for small
businesses cannot take advantage of COBRA's guarantees. 16 Second,
former employees often cannot afford the high premiums required to
continue the benefits.' 61
States must take action to remedy these problems. In the late 1980s,
many states directed insurance companies to create state-subsidized "high-
risk" pools for individuals who could not qualify for continuation or other
coverage, but such plans have proven unsuccessful for states as well as
participants. 62 If states choose to pass high-risk-pool legislation, they still
must take other action due to past difficulties encountered in administering
these plans. One recommendation is that states, which regulate continuation
rights of plans not covered by COBRA, must amend their statutes and
regulations to parallel the coverage offered under COBRA. 63
To assist individuals who cannot bear the financial burden of COBRA
premiums, Washington State, and others, have created COBRA assistance
programs. Through such programs, the state pays COBRA premiums for
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1161-1169 (1994). COBRA amendments also help individuals in new
jobs waiting to qualify under a pre-existing condition clause. See id. § 1162(2)(D)(i);
Scherzer, supra note 120, at 422.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(a).
160. Id. § 1161(b).
161. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE CONTINUATION
COVERAGE UNDER COBRA 8 (Nov. 1994) (summarizing COBRA's provisions and stating
that the law allows employers to charge disabled individuals up to 150% of the premium for
the last I1 months); Widiss, supra note 123, at 1730 (stating that COBRA conversion
premiums are often costly).
162. See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 412 (discussing the creation of such programs to
assist the medically uninsurable). Scherzer explained that over half the states had passed
such laws by 1990 but that most programs had financial difficulties. Id. Even though the
states appropriated money to assist members with payments, individuals still paid
considerably more than if they had a private policy. Id Another author noted that state-
mandated high-risk pools are not an answer to the problem because "they do not exist in all
states, the premium costs are high, the coverage is limited, and some exclude coverage for
AIDS." Widiss, supra note 123, at 1731.
163. See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 424 (applauding New York's 1992 reforms that
accomplished this goal).
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qualifying individuals with HIV disease." Such a program benefits the
individual as well as the state in that the individual keeps his or her private
insurance coverage, which is advantageous to the state because public bene-
fits for the individual probably would cost a great deal more.
65
3. Insurance and Health Care Reform
Since the AIDS epidemic began, AIDS advocates have fought many
battles over insurance issues. A number of them ended unsuccessfully, but,
collectively, they have accomplished something more important: they have
brought the issue of health care reform into the public forum.'6 The
American public, as well as the federal government, must consider how to
reform the current system based on underwriting167 and employer-based
plans.161 People also have begun to realize that the insurance-related
horrors suffered by people with HIV disease can happen to all individuals
with chronic diseases.169 As more women, children, and people of color
contract the virus, the need to reform the system in response to HIV disease
will become even more urgent. 70 In its final report, the National Com-
mission on AIDS called for comprehensive health care reform that prudently
considers HIV disease, and other chronic conditions.' Until federal and
164. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.09.757 (West Supp. 1996) (enabling the
"[a]cquired human immunodeficiency syndrome insurance program," which is administered
by the department of social and health services with state appropriated funds). This
department is responsible for creating eligibility requirements beyond those mentioned in the
statute, which include an HIV infection diagnosis and qualification for continuation benefits
under COBRA. Id.
165. See Widiss, supra note 123, at 1620 n.8 (reporting that current estimates of health
care costs for an HIV-infected person range from $50,000 to $125,000).
166. See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 420 (asserting that advocates provided a "model
for disease group advocacy").
167. See Widiss, supra note 123, at 1735 (arguing that revision of the underwriting
process is not enough to cure the health care system's difficulties).
168. See Scherzer, supra note 120, at 428 (contending that employers as well as
employees are dissatisfied with the current system).
169. See id. (predicting that, as the groups realize their common pursuit, they will unite
to encourage comprehensive health care reform).
170. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH CARE REFORM: OVERVIEW 1
(Sept. 1994) (reporting that nearly all of the 37.4 million uninsured Americans were under
65, and a majority were children and young adults, according to 1992 statistics); Zavos,
supra note 121, at 44 (observing that this change in the disease's epidemiology will increase
the need to provide equitable access to health care).
171. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10 (stressing the importance of coverage
for services such as home and long-term care); see also id. at 12 (asserting that the federal
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state governments provide affordable access to the proper continuum of
health care, individuals living with fIV disease will not receive the peace
of mind that they deserve in their time of desperate need.
II. BUILDING ON EXISTING LAWS TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEEDS OF
PEOPLE LIVING wrrH HIV DISEASE
A. Planning for Incapacity and Death
The traditional mechanisms used for personal and estate planning often
are inappropriate for HIV-infected individuals because of the unpredictable
progression of HIV disease.' While some individuals steadily decline in
health over a period of months or years, many others alternate between
sickness and health before succumbing to the virus.173
"Living with HIV" means tolerating a high level of anxiety, which takes
a tremendous toll at every stage. For those who are well, it means the
uncertainty of waiting for the other shoe to drop, sometimes for years.
For those who are already sick, it means worrying about what the next
complication will bring, how their bodies will betray them next, whether
they will lose some crucial faculty such as sight, or how much pain they
may be asked to tolerate.' 74
This compelling account illustrates the importance of providing state laws
to make things as easy as possible for HIV-infected individuals to plan for
their uncertain futures.
1. Health Care Decisions
Historically, state statutes have allowed an individual to execute a
financial power of attorney, in which he or she may designate someone to
government must search for ways to provide health care to all).
172. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, HP/-Infected Parents and the Law: Issues of Custody,
Visitation and Guardianship, in AIDS AGENDA, supra note 2, at 70, 82 (discussing this
problem in the context of family law issues).
173. Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 3, at 37-38 (commenting on the inconsistency
of HIV disease in its effects on individuals). For example, some people may live for a long
period of time with a low T4 cell count while other may have a moderate count for a number
of years that suddenly drops. aId at 38.
174. Id.
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make decisions on his or her behalf.17 Typical powers delegated to an
attorney-in-fact include making gifts, disclaiming property interests,
withdrawing and receiving trust income, carrying out banking and financial
transactions, and engaging in real property transactions.16 The difficulty
with the traditional power of attorney is that it becomes ineffective upon the
grantor's mental incapacity, which is exactly the point when many people
need its powers.'77
Every state now provides for a durable financial power of attorney.178
To alleviate additional anxiety about future decisions, individuals living with
HIV disease need such an arrangement for health care decisions as well. To
accommodate this necessity, a number of states now have durable health
care power of attorney provisions, which allow a principal to appoint
someone to make health care decisions on his or her behalf upon incapacity.
California, for instance, has passed detailed legislation allowing such
agreements. 79 So that individuals have as much control as possible over
future health care decisions, state law must give the principal power to
decide whether to grant broad or specific powers to the attorney-in-fact. 80
Because people living with HI disease may alternate between sickness and
health for a long period of time, and personal relationships can change
during that period, a statute also must allow the principal to alter the
document and to revoke the appointment, if he or she has the capacity to do
so. 8 1 Most statutes require that individuals execute very specific docu-
ments to give the arrangements legal effect, but state legislatures must
recognize that such actions are not always possible. Virginia has taken
175. Arnold J. Rosoff & Gary L. Gottlieb, Preserving Personal Autonomy for the
Elderly, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 37-38 (1987).
176. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5602 (listing a number of powers which a
principal may delegate to an attorney-in-fact).
177. Rosoff & Gottlieb, supra note 175, at 38. Such provisions are based on agency
law, which dictates that the power terminate upon incapacity because the agent can not have
more power than the principal. Id.
178. Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLuM. L. REv. 985, 1012 (1984) (noting that all 50 states have passed such legislation and
asserting that it is a viable option in the health care setting as well).
179. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 2430-2510 (Deering 1992); see also D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 21-2201 to -2213 (Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981, -2993 (Michie Supp.
1992).
180. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2430(b)-(c) (broadly defining "health care"
as practically any action pertaining to the individual's physical or mental conditions and
"health care decision" as consent, or refusal or withdrawal of consent, to health care).
181. See id. § 2437(a)-(c) (presuming that the principal has the capacity to revoke the
appointment and placing the burden of proof on the other party).
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action by allowing a terminally ill, but competent individual to orally
appoint an agent to make health care decisions.182
To accompany a durable health care power of attorney, a person living
with HIV disease may want to execute a living will, 83 and states should
pass legislation that empowers them to do so. Normally, an individual
executes a living will to direct health care providers not to use artificial life
support procedures if he or she becomes terminally ill. 84 Because these
documents have a number of shortcomings in practice,'85 individuals
should use them to complement, rather than to replace, a durable power of
attorney. Additionally, states should pass or amend specific living will
legislation, which takes these problems into account. By passing the
recommended durable health care power of attorney and living will
provisions, states will give individuals, especially the rising number of them
with diverse family structures and relationships, an important degree of
control over their future health care decisions.
8 6
2. Guardianships
Most current state laws regulating guardianships also do not address the
needs of individuals living with HIV disease and other chronic conditions.
Traditionally, a parent may use a guardianship arrangement18 7 to transfer
182. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (Michie 1994) (authorizing oral arrangements
only if specific procedures are followed).
183. See Fowler, supra note 178, at 1000 (explaining that the living will allows patients
some autonomy but that this instrument is not enough in and of itself).
184. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1995); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1987 & Supp. 1995). Both laws require that two physicians
attest to the patient's terminally ill condition before discontinuing life support upon request.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421(5); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606.
185. See Fowler, supra note 178, at 999-1000 (asserting that an individual cannot
foresee all health care possibilities when the document is executed and that living wills do
not always protect patient rights because of formalistic statutory requirements).
186. See Arlene Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Women in the AIDS Epidemic, 9 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 519, 536-37 (1990) (stressing the importance of such provisions to
the increasing number of women living with HIV disease, who may have nontraditional
family structures). In these situations, women may not necessarily want their legal spouse
or immediate family members to make decisions for them. Id. Additionally, homosexual
men commonly object to immediate family members making their health care decisions.
Robert Steinbrook et al., Preferences of Homosexual Men with AIDS for Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 314 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 457, 457 (1986).
187. MARK I. SOLER ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT I 3.06[2][a] (1994)
(explaining that a guardianship of a minor's person discontinues a parent's custody and shifts
that responsibility to another adult).
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parental powers while retaining the right to support and visit the child.'
Guardianship proceedings normally are governed by the state probate
court' 9 because a parent often names a guardian in his or her will."9
The proposed guardian or a parent may initiate a petition for guardianship
in a family court.'9 ' The court, however, may reject the parent's choice
if it is not in the child's best interest."9  Traditional guardianships are
permanent and terminate only when the child reaches the age of majority,
marries, or dies, whichever comes first.193
For two primary reasons, current guardianship laws do not work for the
growing number of individuals living with HIV disease, most of whom draw
strength from their children and need to know the courts will respect their
child-rearing choices after they have passed away. 194 First, traditional
mechanisms allow only long-term transfers of custody.'95 Considering the
unpredictability of HIV disease, permanent transfer is not always necessary,
and the parent may want to regain custody of his or her children after
returning to good health. 96 Second, the growing number of women with
188. Id. (stating that powers and duties of guardians are defined by state statute).
Powers usually include deciding where the child will live, making health care decisions for
the child, overseeing the child's educational and religious development, and reasonably
disciplining the child. Id.
189. Id. I 3.06[5][a] (adding that this court may also hear the juvenile and family law
cases).
190. Id. I 3.06[5][c].
191. SOLER, supra note 187, 3.06[5][d][i] (observing that the guardian usually files
the petition); see, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. Acr §§ 1701, 1703 (McKinney 1967 & Supp.
1996) (allowing a parent as well as a child fourteen or over to petition for appointment of
a guardian).
192. SOLER, supra note 187, 3.06[5][d][vii].
193. Id. [ 3.06[11].
194. See Ann Kurth, Introduction: An Overview of Women and HIV Disease, in UNTIL
THE CURE 1, 16 (Ann Kurth ed., 1993) (emphasizing that many HIV-infected women, who
are usually the primary caretakers of their children, consider planning for child care their
main concern).
195. SOLER, supra note 187, 1 3.06[3][f] (warning that no state law expressly authorizes
informal guardianships but that parents still may execute them in writing, at their own risk);
id. 3.06[7] (describing a temporary guardianship, as defined by many state statutes, and its
limitations); see also Michele A. Zavos, Legal Considerations, in UNTIL THE CURE, supra
note 194, at 125, 140 (asserting that temporary and informal guardianships are often
complicated and contestable).
196. Zavos, supra note 195, at 140 (asserting that women must have the opportunity to
designate a guardian without relinquishing full custody). One woman explains this dilemma:
I have been trying to draw up custody papers for my daughter for quite some
time now (her biological father died of AIDS two years ago). I would not give
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HIV disease, especially those of a low socioeconomic status, makes the need
for reform even more urgent. 97 States originally designed guardianship
statutes to serve the middle-class, traditional family, 98 but, for individuals
with HIV disease, this model often does not hold true. Many single parents,
mostly women, cannot rely on the other parent to assume responsibility for
the child because the noncustodial parent already may have succumbed to
HIV disease.' Further, HIV disease often strikes those in areas pervaded
by drug use and poverty, and, as a result, the non-infected parent may not
be available or interested in raising the child.2"
Commentators have long suggested that a "springing" guardianship
mechanism would remedy these problems because it would "spring" into
existence when illness leaves a parent unable to care for the child but
"lapse" if and when the parent regains health.201 Motivated by the impact
of HIV disease on single parents, especially single mothers, 2 New York
became the first state to pass such a statute in 1992,203 and Maryland
followed suit by passing its own statute in 19 94 .2'
For the reasons stated above, other states must enact similar legislation
to protect HIV-infected parents, especially the growing number of single
mothers who make up this group. Basically, the New York and Maryland
up custody while I am well, perhaps not even when I am sick. For now, this is
not an alternative for me. I relate this to you because you need to know that
often the children in our lives are our survival. I work at staying healthy so that
I can raise my daughter. It is she who keeps me on track, centered in my will
to survive. This is an essential to women, to mothers living with this disease.
Id. at 125-26 (quoting an anonymous source).
197. See id. at 140 (reporting that most HIV-infected women are "functionally single
parents").
198. Cooper, supra note 172, at 82 (arguing that existing statutes only apply to family
situations that do not conform to "socioeconomic reality of most HIV-infected parents").
199. Id. (explaining that existing laws assume that, if one parent dies, another parent is
standing by to care for the child).
200. Id.; see Zavos, supra note 195, at 140 (relating that many HIV-infected women
cannot afford a lawyer and, as a result, do not execute a will in which they could name
guardian).
201. Zarembka & Franke, supra note 186, at 539-40 (asserting that flexible law of this
type would ensure that parent could regain custody when his or her good health returned
without fighting for it in costly, exhausting court battle).
202. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1726 Practice Commentaries (McKinney Supp.
1996).
203. Id. § 1726; see Zavos, supra note 195, at 140-41.
204. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-903 to 13-904 (Supp. 1994) (providing for
a springing guardianship arrangement that is almost identical to that allowed in New York).
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statutes allow a parent to appoint a guardian by judicial appointment2 5 or
by signed and witnessed instrument.2 6 If "medically unable" to appear
in court, neither method requires the parents' presence, an important
improvement over existing law.207 These laws respect both parents' rights,
a concern of some critics,208 by ordering that both parents join in the
petition.2' At the same time, Maryland recognizes that a single parent
cannot always locate the other parent and requires only "reasonable efforts"
to find an absent parent.210  Furthermore, the parent retains a certain
amount of control in that he or she decides when the guardianship will take
effect, or terminate, in the event that he or she returns to good health.21
205. See N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. Acr § 1726(3) (establishing that only parent or legal
guardian may file a petition for appointment of a standby guardian); MD. CODE ANN., EsT.
& TRUSTS § 13-903(b) (specifying that only parent may file petition for appointment of
standby guardian). The petition must specify a triggering event (incapacity, death, or
whichever occurs first). N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PROC. Acr § 1726(3)(b)(i); MD. CODE ANN., EsT.
& TRUSTS § 13-903(b)(3). The petitioner must describe his or her stage of illness. N.Y.
SURR. Cr. PRoc. Acr § 1726(3)(b)(ii) (requiring "progressively chronic illness" or
"irreversibly fatal disease"); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-903(b)(3) (requiring
"significant risk" of death or incapacity within two years of filing).
206. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. Acr § 1726(4) (allowing such arrangement if signed by the
parent, two witnesses who are at least 18 years old, and the standby guardian); MD. CODE
ANN., ET. & TRUSTS § 13.904(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (imposing same requirements). Both statutes
permit another individual to sign for the parent, upon the parent's consent, if he or she is
physically unable to do so. N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1726(4)(a); MD. CODE ANN., EsT.
& TRusTs § 13.904(a)(2)(i)-(ii). A parent also may appoint an alternate standby guardian
in this document and in the same manner. N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PRoc. ACT § 1726(4)(b)(ii); MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRusTs § 13.904(b)(2). The standby guardian's authority begins upon
receipt of a determination of capacity or a determination of physical debilitation and a copy
of written consent from the parent. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PRoc. ACT § 1726(4)(c); MD. CODE
ANN., ET. & TRUsTs § 13.904(c). An appointment by written instrument ends after 60 days
in New York and after 180 days in Maryland, if the standby guardian does not file a petition
for guardianship with the court. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PRoc. ACT § 1726(4)(c); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 13.904(e).
207. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1726(3)(c); MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRusTs § 13-
903(c).
208. See Cooper, supra note 172, at 93 (listing some commentators' concerns, including
apprehensions about locating and displacing the rights of the other parent).
209. N.Y. SuRR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1726(2) (providing that other guardianship provisions
still apply to standby guardianship arrangements); MD. CODE ANN. EsT. & TRusTs § 13-
903(a) (expressly requiring both parents to sign unless the other cannot be found).
210. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUsTs § 13-903(a)(l)-(3) (requiring both parents to sign
or to document efforts to locate an unavailable parent before filing for judicial appointment).
211. N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT § 1726(3)(0, (4)(f) (providing rules for revocation of
judicial and written appointments); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-903(0, 13-904(h)
(duplicating New York's statute on this point). By explicitly giving the parent the power to
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Although these statutes are relatively new and untested in court, state
legislatures cannot "play it safe" by waiting to pass them. HIV disease is
rapidly affecting single parents, especially women, and these individuals
need laws to accommodate their special needs right away.
B. Fighting Custody Battles
In addition to the problems inherent in guardianship statutes in most
states, many HIV-infected parents may face custody and visitation disputes
in which the law may not protect their rights. Even though courts should
treat HIV disease like any other disability in this context,212 broad statutes
governing custody and visitation still may allow for discrimination against
the HIV-infected parent. Courts often consider the probability of transmis-
sion to the child, even though transmission cannot occur in casual situations;
courts determine the parent's ability to care for the child, despite his or her
condition; and courts weigh the chance that the child could suffer discrimi-
nation because of the parent's condition.213 Courts have rejected all of
these arguments at some point21 but custody and visitation determinations
still leave room for judges' personal opinions.z 5 States, therefore, must
pass legislation to ensure that HIV-infected parents receive fair determina-
tions in custody and visitation disputes.
1. Existing Statutes and Case Law Governing
Custody and Visitation
Because federal law plays little, if any, part in custody and visitation
decisions, this issue is an especially important one for states to consider.
"unspring" the guardianship, the two legislatures allayed yet another concern about springing
guardianship statutes. See Cooper, supra note 172, at 93 (explaining that critics have
contended that the guardian and relinquishing parent may differ as to whether and when the
arrangement should "unspring").
212. Cooper, supra note 172, at 71 (asserting that courts should evaluate HIV-infected
parents based on their ability to fulfill their parenting responsibilities and to ensure the
child's social and psychological well-being).
213. Zavos, supra note 195, at 141 (explaining that disputes based on these consider-
ations are unrelated to the child's best interests); Cooper, supra note 172, at 70 (arguing that
parent may advance these contentions to disguise concerns about HIV-infected parent who
is homosexual or has history of drug use).
214. See infra notes 223-49 and accompanying text (examining each one of these
unsupported arguments).
215. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (stating the ways in which a judge
may abuse his discretion in custody and visitation decisions).
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Most state courts use the "best interests of the child" standard and make
decisions on a case-by-case basis.21 6 Different states articulate their
standards for this determination in diverse ways, but many follow the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), 217 which suggests factors
that courts should take into account.2 8 Most states follow the UMDA in
providing standards for visitation determinations as well.219 The UMDA
directs courts to grant visitation unless "visitation would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health."2'
Even though statutory and case law outlines a framework for these
decisions, custody determinations still allow judges a great deal of
discretion.22' The "best interests" standard is vague, and, therefore,
manipulable, so judges often rely on their own and the community's value
preferences in reaching decisions.' In the absence of clearly defined
judicial standards, state legislatures must take the necessary steps to protect
216. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, in CHILD, PARENT & STATE 3, 4 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994) (noting that
some states list factors to consider while others leave it to court's discretion).
217. Cooper, supra note 172, at 71 (noting that most states have either adopted the
UMDA or used it as foundation for statutes outlining factors for courts to consider).
218. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1979). The five factors mentioned in
the uniform act are:
1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
Id.
219. See Cooper, supra note 172, at 72.
220. UNIW. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 407(a) (1979).
221. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 255-68 (1975), reprinted in
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 636, 648 (1989)
(asserting that the broad standards provided to judges encourage value-based decisions by
particular judges in each case). Mnookin advocates a system that favors family autonomy,
rather than state paternalism, as the underlying value of policies in this area. laL at 646. He
further contends that government involvement is justified only in cases where private dispute
settlement or child protection is necessary. Id. at 648.
222. See Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado about
Nothing?, in CHILD, PARENT & STATE, supra note 216, at 27 (lamenting that these value
choices lead to an ironic result in that the judge often overlooks the child's best interests in
reaching a decision).
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HIV-infected parents from arbitrary custody and visitation judgments based
on the parents' seropositivity.
2. Applicable Case Law
In a number of states, courts have rejected the idea that a parent's
disability is reason enough to deny him or her custody. In In re Marriage
of Carney,2 3 the Supreme Court of California began this trend by holding
that a disability does not constitute prima facie evidence that a parent is
unfit.224  Instead, the court should make an individualized inquiry2" to
determine whether the parent's disability will have a "substantial and lasting
adverse effect on the best interests of the child. 226  Consequently, a
number of other state courts have chosen to follow this approach.227
Courts have specifically applied Carney's principles in custody and
visitation disputes involving HIV-infected parents. For example, a New
York court, in Doe v. Roe,22' held that a disability alone cannot prevent
an otherwise qualified parent from having custody of a child.229 In
addition to refusing to order a father to submit to an HIV antibody test,23
the court rejected the maternal grandparents' efforts to convince the court
223. 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979).
224. Id. at 42.
225. Id. The court should:
inquire into the person's actual and potential physical capabilities, learn how he
or she has adapted to the disability and manages its problems, consider how the
other members of the household have adjusted thereto, and . . . the special
contributions the person may make to the family despite-or even because
of-the [disability].
Id. In addition, the court should consider any other relevant factors in reaching its decision.
Id.
226. Carney, 598 P.2d at 42 (citations omitted). The lower court was admonished for
stereotyping the physically disabled father as unable to participate meaningfully in his child's
life and for failing to give children credit for their ability to adapt to such situations. Id. at
42-23.
227. See, e.g., Bednarski v. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 73-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(remanding case back to trial court because it placed undue emphasis on mother's deafness
when it granted custody to child's grandparents); Hatz v. Hatz, 455 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536-37
(Fam. Ct. 1982), (adopting Carney standard and holding that mother's paralysis did not
warrant revocation of custody), af'd, 468 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1983).
228. 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Super. Ct. 1988).
229. Id. at 726.
230. Id. at 725 (stressing that mandatory testing is contrary to public policy of protecting
confidentiality). Reasoning that the petitioner must show a "compelling need" for
involuntary testing information, the court held that this standard was not met. Id. at 725-26.
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that the father's limited life expectancy and his propensity to take his own
life and that of others made him an unfit parent. 1  Instead, the court
found that the pertinent consideration is the effect, if any, of the father's
disability on the child. 2 Applying this test to the facts at issue, the court
decided that, even assuming the father was an HIV carrier, a shortened life
span could not justify taking a child from a parent with whom he or she has
a good relationship.' Further, expert testimony revealed that the father
displayed no suicidal tendencies. 4 Considered together, Carney and Doe
offer persuasive authority for protecting HIV-infected parents from the
unwarranted loss of custody or visitation rights because of their condition.
In addition to rejecting unfounded claims based on disability alone, a
number of courts also have declined to recognize fear of transmission
through casual contact as a basis for denying custody or visitation. Rather
than concentrating on the father's AIDS diagnosis, a New York trial court,
in Jane W. v. John W.,"2 5 dismissed the condition as a significant issue
and stressed the father's capability to care for the child. 2 6  Noting that
"exceptional circumstances" must exist for a court to limit visitation, the
court refused to terminate the father's unsupervised visitation rights.3 7
Relying on the Jane W. decision, an Indiana appellate court overturned a
lower court decision238 denying visitation rights to a homosexual, AIDS-
infected father, because of his condition, in Stewart v. Stewart.39 The
231. Id. at 726.
232. Id.
233. Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 726 (relying on testimony of court-appointed psychiatrist
who interviewed all parties and children).
234. Id. (elaborating that expert did not consider father a danger to his children).
235. 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (finding that the father's AIDS
diagnosis should carry little, if any, weight in adjudicating visitation disputes).
236. Id. (stressing that father is health care worker and knows proper precautions to take
in protecting family and friends from infection).
237. Id.
238. See Nancy L. Mahon, Note, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and
Visitation Disputes Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1092, 1121 (1988)
(citing Stewart v. Stewart, No. S485-1128 (Sup. Ct. Marion City, Ind., Oct. 9, 1986). In
Stewart, the court disregarded evidence of the mother's parental incompetence and awarded
custody to her after learning of the father's condition. Id. The trial judge's approach not
only defied the best interests standard but also misconstrued medical evidence and focused
on the condition, rather than the child's needs. Id.
239. 521 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (recalling the lower court's decision to
terminate completely the father's visitation rights, a remedy not requested by the mother,
because of the slight chance of transmission through casual contact); see also Robert D.
Zaslow, Child Custody, Visitation, and the HIV Virus: Revisiting the Best Interests Doctrine
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appellate court in Stewart followed the Jane W. court's lead by taking a
more reasonable approach' 4 and choosing to base its decision on the
weight of medical evidence.2 4' Consequently, the Stewart court remanded
the decision with instructions that the trial court may not deny visitation
privileges solely on the basis of the father's AIDS diagnosis.2 42  Many
state courts have since relied on the principles announced in Doe and Jane
W.143 At the very least, judges have an obligation to individually assess
the facts of each case, rather than to deny parental rights based solely on a
parent's disability or a societal fear of transmission through casual contact.
The effect of the social stigma" on the child of an HIV-infected
parent is yet another factor that courts should not consider in reaching their
decisions on parental rights. In Palmore v. Sidoti,45 the Supreme Court
recognized that even though the law cannot reach private prejudices, courts
must not, directly or indirectly, condone them.246 Soon after that decision,
state courts extended Palmore to other contexts. The Supreme Court of
Alaska offered protection to gay and lesbian parents, 47 while an Ohio
to Ensure Impartial Parental Rights Determinations for HIV-Infected Parents, 3 J.
PHARMACY & L. 61, 76 (1994) (asserting that this lower court decision exemplifies how
judges may exploit the best interests standard, based on their own fears and prejudices).
240. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 965 (characterizing the trial court's action as "extreme and
unwarranted" and contrary to the medical evidence presented).
241. Id. at 966 (referring to Jane W. and noting the similarity of the medical evidence
in the two cases). The court mentioned that Jane W. was the only reported case addressing
the visitation issue in this context. Id. at 965. The decision included a lengthy excerpt of
the case's medical testimony and then expressly relied on the case in finding the trial court
in error. Id. at 965-66 (citing Jane W., 519 N.Y.S.2d at 604-05).
242. Id. at 966. On remand, the trial court was also directed to hear current medical
evidence from either party about AIDS and to tailor its decision to all evidence presented.
Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 966.
243. See, e.g., Steven L. v. Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322, 326 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (denying
father's petition for modification of custody order and refusing to consider mother's HIV
infection as sole grounds for such alteration). The court observed that a change in custody
could have a greater emotional effect on the child than the mother's condition and the
possibility of her untimely death. Id.
244. See generally Brandt, supra note 13, at 425-32 (examining society's reasons for
stigmatizing people with HIV disease, in the context of history, society, and culture).
245. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
246. Id. at 433-34 (holding that effect of racial prejudice on child is not permissible
factor for courts to consider in decisions concerning parental rights). The father sought
custody after discovering that the child's mother, who had custody of their daughter, lived
with, and later married, a black man. Id. at 430.
247. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (holding that social stigma
surrounding homosexual mother's sexual orientation is not pertinent consideration in custody
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appellate court allowed a father overnight visitation rights over the mother's
protests of his homosexuality and alleged HIV seropositivity. s  These
cases provide courts the foundation for broadening Palmore's reach to cover
the HIV-infected parent. 9
3. Recommendations for State Legislation on Custody
In keeping with the spirit of recent federal measures, such as the
ADA,25 states must follow suit and fill the gaps left by this measure.
Specifically, states can accommodate HIV-infected parents by amending
child custody statutes to prohibit judges from considering a parent's HIV-
positive status as a per se bar to custody or visitation. Florida already has
amended its custody and visitation statute in this manner,"1 and states
should look to this law for guidance. The Florida statute expressly forbids
a court to deny custody or visitation solely because a parent or grandparent
is IV positive. 2 The court may, however, condition its decision on the
parent or grandparent's agreement to observe infection control measures for
the protection of the child.253 To provide even more guidance to judges,
lawmakers must go further than the Florida statute and instruct judges to
consider each case individually.' The judge must determine the effect,
if any, of the parent's condition on the child and then consider the status
only if "exigent circumstances" exist. 5 The only two possible examples
of such circumstances are deterioration of the parent's condition, leaving
determination, unless it has adverse effect on child). The court remanded the case for further
fact finding on this issue and warned that the mother's conduct, rather than her sexual
orientation, must be contrary to the child's best interests. Id.
248. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that
court's duty is to protect parent-child relationship and that court cannot discriminate against
homosexuals in so doing). The court held that the trial court acted in the best interests of
the child in allowing the father to visit with his children. Id.
249. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (Super. Ct. 1988) (calling upon
court system to eradicate AIDS-related discrimination, stigmatization, and hysteria by
repudiating personal attacks veiled as medical issues).
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
251. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(6) (1995).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Zaslow, supra note 239, at 81.
255. Id. (warning that "exigent circumstances" should be strictly limited to those two
situations).
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him or her unable to meet the child's everyday needs, 256 and the rare
situation where the parent becomes a threat to himself or herself, or to
others."'
By reforming laws to serve the needs of HIV-infected parents, states
will serve a dual purpose. First, lawmakers will exhibit respect for these
parents and the obstacles they must face. In addition, reform in this area
will benefit all citizens in that state by protecting the future of its children.
IV. A FINAL RECOMMENDATION: COMPREHENSIVE HIV
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
To complement all of the aforementioned recommendations for
legislation, states must take one more vital step toward ensuring that the
rights of HIV-infected individuals receive the attention that they deserve.
Federal efforts to educate the public have failed as a whole,28 so state
governments must fill the gaps left by federal inaction and assume the
leadership role in this area.259
Many state governments acted quickly in the earlier years of the
epidemic to provide education to the public, and these efforts must continue,
but with some reforms.26 States must begin by ensuring that all education
programs provide a wide range of information.2 61 While prevention and
control measures obviously are important issues to cover, states also need
to include much more.262  Educating all citizens about the dangers of
discrimination will encourage prevention as well as ease the burdens of
256. Id. at 81-82 (outlining these circumstances and adding that parent still must retain
visitation rights to maximum extent practicable).
257. Id. at 82-83 (giving examples of situations where parent might lose custody,
including: parent who openly threatens to infect others; HIV-infected mother who continues
to breastfeed; one who knowingly fails to reduce risk of blood-to-blood contact; and one who
engages in sexual contact with child).
258. See Scott Burris, Education to Reduce the Spread of HIV, in AIDS LAW TODAY,
supra note 3, at 82 (characterizing federal education program as "halfhearted").
259. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13 (calling on all levels of
government to show leadership to combat AIDS crisis); Burris, supra note 258, at 89
(asserting that federal grants impose too many restrictions on content, which causes state and
local programs to be ineffective). To avoid such results, states must not only pass their own
legislation but also lobby the federal government to alleviate content restrictions placed on
these grants.
260. See Burris, supra note 258, at 94 (reporting that about one-third of the states have
required or encouraged education in the public school system).
261. See id. at 83 (discussing reducing the risk of contracting AIDS).
262. Id.
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people already living with HIV disease.263 In addition, states must teach
the principles of "universal precautions" to everyone in society, not just
workers with occupational risks of exposure, to avoid global infection.2 4
All education programs, but especially those directed toward minority
groups most affected by HIV disease, must work to empower these
individuals if their safety is to be ensured.265 States may do so by
requiring programs that advocate not only safer, but more communicative
sex, so that women can protect themselves more effectively, 266 and present
pictures of people living with, rather than dying of, HIN disease.267
Because the rise in adolescent and young adult transmission presently
endangers prevention efforts,268 states must pass comprehensive fIV
education legislation that reaches as many citizens as possible. Education
must begin in the public schools,269 but program administrators must
realize that young people need more than condoms. Schools must reach
these young people with realistic messages about responsible behaviors, and
the programs must take their social and cultural context into account.270
As mentioned, lIV infection is also increasing in young adults, and
states must do more than target high-risk groups if they intend to combat
AIDS-related discrimination. Because so many people living with HIV
disease are of working age, states must mandate workplace education
programs.71 State governments must set an example for private employ-
263. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 12 (characterizing reduction of
discrimination one of cornerstones for all programs).
264. See Field, supra note 72, at 80 (arguing for "universal precautions" to avoid risk
of global infection).
265. See Burris, supra note 258, at 87 (contending that "HIV is not spread simply by
ignorance or carelessness or bad luck, but also by powerlessness, shame, racism and
mistrust").
266. See Kurth, supra note 194, at 18 (asserting that empowerment of women will lead
to safer sex because they will communicate better with their partners).
267. Phyllis Arnold, Betwixt and Between: Adolescents and HIV, in AIDS AGENDA,
supra note 2, at 41, 43 (stressing the importance of including this information in adolescent
programs).
268. Main Killer, supra note 27, at A2 (providing statistics on the growing incidence
of the virus among young adults).
269. See Arnold, supra note 267, at 43 (warning that education efforts will fail unless
the needs of young adults are addressed).
270. Burris, supra note 258, at 86.
271. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (noting Philadelphia ordinance which requires employees to
educate individuals in workplace). This program requires employers with three or more
employees to hold education programs, run by senior management officials. Id. Employers
who do not comply are fined up to $300 per employee. Id, States could follow the
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ers by educating their own workers to encourage more compassionate
responses to people living with HIV disease and to prevent further
transmission. The federal government's limited commitment to HIV
education includes an HIV education program for federal employees, and
states must follow suit.22
States also must reach those who are not public school students or
members of the private or public work forces. Campaigns to educate the
general public must continue because many people still think they are not
at risk.273 State governments must work even harder to dispel these
unwarranted, incredibly dangerous assumptions through more publicity in a
medium available to the public.274
While many governments and organizations concentrate on educating
the public before they become infected, they often forget the importance of
educating those already living with HIV disease. As more women, children,
and people of color become infected, state governments will need to adopt
new strategies of education. In addition to providing psychological
counseling and information about prevention, states need to give HIV-
infected individuals information about housing, estate planning, and public
medical benefits during post-test counseling.275 Numerous community-
based organizations provide a wealth of services to the HIV-positive, but the
very people who can benefit from these services often are unaware that the
programs exist.
276
Providing effective HIV education programs will require state
legislative efforts to empower individuals living with HIV disease. States
must coordinate existing programs to provide education as well as adequate
health care, housing, drug treatment programs, and a society free of
unwarranted discrimination. In reality, such solutions are costly and require
vast changes on the part of all citizens, but they are necessary to show
individuals living with HIV disease the respect they deserve from the
government and society as a whole.
Philadelphia plan in creating a model for workplace education programs.
272. See Hilts, supra note 6, at Al, A9.
273. See Berge, supra note 65, at 779-81 (examining attitudes of average, middle-class
Americans about their chances of transmission).
274. See generally Burris, supra note 258, at 89-90 (discussing ways in which National
Aids Information and Education Program informs public of HIV).
275. See Kurth, supra note 194, at 16-17 (imploring that HIV-infected women need
more than just medical attention); Zavos, supra note 195, at 140 (explaining that women
living with HIV disease often do not make wills because they cannot afford attorney).
276. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 11 (asking that these organizations
receive acknowledgement and support).
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V. CONCLUSION
HIV-infected individuals are living with, not dying of, the disease, and
states must remember that important fact when making decisions that affect
them. Even though HIV disease became a part of our culture over ten years
ago,277 discrimination persists that haunts these individuals every day of
their limited lives. Legislators, however, have the power to control such
unwarranted reactions by passing laws that comport with federal disability
discrimination measures and by mandating educational programs that reach
as many citizens as possible. Because of HIV disease's novelty and
unpredictability, many existing laws are inadequate to meet the needs of
those living with HIV disease. States must consider creative measures, such
as those discussed here, to accommodate their special situations. Mary
Fisher, an outspoken AIDS advocate living with HIV disease, has called
upon people worldwide to adopt a "language of hope which affirms
life"27 and to recognize that FHV-infected people are indeed living with,
rather than dying of, HIV disease. State legislatures must heed her firsthand
advice before it is too late.
277. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing the genesis of HIV disease
in the United States).,
278. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting Mary Fisher).
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It is designed to break your heart. The game begins in the spring, when
everything else begins again, and it blossoms in the summer, filling the
afternoons and evenings, and leaves you to face the fall alone. You
count on it, rely on it to buffer the passage of time, to keep the memory
of sunshine and high skies alive, and then just when the days are all
twilight, when you need it most, it goes ... and summer is gone.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other sport invokes more emotion, memories, or love in the
United States than baseball. It is almost as old as the United States itself,
and is firmly rooted in the fabric of our society. It is one of the few
subjects that a ten-year-old orphan can discuss with the same level of
proficiency as a sixty-five-year-old brain surgeon. History and tradition
have passed it down through generations, and in many respects the history
of baseball mirrors the history of our country. Sociological issues such as
* Associate, The Kohm Law Office, Virginia Beach, Virginia. B.S., 1987, Syracuse
University; M.S., 1991, State University of New York at Oswego; J.D., 1995, Regent
University School of Law. Mr. Kohm is also a Sports and Entertainment Representative.
While at Syracuse University, he was a member of the basketball team. The author would
like to acknowledge the support of his wife, Lynne, for her help in writing this article.
1. A. Bartlett Giamatti, The Green Fields of the Mind, YALE ALUMNI MAG. & J., Nov.
1977, at 9.
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immigration, segregation, racism, the struggle between labor and manage-
ment, and self governance have played a part in both the American
experience and the history of the game of baseball.
Almost incredibly, though, for the first time since 1904, the 1994
season did not have a World Series. On August 12, 1994, the baseball
season was interrupted by its eighth work stoppage when the Major League
Baseball Players Association, the union that represents the players and team
owners, failed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. There
was anger, disgust, and finger pointing by both sides, and the prevalent
sentiments of the fans were resentment and sadness.
Protracted negotiations continued through the spring of 1995 with no
foreseeable collective bargaining agreement in sight. The owners were
determined to play a 1995 season, and with the lone exception of the
Baltimore Orioles, each franchise fielded teams of non-union players.2 The
1995 season began with the actual players only because two days before
opening day an injunction was issued by the United States District Court
which forced the owners to begin the season under the rules of the expired
collective bargaining agreement.3 Even though the season began with the
real players, none of the issues which contributed to the latest work stoppage
were resolved. There is still no existing collective bargaining agreement,
which leaves open the possibility that the current season may still be
interrupted.
During the seven-month strike, many suggested that baseball would
somehow be better off, and these types of problems would not emerge, if
professional baseball were to lose its judicially created exemption from
federal antitrust laws. By subjecting the owners to the same regulations as
other industries, many argue that the actions and behavior of the owners
would be less conducive to the hostility which has had a history of creating
strife with the players.
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether that is really true. Is
a judicial or legislative repeal of this exemption the panacea that will restore
Major League Baseball to its rightful place as one of our national treasures?
The first part of this paper will examine the history and scope of baseball's
judicially created exemption from antitrust laws, followed by an examination
of the effect of a repeal on certain components of the game such as
labor/management issues, franchise relocation, and the minor leagues.
2. Hal Bodley, Players to Return, U.S.A. TODAY, April 3, 1995, at IC.
3. Id.
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IM. HISTORY OF THE JUDICIALLY CREATED EXEMPTION TO
ANTITRUST LAW
There has been much recent speculation about the inception of baseball
and who really invented it. Legend says the game of baseball was invented
in the sleepy upstate New York village of Cooperstown by Abner Double-
day around 1840. Another theory is that the early form of baseball played
in the United States was a version of the English game known as "Roun-
ders.' 4  Still others have attributed the birth of baseball to a fraternal
organization known as the New York Knickerbockers Club during the 1840s
in New York City.' Whatever its origins, baseball's popularity grew at a
rapid pace, and it soon became one of the most fashionable forms of
recreation in the country.
Towns and cities began to field their own teams, and with enthusiastic
followings, traveled to other towns to play games. Larger cities began to
form leagues.6 But due to the escalating competitiveness of the contests,
corruption soon followed. During the 1860s baseball went through a
transition period from amateurism to professionalism In order to attract
the best players, businesses that sponsored teams began to entice players
with jobs and money.' In 1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings became the
first professional baseball team, in that each player received a salary.9
Other professional teams soon formed, and the result was that on March
17, 1871, the National Association of Professional Baseball Players was
formed." While this league contained many of the best teams in the
country, it was controlled by the players.'" Consequently, there was little
discipline, little organization, gambling, drunkenness, and players who would
jump from team to team in mid-season for more money. 2 These factors
combined to lead to the league's demise after the 1875 season.
3
In 1876, however, the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs
was formed by Chicago businessman William Hulbert.' 4 Hulbert believed
4. HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS 5 (1960).
5. TOTAL BASEBALL 7 (John Thorn et al. eds., 1989).
6. SEYMOUR, supra note 4, at 35.
7. Id. at 47.
8. Id.
9. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 8.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Idc
12. Md
13. Id. at 9.
14. SEYMOUR, supra note 4, at 80. This is the same national league that exists today.
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it was possible to apply business principles to baseball and turn a profit by
having team owners, not the players, control the league. 5 League bylaws
mandated strict control over the players. Players under contract with one
national league team were prohibited from playing with another national
league club until their original contract concluded.16 In addition, players
who tried to jump to other clubs without the permission of their original
team were blacklisted because the rules prohibited a league team from
employing a player who had broken any league rules. 7
But even with these restrictive terms governing the League, the owners
still needed to reduce expenses, and the greatest League expense was the
players' salaries. They discovered that the competition among themselves
in trying to secure the services of the better players was responsible for
inflating salaries. This problem resulted in the inception of what is
commonly known as the "reserve clause." The owners secretly agreed to
reserve a certain number of players on each roster, and it was agreed that
none of the other owners would bid for or solicit the services of any other
teams' reserved players."
In 1887, the reserve clause was inserted into the uniform contract
signed by all players. 9 The impact of the reserve clause was that it made
each player property of his respective team in perpetuity, one year at a time.
Once a player signed with a team, he was the property of that team for the
duration of his career. The player could be traded or released at the
discretion of the team. If the player chose to hold out, other clubs were
prohibited from employing him.
With the power of the reserve clause and the exploding popularity of
the game, Major League Baseball established itself as a premier entertain-
15. Id. One of the original team owners, A.G. Spaulding, said:
The idea was as old as the hills; but its application to Base Ball had not yet been
made. It was, in fact, the irrepressible conflict between Labor and Capital
asserting itself under a new guise. . . . Like every other form of business
enterprise, Base Ball depends for results on two interdependent divisions, the one
to have absolute control and direction of the system, and the other to en-
gage-always under the executive branch-the actual work production.
Id. (alteration in original).
16. l at 82.
17. Id.
18. SEYMOUR, supra note 4, at 108.
19. LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW, § 2.1 (1977). The clause
states: "It is further understood and agreed that the party of the first part [the team] shall
have the right to 'reserve' the said party of the second part [the player] for the season next
ensuing the term mentioned in paragraph 2, herein provided." Ma
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ment industry by the early part of the twentieth century. In an effort to cash
in on baseball's increasing popularity, the rival Federal League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs commenced its inaugural season with eight teams in
March of 1913.20 It tried to raid the rosters of the American2 and
National League teams, but because of the threat of being blacklisted, few
players defected to the new league.' In addition, the Federal League was
not as well financed as the American and National Leagues.' Recognizing
its bleak outlook, the Federal League sued the National and American
Leagues on January 5, 1915, claiming that the reserve clause was an
unreasonable and illegal restraint on competition.24 The case was tried
before Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who would later be named by the
owners as baseball's first Commissioner.' After deliberating eleven
months, Judge Landis had not rendered a verdict.26 Faced with mounting
financial pressures, the Federal League settled out of court.27 Unhappy
with the out-of-court settlement, the owner of the Baltimore franchise filed
suit against Major League Baseball in what would be the first of a trilogy
of cases to reach the Supreme Court regarding professional baseball's
subjection to antitrust regulation."
Congress had passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 for the purpose
of preventing business practices which create monopolies.29 The provisions
of the Sherman Act which have historically been used by those trying to
eliminate baseball's exemption from antitrust laws are sections 1 and 2.
Section 1 makes it illegal to contract or conspire to restrain commerce
20. Il § 1.2.
21. The American League played its first season in 1901. The League resulted from the
National League dropping four of its twelve teams in 1900. Those four teams combined with
a strong minor league, named The Western League, for a total of eight original teams.
TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 17.
22. HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 206 (1971).
23. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 644.
24. SOBEL, supra note 19, at 3.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
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among the states.30 Monopolies or attempts to monopolize trade or
commerce among the states are prohibited by section 2.31
At issue in its suit against professional baseball, 32 the Baltimore Club
alleged three things. First, it was alleged that under section 1 of the
Sherman Act the reserve clause in the uniform player contract was an illegal
33restraint on commerce. The fear of being blacklisted by the American
and National Leagues prevented players from joining the Federal League.
Second, it was alleged that under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the reserve
clause allowed the American and National Leagues to monopolize the trade
and commerce of baseball.34  Lastly, the Baltimore Club claimed that
because of professional baseball's size, popularity, profits, and interdepen-
dence of one team on another for league play, the operations of the National
and American Leagues constituted interstate trade and commerce.35
The jury awarded the Baltimore Club $240,000 in damages.36 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded the
case with instructions to enter judgment for the National League.37 On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision.38 In his opinion, Justice
Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, wrote that although players were
required to cross state lines in order to participate in the games, "the
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. 39  Justice Holmes
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). A selected portion of the statute provides:
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony....
Id.
31. MaI § 2. A selected portion of the statute provides, "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine, or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Id.
32. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920), affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), reh'g granted, 42
S.Ct. 587 (1922).
33. Id. at 687.
34. Id. at 686.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 682.
37. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 269 F. at 688.
38. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
39. Id. at 209.
1236 [Vol. 20
217
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Kohm
reasoned that the games, even though they were played for money, "would
not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those
words."4 Since baseball was not trade or commerce, it was not subject to
antitrust laws. Justice Holmes, having held that the games were not trade
or commerce, did not discuss the Baltimore Club's arguments regarding the
reserve clause in the uniform player contract or its belief that the reserve
clause effected a monopoly of the best players by the National and
American Leagues. The game and business of baseball, as played and
conducted by the National and American Leagues, received a broad and
sweeping exemption from antitrust law. This decision was not limited in
scope to specifics such as the reserve clause or player restraints.
No serious challenge to baseball's antitrust exemption materialized
again until 1948 in Gardella v. ChandlerY4 Danny Gardella played for the
New York Giants minor league organization during the 1944 and 1945
seasons.42 In 1946, he and several other players left organized baseball in
the United States and played in the Mexican professional league.43 In an
effort to discourage other players from doing the same, the owners agreed
that any player who left to play in the Mexican league would be suspended
from professional baseball in the United States for five years.' Gardella
filed an antitrust suit against Albert "Happy" Chandler, the Commissioner
of Baseball, and the American and National Leagues, alleging that because
radio and television broadcasts transmitted games across state lines, the
leagues were engaged in interstate commerce, and thus should be subject to
antitrust regulations.45 Major League Baseball moved to dismiss the action
and the district court agreed, relying on the authority of Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.46
Judge Frank wrote that baseball was engaged in interstate commerce,
"because the defendants have lucratively contracted for the interstate
communication by radio and television of the playing of games."47 Shortly
40. 1&
41. 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), rev'd, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
42. l at 261.
43. Id. at 262.
44. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 645.
45. Gardella, 79 F. Supp. at 262.
46. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
47. ML at 410.
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after this decision, Gardella reportedly was paid $60,000 by Major League
Baseball to not pursue his case any further.48
It was the enterprise of baseball as a whole that the court found to be
subject to antitrust laws.49 The court examined certain elements of the
industry, such as the travel, league structure, reserve clause, and ultimately
the broadcasting.50 In analyzing the combination of these components, it
was baseball in the aggregate which the court determined was subject to
antitrust law. In discussing the reserve clause, Judge Frank wrote that it
"results in something resembling peonage of the baseball player."'"
Shortly thereafter, perhaps encouraged by the result in Gardella,
another player mounted a challenge against baseball's antitrust exemption
in Toolson v. New York Yankees.52 George Toolson was an outfielder in
the New York Yankees minor league organization. Unable to make the
Yankees, he was assigned to their Binghamton, New York, affiliate, but
refused to report.53 He was placed on the ineligible list by the Yankees,
and the team refused to allow him to play with any other organization.54
Toolson filed an antitrust suit against the Yankees alleging that professional
baseball had monopolized the trade and commerce of baseball and that by
broadcasting games by radio and television, Major League Baseball was
engaged in interstate commerce." The district court dismissed the suit for
two reasons. First, the court felt bound by the Supreme Court's decision in
Federal Baseball.56 Second, the court believed it had a "clear duty to
endeavor to be a judge and should not assume the function of a pseudo
legislature. '"57
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, "[o]n the grounds and for
the reasons stated" in the district court's opinion.58 Then on November 9,
48. SOBEL, supra note 19, at 19.
49. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 409.
50. Id.
51. Iad
52. 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 346
U.S. 356 (1953).
53. Id. at 93. The New York Yankee outfield in 1951 consisted of Hank Bauer, Gene
Woodling, and Joe DiMaggio. Also in the Yankee organization was a minor leaguer named
Mickey Mantle.
54. hi
55. Id. at 94.
56. Id.
57. Toolson, 101 F. Supp. at 95.
58. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 200 F.2d 198, 199 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 346 U.S.
356 (1953).
1238 [Vol. 20
219
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Kohm
1952, in a one-paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, stating,
"[w]e think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application
to it of the antitrust laws, it should be by legislation." 9  The Court
believed that if antitrust laws were to be applied to baseball, it was
Congress' and not the Court's responsibility to do so. But for the purpose
of examining the scope of this judicially enacted exemption from antitrust
law, the most important part of the opinion is the last sentence. The Court
wrote:
Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below
are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs so far as that decision
determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.'
Thus, the industry of baseball, as a whole, had again, courtesy of the
Supreme Court of the United States, received a broad exemption from
antitrust laws.
The issue of baseball's exemption from antitrust laws remained dormant
until the St. Louis Cardinals traded outfielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia
Phillies at the conclusion of the 1969 season. Unhappy about the trade,
Flood sent a letter to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn stating, "I am not a piece
of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes," and asked the
Commissioner to declare him a free agent for the upcoming season so he
could negotiate with any other major league team.6' Kuhn refused,
resulting in a lawsuit against himself, the teams, and the owners, in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.62 The
issue in Flood v. Kuhn was similar to those in the previous cases, in that
Flood contended that the reserve system constituted a conspiracy among the
teams and owners which prevented him from playing with any other
team.63 The district court found that Federal Baseball and Toolson were
controlling, and judgment was entered on behalf of Major League Base-
ball. 4 The court of appeals affirmed. 6
59. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 646.
62. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
63. Id. at 272.
64. Id. at 280.
65. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the
lower courts.6 The opinion by Justice Blackmun constitutes one of the
more entertaining opinions in Court history.67 The rationale of the Court
in affirming the decisions of the lower courts were three-fold. First, the
Court noted that in relation to other sports, the exemption granted to
baseball in Federal Baseball and Toolson was an "aberration confined to
baseball. 68 In addition, this aberration was "fully entitled to the benefit
of stare decisis.69 The Court also recognized that the reserve clause was
an important part of baseball's structure, and any judicial attempt to
eliminate or modify it may upset league balance.70  Finally, the Court
echoed the sentiments of Toolson, concluding that it was the responsibility
of Congress, and not the courts, to include baseball within the scope of
federal antitrust laws.71
But the importance of the decision is found in the first line of the
opinion which reads, "[f]or the third time in 50 years the Court is asked
specifically to rule that professional baseball's reserve system is within the
reach of federal antitrust laws."72 The issue and discussions in the case
66. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
67. Id. at 261-64. Justice Blackmun's opinion begins with a nostalgic look at the history
of baseball, as well as references to and excerpts from classic baseball literature such as
Ernest L. Thayer's Casey at the Bat and Franklin Pierce Adams' Tinker to Evers to Chance.
In addition, Justice Blackmun wrote, "[t]hen there are many names, celebrated for one
reason or another, that have sparked the diamond and its environs and have provided tinder
for recaptured thrills for reminiscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipation
in-season and off-season." Id. at 262. He then proceeded to individually list 88 of baseball's
greatest players. Id. at 262-63.
68. ld at 282.
69. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
70. lia at 283.
71. Id at 285.
72. Id. at 259. The reserve clause, as it read in the Uniform Player Contract at the time
of Flood, provided:
On or before January 15 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding business day)
of the year next following the last playing season covered by this contract, the
Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term of that year by mailing the
same to the Player at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be
given, then at his last address of record with the Club. If prior to the March 1
next succeeding said January 15, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon
the terms of such contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the
Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player at said address to renew
this contract for the period of one year on the same terms, except that the
amount payable to the Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said notice;
provided, however, that said amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be
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centered on the legality of the reserve system. The tone of Flood appeared
to narrow the issue from baseball as an industry, and in a broad sense being
exempt from federal antitrust laws, to the reserve clause and its role in the
industry of baseball. In support of the contention that baseball's exemption
from antitrust laws should be limited to the reserve clause, Justice Blackmun
specifically wrote: "Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in
interstate commerce. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the
federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and
an anomaly. 73
In summary, the trilogy of Supreme Court cases has provided baseball
with an exemption from federal antitrust laws. Federal Baseball and
Toolson have held that this exemption applied to baseball as a whole. The
Court in Flood also held that baseball has an exemption from antitrust laws,
but the scope of this exemption appeared to have been narrowed to just the
reserve clause of the Uniform Player Contract. Therefore, as will be
discussed below, both in theory and in reality, a legislative repeal would
have little effect on labor/management issues, franchise relocation, or the
minor leagues.
1II. THE IRRELEVANCY OF FLOOD V. KUHN
Advances in collective bargaining have given players mobility through
free agency that were not available to them when Flood was decided. Major
league players who now have more than six years experience are eligible for
free agency which allows them to offer their services to the highest bidding
team.74 In addition, subsequent litigation regarding franchise relocation
allows the judiciary to further erode whatever was left of baseball's antitrust
exemption after Flood.75
As discussed above, the reserve clause was the result of the owners'
recognition that the stability of the game rested on a secure labor force and
controlling costs. Its institution prohibited players from jumping teams
based on which owner would offer the player the most money. Predictably,
the players opposed the reserve clause, and on October 22, 1885, formed the
an amount payable at a rate not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the
preceding year.
Id. at 260-61 n.1.
73. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
74. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 631.
75. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players in an attempt to unionize.76
At one point, the Brotherhood had a membership of ninety players, and its
president was New York Giant John Montgomery Ward.77 The Brother-
hood's existence was short-lived as it disbanded in 1891 for financial
reasons, without making any serious gains on behalf of the players.7"
Federal Baseball held that baseball was not subject to federal antitrust
law. While this decision was disheartening to the players in terms of
antitrust law, it was also detrimental in terms of labor law. The right of
employees to unionize and to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing is found in section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act.79 The Act applies to all employers that affect commerce, with the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") as the instrumentality to enforce
the Act.80  By application, since baseball was not considered interstate
commerce, Federal Baseball prohibited the players from bringing labor
disputes before the NLRB. Any advances on behalf of the players would
have to be gained through negotiation or collective bargaining agree-
ments.8'
Following only marginal success in the areas of salaries, pensions and
other issues, in December of 1953 the players formed the Major League
Baseball Players Association, which still exists as the players' formal
union. 2 Minor concessions were made on behalf of the owners, but it was
not until 1966 when the players hired former Chief Economic Advisor and
Assistant to the President of the United Steelworkers of America, Marvin
Miller, to be the Association's Executive Director, that the players gained
any substantial concessions.8 3 Miller was responsible for negotiating
76. SEYMOUR, supra note 4, at 221.
77. lL at 223. John Montgomery Ward was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in
1964 as an outstanding shortstop and pitcher. During his playing career with the Giants, he
went to night school at Columbia Law School, graduating with honors. TOTAL BASEBALL,
supra note 6, at 642.
78. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, SPORTS LAW § 6.1 (1986).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156 (1994).
81. Pittsburgh Pirate and Hall of Famer Ralph Kiner approached General Manager
Branch Rickey about a raise after Kiner had hit 47 home runs the preceding season even
though the Pirates had finished in last place. Rickey's response was "[w]e could have
finished last without you." TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 632.
82. SCHUBERT, supra note 78, § 6.1.
83. WALTER T. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 25.1 (1990). Long time
Brooklyn Dodger announcer Red Barber once commented, "[w]hen you speak of Babe Ruth,
he is one of the two men, in my opinion, who changed baseball the most. And the second
most influential man in the history of baseball is Marvin Miller." MARVIN MILLER, A
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baseball's first collective bargaining agreement in 1968 and for negotiating
others in subsequent years.84
Another important development on behalf of the players occurred in
1969 when the NLRB decided to assert jurisdiction over the baseball
industry."5 As noted above, the NLRB is the instrumentality that polices
the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act, which applies to all
business affecting interstate commerce. Prior to 1969, the NLRB had
refused to assert jurisdiction over labor matters in baseball because of the
holdings in Federal Baseball and Toolson.16 This decision by the NLRB
was the result of a petition filed on behalf of the National League Um-
pires. 7 The impact of this holding upon the Major League Baseball
Players Association was that they would now be protected by federal labor
laws.
While the players made gains in labor law and collective bargaining,
the exempted reserve clause was about to receive a damaging blow. The
Collective Bargaining Agreement of 1973 contained a provision in which an
independent arbitrator would make decisions in a formalized grievance
procedure. 8 It would be the arbitration venue, not the courts, that would
eliminate the reserve clause.
Pitcher Andy Messersmith signed a one-year contract to play for the
Los Angeles Dodgers in 1974.89 The reserve clause at that time read:
If prior to March 1, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the
terms of the Contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the
Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player to renew this
contract for the period of one year.90
The Dodgers renewed Messersmith's contract at the completion of the 1974
season and he played the 1975 season without signing a new contract.9'
At the conclusion of the 1975 season, Messersmith asserted that he was a
free agent, at liberty to negotiate with any team for the upcoming season.92
WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME (1989) (back cover).
84. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 372.
85. CHAMPION, supra note 83, § 25.1.
86. Ud
87. Id.
88. Id. § 25.3.
89. IM § 25.4.
90. BILL JAMES, HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 263 (1988).
91. Id
92. CHAMPION, supra note 83, § 25.4.
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The crux of Messersmith's argument was that the Dodgers had renewed
the contract for one year and now that one year had concluded. The owners
believed, as they had since its inception, that the reserve clause meant one
year, and then the next year, and on into perpetuity. The issue between the
two sides, however, was not the clause's legality, for that had already been
decided in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases. The issue, rather, was the
construction of the clause.
The formalized grievance procedure outlined in the governing collective
bargaining agreement provided for a three-person arbitration panel with one
member chosen by the Major League Baseball Players Association, one
member chosen by the owners, and one member chosen by both.93 Not
surprisingly, the partisan votes of Marvin J. Miller representing the players,
and John J. Gaherin representing the owners, cancelled each other's vote,
and the issue was essentially decided by an independent arbiter, Peter
Seitz.94 Seitz's interpretation of the clause was that teams were able to
renew the contract for only one year.95
The collective bargaining agreement negotiated just six months after the
Messersmith case contained a memorable provision. As a result of the
Messersmith decision, any player with six or more years of major league
service would now be able to declare himself a free agent.96 Through
gains won in collective bargaining, most notably the right to arbitration, the
players were able to accomplish what they could not do through the courts.
As discussed earlier, it appears that the last of the Supreme Court cases,
Flood, held that baseball's antitrust exemption was limited in its scope to
the reserve clause. Under the recently expired collective bargaining
agreement, players were eligible to become free agents after six years of
major league service and were not the property of teams for the duration of
their careers. This, coupled with the Flood holding and subsequent litigation
to be discussed below, have rendered any remaining antitrust exemption
practically irrelevant.
IV. THE LABOR EXEMPTION ISSUE
Any judicial or legislative repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption
would also be of very limited value to the players regarding any judicial
recourse against the owners because of certain labor exemptions in antitrust
93. Id
94. ld
95. Id
96. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 631.
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law. Under antitrust law, there exist certain statutory and non-statutory
exemptions from antitrust sanctions for terms negotiated and agreed to in
collective bargaining agreements.
As discussed above, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890 for the purpose of preventing practices which create monopolies or
illegally restrain interstate commerce. Shortly thereafter, in the Danbury
Hatters' case, the Supreme Court held that a union's effort to organize a hat
factory by means of strikes and boycotts violated antitrust law, in that they
were illegal conspiracies on trade.97 To remedy this, Congress passed the
National Labor Relations Act,98 which gave workers the right to organize
and select representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment. Additional legislation by Congress has declared that the
activities of labor unions are not subject to antitrust sanctions.99 These are
the statutory labor exemptions. The purpose of this legislation is to foster
collective bargaining between labor and employers without one side
claiming the other is engaging in activity violative of antitrust law.
In addition, through the development of case law, a nonstatutory labor
exemption has been created which covers the terms of collective bargaining
agreements between labor and management. 1° The nonstatutory labor
exemption to federal antitrust law protects the terms and conditions of
collective bargaining agreements from antitrust attack by either labor or
management. Regarding professional sports, the landmark case outlining the
concept of the nonstatutory labor exemption is Mackey v. National Football
League.' The issue in that case was the legality of the "Rozelle
Rule."' The Rozelle Rule, named after National Football League
Commissioner, Pete Rozelle, provided that when a player's contract expired
and the player signed with a new team, the new team had to provide the
player's former team with compensation, either in the form of an additional
player or players, money, or a draft pick. 3 If the teams could not agree
on the form of compensation, Commissioner Rozelle then made the
determination of what he thought would be fair and equitable, and that
decision would be binding on both teams."
97. Lawlor v. Leowe, 235 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1915).
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
100. CHAMPION, supra note 83, § 26.2.
101. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. at 610.
104. Id.
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The complaint against the NFL, filed by thirty-six players, alleged that
"the enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal combination and
conspiracy in restraint of trade denying professional football players the
right to freely contract for their services."'' 0 5 The players could make this
argument because in 1957, in Radovich v. National Football League,"° the
Supreme Court held that professional football was subject to federal antitrust
laws."W The NFL argued that it could not be subject to an attack under
antitrust laws because the Rozelle Rule was the product of the collective
bargaining agreement between the team owners and the National Football
League Players Association.0 8
The value of Mackey to baseball, and to any potential repeal of an
antitrust exemption, is not the outcome of the case; it is the court's analysis
and three-part test to determine when a nonstatutory labor exemption to
antitrust law applies. Initially, the court discussed the rationale of the
nonstatutory labor exemption claiming that it is necessary to "accommodate
the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets with
the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act. . . ." Then the court outlined a three-part test that
must be met before a nonstatutory labor exemption will be granted. First,
the alleged restraint on trade must primarily affect only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship.110 Second, the agreement seeking the
exemption must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."'
Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining in professional sports include
all issues which concern the terms and conditions of employment."'
Finally, a nonstatutory labor exemption will be granted if the agreement is
the product of bona fide arms length bargaining." 3
In Mackey, the court held that the collective bargaining agreement in
question was not the product of bona fide arm's length negotiations, and
therefore the Rozelle Rule was not exempt from antitrust suit by the
players.1 4  By application, if baseball's traditional exemption from
antitrust law were repealed, legislatively or judicially, the holding in Mackey
105. Id.
106. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
107. Id. at 452.
108. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
109. Id. at 611.
110. Id. at 614.
111. Id.
112. CHAMPION, supra note 83, § 25.2.
113. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
114. Id. at 616.
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is unfavorable to the players. If the actions of baseball's owners were
subject to antitrust law, they could conceivably seek protection from
antitrust attack by the players in the nonstatutory labor exemption.
For the players to be successful in any lawsuit filed against the owners,
the players would have to fail to meet any one of the three prongs of the
Mackey test. This would be a very difficult task for the players because
under the Mackey test, almost any issue the players would be litigating
would primarily affect the parties to the last collective bargaining agreement,
namely, the players and the owners. In addition, the legal issue the players
would be pursuing almost assuredly would be a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, in that it would affect the terms and conditions of
their employment. Finally, based on the long history of concessions earned
by the Major League Baseball Players Association in labor negotiations, it
would be difficult for the players to argue that the last collective bargaining
agreement was not the product of bona fide arms length bargaining. Based
on the above, the nonstatutory labor exemption would be a formidable
hurdle for the players in their attempt at legal recourse.
One of the contentious issues surrounding the most recent strike was
the owners' desire to control labor costs through the use of a "salary cap"
which would prohibit the payrolls of teams from exceeding a certain dollar
amount." 5 Fortunately for the players, if the owners were to implement a
salary cap before a new collective bargaining agreement is reached, by
applying the Mackey test, it is unlikely that the owners would benefit from
the nonstatutory exemption in an attempt by the players to enjoin this action
by the owners. This is because the owners would not be able to meet the
third prong of the Mackey test.
True, the implementation of a salary cap would primarily affect the
owners and the players, and it would certainly concern the terms and
conditions of employment of the players; however, the salary cap would not
be the product of bona fide arms length negotiation. The recently expired
collective bargaining agreement did not contain a salary cap, and the players
are currently obstinate in their opposition to a cap being included in any
new collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the nonstatutory labor
exemption would not protect the owners from antitrust attack if the owners
implemented a salary cap.
Another consideration is whether the nonstatutory labor exemption is
available to either side when the collective bargaining agreement has
115. Hal Bodley, NLRB Official Could be Pivotal Player, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 20, 1995,
at 3C.
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expired. This question was recently answered in National Basketball
Association v. Williams.116 In that case, the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the NBA's players and owners had expired June 23,
1994.7 The owners sued the players to continue to impose the league's
salary cap and draft of college players, which were both agreed to and
bargained for in the expired collective bargaining agreement." 8 It was the
owners' contention that they were able to continue the imposition of these
terms and that they were exempt from antitrust liability under the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption to the antitrust laws." 9 The players claimed that by
acting collectively to impose terms of employment after expiration date of
the collective bargaining agreement, the NBA teams were "acting as a cartel
and committing a per se violation of the Sherman Act."1" The issue was
what terms and conditions would govern the employment of the parties until
a new collective bargaining agreement could be reached, and whether the
imposition of the status quo was a violation of antitrust law.
2 1
The court held that it was acceptable for the owners to implement the
former terms and conditions of the expired collective bargaining agreement
until a new agreement was reached."z  By application, this case is
unfavorable to the baseball players. If the owners were to implement the
terms and conditions of the recently expired collective bargaining agreement,
Williams extends the nonstatutory labor exemption beyond the expiration of
the old agreement. As long as the terms and conditions were the same and
met the three-part test in Mackey, the owners would be shielded from
antitrust attack by the players.
In summary, any repeal of baseball's exemption would have minimal
impact in terms of what legal recourse would be available to the players
against the owners due to both the statutory and nonstatutory labor law
exemptions from antitrust law. The statutory exemptions found in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52, 104, 105, 113 provide that the activities of labor unions are protected
from antitrust sanctions. Similarly, as a result of case law, primarily
Mackey, certain nonstatutory exemptions exist if the discrepancy primarily
affects the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, and the agreement is the product of bona
116. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 686.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 687.
121. Williams, 45 F.3d at 688.
122. Id. at 693.
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fide arms length bargaining." Since these labor exemptions would
supersede antitrust law, the exemptions would provide a safe harbor for
owners from most activities that would normally be subject to antitrust
charges.
V. ANTITRUST EXEMPTON AND FRANCHISE RELOCATION
Another area where baseball's antitrust exemption has come under
scrutiny is in the area of franchise relocation. This issue recently manifested
itself when the San Francisco Giants were the subject of a controversial sale.
Two cases have emerged following the sale, and whatever was left of
baseball's exemption after Flood continues to be rendered even more
meaningless.
In 1988, Tampa, Florida financed the construction of a $138 million
domed stadium in the hopes of attracting a Major League Baseball
franchise." In conjunction with the building of this new stadium, a
group of investors organized for the purpose of purchasing the San
Francisco Giants from owner Robert Lurie and moving the team to
Tampa."z On August 6, 1992, the investors sent Lurie a letter of intent
offering to purchase the Giants for $115 million. In return, Lurie agreed not
to negotiate with other potential purchasers and to encourage Major League
Baseball to approve the sale. 26 One month later, Ed Kuhlmann, Chairman
of the Ownership Committee for Major League Baseball, instructed owner
Lurie to consider other offers to purchase the Giants. 27
Similarly, National League President Bill White invited another
individual to make an offer to buy the Giants, which was done, though the
offer was only $100 million." Both of these acts violated the exclusive
agreement between Lurie and the original investors. By a vote of nine to
four, the National League owners voted to reject approval of the sale to the
original investors, and litigation followed. 29
123. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
124. Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
287, 315 (1994).
125. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
126. Id. at 422.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Latour R. Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality of Major
League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1271 (1994).
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In Piazza v. Major League Baseball,' the plaintiffs constituted the
original investors tendering the offer for $115 million. In the suit, investor
Vincent Piazza claimed that Baseball had monopolized the market for teams,
and that Baseball had placed direct and indirect restraints on the purchase,
sale, transfer, relocation of, and competition for such teams.' Defendant
Major League Baseball ("Baseball") claimed they were exempt from liability
under the Sherman Act, and that Piazza failed to allege that Baseball's
actions restrained competition in a relevant market.' Piazza claimed he
was "competing in the team franchise market with other potential investors
located primarily outside of Major League Baseball for ownership of the
Giants, and that Baseball interfered directly and substantially with competi-
tion in that market."'
33
The court held that the market in this case was ownership in profes-
sional baseball teams."M More importantly, the court concluded "that the
antitrust exemption created by Federal Baseball is limited to baseball's
reserve system," and therefore rejected Baseball's claim that it was exempt
from antitrust liability. 35  In its analysis, the court distinguished the
market for the exhibition of baseball games from the market for the sale of
ownership interests in baseball teams. 36 By creating this dichotomy, the
trilogy of Supreme Court cases limits baseball's exemption to the market for
the exhibition of games. The holding by this court is consistent with the
holding in Flood which narrowed the scope of baseball's exemption from
the whole industry to just the reserve clause. 37
Additional litigation resulted from the Giants' sale, in Butterworth v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.1 31 When it became
evident that the San Francisco Giants would not be moving to Tampa, the
attorney general of Florida issued antitrust civil investigative demands to the
National League to investigate whether there was "[a] combination or
'conspiracy in the restraint of trade in connection with the sale and purchase
of the San Francisco Giants baseball franchise. '" 39 Baseball moved to set
aside the investigative demands based on its assertion that the business of
130. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
131. Id. at 424.
132. Id. at 429.
133. Id. at 430.
134. Id. at 439.
135. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
136. Id. at 440.
137. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
138. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
139. Id. at 1022.
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baseball owns a broad exemption from federal antitrust laws, which includes
decisions regarding the sale and location of franchises.' The attorney
general claimed that the exemption only applied to the reserve system.'
4
'
Relying on Piazza, the Supreme Court of Florida held that baseball's
antitrust exemption extended only to its reserve system and remanded the
case for trial on its merits. 42 Thus, all litigation concerning the sale of
the Giants has affirmed the narrow and limited scope of any exemption from
antitrust law owned by baseball. In theory, the owners could claim that the
exemption is necessary to insure the stability of league franchises. In
reality, based on Piazza and Butterworth, the courts have rendered any
existing exemption meaningless by narrowing its scope to the reserve clause.
As discussed earlier, collective bargaining has superseded the reserve
system, so in effect, baseball has no relevant exemption from antitrust laws.
VI. THE EFFECT ON THE MINOR LEAGUES OF AN ANITRUST
EXEMPTION REPEAL
Still another consideration of any repeal of Major League Baseball's
antitrust exemption is the effect it would have on the minor leagues. Cur-
rently, baseball's minor league teams are primarily affiliates of their
respective major league teams. 43 Each major league team is allowed one
team at the AAA level, the level closest in competition and skill to the
major leagues, and one team at the AA level, the next closest league to the
major leagues in terms of skill."4 Many teams operate more than one
team at the A and Rookie League level, the lowest rung on the minor league
ladder.' 45
The major leagues make a significant investment in their minor league
affiliates. According to Stanley Brand, Vice President of the Minor
League's governing body, Major League teams spend a total of $130 million
on their minor league operations.' 46 The parent major league clubs are
responsible for all spring training costs and almost all of the salaries of the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1023.
142. Id. at 1025.
143. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 663. There are some minor league teams that
operate independently of any major league affiliation.
144. Zimbalist, supra note 124, at 305.
145. Id.
146. Dave Anderson, Baseball's Best Remedy: A Repeal, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 18,
1994, at 15C.
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players and coaches of their minor league teams. 47 For its significant
investment, the minor leagues provide several valuable services to the major
leagues: they develop potential players, facilitate fan interest in future
players, spread fan base geographically, serve as a reservoir to replace
injured players, and, with antitrust implications, hoard all the available
player talent which prevents rival leagues from forming.
48
It is in this context of restraint on minor league players in which
antitrust consequences must be considered. As a result of the Messersmith
decision by arbitrator Peter Seitz and subsequent collective bargaining
agreements, major league players may become free agents after six years of
major league service. 149 Minor league players remain the property of their
major league organization until they have at least three years of minor
league service and are not listed on the forty-man major league roster.'50
Any repeal of an exemption would most likely lead to litigation similar to
the claims made by Curt Flood, who argued in his case that any restraint on
a player's ability to sell his services to the highest bidder was a result of a
conspiracy by owners to monopolize contracts. 5 '
Similarly, minor league players would be interested in the opportunity
to market their services to other organizations willing to pay more money.
Or, as in Toolson, a player may make a determination based on personnel
that he could reach the major leagues more quickly in a different organiza-
tion. Additional antitrust claims could be brought alleging that the amateur
draft, where teams are selected from the high school and college ranks to
compile their minor league rosters, constitutes a conspiracy in restraint of
trade by denying the drafted players the right to freely contract for their
services to the highest bidder.
Conversely, the argument for an exemption by Major League Baseball
is that the teams need some stability in their control over minor league
players. In other words, if a repeal of baseball's exemption limited the time
constraints on minor league players, the major league teams would have
little incentive to invest in players who are in their control for a short period
of time. Professional football and basketball draw all of their players from
the collegiate ranks. In effect, this makes college football and basketball the
147. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 663.
148. Zimbalist, supra note 124, at 304.
149. TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 5, at 634.
150. Ron Kroichick, Oakland Athletics, SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1994, at 41.
151. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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minor leagues for their respective sports. Major League Baseball almost
exclusively draws its talent from the minor leagues.'52
Based on the above, predicting the impact of a repeal on the minors is
difficult to do with any certainty. One extreme is a complete free-for-all,
where minor league players are able to play where and when they desire
based on the major league organization willing to pay the most money. The
other extreme is the status quo where the existing restraints on minor league
players constitute anticompetitive behavior where the players remain the
property of their organization until they become subject to the Rule 5 Draft,
complete six years of major league service, are traded, or are released. 153
Reality would lie somewhere in the middle. Major league organizations
would have less control over the time a minor league player would remain
in the organization. As a result, major league teams would be less likely to
subsidize their minor league affiliates at their current levels. Teams at the
AAA and AA levels are a necessities for major league teams. Because of
the skill level involved all players called up to major league rosters come
directly from these teams. As a result of the reluctance to spend money on
player development, however, few A level teams would remain.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the discussion regarding baseball's exemption from antitrust
laws constitutes much ado about nothing. An analysis of the series of
Supreme Court cases that created this exemption reveals that its scope has
been significantly narrowed. Federal Baseball and Toolson granted the
'baseball ifidustry a broad exemption from antitrust laws. Flood, on the other
hand, appears to have tapered the exemption to one component of the
industry, the reserve clause. Through Flood the Court upheld the legality
of the reserve clause and its anticompetitive effect of indenturing players to
a team for the duration of their career. However, advances in collective
bargaining have made the reserve clause irrelevant, because the players have
negotiated the right to free agency after six years of major league service.
The right to salary arbitration after three years of major league service
makes the six years of involuntary servitude before free agency more
tolerable.
152. Two notable exceptions regarding players who have gone straight to the majors
from college with no minor league experience are New York Yankee pitcher Jim Abbott, and
Toronto Blue Jay first baseman John Olerud.
153. All players who have at least three years of minor league service and who are not
listed on 40-man major league rosters are eligible to be drafted by any other organization.
1996] 1253
234
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
In addition, the value of a repeal and the availability of legal recourse
to enjoin anticompetitive activity by either side would be limited due to
exemptions in antitrust law. Terms of collective bargaining that primarily
affect the parties to the agreement, are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, and are the product of bona fide arms length bargaining, are
shielded from antitrust attack by either labor or management.
Regarding the issue of franchise relocation, the recent litigation
concerning baseball's antitrust exemption has confirmed Flood, in that the
exemption is limited to the reserve clause, and, thus, does not necessarily
apply to matters of franchise relocation. The implication of the results of
the litigation following the sale of the San Francisco Giants is that the
judiciary, perhaps for policy reasons, is likely to be more hostile to any
anticompetitive behavior on the part of Major League Baseball when making
franchise decisions.
Lastly, the effect of a repeal on the minor leagues would be difficult
to predict. Restraints on minor league players certainly would not be as
stringent as they are now which would result in a reluctance by major
league affiliates to subsidize their minor league counterparts. No drastic
changes, however, would materialize as the AAA and AA farm systems
would remain the same, as these levels would continue to be the reservoir
from where major league teams draw their players. Is the repeal of the
remaining antitrust exemption the answer for baseball? Obviously not. Any
repeal will be irrelevant and meaningless from this point onward. Quoting
a great philosopher: "It's deja vu all over again."'-'
154. While not trying to trivialize Yogi Berra's unforgettable statement, nothing could
be truer.
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I. DISCOVERY
A. Rules of Discovery
After many years of silence on the issue, the Supreme Court of Florida
has in recent years begun to develop a body of law respecting penalty phase
discovery. In May of 1995, the court proposed the following rule:1
RULE 3.202 EXPERT TESTIMONY OF MENTAL MITIGATION
DURING PENALTY PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIAL: NOTICE AND
EXAMINATION BY STATE EXPERT
(a) Notice of Intent to Present Expert Testimony of Mental
Mitigation. When in any capital case it shall be the intentiofi of the
defendant to present, during the penalty phase of the trial, expert
testimony of a mental health professional, who has tested, evaluated, or
examined the defendant, in order to establish statutory or nonstatutory
mental mitigating circumstances, the defendant shall give written notice
of intent to present such testimony.
(b) Time for Filing Notice; Contents. The defendant shall give
notice of intent to present expert testimony of mental mitigation no later
than 45 days before the guilt phase of the capital trial. The notice shall
contain a statement of particulars listing the statutory and nonstatutory
mental mitigating circumstances the defendant expects to establish
through expert testimony and the names and addresses of the mental
1. The impetus for the rule arose from Bums v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 606 n.8 (Fla.
1992), in which the court asked the Criminal Rules Committee to develop a procedure for
the state's mental evaluation of a defendant for capital sentencing purposes.
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health experts by whom the defendant expects to establish mental
mitigation, insofar as is possible.
(c) Appointment of State Expert; Time of Examination. After the
filing of such notice and on the motion of the state indicating its desire
to seek the death penalty, the court shall order that, within 48 hours
after the defendant is convicted of capital murder, the defendant be
examined by a mental health expert chosen by the, state. Attorneys for
the state and defendant may be present at the examination. The
examination shall be limited to those mitigating circumstances the
defendant expects to establish through expert testimony.
(d) Defendant's Refusal to Cooperate. If the defendant refuses to
be examined by or fully cooperate with the state's mental health expert,
the court may, in its discretion:
(1) order the defense to allow the state's expert to review all mental
health reports, tests, and evaluations by the defendant's mental health
expert; or
(2) prohibit defense mental health experts from testifying concerning
mental health tests, evaluations, or examinations of the defendant.2
In issuing this proposed rule,3 the court rejected a proposal by the Criminal
Rules Committee to clarify that rule 3.220, which ostensibly governs all
discovery in criminal cases, applies to death penalty proceedings. 4 Do
provisions of rule 3.220 concerning depositions, reports of experts, and the
like nevertheless apply to capital sentencing? The court did not say, except
2. Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220-Discovery (3.202-Expert
Testimony of Mental Mitigation During Penalty Phase of Capital Trial), 654 So. 2d 915, 916-
17 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter Amendments].
3. The court directed the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and other interested
parties to file comments by July 1, 1995. It also directed the Committee to consider
the need for 1) a rule requiring the defendant and the State to file a statement
of the issues to be tried in the penalty phase of a capital trial and 2) a pretrial
procedure, similar to summary judgment, that would allow the trial court to
determine whether the death penalty is an option based on the aggravating and
mitigating factors alleged to exist in a capital case.
Amendments, 654 So. 2d at 916. As to the first matter, the court has ruled in the past that
the state has no duty to disclose the aggravating circumstances it seeks to employ. E.g.,
Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 n.21 (Fla. 1979). As to the second, the court has
ruled that it would violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution for a
trial court to determine, before a trial, whether the state could seek the death penalty in the
event of a conviction. State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986).
4. Among other things, the Committee had proposed to amend rule 3.220 (a) to "make
the discovery rules applicable to the penalty phase of a capital trial." Amendments, 654 So.
2d at 915.
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to write in a footnote: "The proposed rule will not relieve the parties of the
continuing duty to disclose witnesses under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.220(j)."'
Respecting discovery in postconviction proceedings, the court addressed
the question of whether a judge may be subjected to discovery depositions
in State v. Lewis. The court held that where a rule 3.850 motion for
postconviction relief alleges improper actions by the trial judge, there may
be limited discovery depositions of the judge where "absolutely necessary."7
The court added that a judge has the power to limit his own deposition in
stating: "The judge may refuse to answer any question which the judge
deems intrusive."' In Asay v. Florida Parole Commission,9 the court held
that Brady v. Maryland,0 does not apply to clemency proceedings so that
clemency records need not be disclosed to death row inmates."
B. Grand Jury
Discovery of grand jury testimony has also been a matter of controver-
sy over the years. In Keen v. State,2 the court seemed to have resolved
the matter, ruling that the trial court erred by refusing to grant at least in
camera review of grand jury testimony of a witness who had initially said
the death of Michael Keen's wife was an accident, but later said that he and
Mr. Keen had murdered her. Relying on Dennis v. United States," and
Miller v. Wainwright,'4 the court wrote that, upon a showing of particular-
5. Id. at 916 n.1. The Committee's proposal would have amended rule 3.220 to provide
for separate witness lists for the guilt and penalty phases. IL
6. 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994).
7. Id. at 1250.
8. Il
9. 649 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 591 (1995).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense. Il at 86.
1I. In a related matter, the court amended Florida Bar Rule 4-1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information) by adding section (5)(e), which states: "Limitation of Amount of Disclosure.
When disclosure is mandated or permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information
than is required to meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule." The
Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 311 (Fla.
1994). Presumably, this new rule was to govern disclosure of attorney-client communications
in litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases.
12. 639 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1994).
13. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
14. 798 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied and judgment vacated by, 480 U.S. 901
(1987). The court also cited to Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 457
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ized need for access to grand jury testimony, 5 the trial court must turn
such testimony over to the defense.
6
During the survey period, the court rejected a claim under Keen in
Armstrong v. State,7 ruling that the trial court did not err in denying in
camera review of grand jury testimony where the defense failed to show its
materiality and failed to advise the court as to its possible usefulness.
II. THE PENALTY TRIAL
A. The Jury Sentencing Trial
In State v. Hernandez,8 the court resolved a nagging question
regarding the procedure for waiving the right to a jury sentencing proceed-
ing. In State v. Ferguson,9 the district court had held that under rule
3.260 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant could not
waive the sentencing jury without the state's consent.2" Hernandez
overruled Ferguson, and held that the trial court has discretion to proceed
to sentencing without a jury upon a knowing and intelligent waiver by the
defendant." It noted, however, that under Sireci v. State,2 the "trial
judge may require a jury recommendation notwithstanding the defendant's
waiver."' 3
B. Evidence and Argument
1. Hearsay
Section 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes provides the following
regarding evidence at death penalty sentencing proceedings:
U.S. 1111 (1982), without noting that Miller effectively overruled Jent. For the history of
this issue, see Gary Caldwell, Recent Florida Capital Decisions, 16 NOVA L. REv. 1357,
1362-64 (1992).
15. Under Miller, the defense shows a particularized need by demonstrating inconsisten-
cies between the deposition and trial testimony of a material witness. Miller, 798 F.2d at
429.
16. Keen, 639 So. 2d at 600 & n.4.
17. 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
18. 645 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1994).
19. 556 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 564 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. .1990).
20. Id. at 464.
21. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d at 435.
22. 587 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).
23. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d at 435.
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In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the
defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6). Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
any hearsay statements. 24
Somewhat surprisingly, the supreme court's decisions have interpreted the
statute to authorize the state's use of hearsay and to prevent the defense's
use of it.
As to the state's use of hearsay, the main case is Rhodes v. State,25 in
which the State presented the capital sentencing jury with evidence about an
offense committed by the defendant in Nevada. A police captain played a
taped interview of the Nevada victim, and gave hearsay testimony about the
statement. The supreme court ruled that the Confrontation Clause barred the
State's use of the taped statement,26 but then ruled that the State could use
the captain's hearsay testimony regarding the victim's statement, concluding
24. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1995).
25. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
26. Id. at 1204.
While hearsay evidence may be admissible in penalty phase proceedings, such
evidence is admissible only if the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements. The statements made by the Nevada victim came
from a tape recording, not from a witness present in the courtroom. In Engle
v. State, we stated:
The [S]ixth [A]mendment right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is a fundamental right which is made
obligatory on the states by the [Due Process Clause] of the [F]our-
teenth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution. The primary
interest secured by, and the major reason underlying the [C]onfron-
tation [C]lause, is the right of cross-examination. This right of
confrontation protected by cross-examination is a right that has been
applied to the sentencing process.
Obviously, Rhodes did not have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
this witness. By allowing the jury to hear the taped statement of the Nevada
victim describing how the defendant tried to cut her throat with a knife and the
emotional trauma suffered because of it, the trial court effectively denied Rhodes
this fundamental right of confronting and cross-examining a witness against him.
Under these circumstances if Rhodes wished to deny or explain this testimony,
he was left with no choice but to take the witness stand himself.
Id. (citations omitted).
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that because the defendant could cross-examine the captain, his hearsay
testimony was admissible.27
At to the defense's use of hearsay, the court wrote in Hitchcock v.
State:2
8
Hitchcock argues that, although the state's introducing hearsay in a
penalty proceeding is limited to that hearsay which a defendant is given
the opportunity to rebut, a defendant's ability to introduce hearsay is
unlimited. While the rules of evidence have been relaxed somewhat for
penalty proceedings, they have not been rescinded. We find no merit
to Hitchcock's claim that the state must abide by the rules but that
defendants need not do so. Additionally, even if admissible, the hearsay
statements would have been merely cumulative to other testimony about
Hitchcock's past.29
During the survey period, the court expressed some antipathy for
defense hearsay evidence in Griffin v. State0 and Wuornos v. State.3 In
Griffin, relying on Hitchcock, the court approved the trial court's refusal to
let the defense present evidence of the defendant's remorse and character.32
In Wuornos, without totally disapproving the defense's use of hearsay, the
court ruled that the trial court did not err in failing to find in mitigation facts
presented via hearsay: "The vast bulk of the case for mitigation was
hearsay. While hearsay can be admissible in the penalty phase, we cannot
conceive that there is any absolute duty for the trial court to accept it in
mitigation where, as here, the State's rebuttal established strong indicia of
unreliability."33
In Henry v. State,34 the court found no error in the State's presentation
of hearsay in the form of a transcript of the testimony of a witness at the
trial leading to Henry's conviction of a prior violent felony.
27. Il
28. 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), judgment vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
29. Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
30. 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1317 (1995).
31. 644 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995).
32. Griffin, 639 So. 2d at 970.
33. Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1020.
34. 649 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2591 (1995).
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2. Treatment of Mitigation
In three cases, the court seemed to express three different views about
opinion evidence presented in mitigation. In Walls v. State,35 Justice
Kogan wrote for the court:
36
Eighth, Walls contends that the trial court improperly rejected
expert opinion testimony that he was suffering extreme emotional distur-
bance and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the law's
requirements was substantially impaired. In Florida as in many states,
a distinction exists between factual evidence or testimony, and opinion
testimony. As a general rule, uncontroverted factual evidence cannot
simply be rejected unless it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustwor-
thy, unreasonable, or contradictory. This rule applies equally to the
penalty phase of a capital trial.
Opinion testimony, on the other hand, is not subject to the same
rule. Certain kinds of opinion testimony clearly are admissible-and
especially qualified expert opinion testimony-but they are not
necessarily binding even if uncontroverted. Opinion testimony gains its
greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its
weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking. A debatable
link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually
means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve. We
cannot conclude that the evidence here was anything more than
debatable. Accordingly, this Court may not revisit the judge and jury's
determination on appeal.37
In a footnote to the opinion the court stated:
Reasonable persons could conclude that the facts of the murder are
inconsistent with the presence of the two mental mitigators. Moreover,
all the experts hedged their statements, gave equivocal responses, or
responded to questions that themselves were equivocal. The psychiatrist
said he could not testify as to Walls' state of mind at the time of the
murder. One psychologist responded yes to a question that essentially
only asked whether Walls was suffering any impairment at the time of
the murder. The facts may be consistent with some degree of emotional
impairment, which the trial court surely recognized in finding emotional
35. 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 943 (1995).
36. Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Overton, Shaw, and Harding concurred in the
court's opinion. Id. at 391. Justice McDonald wrote a special concurrence joined by Justice
Overton. Id.
37. 1&. at 390-91 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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handicap and brain dysfunction as nonstatutory mitigators. Neverthe-
less, the expert testimony does not address the true problem here: the
relative weight of mitigating versus aggravating circumstances. On the
whole, the facts are consistent with the conclusion that any impairment
Walls suffered was nonstatutory in nature and, in any event, was of far
slighter weight than the aggravating factors found to exist.38
Thus, Walls indicates that the sentencer is free to disregard unrebutted
expert evidence offered in mitigation. In Spencer v. State,39 however, the
court took an opposite view:
We also find merit in Spencer's claim that the trial court improper-
ly rejected the statutory mitigating circumstances. During the penalty
phase, the two experts testified that Spencer suffered from chronic
alcohol and substance abuse, a paranoid personality disorder, and
biochemical intoxication. Based upon their testing, interviews, and
evaluations, both experts concluded that Spencer was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the
murder was committed and that his capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired. The sentencing order finds that
neither of these mitigating factors is present.
Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted
evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that
the mitigating circumstance has been proved. A trial court may reject
a defendant's claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proved if
the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the trial
court's rejection of the mitigating circumstance. In this case, the
evidence of these mitigating circumstances that was submitted by
Spencer was uncontroverted. The trial judge rejected the experts'
opinions as speculative and conclusory. However, the experts based
their opinions on a battery of psychological and personality tests
administered to Spencer, clinical interviews with Spencer, examination
of evidence in this case, and a review of Spencer's life history, school
records, and military records. Thus, the trial court erred in not finding
and weighing these statutory mental mitigating circumstances. 4°
38. Il at 391 n.8.
39. 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994).
40. Md. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
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The voting pattern in Spencer is worth noting. Justices Shaw, Harding,
and McDonald joined the per curiam opinion for the court,4 and Justice
Kogan concurred in part and dissented in part, writing:
In light of the strong case for mental mitigation here and the lack
of cold calculated premeditation, I would reduce the penalty to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. A
remand here would be a useless act because the death penalty cannot be
imposed based on the facts. I note that this case is directly on point
with Santos v. State, in which we remanded based on similar facts only
to reverse the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in the appeal
after remand. Moreover, based on our second Santos opinion, I believe
death clearly cannot be proportional in this instance. I therefore dissent
as to the remand, but otherwise concur with the majority.42
Justice Kogan made no mention of the apparent contradiction between these
views and his opinion for the court in Walls.
In Jones v. State,43 the court approved the trial judge's refusal to find
in mitigation apparently uncontroverted evidence that the defendant's
alcoholic mother had abandoned him as a child:
As a separate nonstatutory mitigating circumstance the trial judge
considered the fact that Jones was "an abandoned child who was raised
by relatives." The court rejected this "childhood scenario" as a mitigat-
ing factor, reasoning that Jones' mother delivered him into an "infinitely
superior environment" where he was cared for by "decent, law abiding
and God fearing" relatives who "cared for him as if he was one of their
own" and where he did well in school and was a good child.
Jones challenges the trial judge's failure to find his abandonment
by an alcoholic mother in mitigation and maintains that a new sentenc-
ing proceeding is required because the mental health experts who
testified did not bring to the court's attention the fact that Jones likely
suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome. First, on this record, the court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to find in mitigation that Jones was
abandoned by an alcoholic mother."
41. Id. at 385.
42. IU. at 386 (citations omitted).
43. 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 202 (1995).
44. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 201264
245
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Caldwell
3. "Victim Impact" Evidence
In Windom v. State,45 the court addressed a number of issues pertain-
ing to the State's use of "victim impact" evidence:
Windom attacks the admissibility of testimony by a police officer
during the sentencing phase of the trial. The police officer was
assigned by her police department to teach an anti-drug program in an
elementary school in the community in which the defendant and the
three victims of the murders lived, and where the murders occurred.
Two of the sons of one of the victims were students in the program.
The police officer testified concerning her observation about one of
these sons following the murder. Her testimony involved a discussion
concerning an essay which the child wrote. She quoted the essay from
memory: "Some terrible things happened in my family this year be-
cause of drugs. If it hadn't been for DARE, I would have killed
myself." The police officer also described the effect of the shootings
on the other children in the elementary school. She testified that a lot
of the children were afraid.
Defendant asserts, first, that this evidence was in essence nonstatu-
tory aggravation, relying upon Grossman v. State. Defendant does
concede that subsequent to Payne v. Tennessee this Court has held
victim impact testimony to be admissible as long as it comes within the
parameters of the Payne decision. Both the Florida Constitution in
Article I, Section 16, and the Florida Legislature in section 921.141(7),
Florida Statutes (1993), instruct that in our state, victim impact evidence
is to be heard in considering capital felony sentences. We do not
believe that the procedure for addressing victim impact evidence, as set
forth in the statute, impermissibly affects the weighing of the aggravat-
ors and mitigators which we approved in State v. Dixon, or otherwise
interferes with the constitutional rights of the defendant. Therefore, we
reject the argument which classifies victim impact evidence as a
nonstatutory aggravator in an attempt to exclude it during the sentencing
phase of a capital case.
Rather, we believe that section 921.141(7) indicates clearly that
victim impact evidence is admitted only after there is present in the
record evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The
evidence is not admitted as an aggravator but, instead, as set forth in
section 921.141(7), allows the jury to consider "the victim's uniqueness
as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's
members by the victim's death." Victim impact evidence must be
limited to that which is relevant as specified in section 921.141(7). The
45. 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995).
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testimony in which the police officer testified about the effect on
children in the community other than the victim's two sons was
erroneously admitted because it was not limited to the victim's
uniqueness and the loss to the community's members by the victim's
death.
However, defendant did not object to this testimony specifically,
and thus his objection on appeal is procedurally barred ....
Defendant's second attack on the victim impact evidence concerns
the application of 921.141(7) to defendant's crime. He claims that such
application was a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United
States and Florida Constitutions since the murders were on February 7,
1992, and subsection seven of section 921.141 did not go into effect
until July 1, 1992. We do not agree. To the contrary, we approve the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision on this point in State v.
Maxwell, in which the district court found our decision in Glendening
v. State to be instructive. Section 921.141(7) only relates to the
admission of evidence and is thus procedural. Therefore, application of
section 921.141(7) in the present case does not violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.'
4. Final Argument
In Wike v. State,47 the court found per se reversible error in the trial
court's failure to allow the defense to make its final argument to the
sentencing jury under rule 3.780 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.
III. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Sentence of Imprisonment's
Although the application of this circumstance is usually straightforward,
Thompson v. State,4 9 involved a rare misapplication. At the time that the
defendant murdered a sandwich shop employee, he was ostensibly serving
community control sentences for various thefts and forgeries. Accordingly,
the trial court employed the "sentence of imprisonment" circumstance in
46. l at 438-39 (citations omitted).
47. 648 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1994).
48. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he capital felony was committed by
a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control." FLA. STAT. §
921.141(5)(a).
49. 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
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sentencing him to death for the murder. After imposition of the death sen-
tence, the court presiding over the community control cases ruled that the
community control sentences had been illegally imposed. Accordingly, the
defendant argued on appeal that it was error to use the "sentence of
imprisonment" circumstance against him. The supreme court agreed:
"We have expressly held that a conviction used as an aggravating
circumstance, which is valid at the time of the sentence but later
reversed and vacated by an appellate court, results in an error in the
penalty phase proceeding. The reversal eliminates the proper use of the
conviction as an aggravating factor." We conclude that the same
reasoning applies to an aggravating circumstance based on an illegal
sentence. We strike this aggravating circumstance."0
B. Previous Violent Felony Conviction"
Again, there is usually little trouble with the application of this
circumstance. 2 There were no significant developments regarding this
circumstance during the survey period.
50. IL at 827 (citations omitted).
51. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he defendant was previously convicted
of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b).
52. A defendant has been "previously convicted" even if the violent felony is
contemporaneous with the murder. See Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979)
(attempted murders of two victims could constitute prior violent felonies in sentencing
defendant for murder of third victim). On the other hand, contemporaneous violent felonies
committed on the murder victim do not satisfy the circumstance. See Holton v. State, 573
So. 2d 284 (Fla.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991). The court has written directly contrary
opinions as to whether the circumstance applies only to felonies which contain a violent
element or whether the court can look to the facts to determine whether the previous felony
involved violence. Compare Elam v. State, 636 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 1994) (holding it
error to use conviction for solicitation to commit murder to establish the circumstance since
violence is not an inherent element of this offense) with Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138
(Fla. 1993) (approving the trial court's use of conviction for possession of firearm by
convicted felon, notwithstanding that violence is not an inherent element of that offense;
sentencer not bound by the elements of the offense, and can look to facts underlying prior
offense), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1206 (1994).
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C. Great Risk53
In Coney v. State,5" the court disapproved use of this circumstance in
an arson-murder at a jail, in which "Jimmie Coney set his putative jailhouse
lover ablaze."55 Striking the circumstance, the court wrote: "the fire was
relatively small, was contained within a single cell, was set in an area under
constant surveillance, and was easily extinguished with several puffs from
a fire extinguisher.,
56
D. Felony Murder
7
There were no significant developments respecting this circumstance.
E. The Law Enforcement Circumstances: Avoiding Arrest,
Hindering Law Enforcement, and Murder of Law Enforcement
Officers8
Where the defendant has murdered a police officer, the application of
these aggravating circumstances is nearly automatic, although they usually
merge into one.59
Problems arise, however, when the victim is not a law enforcement
officer. Robertson v. State' sets out the standards applying to such cases:
53. An aggravating circumstance also exists where "[t]he defendant knowingly created
a great risk of death to many persons." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c).
54. 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 315 (1995).
55. Id. at 1010.
56. Id. at 1015.
57. "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d).
58. In addition, an aggravating circumstance exists when "[tlhe capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape
from custody," id. § 921.141(5)(e); "[t]he capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws," id. §
921.141(5)(g); "[t]he victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties," id. § 921.141(5)0).
59. E.g., Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2588
(1995); Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
60. 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993) (striking circumstance where defendant murdered a
woman who had witnessed her companion's murder).
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The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating
circumstance exists. Moreover, even the trial court may not draw
"logical inferences" to support a finding of a particular aggravating
circumstance when the State has not met its burden. In order to support
a finding that a defendant committed a murder to avoid arrest, the State
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's dominant or
only motive for the murder of the victim, who is not a law enforcement
officer, is the elimination of a witness. "Proof of the requisite intent to
avoid arrest and detection must be very strong" to support this aggravat-
ing circumstance when the victim is not a law enforcement officer.6'
Thus, in the past, the court has struck the circumstance where
defendants committing burglaries have murdered victims who knew and
could identify them.62 On the other hand, it has applied the circumstance
where the defendant has moved a victim to a remote location.63
The court followed the first line of cases in disapproving the circum-
stance in Thompson v. State.6'4 The evidence there was that the defendant
robbed and shot the attendant of a Subway sandwich shop. The court struck
the circumstance because "we do not know what happened" at the time of
the shooting.65
It followed the second line in approving the circumstance in other
cases. In Thompson v. State,66 a retarded former grave digger, thinking
that the cemetery owed him money, forced the bookkeeper to write him a
check, then took the bookkeeper and his assistant to a wooded area and
murdered them. Finding that the record supported the circumstance, the
court wrote: "Once Thompson had obtained the $1,500 check from Swack
and Walker, there was little reason to kill them other than to eliminate the
61. Id. at 1232 (citations omitted).
62. E.g., Davis v. State, 604 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1992) (burglar killed elderly woman who
knew and could identify him; supreme court held that the fact that witness elimination may
have been a motive in the murder was insufficient to support circumstance); Geralds v. State,
601 So. 2d 1157, 1164 (Fla. 1992) (striking circumstance and speculating that where burglar
tied victim up and then killed her, perhaps defendant killed her while she was trying to
escape).
63. E.g., Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla.) (holding circumstance applied where
defendants abducted and raped woman, killing her to cover up their crime), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 109 (1993).
64. 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
65. Id. at 827. See the discussion of the court's striking of the coldness circumstance
below. See infra part III.H.
66. 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2283 (1995).
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sole witnesses to his actions."67 The court apparently did not consider the
defendant's slim intellectual resources in reaching this determination.
The court affirmed the circumstance without discussion in Suggs v.
State where Ernest Suggs took a barmaid to a remote area and stabbed
her,6" and in Fennie v. State where Alfred L. Fennie flagged down a
woman motorist, forced her into the trunk of her car, eventually shooting her
after driving around telling others he was going to kill her.69
F. Pecuniary Gain
70
This circumstance usually applies in robbery and burglary eases where
it merges with the felony murder circumstance.71 Problems may arise
when the state's theory is that the defendant has committed a murder to
obtain insurance proceeds. In Chaky v. State,72 pointing to the fact that
Kenneth Chaky had increased life insurance coverage of his wife less than
seven months before he murdered her, the trial court concluded that he had
committed the murder for pecuniary gain. 3 The supreme court disagreed:
In his third issue, Chaky contends that the evidence is insufficient
to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating circumstance of
"committed the murder for pecuniary gain." This aggravating circum-
stance applies "only where the murder is an integral step in obtaining
some sought-after specific gain." Moreover, proof of this aggravating
circumstance cannot be supplied by inference from circumstances unless
the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than
the existence of the aggravating circumstance. The only evidence
presented to support this aggravating circumstance was that Chaky, as
a matter of course through his employment with the University of
Florida, maintained two life insurance policies on his wife, totalling
67. Id. at 695. The court employed somewhat similar reasoning in Hannon v. State, 638
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995). There, the defendant and two
friends murdered a man who had mistreated the sister of one of the friends. The defendant
then chased the first victim's roommate upstairs and murdered him. The court upheld the
avoid arrest circumstance because the roommate's murder was "ancillary" to the purpose of
killing the first man. Id. at 44.
68. 644 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995).
69. 648 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).
70. An aggravating circumstance exists if "[t]he capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(0.
71. E.g., Robertson v. State, 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993).
72. 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
73. Id. at 1171.
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$185,000, and that he had increased this life insurance on a regular
basis since his initial employment date with the university in 1985.
Additional testimony indicated that fifty-percent of all employees with
the university maintained similar policies and that the amount of
insurance Chaky maintained on his wife was only half of the amount of
life insurance he maintained on himself. Further, the last increase in his
life insurance was initiated more than six months before he killed his
wife. Although Chaky did tell Thompson and Feinberg that he would
pay them for their assistance, Thompson assumed that he was to be paid
from automobile insurance money obtained for burning Chaky's car and
Feinberg was never told where the funds for payment would come from
and was not told that he would be paid until after the murder occurred.
Although one could surmise under these circumstances that Chaky killed
his wife to obtain the insurance proceeds, we must conclude that the
evidence in this record is insufficient to support that hypothesis beyond
a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we find that the trial judge errone-
ously concluded that Chaky committed the murder for pecuniary
gain.74
G. Heinousness75
During the survey period, the court did little to firm up this often
shapeless circumstance.7 6 In 1995, after many years of litigation, the court
adopted the following jury instruction defining the circumstance:
8. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wieked, evi4, heinous, atrocious, or cruel. "Heinous" means
extremely wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously
wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of
pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious,
or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime
74. Id. at 1172-73 (citations omitted).
75. An aggravating circumstance exists if "[tihe capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h).
76. For the background of this circumstance, see Craig S. Barnard, Death Penalty (1988
Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA L. REV. 908 (1989); Eric Cumfer, Instructing a Capital
Sentencing Jury on Florida's Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating
Circumstance, 14 FLA. B. CRIM. L. SEC. NEWSL., Oct. 1991, at 18; Michael Mello, Florida's
"Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Class of Death-
Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REv. 523 (1984); Richard A.
Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986).
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was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim. 7
7
This instruction is an amalgam of definitions of "heinous," "atrocious," and
"cruel" found unconstitutional in Shell v. Mississippi,78 and a narrowing
construction ("accompanied by additional acts... unnecessarily torturous
to the victim") found constitutional in Proffitt v. Florida.79
Notwithstanding this attempt at regularizing the circumstance's
application, the court still seems to reach contrary results in similar cases.
In Green v. State,8° the court disapproved the circumstance where, robbing
Charles Flynn and Kim Hallock at gun point in the woods, Crosley Green
tied Flynn's hands behind his back, and kidnapped the pair.8" Attempting
to escape, Flynn shot at Green8" who shot him back as Hallock escaped.
The court wrote: "The additional acts accompanying Flynn's death-Flynn
knew Green had a gun, his hands were tied behind his back, and he was
driven a short distance to the orange grove-do not turn this shooting death
into the "'especially' heinous" type of crime for which this aggravator is
reserved.83
The court took a different tack in Wuornos v. State84 writing:
Next, Wuornos contends that this murder was not heinous,
atrocious, or cruel beyond a reasonable doubt. Wuornos' initial
confession to law officers detailed a sequence in which she first
struggled with Mallory for no reason other than his refusal to remove
his clothes. After winning the struggle, she pointed the gun at him and
announced that she "knew" he was going to rape her. Despite
Mallory's protestation that he had no intent to rape her, she shot him
anyway. Mallory still was conscious and able to walk from the car. In
spite of seeing this, Wuoros then ran around to where Mallory was
standing, and shot him several more times.
We believe the protracted nature of this killing together with the
mental suffering it necessarily would entail created a question for the
finder of fact to resolve, especially in light of the similar crimes
77. In Re Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases - No. 90-1, 579 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla.
1990).
78. 498 U.S. 1 (1990).
79. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
80. 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).
81. Id. at 395-96.
82. Apparently Flynn's hands were still tied behind his back. Id at 393.
83. IdM at 396; see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
84. 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
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evidence. That question has been resolved against Wuornos, and the
resolution is sufficiently supported by the record.85
Similarly, the court wrote in the case of Charlie Thompson:
We also find that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that each murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Swack was stabbed numerous times before he was shot. Also, both
victims undoubtedly suffered great fear and terror for some time prior
to their murders. In the sentencing order, the trial judge stated:
After obtaining a check to which he was not entitled, the
Defendant forced the victims to go in one of the victim's cars
to a park and then walk to a secluded wooded area. The
Defendant was armed with a knife and a gun. The victims
were forced to disrobe. The female victim was then allowed
to redress. While clothed only in his underwear and shoes
and socks, the male victim struggled with the Defendant and
was stabbed nine times in various parts of his body. While
the victim was still alive, the Defendant shot him in the head.
The female victim was lying face down on the ground with
her head on her arm. The autopsy revealed a bite mark to her
arm that was inflicted while she was alive and aware of her
impending death which came from a gunshot to her head. It
is unclear which victim was killed first, but it is clear that
both were aware for some period of time that the Defendant
intended to kill them.
We have previously found that these type of facts support a finding of
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor. 6
Wyatt v. State7 is consistent with Thompson. Robbing a pizza
restaurant, Thomas Wyatt raped an employee, and then shot her and two co-
85. Id at 1011 (citation omitted). The court also upheld use of the circumstance for
another murder committed by Aileen Wuomos in a separate case where the victim "suffered
bruises and abrasions and was shot while in the act of twisting or writhing in a vain effort
to avoid his attacker." Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995).
86. Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 695-96 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2283
(1995) (citations omitted).
87. 641 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983 (1995).
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workers (one of them her husband). The court upheld the circumstance
because the victims "were acutely aware of their impending deaths."88
The court also upheld the circumstance in Whitton v. State,89 where
the defendant beat and stabbed a drunken friend stealing his money. The
court rejected an argument that since the decedent had a blood alcohol level
of .34, it was unlikely that he experienced the degree of pain or suffering
associated with the heinousness circumstance.90
State v. Breedlove involved an unusual interpretation of the circum-
stance. The trial court had granted a motion to vacate McArthur Breed-
love's death sentence for a 1979 murder92 because the sentencing jury had
received an unconstitutional jury instruction on the heinousness circum-
stance.93 The supreme court reversed, writing that the use of the unconsti-
tutional instruction was harmless.94 Without purporting to employ the
narrowing construction contained in the 1991 jury instruction, the court
employed an amorphous standard that the murder was "far different from the
norm of capital felonies[:]"
However, we believe that the failure to give the requested
instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel was harmless error. The
evidence presented at the trial clearly established that Breedlove
committed the murder in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The
fatal stabbing was administered with such force that it broke the
victim's collar bone and drove the knife all the way through to the
shoulder blade. The puncture of the victim's lung was associated with
great pain and the victim literally drowned in his own blood. The
victim had defensive stab wounds on his hands and did not die
immediately. Moreover, the attack occurred while the victim lay asleep
88. Il at 1341. In another case, Wyatt took a woman from a bar across the state and
then shot her and stole her car. Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1372 (1995). The trial court instructed the jury on the heinousness circumstance, but
did not find it in the sentencing order. The supreme court ruled that it did not need to decide
whether the evidence supported the circumstance "because the jury was properly instructed
and the trial judge did not find the existence of this aggravating circumstance." Id. at 360.
89. 649 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 106 (1995).
90. 1& at 866-67.
91. 655 So. 2d 74 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 678 (1995).
92. The supreme court had affirmed the conviction and death sentence in Breedlove v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
93. See Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1245 (1992) (holding that heinousness jury
instruction violated eighth amendment requirement of narrow definition of aggravating
circumstances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994).
94. Breedlove, 655 So. 2d at 76.
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in his bed as contrasted to a murder committed in a public place. In
fact, in discussing this aggravator in Breedlove's direct appeal, we
stated that this killing was "far different from the norm of capital
felonies" and set apart from other murders. Under the facts presented,
this aggravator clearly existed and would have been found even if the
requested instruction had been given. Further, there were two other
valid aggravating circumstances, including the previous conviction of a
violent felony. While Breedlove presented some testimony concerning
possible psychological problems, two state experts expressly stated that
they found no evidence of organic brain damage or psychosis and one
of them said Breedlove was malingering. Any error in the instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not affect Breedlove's
sentence.95
Apparently in response to a dissent by Justice Anstead (joined by Justices
Shaw and Kogan) based on James v. State,96 the court wrote: "Breedlove's
95. lld at 76-77 (citations omitted).
96. 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993). James has an interesting history. In 1981, Davidson
and Larry Clark robbed a sign shop owned by Felix and Dorothy Satey. Clark shot Mr.
Satey twice, and the men then went into an adjoining residence where one of them shot
the seventy-four-year-old Mrs. Satey who was confined by a physical disability
to a castored typist's chair. Mr. Satey pleaded that his wife not be harmed, then
heard a gunshot followed by his wife's moaning. When found, Mrs. Satey had
a gunshot wound over the right eye, from which she subsequently died.
Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 975 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). On
Clark's appeal, the court struck the heinousness circumstance, writing:
Directing a pistol shot to the head of the victim does not establish a homicide
as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Although Mr. Satey testified that he
heard his wife moan after being shot, there was no evidence of whether she was
conscious after being shot, not [sic] did the medical examiner indicate how long
Mrs. Satey survived or what degree of pain, if any, she suffered. Although the
helpless anticipation of impending death may serve as the basis for this
aggravating factor, there is no evidence to prove that Mrs. Satey knew for more
than an instant before she was shot what was about to happen to her. Similarly,
as pitiable as were Mr. Satey's vain efforts to dissuade his attackers from
harming his wife, it is the effect upon the victim herself that must be considered
in determining the existence of this aggravating factor.
Id. at 977 (citations omitted). Relying on Clark, the court then struck the circumstance in
James's appeal. See James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098
(1984). In both cases, however, the court found harmless the trial court's use of the
heinousness circumstance.
In 1993, the court accepted James' argument that the unconstitutional instruction on
the circumstance required resentencing:
In closing argument the state attorney argued forcefully that the murder
was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. On appeal, on the other hand, we held that the
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reliance on James v. State, is misplaced because in that case it was
determined that the facts did not support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.
97
H. Coldness98
As in the past,99 the coldness circumstance was the most frequently
misapplied during the survey period.' °
facts did not support finding that aggravator. Striking that aggravator left four
valid ones to be weighed against no mitigators, and we believe that the trial
court's consideration of the invalid aggravator was harmless error. We cannot
say beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that the invalid instruction did not
affect the jury's consideration or that its recommendation would have been the
same if the requested expanded instruction had been given. Therefore, we
reverse the trial court's order as to the last issue regarding the constitutionality
of the instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. The trial court
is directed to empanel a new jury, to hold a new sentencing proceeding, and to
resentence James.
James, 615 So. 2d at 669 (citation omitted).
97. Breedlove, 655 So. 2d at 77 n.4.
98. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he capital felony was a homicide and
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral
or legal justification." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i). For the early history of this circum-
stance, see Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated" Aggravating
Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STETSON L. REV. 47 (1987).
99. See Gary Caldwell, Capital Crimes (1993 Survey of Florida Law), 18 NOVA L. REV.
117, 128 (1993).
100. The court approved use of the circumstance in twelve direct appeals. See Hunter
v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 946 (1996); Gamble v. State,
659 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 933 (1996); Windom v. State, 656 So.
2d 432 (Fla.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995); Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995); Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 314 (1995); Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994); Fennie v. State, 648 So.
2d 95 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995); Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012
(Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995); Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995); Suggs v. State, 644 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 943 (1995); Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1317
(1995). The court disapproved use of the circumstance in six appeals. See Besaraba v. State,
656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994); Spencer v. State,
645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994); Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2588 (1995); Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994); Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983 (1995). In several other cases, the court
reversed convictions or sentences without approving or disapproving the trial court's use of
the circumstance.
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In Jackson v. State,'' the court summarized the requirements of the
circumstance: 1) the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection
rather than of emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage; 2) there was a careful
plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident; 3)
the defendant had a "heightened" level of premeditation over and above
what is required for unaggravated first-degree murder; and 4) there must be
no "pretense of moral or legal justification," meaning a colorable claim of
some excuse, justification, or incomplete defense to the murder."°
It is easiest to apply the circumstance where the defendant has
previously announced his intention to commit murder. Thus, there could be
no dispute about its use in Fennie where the defendant, after forcing a
woman into the trunk of a car, drove around telling others he was going to
kill the woman. 3
At the other extreme, as noted in Jackson, are cases where the
defendant acts out a state of profound mental agitation which belies any
claim of cold-bloodedness." Thus, the court disapproved the circum-
stance in Spencer v. State,"5 where, although there was "evidence that
Spencer contemplated this murder in advance, we find that the evidence
offered in support of the mental mitigating circumstances also negates the
cold component of the CCP aggravator."'' 6 As may be recalled, the trial
101. 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).
102. Id. at 89. The most acceptable "pretense of moral or legal justification" is that the
defendant, while committing a violent felony, killed the victim in order to defend himself.
Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221, 224-25 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087 (1989).
Some pretenses of justification rejected by the court are: defendant poisoned neighbor to get
her family to move, Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
892 (1994); defendant was retarded, Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 109 (1993); defendant murdered daughter as way of getting back at wife, Klokoc v.
State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991); considering himself protector of the black community,
defendant murdered Iranian shopkeeper's brother, Gunsby v. State, 574 So. 2d 1085 (Fla.)
(indicating through dicta that attempting to rid neighborhood of drug dealers might be
reasonable pretense), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 843 (1991).
103. See also Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966 (1994), cert. denied, 115 5. Ct. 1317
(1995) (before shootout with police, defendant said he was not going back to jail).
104. Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89.
105. 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994).
106. Id. at 384. In fact, there was substantial evidence of premeditation-Spencer
repeatedly said that he was going to kill his wife in the weeks leading up to the murder. Id.
at 379; see also Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995). A half hour after being
evicted from a bus, Joseph Besaraba confronted the driver at a bus terminal, shooting him
and a passenger dead and then shooting a man while stealing a getaway car. The court
struck the circumstance because "the random nature of Besaraba's acts during the crimes
belies a careful plan" and the trial court found "strong mental health mitigating circumstances
1996] 1277
258
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
court had rejected unrebutted expert opinion testimony respecting statutory
mental mitigating circumstances.'0 7
In between, there are many cases in which the exact events of the fatal
episode and the defendant's state of mind are in dispute. In some cases, the
court defers to the trial court's resolution of uncertainties in the evidence,
but in others it applies a rule that the state must conclusively rebut
hypotheses contrary to the circumstance's application.
The court took the first approach in one of Aileen Wuomos' cases.'Os
In a thorough discussion of each of the four elements of the circumstance,
the court noted that the defense evidence, if believed, would rebut each
element."° Nevertheless, the court approved the finding of the circum-
stance, writing that the jury and trial judge could accept the State's theory
of the case and reject-the defendant's "testimony as self-serving, unbeliev-
able in light of Wuomos' constantly changing confessions, contrary to the
facts that could be inferred from the similar crimes evidence, or contrary to
other facts adduced at trial."' °"
The court took the opposite approach in the case of Derek Todd
Thompson."' The trial court had determined that Thompson's murder of a
store clerk during a robbery was cold, calculated, and premeditated." 2
The supreme court reversed, noting that while a witness saw Thompson
enter the shop and talk with the clerk, she was looking away when she heard
the gun fire:
No one saw the actual shooting .... A number of scenarios inconsis-
tent with heightened premeditation are possible: The victim may have
struggled with Thompson; the victim may have tried to duck and hide
from Thompson; or the victim may have tried to escape. The record
simply does not show what happened in the brief time span when the
witness looked away."'
that weigh against the formulating of a careful plan to kill" the bus driver. Id. at 445.
"Although the record may reflect a suspicion that [a careful plan to kill] existed," the court
determined that "it is plausible that Besaraba acted impulsively." Id. at 446. But see
Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1994) (upholding circumstance notwithstanding thai
trial court found in mitigation that retarded defendant had chronic mental illness and acted
under "moderate" disturbance at time of murder), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2283 (1995).
107. Spencer, 645 So. 2d at 380.
108. Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
109. Id. at 1008.
110. Id.
111. Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
112. Id. at 826.
113. Id.
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As already noted, the court took a similar approach in Besaraba ("it is
plausible that Besaraba acted impulsively")."'
Sometimes there does not seem to be any principled reason for the
court's ruling on the circumstance. One would be hard pressed to explain
why one of the two following horrible sets of facts is more "cold-blooded"
than the other:
The evidence shows that the victims were subjected to at least twenty
minutes of abuse prior to their deaths. Wyatt pistol-whipped William
Edwards when the safe did not contain enough money for his satisfac-
tion. Wyatt also undressed Frances Edwards completely and raped her
a short distance from where the other two employees were being held.
Wyatt then killed his victims in front of each other. William Edwards
begged for his life and stated that he and Frances, his wife, had a two-
year-old daughter at home. Wyatt shot him in the chest. Upon seeing
her husband shot, Frances Edwards began to cry and Wyatt then shot
her in the head while she was in a kneeling position. Having witnessed
the shooting of his co-workers, Michael Bornoosh started to pray.
Wyatt put his gun to Bornoosh's ear and before he pulled the trigger
told him to listen real close to hear the bullet coming. When Wyatt
realized William Edwards was still alive he went back and shot him in
the head."'
Walls indicated that he deliberately woke up the two victims by
knocking over a fan after entering the house to commit a burglary.
Then he forced Alger to lie on the floor and made Peterson tie him up
so that his hands were "behind the back, ankles shackled." He next
forced Peterson to lie on the floor so he could tie her up in the same
manner.
Walls stated that Alger later got loose from his bindings and
attacked Walls. During the fight, Walls tackled Alger, forced him to
the floor, and "caught [Alger] across the throat with the knife." Alger
continued struggling with Walls and succeeded in biting him on the leg.
At this point, Walls apparently dropped his knife. Walls then pulled out
his gun and shot Alger several times in the head.
Walls returned to Peterson. He found her "laying in there crying
and everything, asked--asked me some questions." Walls said he could
not understand what she was saying, so he removed her gag. She asked
if Alger was all right. Walls said:
114. Besaraba, 656 So. 2d at 446.
115. Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983
(1995).
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I told her no. I told her what was going on, and I said,
"I came in here, and I didn't want to hurt none of y'all. I
didn't want to hurt you, but he attacked my ass, and things
just happened."
Walls then untied Peterson, and "started wrestling around with her."
During this second struggle, he ripped off Peterson's clothing. Walls'
confession stated:
[Peterson] was like curled up crying like. I don't know, I
guess I was paranoid and everything. I didn't want no, uh, no
witnesses.
I---all I know is just-all I know I just went out, and I just
pulled the trigger a couple of times right there behind her
head.
I mean close range, I mean shit, it's got powder burns
(unintelligible) and everything.
Walls stated that after the first shot, Peterson was "doing all kinds of
screaming." He then forced her face into a pillow and shot her a
second time in the head."
6
The court struck the circumstance in Wyatt" 7 but approved it in
Walls.118
IV. MITIGATION
A. Right to Present Mitigation
In Guzman v. State,119 the court went out of its way to emphasize in
dicta the right of the defense to present evidence of mitigation: "trial judges
should be extremely cautious when denying defendants the opportunity to
present testimony or evidence on their behalf, especially where a defendant
is on trial for his or her life." 120
116. Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d at 381, 384-85 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 943
(1995).
117. Wyatt, 641 So. 2d at 1341.
118. Walls, 641 So. 2d at 389.
119. 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
120. Id. at 1000.
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B. Disparate Treatment of Others
The court ruled in several cases on arguments that a co-defendant's life
sentenGe constitutes a mitigating circumstance. In Barrett v. State,' a
quadruple homicide case, the court held that the jury could have rationally
based its life verdicts on the life sentences received by one of John C.
Barrett's co-defendants." The court also wrote that
[t]he jury could have reasonably concluded that Barrett was not the
person who actually committed the murders, and that Burnside had
committed the murders with the help of someone other than Barrett.
Conflicting evidence on the identity of the actual killer can form the
basis for a recommendation of life imprisonment."
In Heath v. State," on the other hand, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the co-defendant's life sentence did not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances"z since, according to the co-
defendant's testimony, the defendant was the dominating force in the
murder. 126
In Gamble v. State,27 the court was presented with a procedural twist
on this issue. Guy R. Gamble and Michael Love carefully planned and
carried out the murder of their landlord. After a jury convicted Gamble and
recommended that he be sentenced to death, Love entered a guilty plea and
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Rejecting Gamble's argument that
Love's sentence could have provided a basis for a life recommendation from
the jury, the supreme court wrote:
The trial court found two aggravating factors (cold, calculated, and
premeditated and pecuniary gain), one statutory mitigating factor (age),
and several non-statutory mitigating factors, most of which were given
little weight. One of the non-statutory mitigating factors given "some"
weight was Love's sentence of life. Gamble asserts that his jury would
have also recommended a life sentence if it had been informed of
Love's sentence. Gamble proffers that this factor singlehandedly
121. 649 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1994).
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id. (citing Cooper v. State, 581 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1991)).
124. 648 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2618 (1995).
125. Prior conviction of a violent felony (second-degree murder) and commission of
murder during course of violent felony. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 665-66.
127. 659 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 933 (1996).
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requires a sentence reduction. We disagree. Love's sentence was based
on a guilty plea entered after Gamble's penalty phase proceedings.
Clearly the Gamble trial judge was not required to postpone Gamble's
sentencing and await Love's plea and sentence. We refuse to speculate
as to what may have occurred had the Gamble jury been made aware
of the posture of Love's case. We find no error relative to the
issue. 28
C. Consecutive Life Sentences
The supreme court seems to have two rules respecting the mitigating
effect of consecutive life sentences. 29 In Nixon v. State,'3" Joe Elton
Nixon was convicted of first-degree murder and several noncapital offenses
for which he could receive life sentences. The trial court refused his request
for a penalty phase jury instruction on the penalties for the noncapital
offenses. 31 On appeal, the supreme court rejected his argument that the
refusal prevented the jury from considering in mitigation, the fact that life
sentences on the other offenses would prevent his ever being released from
prison.13  "The fact that Nixon was convicted of three other offenses each
of which carried lengthy maximum penalties is irrelevant to his character,
prior record, or the circumstances of the crime."'133
In Jones v. State,TM on the other hand, the court ruled that the trial
court erred in refusing to let Randall Scott Jones argue in mitigation that,
since he was convicted of two first-degree murders, consecutive life
sentences would prevent him from ever being released from prison. 35
The court stated,
[c]ounsel was entitled to argue to the jury that Jones may be removed
from society for at least fifty years should he receive life sentences on
each of the two murders. The potential sentence is a relevant consider-
128. Id. at 245. Compare Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992) (co-
defendant's subsequent life sentence could form basis for reduction of sentence to life
imprisonment in postconviction proceedings).
129. The theory of mitigation is that consecutive sentences will ensure that the defendant
will not be released into society.
130. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991).
131. Id. at 1344-45.
132. Id. at 1345.
133. Id.
134. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
135. Id. at 1239-40.
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ation of "the circumstances of the offense" which the jury may not be
prevented from considering.'36
During the survey period the court ruled, consistently with Jones, that a jury
can reasonably base a life sentence on the fact that consecutive life
sentences will assure that the defendant will never be released in prison. In
the double homicide case of Turner v. State,' the court found that the
trial court had failed to consider the mitigating effect of consecutive life
sentences for the two murders in overriding a jury life recommendation. 3 1
The court specifically wrote that among the "ample mitigation" supporting
the life verdict was the fact that "the alternative to the death penalty was
two life sentences, which the jury knew would have required Turner to serve
a minimum of fifty years in prison before he could be considered for
parole.9139
D. Statutory Versus "Nonstatutory" Mitigation
Under Hitchcock v. Dugger,14 mitigation may not be limited to the
"statutory circumstances" listed in section 921.141 of the Florida Stat-
utes."' Nevertheless, the supreme court sometimes considers statutory
circumstances somehow more important that nonstatutory circumstances.
For instance, in Foster v. State,142 a case in which the trial court found
fourteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the supreme court found the
use of an unconstitutional jury instruction on the coldness circumstance
harmless, and wrote:
In view of the fact that the trial court found no statutory mitigators and
three strong aggravators, we also find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the invalid CCP instruction did not affect the jury's consideration and
136. Id. at 1239-40. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that, where the state had put in issue the future dangerousness of the
defendant, the trial court violated due process in preventing the defense from informing the
jury that the defendant would not be eligible for parole. Id. at 2193. The Court declined to
decide whether a defendant's ineligibility for parole is a mitigating circumstance for purposes
of the eighth amendment requirement that the sentencer consider all mitigating evidence. Id.
at 2196-97.
137. 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994).
138. Id. at 448.
139. Id.
140. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
141. Id. at 398-99.
142. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 314 (1995).
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that its recommendation would have been the same if the requested
expanded instruction had been given. 143
E. Waiver of Mitigation
A growing number of cases have involved defendants who prevent
presentation of mitigation or even demand to be executed. Koon v.
Dugger 44 established the circumstances in which the trial court should
allow defense counsel to waive presentation of mitigation:
When a defendant, against his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and
what that evidence would be. The court should then require the
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these
matters with him, and despite counsel's recommendation, he wishes to
waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. 145
As may be expected, such cases may involve murders arising from
tormented domestic relationships and those committed by mentally disturbed
persons. Typical is Layman v. State. 46  The evidence showed that
Gregory Scott Layman ambushed his estranged girlfriend, Sharon DePaula,
shooting her twice with a sawed-off shotgun. He confessed to the crime and
said he wanted to die for it. At the penalty proceeding, when the State
announced that it was not seeking death, Mr. Layman objected, insisting that
he be sentenced to death. After the State presented no evidence in
aggravation, "Layman, representing himself, then addressed the jury and said
that he wanted to die for several reasons: He had a history of committing
violence against Sharon; the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated;
and he still loved Sharon deeply and wanted to be with her in the after-
life." 47  The jury rendered a death verdict, which the trial court fol-
143. Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
144. 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 250.
146. 652 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1995).
147. Id. at 374.
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lowed. 4 However, the supreme court reversed the sentence because of
defects in the rendition of the sentencing order.'49
The court affirmed death sentences in the following cases which
involved various waivers of mitigation. Farr v. State,"s° discussed at
length the issue of waiver of mitigation. The case was before the court after
a remand for resentencing."5 At resentencing, "Farr forbade his attorney
to present a case for mitigation on remand and... himself took the witness
stand and systematically refuted, belied, or disclaimed virtually the entire
case for mitigation that existed in the earlier appeal."' The court
determined that under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in
rejecting the case for mitigation.
After some discussion, the court wrote:
It deserves emphasis, however, that the ability of a capital
defendant to restrict counsel's argument is not without limit. It is true
that the right to counsel embodies a right of self-determination in the
face of specific criminal charges. At the trial level, this certainly means
that "defendants have a right to control their own destinies" when facing
the death penalty. Nevertheless, there are countervailing interests that
must be honored.
In Klokoc, for example, we addressed the problem that can arise
when a death-sentenced defendant attempts to restrict the argument of
appellate counsel in this Court. The Florida Constitution imposes upon
the Court an absolute obligation of determining whether death is a
148. Id.
149. Id. at 375-76.
150. 656 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1995).
151. See Farr, 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993). The 1993 opinion shows: after injuring
two women by gunshot during a kidnap attempt outside a bar, Victor Marcus Farr
commandeered a car with a man and woman inside. The man escaped, and the defendant
drove the car into a tree in an attempt to kill himself and the woman. He lived, she died.
He plead guilty, waived the sentencing jury, and asked for a death sentence. The supreme
court found the defendant's waiver of mitigation valid, but nevertheless ordered resentencing
because the trial court had erred by failing to consider mitigation contained in psychiatric and
presentence investigation (PSI) reports, writing:
We repeatedly have stated that mitigating evidence must be considered and
weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is believable
and uncontroverted. That requirement applies with no less force when a
defendant argues in favor of the death penalty, and even if the defendant asks
the court not to consider mitigating evidence.
Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
152. Farr, 656 So. 2d at 449.
153. Id. at 450.
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proportionate penalty. For that reason, appeals from death penalties are
both automatic and mandatory, and cannot be rendered illusory for any
reason. Thus, the Klokoc Court held that appellate counsel must
proceed with a proper adversarial argument notwithstanding the
defendant's instruction to dismiss the appeal or to acquiesce to the death
penalty.
We acknowledge that this is a troubling area of the law. On a
case-by-case basis, we have attempted to achieve a solution that both
honors the defendant's right of self-determination and the constitutional
requirement that death be imposed reliably and proportionately. While
there are no simple solutions, we do strongly believe that trial courts
would be wise to order presentence investigations in at least those'-cases
in which the defendant essentially is not challenging imposition of the
death penalty. Nevertheless, the failure to order one cannot be consid-
ered error in light of a defendant's refusal to seriously challenge death
as a penalty.'54
In a special concurrence joined by Justices Shaw and Kogan, Justice
Anstead wrote that he would "adopt a uniform rule that requires a presen-
tence investigation and report in all capital cases. Our failure to adopt such
a requirement is tantamount to inviting arbitrary decision-making at both the
trial and appellate levels in a significant number of cases."' 55  Justice
Kogan (joined by Justice Anstead) dissented in part, writing:
Our analysis of these cases is at best criticizable. There could be
a variety of solutions, but all are problematic. One would be to recede
from Klokoc, which would result in appeals such as Mr. Farr's
becoming perfunctory affirmances. This clearly would increase the
proportionality problem but would more fully honor rule 9.140(b)(3).
Another would be to adopt Justice Barkett's approach in Hamblen,
which would increase the restriction on the defendant's right of self-
determination yet would more fully satisfy the proportionality doctrine.
Yet the latter approach would not fully honor rule 9.140(b)(3). Part of
the problem could be eliminated simply by requiring a presentence
investigation in every case in which death is imposed, including those
in which a defendant does not seriously challenge imposition of the
death penalty. I would so order. On this point, I dissent from the
majority.
A time is coming when this Court must comprehensively address
the problem of defendants who seek the death penalty, whose numbers
154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 450-51.
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are growing. We have reached the stage at which our holdings are not
entirely consistent with each other or with our own rules of court.
Case-by-case adjudication of a larger problem certainly has its place,
but not when the result is a confounding of the overall law: a point we
are rapidly reaching.
I personally would favor referring the entire matter to one of The
Florida Bar's standing rules committees or to a committee or Court
commission created especially to investigate this problem. This Court
has inherent authority to promulgate rules of procedure, which could
include a new procedural framework for dealing with defendants who
favor their own executions. Our piecemeal approach to cases like Farr's
has not adequately addressed all the problems at hand, and I believe the
time is approaching for a comprehensive study and the development of
one or more proposals for reform, with adequate input from all
segments of the public and the Bar. I therefore would refer this issue
to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar for
more intensive study and formulation of a recommendation to the
Court.
56
Like Layman, Windom v. State,"s' involved a seriously disturbed
defendant. Curtis Windom shot a man on a street corner, ran to his
(Windom's) girlfriend's house, shot her, and later shot the girlfriend's
mother while she was driving down the street. All three died. He also shot
another man in the street who survived. According to the sentencing order,
the survivor "said the Defendant did not look normal-his eyes were
'bugged out like he had clicked."" 58  Windom waived presentation of
mitigation under odd circumstances:
In this triple murder, the defendant made a knowing waiver of
presenting any mitigating evidence to the advisory jury. The defendant
did this in order to avoid any evidence being presented to the jury
concerning the murders being related to the defendant trafficking in
cocaine. The trial judge elicited a direct confirmation from the
defendant that he understood that he was waiving his right to present
mitigating evidence and that the reason was so that the "drug thing"
would not be heard by the jury.159
156. Id. at 452-53.
157. 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995).
158. Id. at 435.
159. Id. at 438-39.
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Lockhart v. State"6 presented an entirely different picture. Michael
Lee Lockhart, "inflicted a number of wounds described as pricking,
prodding, or teasing wounds" on a fourteen-year-old girl, and then bound,
stabbed, strangled, and raped her.161 After the judge denied defense
counsel's motion to withdraw, 62 the defendant sought to discharge
counsel, plead guilty, and refused to present mitigation.
The defendant in Pittman v. State,'63 according to the trial court's
findings in mitigation, had a hyperactive personality, may have suffered
physical and sexual abuse as a child, and was an impulsive person with
memory problems and impaired social judgment."6 A jury convicted him
of three counts of first-degree murder on evidence that he repeatedly stabbed
his estranged wife's parents and sister and burned their house. After the
jury recommended death sentences for all three murders, the defense
inexplicably failed to produce evidence (or argument apparently) to support
override life sentences.16
5
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In Guzman v. State,'" the court wrote in dicta:
By this opinion, we direct that trial judges fully instruct death penalty
juries on all applicable jury instructions set forth in the Florida Standard
Jury Instructions unless a legal justification exists to modify an
instruction. If a legal need to modify an instruction exists, that need
should be fully reflected in the record in accordance with Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.985.167
The court also followed this doctrine of adherence to the standard jury
instructions in Gamble, rejecting arguments that
160. 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995).
161. Id. at 71.
162. On the motion, counsel argued "that he could not be ready when trial started
because of his workload, the complexity of the case, and the travel required due to
Lockhart's out-of-state convictions." l The out-of-state convictions included convictions
for murder in Texas and Indiana. Id. at 71 n.2.
163. 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1982 (1995).
164. Id. at 170 n.2. There was also evidence that he had been a difficult child, with
severe attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity, that his mother disciplined him severely,
and that he was a paranoid schizophrenic and had organic personality disorder. Id. at 169.
165. Pittman, 646 So. 2d at 172.
166. 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
167. Id. at 1000.
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the standard jury instructions fail to: (1) inform the jury that even if an
aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they
may still recommend life imprisonment; (2) adequately define mitigating
circumstances; and (3) inform the jury that it could find mental
impairment even if it failed to conclude that such impairment was
extreme.
168
In Chaky v. State,69 there was an unusual failure by the trial court
to reduce its instructions to the jury to writing and send them into the jury
room for use during deliberations. 7' While determining that Chaky's
lawyer had failed to preserve the matter for appeal, the court noted that the
trial court had violated the requirement of rule 3.390(b) of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure, that jury instructions "in capital cases shall.., be
in writing.. 7. The court also noted that rule 3.400(c) gave the trial court
the discretion to send a copy of the instructions into the jury room."
With its decision in Chaky, the court then issued a comment seeking to
promulgate a proposed rule amending rule 3.400(c), which would make the
rule mandatory for instructions in all capital cases.'73
VI. THE SENTENCING ORDER
A. Campbell v. State
During the survey period, the court continued to be troubled by fallout
from its decision in Campbell v. State.74 In Campbell the court wrote:
When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court
must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance
proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the
evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of
a mitigating nature. The court must find as a mitigating circumstance
each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and has been reason-
ably established by the greater weight of the evidence: "A mitigating
circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the
168. Gamble v. State, 659 So. 2d 242, 246 (Fla. 1995).
169. 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
170. Id. at 1169.
171. Id. at 1172 (quoting FLA. R. CumI. P. 3.390(b)).
172. Id.
173. Id. The court did go on to adopt this mandatory rule. In re Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure - Rule 3.400, 657 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1995).
174. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
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defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circum-
stance exists, you may consider it as established." The court next must
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating and, in order
to facilitate appellate review, must expressly consider in its written
order each established mitigating circumstance. Although the relative
weight given each mitigating factor is within the province of the
sentencing court, a mitigating factor once found cannot be dismissed as
having no weight.175
In Ferrell v. State,76 the court took a strong stand on strict adherence
to Campbell:
We now find it necessary to further emphasize the requirements
established in Campbell. The sentencing judge must expressly evaluate
in his or her written sentencing order each statutory and non-statutory
mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant. This evaluation
must determine if the statutory mitigating circumstance is supported by
the evidence and if the non-statutory mitigating circumstance is truly of
a mitigating nature. A mitigator is supported by evidence if it is
mitigating in nature and reasonably established by the greater weight of
the evidence. Once established, the mitigator is weighed against any
aggravating circumstances. It is within the sentencing judge's discretion
to determine the relative weight given to each established mitigator;
however, some weight must be given to all established mitigators. The
result of this weighing process must be detailed in the written sentenc-
ing order and supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record.
The absence of any of the enumerated requirements deprives this Court
of the opportunity for meaningful review.'77
In Green v. State,7 ' however, the court was less concerned about its
ability to conduct a meaningful review of the death sentence: "Although the
sentencing order might not comply strictly with the requirements of
Campbell, the trial judge clearly gave careful consideration to the mitigating
factors." '179 Similarly, in Lowe v. State,8 ° the court wrote that while it
"might take issue" with the trial court's rejection of unrebutted mitigation,
175. Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
176. 653 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1995).
177. Id. at 371; see also Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1995); Layman v. State,
652 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1995).
178. 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).
179. Id. at 396.
180. 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 230 (1995).
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it nevertheless affirmed the death sentence because "the trial judge also
stated that, even if these factors were of a mitigating nature, they 'would not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances of committing a prior robbery and
committing a murder during the commission of another attempted rob-
bery. , ', s
Justice Wells, in a dissent in Crump v. State,"s joined by Chief
Justice Grimes, registered a vigorous disapproval of Campbell, writing that
the court's decision remanding for resentencing pursuant to Campbell was
"just one more procedural impediment to finality.' ' 3
B. Timing
Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes does not state when the trial
court is to render its sentencing order, although the context makes clear that
it is to do so after the penalty verdict.'84 The supreme court has devel-
oped two rules respecting the timing of the rendition of the sentencing order.
In Grossman v. State,' the court ruled that the court must render the
written sentencing order at the time that it pronounces the sentence.186 In
Spencer v. State,'87 the court decided that the court is not to render its
decision until after a post penalty verdict hearing (sometimes called an
"allocution hearing" or, now, a "Spencer hearing") at which it has heard
such additional argument and evidence as the parties may present.'
While a violation of Grossman requires reduction of the sentence to one of
life imprisonment,'89 a violation of Spencer apparently requires only
resentencing.
In Perez v. State"9 and Layman v. State, '9 the court followed
Grossman and ordered that death sentences be reduced to life imprisonment.
181. Id. at 976; see also Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1995).
182. 654 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1995).
183. Id. at 549. But see Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1995). Justice Wells again
joined by the Chief Justice, agreed in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that
the sentence be reversed under Campbell Id, at 429-30. Bryant was decided two weeks
before Crump.
184. FLA. STAT. § 921.141.
185. 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
186. Id. at 841.
187. 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
188. Id. at 690-91. However, Spencer merely formalized what had already been the
practice in most if not all circuits.
189. E.g., Christopher v. State, 583 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1991).
190. 648 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1995).
191. 652 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 1995).
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In Layman, Justice Wells again issued a strongly worded dissent, contend-
ing, "[s]anctions such as the one imposed by these cases have too heavy a
price in the public's loss of confidence in the judicial system. I would
recede from this sanction."'9
In Armstrong v. State,193 the court declined to apply Spencer to a
sentencing which occurred before Spencer was decided.
VII. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Tedder v. State
Although section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes lets the trial court
impose a death sentence notwithstanding a life verdict, 194 the supreme
court has ruled that it will affirm such an "override" sentence only where
virtually no reasonable person could disagree with the death sentence. 95
In keeping with this rule, the supreme court reversed most override death
sentences that came before it during the survey period."9
The court's method of appellate review in override cases differs
substantially from its review in death verdict cases. In the latter, the court
usually defers to the trial court's decisions of minimizing or disregarding
mitigation. 97 But in override cases, it usually acts on the assumption that
the jury has accepted all mitigation presented to it and has given it sufficient
weight to outweigh the state's case for death. 9 As shown in the preced-
ing footnote, the court will reverse override sentences even in horrendous
192. Id. at 377 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
194. FLA. STAT. § 921.141.
195. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
196. The court reduced override sentences in five cases pursuant to Tedder. See Barrett
v. State, 649 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1994) (quadruple homicide); Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1994) (double homicide); Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994) (double
homicide); Parker v. State, 643 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1994) (triple homicide); Esty v. State, 642
So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1380 (1995). In Perez, also an override
case, the court reduced the sentence under Grossman without reaching the Tedder issue.
Perez, 648 So. 2d at 720. The court has also affirmed override sentences in two cases:
Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 387 (1995); Garcia
v. State, 644 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1994) (affirming one override death sentence and one death
sentence following death recommendation), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
197. E.g., Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 976-77 (Fla. 1994); Green v. State, 641 So.
2d 391, 395-96 (Fla. 1994).
198. E.g., Barrett, 649 So. 2d at 223.
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cases involving multiple homicides.'99 Thus, the penalty verdict continues
to be of paramount importance to the ultimate disposition of the case.
B. Clemons v. Mississippi and Espinosa v. Florida
Where the sentencer has employed an improper aggravating circum-
stance, the state appellate court must reverse a resulting death sentence
unless it either determines that the circumstance did not contribute to the
sentence, or it independently reweighs the remaining circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances and finds that the death sentence is still
appropriate." Since Florida shares sentencing responsibility between the
jury and judge, the state supreme court must look to the effect of a
sentencing error on both actors.201  Espinosa disapproved the Florida
court's practice of considering only the effect of an error on the judge's
sentencing decision." Although the court has in the past repeatedly
asserted that it will not reweigh sentencing circumstances,0 3 it seems to
have done so during the survey period.
In Hill v. State,2" a federal district court partially granted the writ of
habeas corpus after finding that, in affirming Clarence Edward Hill's death
sentence after striking an aggravating circumstance, the state supreme court
199. See cases cited supra note 196.
200. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991);
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
201. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).
202. Id. at 1082.
203. "mhe Florida Supreme Court has made it clear on several occasions that it does
not reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Parker, 498 U.S.
at 319. The state court has held that it complies with Clemons by the second alternative,
harmless error analysis. White v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 700, 702 (Fla. 1990); Preston v. State,
564 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1990). The court sees itself as "a reviewing court, not a fact-
finding court," so that it defers to the findings of the trial court. Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d
18, 23 (Fla. 1990).
The court's strong stance against reweighing arises from the extraordinary case of
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981)
which involved the "alleged impropriety" of the supreme court's practice in capital cases of
reviewing secret Department of Corrections documents not available to counsel and not
contained in the appellate record. Id. at 1328. Some 122 death row inmates joined Joseph
Green Brown in protesting this practice. Without denying that it had such an ongoing
practice, the court ruled that, since it is a reviewing rather than a sentencing court, it could
not engage in "weighing or reevaluating the evidence adduced to establish aggravating and
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 1331. Hence, it wrote that its review of matters dehors the
record could not affect its appellate review of the death sentence. Id. at 1332.
204. 643 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 196 (1995).
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had violated Parker v. Dugger"° and may have also violated Clemons in
failing to consider uncontroverted mitigating evidence. °6 Permitting Hill
to reopen his appeal for the limited purpose of addressing the issues raised
in the federal court decision, the supreme court again affirmed the death
sentence, writing:
four of the five aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge
remain valid. Even when we consider the statutory mitigating circum-
stance of Hill's age of twenty-three at the time the murder was
committed and the uncontroverted evidence of non-statutory mitigating
circumstances presented by Hill at sentencing regarding his background,
we must conclude that the trial judge's error in finding that the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In aggravation, the evidence reflects that Hill, during
the course of a robbery, killed a police officer so that he and his
accomplice could escape prosecution. Moreover, Hill had previously
been convicted of robbery with a firearm, and, in this case, he knowing-
ly created a great risk of death to many persons by firing a number of
shots in a populated area. We again hold that death is the appropriate
sentence in this case because no reasonable possibility exists that the
evidence presented in mitigation, such as Hill's age, his good work
history, and his helpful and nonviolent nature, is sufficient to outweigh
the four valid aggravating circumstances.2'
Similarly, in Castro v. State,"8 after striking the coldness circum-
stance, the court affirmed the death sentence writing that there remained
three valid aggravating circumstances and only a "weak case for mitiga-
tion."209
The court also seemed to engage in reweighing in Wuornos v.
State,21° writing that the trial court's failure to find and weigh nonstatutory
circumstances was harmless "because their weight is slight when compared
with the case for aggravation."211
205. See supra note 200.
206. Hill, 643 So. 2d at 1072-73.
207. Id. at 1074 (footnotes omitted).
208. 644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994).
209. Id. at 991.
210. 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
211. Id. at 1011.
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C. Retroactivity
The riddle of retroactivity continued to bedevil the court during the
survey period. In Smith v. State," the court seemed to settle the matter
by writing that all of its decisions would apply retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal. Thereafter, however, the court refused to follow
Smith and apply to pending cases its ruling213 that trial courts may not
instruct juries on flight as being indicative of the defendant's guilt.214 In
Wuornos v. State, 5 the court refused to follow its decision in Castro v.
State,216 in which it had held that the court must instruct the jury not to
give double consideration to aggravating circumstances based on the same
aspect of the offense,217 and wrote: "We read Smith to mean that new
points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with
respect to all nonfinal cases unless this Court says otherwise.""2 8
But in Kearse v. State,219 the court retroactively applied Castro. The
court wrote that the trial court committed several errors in instructing the
penalty jury, including the refusal to give an anti-doubling instruction.20
The court also retroactively applied its holding in Jackson, that the then-
standard instruction on the coldness circumstance was unconstitutional.22'
It wrote that, in a case involving a pre-Jackson penalty phase, it "cannot
fault" the trial court for giving the standard instruction, but then held that
use of the standard instruction was harmful error.22
In Foster v. State,2' 3 the court retroactively applied Jackson to a
sentencing hearing that had occurred prior to an earlier remand for entry-of
a new sentencing order, writing that the death sentence was not yet
fimal.
224
212. 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992).
213. Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992).
214. E.g., Taylor v. State, 630 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1993) (refusing to apply Fenelon to
case pending on appeal), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 107 (1994).
215. 644 So. 2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 107 (1994).
216. 597 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1992).
217. Id. at 261.
218. Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1007-08 n.4
219. 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995).
220. Id. at 685.
221. Id. at 686 (citing Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 901).
222. Id.
223. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 314 (1995).
224. Id. at 115.
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D. The Appellate Record
Lockhart v. State,22 5 and one of Aileen Wuornos' cases226 addressed
questions regarding a court's power to look beyond the record before it.
After Michael Lee Lockhart, as noted below, waived mitigation in the trial
court, the judge sought to find mitigation by reading newspaper articles
based on interviews of the defendant. The supreme court disapproved of
this approach.227
In Wuornos, after entering a plea of nolo contendere to three murder
charges, Wuomos presented at sentencing some limited hearsay evidence in
mitigation.228 On appeal, the supreme court rejected her request that the
court take judicial notice of the case in mitigation in her other case:
The entire reason for having a trial in a court of record is so that the
appellate courts of Florida may review questions of law based on a true
transcript of what occurred. While judicial notice of other proceedings
certainly is permissible in some instances, it is not proper when the
party in effect is asking that we use a wholly separate proceeding to
establish a mitigating factor that was not asserted at any time in the
proceedings below. 29
E. Proportionality
Under Songer,23" the court will reduce a death sentence to one of life
imprisonment where there is only one aggravating circumstance to weigh
against substantial mitigation.23 During the survey period, the court
followed Songer in reducing death sentences in the following three cases.
In the case of Derek Todd Thompson,232 the court struck three of the
four aggravating circumstances supporting a death sentence for the murder
225. 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995).
226. Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708
(1995).
227. Lockhart, 655 So. 2d at 74.
228. Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1015.
229. Id. at 1019. The court has in the past looked outside the record in cases in which,
like, Gamble, a co-defendant has received a life sentence after the appellant's sentencing.
Gamble, 659 So. 2d at 245. In Witt v. State the court wrote that it could not "judicially
ignore" the subsequent life sentence of a co-defendant. 342 So. 2d 497, 500 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); see also Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992).
230. Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
231. Id. at 1011-12.
232. Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
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of a restaurant employee during a robbery. 3  This left only the felony
murder circumstance to weigh against the mitigating factors that the
defendant was a good parent and provider, had no violent propensities
before the murder, had been honorably discharged from the Navy, had been
regularly employed, was raised in the church, possessed rudimentary artistic
skills, and was a good prisoner.2
In Chaky v. State,235 the court found the prior violent felony circum-
stance 36 insufficient to outweigh mitigating evidence respecting Kenneth
Chaky's exemplary work, military, 7 family record, remorse, and potential
for rehabilitation and good prison record.238 Although the case involved
a murder arising from a troubled family relationship, the court did not
discuss its line of cases stating death is a disproportionate penalty for such
murders.239
Besaraba v. State2' applied Songer to a double homicide. As
already noted, the court struck the coldness circumstance, leaving only the
prior violent felony circumstance.241 The court found this insufficient to
outweigh mitigation that Joseph Besaraba had no significant prior criminal
history, committed the murder under the influence of a great disturbance,
had a history of substance abuse and physical and emotional problems, was
of good character and had a record of reliable employment, conducted
himself well while incarcerated, and had suffered an unstable and deprived
childhood. 22
233. Id. at 827.
234. Id. at 826 n.2. The jury voted nine to three for a death sentence. Id. at 825-26.
235. 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
236. The defendant had been convicted for attempted murder while serving in the
military in Vietnam. Id. at 1171.
237. Notwithstanding the attempted murder conviction, Chaky "was restored to active
duty and eventually was honorably discharged." Id
238. Id. at 1173.
239. See Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (1990), Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 361
(Fla. 1988), Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985).
240. 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995).
241. As to each murder, the other contemporaneous murder constituted a "prior" felony
conviction for sentencing purposes. Id. at 443 n.4.
242. Id. at 446-47. Much of his childhood was spent in Nazi concentration camps and
post-war refugee camps. Id at 446.
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F. Revisiting Issues
Foster v. State' 3 presents an unusual case of the court revisiting an
issue on an appeal after remand. On a previous appeal, the court rejected
a constitutional challenge to the standard jury instruction on the coldness
circumstance, 2' but remanded for the trial court to enter a new sentencing
order245 expressly evaluating mitigation under Campbell v. State2" and
Rogers v. State.247 On the appeal after the remand, the court let the
appellant re-litigate the jury instruction issue because the sentence was "not
yet final."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The supreme court's decisions broke little new ground during the
survey period. Nevertheless, the adoption of rule 3.202 (as discussed in the
first section of this article) governing state mental examination of capital
defendants 9 promises substantial litigation in years ahead.
243. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1995).
244. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 462 (Fla. 1992).
245. Id. at 465.
246. 571 So. 2d 415 (1990) (holding abusive and deprived childhood should be
considered in mitigation).
247. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987) (ruling that evidence presented by the State during the
penalty phase should be limited to those matters provided by statute), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1020 (1988).
248. Foster, 654 So.2d at 115 n.6.
249. Rehearing was still pending as of April 10, 1996.
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I. GENERAL, LIMITED, AND LIMITED LiABlrry PARTNERSHIPS
A "registered limited liability partnership ("RLLP")," also known as a
"limited liability partnership"' or LLP, represents the most recent item on
the roster of possible partnership structures in Florida.2 Before passage of
the Florida Registered Limited Liability Partnership Act in June 1995,
persons desiring to do business in the state as a partnership had only two
choices: the general partnership and the limited partnership.3
In a general partnership all partners have joint and several, unlimited
personal liability for their own acts, for those of the other partners and of
the employees acting within the scope of their employment, and for the
debts of the partnership. In a limited partnership, which consists of two
classes of partners, limited and general, only the limited partners enjoy some
protection from liability. The general partners in a limited partnership are
personally liable for all the debts of the partnership, of the partners, and of
the employees. In contrast, the limited partners are only liable for the
amount contributed to the business, unless they participate in the manage-
ment, or take control, of the business In short, a general partnership
provides no protection for the partners' assets. A limited partnership leaves
the general partner fully exposed and provides limited liability for the
limited partner at the cost of lack of control of the business.
Mirroring the limited liability provisions of other states that have
enacted similar legislation, the Florida RLLP Act allows general and limited
partnerships to limit the exposure of their partners to liability for their own
negligent acts and those of the persons whom they supervise and shields
them from liability for the acts of their partners. The Florida RLLP fits
1. The two terms are generally considered interchangeable. Martin I. Lubaroff,
Registered Limited Liability Partnerships--the Next Wave, INSIGHTS, May 1994, at 23, 23
n.1.
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 620.78-.789 (1995) (creating a "registered limited liability partner-
ship").
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 620 (1993).
4. Florida's partnership laws provide "safe harbors" for limited partners, allowing them
to control the busirness to the extent specified in the statute without forfeiting their limited
liability. FLA. STAT. § 620.129(2) (1995).
5. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
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into the parameters of the LLP structure as defined in prior legislation and
contains many of the same advantages and disadvantages.
II. DEFINING AN LLP
As a new twist on partnership law, the LLP structure has sparked the
interest of legislators and gained recognition in a majority of states since
1991, the year that Texas passed the first LLP legislation.6 Its popularity
stems from the statutory protection it provides to partners. In an LLP,
partners are shielded from vicarious liability for the negligence and
malpractice of other partners.
A. Hybrid Liability
By definition, an LLP is a general partnership for all purposes except
as modified by statute.7 Because it falls within the framework of a
partnership, and is not a distinct legal entity,' an LLP is subject to all the
laws governing general partnerships in each state, except for the liability
provisions which in most cases have replaced the joint or joint and several
liability provisions of the partnership statutes.' Of the thirty-nine legisla-
6. See, e.g., Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 23 & n.2; see also Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b-3.08(a) (West Supp. 1995); infra note 10 (listing the 39 states that enacted LLP
statutes by Jan. 1996).
7. Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 23; see also Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability
Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships: Operations and Drafting After Rev. Proc.
95-10, Q236 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 (Mar. 16, 1995) (defining an LLP).
A registered limited liability partnership (LLP) is a general partnership
which has been registered with the secretary of state. [sic] [by] filing an
appropriate document.... The statutes vary on the filing requirements, and
some statutes require that the partnership maintain insurance. The statutes go to
some length to confirm that an LLP is not only a general partnership, but is also
the same general partnership that existed prior to the filing of the registration
with the secretary of state. The benefit of being a general partnership rather than
a separate and distinct entity is that the LLP ... is able to take advantage of the
rules developed for general partnerships.
Id.
8. Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnerships and Other Entities
Authorized in Colorado, 24 COLO. LAw. 1525, 1525 (1995) (defining an LLP).
9. Most states have adopted amendments to their version of the Uniform Partnership Act
("UPA") to include the LLP as an option under the partnership umbrella. See, e.g., Uniform
Partnership Act (1994), P.A. 95-341, § 18, 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1252, 1257 (West)
(replacing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-53) (effective July 1, 1997).
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tures that have passed LLP statutes to date, 10 most have altered their
preexisting partnership laws and some, including Florida, have created
separate sections within the partnership statute to govern LLPs.
In those states which have altered existing partnership statutes, the
resulting hybrid of an unlimited and a limited liability partnership exhibits
the duality to be expected in an entity that is both a creature of statute and
a creature of the common law. First, LLP statutes restrict the rights of
injured third parties to collect from all the partners of the partnership and
thus affect indemnity and contribution among the partners."
Second, although the statutes limit liability among general partners
under some circumstances, they do not eliminate the liability of one partner
to another for which the partnership agreement expressly provides.1
2
Because it remains a partnership, the partnership agreement governs the new
LLP just as it did the general partnership. Consequently, before registering
as an LLP, the partners should review and amend their agreement to avoid
inadvertent contradiction of the statutory limited liability through prevailing
contractual provisions. 3
Third, the statutory alterations to the partnership format do not act as
a panacea to cure all the ills of unlimited liability exposure. The partnership
itself remains jointly and severally liable to injured third parties along with
10. The 39 legislatures that have enacted LLP legislation as of January 1996 are
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Unlike other states, the Ohio Legislature has recognized the legal existence of a
"registered partnership having limited liability," rather than the usual LLP or RLLP. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1775.14, .61-.63 (Anderson Supp. 1995).
Texas was the first state to pass LLP legislation in 1991. Lubaroff, supra note 1
(discussing the original five LLP statutes enacted in Texas, followed by Louisiana in 1992,
and Delaware, D.C., and North Carolina in 1993); see also Act effective August 26, 1991,
ch. 901, § 84, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (Vernon).
Connecticut first passed LLP legislation in 1994 effective January 1, 1996. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-53 historical notes (West Supp. 1995). Before the new law could
take effect, the legislature reworked the statute to include it in its revised Uniform
Partnership Act (1994). See P.A. 95-341, §18, 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. at 1257.
11. John R. Marquis, Creating a Michigan Limited Liability Partnership, 74 MICH. B.J.
698, 699 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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the negligent partner." Under the majority of LLP statutes, the partners
are still accountable for business debts of the partnership. 5 In addition,
the partners continue to be individually responsible for their own wrongdo-
ing. 6 As a result, while the new entity provides a measure of relief from
some types of liability exposure, the partnership's assets, and to the extent
of its contractual debts and the partners' own negligence, the partners'
individual assets are still at risk.
B. Limited Liability
1. Lateral Liability
All the LLP statutes purport to protect innocent partners from liability
for the wrongdoing of other partners by reducing exposure to "lateral" or
"horizontal" vicarious liability. 7 For example, the Delaware statute, the
third LLP statute to be enacted by a state legislature, uses the words,
"negligence, wrongful acts or misconduct" to describe the excused
conduct.'" The term "negligence" in section 1515 was intended to include
acts generally considered negligent and the addition of the terms "wrongful
acts" and "misconduct" was meant to encompass tortious conduct generally
beyond the scope of "negligence" as a legal term.19
The legislative history of Delaware's LLP law indicates that it was
intended to be "broadly protective" but only for specific conduct.20 By
confining the resulting liability shield to tortious conduct, the drafters hoped
to prevent the creation of "a magic, ever expanding list of excused conduct"
under the aegis of an LLP.2" In attempting to provide broad protection
14. David B. Rae, Limited Liability Partnership: The Time to Become One Is Now,
Hous. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 47, 47.
15. See infra part VI.B (discussing LLP statutory provisions which shield a partner from
personal liability for the partnership's contractual debts, as well as from claims arising from
negligence or malpractice).
16. See generally Thomas W. Van Dyke & Paul G. Porter, Limited Liability
Partnerships: The Next Generation, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Nov. 1994, at 16 (providing an
overview of the LLP structure). "The LLP is not an entirely new business entity; rather, it
is a general partnership that statutorily limits the liability of general partners without
changing the partnership mode of operation." Id at 20.
17. See Keatinge et al., supra note 8, at 1525.
18. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(b) (Supp. 1994); see Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 23.
19. Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 24.
20. Id
21. Id.
1996] 1303
284
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
while narrowly defining the type of conduct protected, the Delaware statute
served as the model for most of the subsequently enacted LLP legislation.22
2. Vertical Liability
Most LLP statutes expressly sanction "vertical" vicarious liability by
making each partner responsible for the tortious acts of the persons whom
the partner supervises."3 Again using the Delaware statute as an example,
a partner in a Delaware LLP is liable for the "negligence, wrongful acts, or
misconduct ... of any person under his direct supervision and control. 24
The statute apparently requires active supervision and control but does not
state that they are prerequisites to liability. The inference may be drawn
that a partner is not responsible for another partner's wrongdoing when the
supervision is casual or cursory.2 ' Because the degree and quality of
supervisory involvement necessary for liability is unclear, vertical liability
will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation. Despite this definitional
ambiguity, the verbatim borrowing of the quoted language by many states
proves that Delaware's interpretation of vertical liability has set the standard
in subsequently enacted LLP statutes across the nation.
This paper will first discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the
LLP as a business structure. It will then examine in detail both the newly
enacted Florida version of the LLP statute and the individual liability
provisions of the LLP statutes of other states. Because the nature of a
partner's liability is "at the heart of what it means to be an [LLP], 26 such
an examination will serve to illuminate its essential elements.
III. ADVANTAGES OF LLPs
Although professional partnerships of accountants and lawyers were the
first entities to take advantage of the limited liability offered by LLPs, the
statutes in most states do not restrict the type of partnership that may
22. See infra part VI.A (discussing the statutes, including the Florida RLLP Act, that
list excused tortious conduct).
23. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 486.15(2) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
56.315(c) (1994); Act of May 11, 1995, ch. 337, § 7, 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West).
24. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 1515(c) (1993).
25. Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 25. "An intimate involvement in supervision and control
in connection with what is going on with respect to a matter appears to be required as a
precursor to the imposition of liability." Id.
26. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8204 committee cmt. (Supp. 1995).
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register as an LLP.27 Any partnership, whether of architects, engineers, or
plumbers, whether professional or service organization, may become an
LLP.28 An LLP provides an attractive modification of the unlimited
liability of a general partnership because it is easy to form, it benefits from
partnership pass-through taxation, and it enjoys an uncomplicated struc-
ture.2 9 The question of suitability of the structure for a particular business,
however, should be considered on the basis of the specific needs of the
business and its participants.
A. Ease of Formation
Formation of an LLP requires the filing with the designated state
authority of cursory information concerning the partnership." The
registration must include the partnership's name and address, the number of
partners, and a brief description of the business, and be accompanied by a
filing fee (usually $100 per partner). The registration is effective for one
year and therefore must be renewed annually, which requires an annual
filing fee. The partnership must comply with the statutory insurance
requirements.31 Compliance with these simple steps erects a statutory
shield of limited liability while the partnership is registered as an LLP. The
shield, however, has not been tested by the courts.
27. See, e.g., Rae, supra note 14, at 47 (noting that the Texas LLP statute permits any
general partnership to convert to an LLP). Rae commented that restricting LLPs to
professional partnerships was thought to be discriminatory. Id. at 47 n.1.
28. Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 29. "There is no reason why any partnership, particularly
partnerships involved in service-related businesses should not consider electing LLP status."
Id.
29. Van Dyke & Porter, supra note 16, at 16.
30. For example, in Florida, registration requires payment of a filing fee and proof of
insurance. See discussion infra parts V.A, F.
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 620.7851 (1995).
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B. Benefits of Partnership Taxation
An LLP retains the advantages of pass-through partnership taxation,3"
so long as the LLP does not take on corporate characteristics.33 Because
an LLP is a variation on a general partnership, its tax status as a partnership
is probably more certain than the tax status of the limited liability company
("LLC") 34 the current frontrunner in the legislative race to enact the perfect
limited liability entity. The uncertainty with respect to the taxation of an
LLC has caused businesses to approach it with caution. The relative
certainty of the tax status of an LLP as a partnership,35 on the other hand,
will probably promote its use.
C. Simplicity of Structure
An entity created by agreement among its founders imposes fewer
restrictions, is inexpensive to set up and maintain, and provides a simpler
governing format than one that must comply with statutory mandates. For
32. In a partnership, the business is required to file returns with the Internal Revenue
Service which allocates the profits and losses among the partners, but the business itself is
not subject to tax. This type of tax treatment is known as pass-through or flow-through
taxation. In contrast, corporate profits are subject to "double taxation," once as corporate
income and once as shareholder income. Double taxation can lead to possible combined
taxation of more than 60% for a corporation and its shareholders.
33. The Internal Revenue Service examines four indicia of corporate characteristics to
determine whether an entity is essentially a corporation and should be taxed as one: limited
liability; free transferability of interests; centralization of management; and continuity of life
or perpetuity. Rae, supra note 14, at 47 n.4. Because partners of an LLP already enjoy
limited liability, to maintain its tax status as a partnership, the LLP must take care not to
acquire more of the cited indicia. Id.
34. An LLC provides every participant (known as a "member") with limited liability
akin to that of a shareholder in a corporation and to date has been given partnership tax
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code, so long as it lacks the majority of the corporate
characteristics. See MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.360 (Martin M.
Weinstein et al. eds., Supp. Jan. 1996) (summarizing recent Revenue Rulings classifying
LLCs as partnerships for federal income tax purposes). For Florida state taxation purposes,
Florida LLCs are taxed as corporations. FLA. STAT. § 608.471 (1995).
35. See Barbara C. Spudis, LLCs: Recent Developments and the Developing Uses of
Hybrid LLCs, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS,
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCrURING 1995, at 1003, 1003
(PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 373, 1995). "Because LLPs
are partnerships for state law purposes, classification issues have not arisen for them and no
private letter rulings have been published in the taxpayer requested a ruling with respect to
classification of an LLP." Id.
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these reasons, a partnership is popular as a business entity based on
agreement among the partners.
To smooth the transition to an LLP from a general partnership, the
original partnership agreement stays in force in an LLP and continues to
govern the structure of the entity. 6 Unlike a professional service corpora-
tion ("PSC") or an LLC, two other limited liability entities, the limited
liability registration of a partnership permits partners to carry on their
business as usual. Although enjoying similar limitations on vicarious
liability among its shareholders, a PSC is subject to a surfeit of state
regulation and is open only to the types of professionals listed in the PSC
statutes. 37 Similarly, an LLC must also comply with burdensome state
regulations, and has been compared to those that govern a corporation.38
Because the LLP is subject to minimal state interference, it constitutes an
alternative format worthy of consideration.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF LLPs
The disadvantages of LLPs as a choice of business structure center
around the liability for which they do not provide a shield. Other areas of
uncertainty include governing law and cultural3 9 questions.
A. Chinks in the LLP Liability Shield
The following list of "horribles" is not fantastic (nor exhaustive). A
business considering formation or conversion to an LLP should carefully
consider the pitfalls of doing so, even as it basks in the benefits conferred
by the LLP structure.
(1) A partnership which registers as an LLP has not escaped its liability
for any claim, whether in tort or in contract, and each partner is still liable
for his or her own wrongdoing and that of the persons the partner supervis-
es.4
36. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 621 (1995); see also id § 621.07 (using language identical
to that of § 620.782 to limit the liability of the professionals in a PSC).
38. LLC statutes also restrict who may form one. See Thom Weidlich, Limiting
Lawyers' Liability; LLPs Can Protect Assets of Innocent Partners, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994,
at 1, 1 (noting that certain states do not allow lawyers to form LLCs).
39. See infra part IV.C (citing examples of "cultural" issues that may arise in LLPs).
40. Marquis, supra note 11, at 703.
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(2) Under most LLP statutes, partners in an LLP are not protected
against the contract claims of third parties. This liability loophole may lead
to the proliferation of suits against LLPs for breach of contract.4
(3) The assets of partners in an LLP are exposed to claims that arose
before the partnership registered as an LLP.
42
(4) Should an LLP inadvertently forget to renew its registration on
time, the partnership loses its limited liability until it refiles, pays the annual
fee, and otherwise complies with the appropriate statutory provisions.43
This gap period may expose the partners to vicarious liability, even if the
partnership later re-registers.
(5) Because an LLP only shields non-negligent partners from the effects
of catastrophic events and does not safeguard partnership assets, the
partnership may have been decimated before statutory protections for
individual partners take effect.'
Such problems may still be legislatively remedied, but the LLP statutes
enacted to date do not address them.
B. Governing Law
Many states have taken care in enacting LLP statutes to include
provisions allowing LLPs formed in other states to do business within the
state.45 Florida's LLP statute takes a quantum leap ahead by expressly
providing that (a) a domestic LLP be recognized in other jurisdictions and
that (b) the liability of the partners in a Florida LLP doing business out of
state be governed by the Florida LLP statute.46 The issue, however,
remains unresolved in the states which have not yet addressed either foreign
or domestic LLPs legislatively. As a result, interstate problems may exist
for an LLP that does business across state lines.47
41. See infra part IV.C.
42. Marquis, supra note 11, at 703.
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 620.78 (mandating yearly renewal of registration for a
Florida LLP).
44. Marquis, supra note 11, at 703.
45. Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 23 (citing the New Jersey and Minnesota LLP legislation
as examples of jurisdictions qualifying a foreign LLP); see also FLA. STAT. § 620.7885
(1995) (citing requirements for a foreign LLP wanting to do business in Florida).
46. FLA. STAT. §§ 620.783, .789; see infra part V.D, G (discussing the choice of law
and interstate commerce provisions of the Fla. RLLP Act).
47. An even stickier issue may be the tax implications for out-of-state partnerships who
decide to register in a state as a foreign LLP. Would these business entities be liable for
local taxation?
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Because most LLP statutes were recently enacted, only a few courts
have had the opportunity to address questions of whose law governs. Of
these, in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gardere & Wynne, L.L.P.,48 the
United States District Court for Massachusetts stated that the law of the state
of organization governs an LLP.49 The case was decided in December
1994, a year before the enactment of the Massachusetts LLP statute.
50
Liberty Mutual, a long-standing client of the defendant Dallas law firm,
Gardere & Wynne ("G & W"), had its principal place of business in Boston
and therefore chose to bring suit in a Massachusetts court. It alleged that
two new members of G & W, also named as defendants, breached their
fiduciary duty by continuing to represent a company against whom the
insurance company had been litigating for a number of years.
The federal district court considered two defense motions to dismiss the
case based on lack of personal jurisdiction and other legal theories, or
alternatively, to transfer venue to Texas. Repeatedly noting that it was
being called upon to decide "difficult and unsettled issues of Texas law"'"
because the defendant G & W was organized as a Texas LLP, the court
ruled in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Texas mainly as a result
of jurisdictional concerns in Massachusetts which would become moot in
Texas. 2 In deciding to transfer, the court clarified that Texas law would
apply regardless of whether the case was heard in Massachusetts or in Texas
because of the Texas LLP's right to be judged under Texas law in a foreign
court.
5 3
Interestingly, the court also alluded in dicta to the "difficult issues of
Texas law that will have to be addressed by whichever court decides the
case on the merits," such as the extent to which non-involved partners are
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty.54 The court explained that the list of
excused conduct in the Texas LLP statute does not specifically shield a
partner from liability for such contractual wrongdoing.5  This comment
48. No. CIV.A.94-10609-MLW, 1994 WL 707133 (D. Mass. Dec. 6 1994).
49. Ud at *6 n.7.
50. Act of Nov. 28, 1995, ch. 281, § 7, 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. 822, 823 (West)
(amending MASS. GEN. L. ch. 108A § 15).
51. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1994 WL 707133, at *4; see also id. at *6, *7, *9 (also
referring to Texas LLP law as "unsettled").
52. Id. at *11.
53. Id at *6 n.7.
54. Id at *9.
55. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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echoes the concern that the limited liability shield may not protect partners
from contractual liability to third parties.56
Two other recent cases have touched on jurisdictional issues with
respect to LLPs, Lowsley-Williams v. North River Insurance Co." and
UOP v. Andersen Consulting.8 In the latter case, a Connecticut court
ruled that the state long-arm statute governing foreign partnerships covered
an Illinois LLP because it was a foreign partnership, although the foreign
LLP had offices in Connecticut and several of its partners lived in-state. 9
The holding may provide guidance to other courts in determing the status
of a foreign LLP.
In Lowsley-Williams, on the other hand, the federal district court in
New Jersey could do no more than note the need for congressional action
to help the judiciary define diversity jurisdiction when addressing "the wide
array of non-traditional legal entities which currently exist and which are
continuously being created."'  Faced with deciding the citizenship of a
Lloyd's London syndicate with which the plaintiff was associated, the court
concluded that the syndicate most closely resembled an LLP.6  Because
of the lack of legislative guidelines on diversity jurisdiction relating to
partnerships, however, the categorization proved inconclusive. Both cases
illustrate the struggle that courts will continue to confront in addressing
jurisdictional issues surrounding LLPs.
C. Cultural Questions
Perhaps more difficult to resolve than jurisdictional issues are the
cultural questions that may arise within an LLP because these cannot be
resolved through legislation. For example, partners may be reluctant to take
on supervisory burdens because of potential liability if the supervised person
missteps and is considered to have acted while under the partner's "direct
supervision and control." 62 The new entity may also alter relationships
among the partners because limited lateral liability erects a legal barrier
56. See supra part IV.A (discussing the chinks in the liability shield).
57. 884 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995).
58. No. CV 95014753S, 1995 WL 784971 (Conn. Super. Dec. 21, 1995).
59. d at *2.
60. 884 F. Supp. at 170.
61. Id.
62. See supra part I.B.2.
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between negligent and non-negligent partners.63 The statute might thus
have an inhibiting effect on the way the partners perform.'
Whether or not these disadvantages will eventually discourage the
widespread use of LLPs, state legislatures are rallying to the LLP banner.
The Florida Legislature is a recent convert.
V. THE FLORIDA RLLP ACT
The Florida Registered Limited Liability Partnership Act supplements
Florida's partnership laws by creating sections 620.78 through 620.789 of
the Florida Statutes. The Act permits a Florida partnership to register as an
RLLP; specifies registration and name requirements; outlines the limitation
on individual partner liability for the acts of others; and mandates that an
RLLP must be insured for a minimum amount.65 The following section-
by-section analysis examines these details of the Act in full, as well as other
significant provisions.
A. Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
Section 620.78 of the Florida Statutes outlines the requirements that a
partnership must satisfy to become an RLLP. The partnership must file a
statement of registration or a statement of registration renewal with the
Department of State ("DOS"), containing, among other items, its name and
address, the number of partners, and a brief description of the partnership
business.66 The statement of registration must either be executed or
authorized by a "majority in voting interest of the partners."'67 Registration
must be accompanied by a fee of $100 for each resident partner, up to a
limit of $10,000 for each LLP, and is effective for one year after the date
the registration statement is filed or renewed.6"
The statute mandates that the DOS shall register or renew the
registration of any partnership that has complied with the registration or
renewal requirements. The DOS thus may not reject a properly filed
registration statement. It also provides that an RLLP can amend its
63. Marquis, supra note 11, at 703.
64. Id. But see Weidlich, supra note 38, at 1 (quoting a commentator that an LLP
structure will increase the level of comfort for lawyers practicing together).
65. See also FLA. H.R. Comm. on Com., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT CS for HB 717, part I Summary (May 9, 1995) (preliminary draft).
66. FLA. STAT. § 620.78(1).
67. Id. § 620.78(2).
68. Id. § 620.78(3), (6).
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statement of registration by filing a "certificate of amendment" with the
DOS.69
B. Cancellation of Registration
Section 620.781 of the Florida Statutes provides that an RLLP may
cancel its registration by filing a statement of cancellation of registration
with the DOS.70 The section specifies that the statement of cancellation
must be executed or authorized by a "majority in voting interest of the
partners."7 The statement of cancellation must also contain the name of
the RLLP, the initial date of registration, and the effective date of cancella-
tion if it is not effective when filed.72 The filing of the statement only
cancels the partnership's registration as an LLP and does not dissolve the
partnership itself.73 Thus, an RLLP may decide to terminate its status as
a limited liability entity without dissolving the partnership.
C. Partner's Liability
Section 620.782 of the Florida Statutes sanctions limited lateral liability
for partners in an RLLP. In a validly registered LLP, a partner is "not
individually liable for obligations, or liabilities of the partnership, whether
in tort, contract, or otherwise, arising from errors, omissions, negligence,
malpractice, or wrongful acts committed by another partner or by an
employee, agent, or representative of partnership."74
A partner, however, remains individually liable for (a) debts "arising
from any cause other than those specified"; for (b) the wrongful acts
"committed by the partner or any person under the partner's direct supervi-
sion and control in the specific activity in which errors, omissions,
negligence, malpractice, or wrongful acts occurred"; or for (c) obligations
"for which the partner has agreed in writing to be liable."75 The section
primarily protects a partner in an RLLP from liability for the wrongdoing
of other partners "or any person" over whose acts he had no actual supervi-
sion or control, but it does not protect the partnership itself from any
obligations or liabilities for the wrongful acts.
69. Itd § 620.78(5), (8).
70. d § 620.781(1).
71. FLA. STAT. § 620.781(1).
72. I § 620.781(2).
73. Id. § 620.781(3).
74. Id § 620.782(1).
75. Id. § 620.782(2).
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The section contains three additional noteworthy provisos. First, a
partner forfeits his liability protection if the RLLP does not carry the
specified minimum amount of insurance coverage. The insurance require-
ment provides some recourse for victims of a protected partner's wrongdo-
ing.76 Second, the cancellation of registration, dissolution, or withdrawal
of a partner does not affect the limitation of an individual partner's liability
while the registration of the RLLP was in effect. 7 Third, the RLLP may
sue or be sued without the necessity of joining its partners in the suit, and
a partner who is not liable for a wrongful act is "not a proper party" in a
suit against the RLLP arising out of the wrongful acts described in section
620.782(). 71 This provision emphasizes both the non-negligent partner's
protected status and the exposure of the RLLP itself.
D. Liability-Governing Law
Section 620.783 of the Florida Statutes, the choice of law provision,
provides that the liability of a partner in an RLLP registered in Florida is
governed solely by Florida law.
79
E. Name of a RLLP
Section 620.784 of the Florida Statutes deals with the requirements for
the name of an RLLP. Among other requirements, the name must contain
the words "Registered Limited Liability Partnership," or the designation
"L.L.P." or "LLP" as the last words of its name. 0 This provision gives
notice to third parties who have dealings with the RLLP of the limitations
on liability of its partners.
F. Insurance of RLLPs
Section 620.7851 of the Florida Statutes allows an RLLP to meet the
mandatory insurance requirement in one of two ways, by purchasing liability
insurance or by setting aside funds to satisfy judgments."' In either case,
the "minimum coverage amount" is defined as $100,000 multiplied by the
number of general partners in excess of one, and must be at least $200,000
76. FLA. STAT. § 620.782(3); see also id. § 620.7851 (1995).
77. Id. § 620.782(4).
78. Id. § 620.782(6), (7).
79. Id. § 620.783 (1995).
80. FLA. STAT. § 620.784(1).
81. Id. § 620.7851(1).
1996] 1313
294
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
up to a limit of $3,000,000.82 The insurance requirement ensures that a
victim of the wrongful acts listed in section 620.782 will have recourse to
a minimum amount of insurance funds for recovery of damages without
limiting the amount of damages recoverable from the partnership or from an
unprotected partner.83
G. Professional Services
Section 620.787 addresses ethical considerations pertaining to those
professionals who provide services already regulated by a state regulatory
agency and who wish to register as an LLP. The section states that the
appropriate regulatory agency will continue to supervise the registered
partnership. Further, the partners in an LLP are "subject to disciplinary
proceedings and penalties in the same manner and to the same extent as
individuals '84 in that profession. To ensure on-going oversight, the LLP
must provide a certified copy of its registration to the regulatory agency.85
Among other types of professional service providers attracted to the
LLP blueprint, law firms organized as LLPs would remain within the
traditional partnership framework while enjoying the advantages of limited
liability. Florida law firms considering section 620.78 registration rely on
compliance with section 620.787 to avoid violating the two Rules of
Professional Conduct that prohibit lawyers from limiting their liability.
86
Section 620.787 directs a law firm organized as an LLP to remain under the
supervision of the Florida Bar, the state agency responsible for the ethical
conduct of lawyers. Section 620.782, the liability provision of Florida's
LLP Act, echoes Bar Rule 4-5.1(c)(2) 87 by not relieving a partner in an
82. Id. § 620.7851(2).
83. Id. § 620.7851(4).
84. Id. § 620.787(1).
85. FLA. STAT. § 620.787(2).
86. See Steel, Hector & Davis Memorandum to John A. Boggs, Director Law. Reg., Fla.
Bar, from Victoria L. Weber & Cathy M. Sellers, Necessity for Florida Bar Rule Addressing
Registered Limited Liability Partnerships 5 (June 20, 1995) (reviewing the Fla. RLLP Act,
Fla. Bar rules and case law, and the practice in other LLP jurisdictions to conclude that a Bar
rule authorizing legal LLPs is unnecessary) (on file with authors).
87. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-5.1(c)(2) (1995).
Responsibility for Rules Violations. A lawyer shall be responsible for another
lawyer's violation of the Rules of Profession Conduct if:
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices,
or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
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LLP from supervisory responsibility and is subordinated to the ethical
guidelines of the Bar rules as a result of section 620.787. More importantly,
the Bar rules are confined to questions of ethical conduct; matters of civil
or criminal liability fall outside the scope of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.88 Legal professionals wishing to register as LLPs see no conflict
between the LLP statute and the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct
because they contend that the two are mutually exclusive."9
Legal practitioners also argue that Bar Rule 4-1.8(h),9' which bars
lawyers from making agreements to limit their prospective malpractice
liability to a client, is consistent with section 620.782. Because the limiting
of a lawyer's liability under the LLP Act is self-executing and, therefore,
requires no additional agreement between the lawyer and the client, the Act
does not violate the prohibition on entering into liability-restricting
agreements in the Bar rule.9 Moreover, by using the singular noun,
"lawyer's liability," to identify whose liability may not be limited, the
language of rule 1.8(h) suggests that its prohibition does not apply to
vicarious liability among lawyers.92 The rule apparently was intended to
assist a client in obtaining representation in a matter where the risk of legal
malpractice was high because of the nature of the problem.93 Rule 1.8(h)
thus provides an exception to the general rule that lawyers are liable for
their own malpractice. Because this general rule is incorporated into section
620.782(2)(b), which holds lawyers liable for their own malpractice, legal
to take reasonable remedial action.
Id.; see also Michael J. Lawrence, Note, The Fortified Law Firm: Limited Liability Business
and the Propriety of Lawyer Incorporation, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 207, 214-15 (1995)
(discussing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 5.1 (1995)).
88. FLA. STAT. Bar Rule 4-5.1 cmt. ("Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or
criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these
rules.").
89. Weber & Sellers, supra note 86, at 6. But see Keatinge et al., supra note 7, at 149-
50 (noting that "[a]t the least, violation of ethical rules is probative of violation of the
standard of care" (footnote omitted)).
90. "Limiting Liability for Malpractice. A lawyer shall not make an agreement
prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by
law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement .. " R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(h).
91. Id.
92. Lawrence, supra note 87, at 216.
93. IM (citing GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WLLLAM HODES, 2 THE LAW OF
LAWYERiNG: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT § 1.8:901
(Supp. 1992)).
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professionals maintain that the Florida LLP Act is consistent with Florida
Bar Rule 4-1.8(h).
Beyond compliance with codified ethical regulation, however, is the
troubling question of a lawyer's responsibility to the client. Lawyers are
generally held to a higher standard both by the public and by the judicia-
ry.94 Even if the state Bar is convinced that registration as an LLP will not
conflict with existing Bar rules, legal practitioners must consider the
impression that an attempt to create a liability shield will make on the
public. The potential for negative repercussions from limited liability
among law firm partners should not be ignored. Despite the long-standing
acceptance of limited vicarious liability for attorneys in Florida PSCs,9 s the
public may incorrectly perceive lawyers' use of the new LLP format as
unseemly.
H. Miscellaneous Provisions
Sections 620.786, 620.788, 620.7885, and 620.7887 of the Florida
Statutes address the effect of registration on dissolution of an RLLP;9 6 the
conversion of a limited partnership into an RLLP; and the requirements for
registration and cancellation of registration of a foreign (that is, out-of-state)
RLLP that wants to do business in Florida.97
I. Applicability to Foreign and Interstate Commerce
Section 620.789 of the Florida Statutes constitutes the comity provision
of the Act, in which the Florida Legislature asks that other states defer to
its jurisdiction over LLPs organized in Florida. The section codifies the
legislative intent that the "legal existence" of Florida RLLPs doing business
outside the state be recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.9" It also enables a domestic LLP to do business
94. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. 1983) (holding a
lawyer in a PSC liable for his partner's misconduct, despite state legislation permitting
lawyers organized as a PSC to limit their vicarious liability).
95. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 557 (Fla. 1961) (holding that Florida Bar
members may practice law as PSCs).
96. FLA. STAT. § 620.786 (1995).
97. The organizational and internal affairs of a foreign LLP are to be governed by the
laws of the jurisdiction under which it is organized, "including the liability of partners, solely
by reason of being partners, for the debts, obligations, and liabilities of or chargeable to the
partnership." Id. § 620.7885(4).
98. Id. § 620.789(2).
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nationwide and internationally.99 In enacting section 620.789, the legisla-
ture intended that the limitation on liability that non-negligent partners enjoy
in a Florida RLLP will protect them wherever the entity does business.
J. Effective Date
The Florida RLLP Act took effect October 1, 1995, the thirtieth LLP
statute to become effective."
K. How Does the Florida RLLP Measure Up?
Section 620.782 on the nature of a partner's liability constitutes the
functional provision of the Act. A comparison of its operative language to
the words that other states have chosen to limit liability in an LLP sheds
light on the potential efficacy of the liability shield. Although Florida's
LLP Act was recently enacted, the legislature chose to follow Delaware's
1993 narrow formulation of the liability provision. Like Delaware, Florida
used a particularized list of excused conduct, rather than emulating Minne-
sota's choice of a broader, more protective, corporate-like liability shield.
Florida's choice of a conservative approach suggests that the legislature was
concerned with the potential difficulty that Florida RLLPs might encounter
in doing business outside the state. 1 Its solution was to minimize the
difficulty by not placing Florida LLPs in the forefront of the movement
toward enhanced liability protection. The variety of legislative approaches
to creating LLPs also highlights the interstate diversity in the nature of the
protection provided to a partner in a limited liability partnership.
99. Ia § 620.789(1).
100. Act of June 18, 1995, ch. 409, § 13, 1995 Fla. Laws 1386, 1391 (effective October
1, 1995) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 620.78 et seq.).
101. See Michael J. Bohnen, Limited Liability Partnerships for Law Firms Proposed
Massachusetts Legislation, BOSTON B.J., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 7, 13 (discussing comity issues
for Massachusetts LLPs).
It is not clear whether the limitation on liability will be recognized in states that
do not have LLP legislation. Arguably, courts of other states should recognize
the liability shield of an LLP under the 'internal affairs doctrine,' which treats
the laws of the state of organization as governing the liability of members of
other forms of business organizations.... However, because... [some] states
do not have LLP laws, the issue remains a consideration in those jurisdictions.
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VI. THE NATURE OF A PARTNER'S LIMITED LIABILITY
By January 1996, thirty-nine legislatures had enacted provisions
limiting a partner's liability in LLPs.' In defining the nature of a
partner's liability in the new entity, these statutes fall into two broad
categories: those that contain a particularized list of excused conduct, the
"list" jurisdictions, and those that do not, the "no list" jurisdictions. 0 3
The former category contains the majority of states and provides a narrower
102. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-215 (Supp. 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15015
(Deering Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-60-115 (West Supp. 1995); Uniform
Partnership Act (1994), P.A. 95-341, 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. § 18 (West) (amending CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-53) (effective July 1, 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515 (1993 &
Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-146 (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. §§ 620.78-.789 (1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-15 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-315 (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 205/15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE § 23-4-1-15 (Supp. 1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 486.15 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-315 (1994); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 362.220 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431
(West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9-307 (Supp. 1995); Act of Nov.
28, 1995, ch. 281, 1995 Mass. Legis. Serv. § 7 (West) (amending MASS. GEN. L. ch. 108A,
§ 15); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449.46 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (West
1995 & Supp. 1995); Act of Mar. 14, 1995, ch. 353, 1995 Miss. Laws § 3 (amending Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-12-29); Mo. REV. STAT. § 358.150 (Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
10-307 (1995); Act of July 1, 1995, ch. 465, 1995 Nev. Stat. § 12 (amending NEV. REV.
STAT. § 87.150); Ch. 96, § 3 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 302, 302-03 (West) (amending N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 42:1-15); Ch. 185, § 13 1995 Adv. Leg. Serv. 1534, 1552-53 (Michie) (to be
codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-48); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26 (McKinney Supp.
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-22-08 (Supp. 1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1775.14 (Anderson Supp. 1994); Act of July 19, 1995, ch. 689,
1995 Or. Laws § 3 (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 68.270); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8204
(Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 48-2-15 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-114 (Supp. 1995); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-12 (Supp.
1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.04.730 (Supp. 1995);
Act of Dec. 1, 1995, 1995 Wis. Legis. Serv. Act 97, § 9 (West) (to be codified at WIS. STAT.
§ 178.12(2)-(4); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (listing states that have
enacted LLP statutes).
103. Cf Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited Liabilityfor Lawyers: General Partners Need Not
Apply, 51 Bus. LAW. 85, 107-09 (1995) (categorizing LLP statutes into three groups
immunizing partners from vicarious liability for "tort only," "tort or contract," and "tort,
contract, or otherwise" types of wrongdoing); Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability
Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization,
51 BuS. LAW. 147, 175-80 (1995) (dividing LLP acts chronologically into first, second, and
third generation statutes, with the original group providing protection for negligence claims,
the next group addressing negligence and other misconduct, whether in tort, contract, or
otherwise, and the most recent enactments providing full vicarious liability protection).
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type of protection for partners choosing to do business as an LLP. The
latter category protects partners who register from the tortious conduct of
fellow partners, in some states even for supervisory liability,""4 and has
extended statutory protection to liability for debts chargeable to the
partnership.
A. The "List" Jurisdictions
Twenty-three legislatures have passed LLP statutes that attempt to
restrict the type of conduct for which an innocent partner can be liable by
listing specific acts of others from which the partner is shielded.
The District of Columbia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas passed
one-of-a-kind statutes between 1991 and 1993. In Texas, for instance, a
partner is not liable for another partner's "errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance," a fairly typical list of excused conduct. 5
The shield is not qualified, however, by the usual provision providing for
vertical liability for the conduct of a person under the partner's "direct
supervision and control."'I Instead, a partner in a Texas LLP is exposed
to risk if the partner is "directly involved in the specific activity in which
the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were
committed by the other partner," or the partner "had notice or knowledge"
of the culpable conduct and according to the 1993 amendment of the earlier
liability provision, "failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or cure" the
wrongdoing."W Although North Carolina's statute similarly provides that
to incur liability the partner must have been "directly involved in the
specific activity,"'08 the notice or knowledge provision does not appear in
its liability provisions or that of any other state's LLP laws.
104. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-60-115(2)(a) (stating that partner in an LLP
is liable for own misconduct but omitting mention of liability for misconduct of person under
partner's supervision or control); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-15(c).
105. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a). The Texas LLP statute was
amended in 1993, but the list of excused conduct remained unchanged. See id. 1993 bar
committee's cmt. (noting that "[s]ubsection (a)(1) follows TUPA § 15(2) in providing that
a partner in a [RLLP] is not individually liable for the errors or omissions of another
partner").
106. See discussion of vertical liability supra part I.B.2; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3431 (West Supp. 1995) (omitting provisions for vertical liability).
107. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a)(1). The 1991 statute did not qualify
the notice requirement with a "reasonable steps" provision. See id 1993 bar committee's
cmt. (saying that the amendment merely "clarifies" the former version).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45(b).
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Delaware's 1993 LLP legislation spawned numerous progeny that are
very similar and sometimes identical. The statutes of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington all include negligence, wrongful
acts, or misconduct in their lists of excused conduct, mirroring Delaware's
provision; 1  eight of them add "omissions" and "malpractice" to the
list.1"' These two additions make the LLP structure more attractive to
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, by limiting a partner's
malpractice exposure to his own wrongdoing, and not that of fellow
practitioners."
The LLP statutes in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia loosely
resemble that of Delaware. Arizona's and Connecticut's statutes, for
example, omit the phrase "whether in tort, contract, or otherwise," although
both use the identical list of excused conduct as Delaware, namely
"negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct... 2 The omission may result
in an innocent partner being liable for a contractual breach of another
partner, even if the breach can be interpreted broadly as negligent behavior.
Finally, the LLP statutes in Kentucky and Utah, similar to those of
Texas and Louisiana,"' contain lists of excused conduct but no provision
for vertical liability, although both states expressly provide that the partner
is liable for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct."4 These
provisions further limit the type of conduct for which an innocent partner
can be held liable.
B. The "No List" Jurisdictions
The "no list" states, those which contain no particularized list of
excused conduct, can be further subdivided by the differences in the
109. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 486.15(2); see also supra part II.B.1.
110. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 205/15.
111. But see 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8204 committee cmt.
Although the Committee chose to use the phrase "negligent or wrongful
acts or misconduct" because of its use in other contexts in Pennsylvania law, the
Committee believes that it should include the actions covered by the Texas
provision cited in the Official Source Note, which refers to "errors, omission,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance."
Id.
112. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-215(B); Uniform Partnership Act (1994), P.A. 95-341,
§ 18, 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1257 (West).
113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
114. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-12(2)(a).
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operative language of their legislation. They fall into two categories. In
early 1994 the Minnesota Legislature created a limited liability entity which
provides the most comprehensive protection to partners in a registered firm
of any state. 5 By the end of 1995, fifteen additional states had chosen
this broadly exculpatory approach to the limitation of a partner's liability in
an LLP. California, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, New York, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin passed legislation that provides that a partner is "not
liable.., for any debts, obligations, or liabilities of... the partnership or
any other partner ... solely by reason of being a partner."' 1 6 Colorado,
Idaho, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, and Ohio have
statutes that resemble Minnesota's version: "A partner of a limited liability
partnership is not, merely on account of this status, personally liable for
anything chargeable to the partnership .... ,, 7
In minimizing a partner's liability in an LLP, the Minnesota Legislature
created a "corporate-like liability shield that severs the connection between
partner status and personal liability for partnership debts.1 .. A partner in
an LLP is protected exactly as are shareholders in a Minnesota corporation
and members in a Minnesota LLC, although partners in an LLP, do not
enjoy perpetual protection." 9 Limitation on liability lasts for one year
only while the current registration is in effect. If the registration is not
renewed, the liability buffer expires. The statute also expressly provides that
the corporate doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies- to LLPs.'2
115. See Keatinge et al., supra note 7, at 120-21 (discussing the liability of partners in
an LLP in the state of organization).
116. OR. REV. STAT. § 68.270 (1995). The liability provision in California's LLP Act
resembles this group of statutes, but it omits the word "solely," and like Maryland, New
York, Oregon, and South Dakota, does not qualify the liability with either "individually," as
Georgia does, or "personally," as in the LLP laws of Indiana and Wisconsin. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15015; GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-15; IND. CODE § 23-4-1-15. The omissions in
California's statute leave more room for manipulation when applying the statute to specific
instances of partner liability. California, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin were the most recent
states to jump on the LLP bandwagon and chose to join the no-list jurisdictions. In contrast,
the first states to enact LLP legislation took the more conservative approach by including
lists of excused conduct in their bills.
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West 1995).
118. Id. § 323.14 reporters' notes (naming Professors Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter
G. Bishop as co-reporters); see also id. § 323.14(2) (entitled "Limited Liability Partnership
Shield").
119. Id. § 323.14 reporters' notes (indicating that "the LLP shield is more ephemeral"
than the shield for corporate shareholders).
120. Id. § 323.14(3) (providing that "the case law that states the conditions and
circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under
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It does not, however, absolve a partner from personal liability for his own
misconduct.12' The Minnesota LLP was created in the corporate image.
In Colorado, a partner also enjoys blanket protection. The LLP shield
shelters partners from liability "directly or indirectly . . . for a debt,
obligation, or liability of... the partnership while it is a registered limited
liability partnership, except that... the liability of a partner... for such
partner's own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct" is not affected by
the section." Under the Colorado LLP Act, LLPs duplicate the liability
protection of LLCs, which shield members from liability to the same degree
as corporate shareholders are protected." In passing an LLP statute that
departs from the tradition begun by Texas in 1991, the Colorado Legislature
sought to reduce conflicts in two areas. First, it sought to avoid questions
and potential litigation regarding claim exclusion. Second, it hoped to
minimize conflicts arising from payment priority for personal negligence
claims as opposed to partnership contractual claims."
The "no list" states have enacted statutes that apparently shield partners
in an LLP from all liability that does not arise from personal negligence.
These limited liability entities may thus protect partners from contractual
claims as well as negligence and malpractice claims whether based on
common law or statute, whether the statute is state or federal.125
VII. CONCLUSION
LLP legislation is varied and becoming more so each day, as states
continue to embrace the innovative concept of limited liability within a
partnership framework. While legislatures are picking and choosing among
various possibilities for limited liability entities, the final format of the LLP
is still undecided. Questions remain regarding the extent of limitation on a
partner's liability and other issues such as taxation of foreign LLPs. Ideally,
once all the states have enacted their own legislation, a movement toward
uniformity will arise that will solve the problems attributable to the lack of
uniformity among state LLP statutes.
Minnesota law also applies to [LLPs]").
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 reporters' notes.
122. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-60-115(2)(a).
123. Keatinge et al., supra note 8, at 1525 & n.7.
124. Id. at 1525 & n.10.
125. See Lubaroff, supra note 1, at 26 (noting as example that under the LLP statutes
enacted from 1991 to 1993 it was uncertain whether liability limitations would extend to
statutory liability of a partner for employment discrimination).
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"There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."
-WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ahhhh! Life at nineteen... carefree youthfulness, Bacchanalian week-
ends, and unlimited free time. Life's biggest worries often amount to
nothing more than performing well on an exam, getting a date for the
weekend, or trying to adhere to this year's New Year's Resolution.
STOP!N!!!!!!
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Now, imagine that you are nineteen years old and require three
medications every day, without which you may die.' Your only means of
communication is a collection of noises that others have learned to interpret.
You never have more than fifteen to thirty minutes to yourself because you
are monitored on an hourly basis. You are prohibited from engaging in
sexual relations with the opposite sex because the possibility of pregnancy
could be fatal. An intercom has been installed in your bedroom to ensure
that you have no male visitors (and to provide medical supervision). To
most, this lifestyle seems like nothing short of a nightmare. To Catherine
White,2 this is reality.
Catherine is a nineteen-year-old mute woman who, since infancy, has
suffered from a moderately severe mental disability, grand mal epilepsy,
cerebral palsy, and scoliosis. Her mental and physical disabilities are
irreversible. Her I.Q. test results range between thirty and fifty on the
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale revised. Experts who have evaluated
Catherine agree that she has the mental age of a three to five-year-old
child.3
Over the course of her life, Catherine has experienced over fifty
seizures,4 some of which have lasted over sixty minutes.5 Any virus,
infection, cold, or fluctuation in her body temperature may cause her to have
a seizure.6 She is administered three drugs every day to control her
epilepsy.7 Without medication, she could experience status epilepticus,
causing her to seize repeatedly, and possibly die.8
1. The forthcoming facts approximate those in Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa.
Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175
(1995).
2. The name used in this article is fictitious, to protect Catherine's right to privacy.
3. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother (Feb.
20, 1995). The author would like to express his thanks to Ms. Engdahl for her assistance in
the preparation of this article.
7. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430 ("Every day Catherine is administered three drugs,
Phenobarbital, Dilantin, and Tegritol, sometimes in toxic doses, to control her epilepsy.").
8. Id. "At one point in 1989, [Catherine's] behavior became more aggressive and self-
abusive. It was thought that her Dilantin level was too high and was possibly contributing
to her behavior problem." Id. Her neurologist consequently reduced her dosage of Dilantin.
As a result, she began to experience a "severe seizure, and her dosage of medication had to
be increased to a toxic level in order to stabilize her." Id. Catherine had a seizure again.
Her physician noted this episode as a reminder of how difficult it is to control Catherine's
epilepsy. Id.
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Catherine could also suffer severe, life threatening trauma in the event
that she became pregnant. 9 Her epilepsy could cause a spontaneous
abortion or premature birth."0 Testimony indicated that a pregnancy could
also be psychologically traumatic for Catherine in the unlikely event that she
could carry the pregnancy to term, and then have to be separated from the
child due to her inability to care for it."
Because of the life-threatening dangers associated with pregnancy,
Catherine's mother chose to request permission from the Orphan's Court to
have a tubal ligation performed on her daughter." As required by
9. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 432. Catherine could experience a combination of
psychological and physiological trauma if she were to become pregnant. This instability
could aggravate her already tenuously controlled condition. See generally ERNST
NIEDERMEYER, EPILEPSY GUIDE: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF EPILEPTIC SEIZURE
DISORDERS 212 (1983) (explaining how pregnancy may aggravate seizure disorder); S. Koch
et al., Obstetric Complications in Pregnancies of Epileptic Mothers and Their Obstetric
Histories, in EPILEPSY, PREGNANCY, AND THE CHILD 91 (1982) (providing results of various
studies indicating complications suffered by epileptics during pregnancy); C.M. Lander &
M.J. Eadie, Plasma Antiepileptic Drug Concentrations During Pregnancy, 32 EPILEPSIA 257
(1991) (providing results of study confirming lower plasma antiepileptic drug ("AED")
concentrations in epileptics during pregnancy which may, as direct consequence, expose
patients with active epileptic disorders to heightened risk of increased seizure activity).
Catherine suffers from grand mal epileptic seizures which have lasted in excess of 60
minutes. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430. In some years of her life, Catherine has
experienced over 50 seizures. Id. Such seizures are also termed "status epilepticus" because
they are very prolonged. NIEDERMEYER, supra, at 78. For individuals who suffer status
epilepticus grand meal seizures during pregnancy, mortality of the fetus is high and maternal
mortality is considerable. I at 212. In one study of 29 patients with status epilepticus
during pregnancy, 9 of the 29 patients died, and at least 14 of the 29 fetuses died in utero
or shortly after birth. K. Teramo and V.K. Hiilesmaa, Pregnancy and Fetal Complications
in Epileptic Pregnancies: Review of the Literature, in EPILEPSY, PREGNANCY, AND THE
CHILD, supra, at 54. The life-threatening risks posed to Catherine in the event that she
became pregnant were not in dispute. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, supra note
6.
10. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 430.
11. IU In addition to the anxiety she would suffer as a result of being separated from
her child, research indicates that there may be psychological problems associated with the
pregnancy itself for a woman in Catherine's position. Dieter Schmidt, The Effect of
Pregnancy on the Natural History of Epilepsy: Review of the Literature, in EPILEPSY,
PREGNANCY, AND THE CHILD, supra note 9, at 8 ('The fear of the potential risk of giving
birth to a child with epilepsy, malformations, or functional defects may be overwhelming,"
"[t]he psychosomatics of pregnancy may contribute to the outcome of epilepsy during
pregnancy," and the "[l]oss of sleep or pregnancy-induced changes in sleep physiology,
anxiety-induced hyperventilation, or fatigue, may increase the seizure frequency.").
12. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 3, Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(No. 91-2970). Catherine's mother was quoted as saying, "[I] just wanted to see her
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Pennsylvania law, Catherine's mother sought appointment as her guardian
with specific authority to consent to the sterilization procedure.' 3  The
court of Common Pleas granted her such authority.14 This decision was
subsequently affirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
15
This note analyzes the constitutional implications of involuntary
sterilization as applied to the mentally disabled, when sought strictly out of
medical necessity. Part I discusses the case of Estate of C.W. Specifically,
it touches upon the common law sources which laid the groundwork for
Pennsylvania's best interests requirement for involuntary sterilization. Part
I argues that the sterilization of Catherine was lawfully granted. Part II will,
on a global level, trace the historical evolution of the eugenics movement
from which the court's current skepticism towards involuntary sterilization
lies. Part III explains the current status of sterilization. Part IV outlines the
evolution of the modem right to privacy, argues that the fundamental right
to sexuality is implicit in both the right to privacy and in the First
Amendment right to self-expression, and explains the right to habilitation.
Part V argues that the court's granting of authorization to perform the
sterilization procedure served to justly uphold Catherine's constitutional
rights to privacy, sexuality, and habilitation. Finally, part VI concludes with
a balancing test, which balances the state's interest in protecting Catherine's
rights to privacy16 and procreational freedom against her mother's interest
in protecting Catherine's rights to privacy, sexuality, habilitation, and life
itself.
[Catherine] have a life.. . . I want to do the best I can to protect her from any problems
happening in her life." Id.
13. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511 (1995). The court, upon petition and hearing and
upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence, may find a person domiciled in the
commonwealth to be incapacitated and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or
estate. Id.
14. Estate of C.W., No. 87-3107, slip. op. at 56 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Phila. County
Feb. 28, 1990), aff'd, 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
15. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
16. The right to privacy which the state asserts on Catherine's behalf relates to her
freedom from bodily intrusion. Alternatively, the right to privacy asserted by her mother is
the right for Catherine to be let alone, free from invasive state interests controlling her well-
being.
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II. GENERAL OvERvIEw: ESTATE OF C.W.
A. Catherine's Background
Since the age of twelve, Catherine has lived in a community living
arrangement ("CLA") 17 because she had become increasingly difficult to
care for at home." In view of her potential proximity to other males living
in the CLA, 19 her overly affectionate nature,2' and her heightened sexual
awareness,21 there exists a strong likelihood that Catherine could become
sexually involved and become pregnant.22 In the event that she did
become pregnant, her epileptic condition could very well put her and her
fetus into a life-endangering situation.
17. Community living arrangements such as the one where Catherine lives are intended
to provide a cooperative or structured small group living arrangement that is part of the
community, as opposed to an institutional system closed off from the community. See
generally HANDBOOK OF MENTAL RETARDATION (Johnny L. Matson & James A. Mulick
eds., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
18. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 431 (stating that while at home, Catherine sometimes
refused to eat or take medications and she often disrupted rest of family).
19. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 6, Estate of C.W (No. 91-2970). At one time,
there were three male residents living in the CLA whose ages ranged from 17 to 22. Id.
20. Ud at 5-6. Testimony indicated that Catherine is particularly affectionate, even with
strangers. Because she has been so sheltered through her developmental years, she has
learned to trust everyone with whom she comes into contact. She believes that everyone is
as caring as her parents and family, so consequently assumes that they are her true friends.
Id. After conducting an interview of Catherine, the trial judge said that Catherine "willingly
hugged everyone in the room including people whom she had never met." Estate of C.W.,
640 A.2d at 431. She was described by the judge to be "extremely suggestible, compliant,
and anxious to please." ld.
21. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 4, 5, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). Catherine is
"sexually interested" and "aggressive physically and sexually with other people." Id. at 5.
More than one witness testified that Catherine appears "to crave physical contact with
others." Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 434. A psychologist who examined Catherine
indicated that she was "keenly aware of her sexuality and femininity and uses both whenever
possible, even where inappropriate." Id The record also indicated that "there had been
increased kissing involvement" between Catherine and her boyfriend. Id A doctor who
performed a physical examination of Catherine revealed that "she did not have an intact
hymen." Id.
22. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 434 ("The record supports the trial court's finding that
[Catherine] might be willing to engage in voluntary sexual intercourse."); see also discussion
supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, out of medical necessity,2 3 Catherine's mother wished to
undertake whatever means necessary to protect her daughter from becoming
pregnant. While many different contraceptives were initially consid-
ered-barrier methods such as an IUD or diaphragm, hormonal treatments
such as Depo-Provera, or the birth control pill, and a tubal ligation 4- -
medical testimony indicated that, in light of her tenuously controlled
epilepsy, the safest available option25 for Catherine was to undergo a
laparoscopic tubal sterilization. 6
B. Procedural Requirements and Holding
Pennsylvania courts follow the precedent set by a 1982 case, In re
Terwilliger,27 which established Pennsylvania's standards governing the
process through which a guardian is granted specific authority to consent to
the involuntary sterilization of a mentally disabled person.2 After
Terwilliger, courts require that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking
the approval of the authorized procedure.29 Courts additionally require that
the party prove, through clear and convincing evidence, that such an
operation is in the "best interests" of the mentally disabled person.3" Once
the petition for authorization is filed with the court, the judge appoints a
guardian ad litem who is responsible for asserting and defending the rights
of the individual at trial.3  After the guardian has been appointed, the
court must find the following: first, that the individual lacks the capacity
to make a decision about the sterilization and that the incapacity is unlikely
23. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother
(Feb. 1, 1995).
24. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 437.
25. See Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 11, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). The court-
appointed medical expert, Catherine's treating physician, petitioner's medical expert, and a
psychiatrist all testified that the appropriate medical procedure for Catherine is a tubal
ligation (laparoscopy). Id.
26. See SARAH F. HAAvIK & KARL A. MENNINGER, II, SEXUALITY, LAW, AND THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON 109 (1981). A relatively simple operation, the "tubal
sterilization" or "tubal ligation" procedure can be done on an outpatient basis. The patient
is given general anesthesia, and a small incision is made near the navel. A laparoscope is
inserted to enable the physician to view the Fallopian tubes. The tubes are then cut and
cauterized. "The entire procedure can be completed in fifteen minutes." Id.
27. 450 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. 1982).
28. Il at 1382-84.
29. See id. at 1382.
30. eL
31. kla at 1383.
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to change in the near future,32 and second, that the person is capable of
reproduction.33 Once these findings have been made, the court proceeds
to its ultimate determination which is whether the sterilization is in the
woman's best interests.34 The Orphan's Court appointed the mother as
guardian,35 and the case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court,
which held that the best interests of Catherine required that her mother be
appointed guardian with authority to consent to the tubal ligation proce-
dure.36
C. Best Interests Determination
Pennsylvania, like many other states,37 has never had a statute
governing the process through which one may receive authorization for the
involuntary sterilization procedure.38 Instead, the decision rests entirely
with the judiciary.39 The court's power to render such a decision stems
from the common law doctrine of parens patriae,4 which enables it to
32. Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
33. ld.
34. See id.
[I]t must be established that sterilization is the only practicable means of
contraception, i.e., all less drastic contraceptive methods, including supervision,
education and training are unworkable and detailed medical testimony must
show that the sterilization procedure requested is the least significant intrusion
necessary to protect the interests of the individual.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Estate of C.W., No. 87-3107, slip. op. at 56 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Phila. County
Feb. 28, 1990), aff-d, 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995). Catherine's mother was appointed as a
guardian for the purpose of approving the sterilization. Id.
36. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super.
1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
37. Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Wyoming have never
had a compulsory sterilization statute. Richard A. Estacio, Sterilization of the Mentally
Disabled in Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92
DICK. L. REv. 411 (1988). As of 1988, most states do not have sterilization statutes,
including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id at 423.
38. Id
39. Id.
40. Parenspatriae literally means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY
1114 (6th ed. 1991). The phrase refers to the role of the state as a sovereign and guardian
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protect those individuals within the state who, because of a legal disability,
are incapable of protecting themselves.4 In making the decision whether
to authorize an involuntary sterilization procedure, the court may only
consider the best interests of the incompetent, and not that of the parents,
guardian, or society."
Perhaps the most influential case to utilize the "best interests" test was
In re Grady.43 In Grady, it was emphasized that in spite of the disabled
person's lack of input during the decision-making process, the court's
decision was "designed to further the same interests she might pursue had
she the ability to decide for herself."'  The court further provided that its
role was not that of an interpreter, but rather a surrogate.45 To help
facilitate the best interests determination, the court provided the following
guidelines to be considered:
1) The possibility that the disabled person can become pregnant.
2) The possibility that the incompetent person will experience
trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth,
and, conversely, the possibility of trauma or psychological damage from
the sterilization operation.
3) The likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in
sexual activity or be exposed to situations where sexual intercourse is
imposed upon her.
4) The inability of the disabled person to understand reproduction
or contraception and the likely permanence of that inability.
5) The feasibility and medical advisability of less drastic means
of contraception, both at the present time and under foreseeable future
circumstances.
6) The advisability of sterilization at the time of the application
rather than in the future....
to individuals who are under some type of legal disability, such as juveniles, or the insane.
Id.
41. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981).
42. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. 1982); see, e.g., In re Grady, 426
A.2d at 467. Terwilliger relied heavily on many of requirements laid out by Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Grady, including requirement that court consider only best interest of the
incompetent.
43. 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981).
44. Id at 467.
45. Id
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7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the
possibility that the person may at some future date be able to marry
and, with a spouse, care for a child.
8) Evidence that scientific advances may occur within the
foreseeable future which will make possible either improvement of the
individual's condition or alternative and less drastic sterilization
procedures.
9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are seeking
it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the best interest of
the incompetent person rather than their own or the public's conve-
nience.
This non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered was adopted by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Terwilliger to comprise part of its "best
interests" test, and was subsequently relied upon in the Estate of C.W'
The most heavily debated point in the case was whether the sterilization of
Catherine was the "only practicable means of contraception."4  As
provided in Terwilliger, this determination is reached through the use of a
"least restrictive means" test, which requires that "all other contraceptive
alternatives be found unworkable."
49
D. Sterilization as the Least Restrictive Means of Contraception
The "least restrictive means" test requires an evaluation and comparison
of the net benefits associated with each available alternative to determine
which is the most practicable. The contraceptive options under initial
consideration included barrier methods such as the intra-uterine device
("IUD") or diaphragm, and hormonal methods such as Depo-Provera or oral
contraceptives. Evidence indicates that the health risks associated with these
contraceptives are non-existent with a tubal ligation procedure.
An IUD poses such potential risks as the perforation of the uterine wall,
pelvic inflammatory disease, cramping pain, spontaneous expulsion, heavy
bleeding between periods, and pregnancy failures.5" The IUD must also
46. Id at 483.
47. 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.), stay granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
48. Il at 433.
49. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
50. JEFFREY S. VICTOR, HUMAN SEXuALrrY: A SocIo PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 49
(1980).
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be replaced every year.5" The necessity of an annual medical procedure is
more intrusive than the single procedure which would be necessary if
Catherine underwent a tubal ligation. 2 A diaphragm was not seriously
considered because it would require a high level of motivation and cognitive
understanding on the part of Catherine. 3 Hormonal treatments such as
Depo-Provera have been linked with cervical cancer after prolonged use. 4
Other reported problems with the use of this product include irregular
bleeding and a higher risk of breast cancer.5 Furthermore, while the
physical variations caused by the product may pose little, if any, danger to
healthy people, Catherine, as a severe epileptic, would be subjected to a
considerably higher risk of destabilization, grand mal seizures, and potential
status epilepticus 6 Finally, oral contraceptives such as the birth control
pill increase the risk of liver cancer and may increase the risk of breast and
cervical cancer.57 The hormonal changes normally induced by the pill may
also pose additional dangers to Catherine's already barely manageable
epileptic condition. 8
51. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 438.
52, Id.
53. WILLIAM S. ROWE & SANDRA SAVAGE, SEXUALITY AND THE DEVELOPMENTALLY
HANDICAPPED 51 (1987). Catherine's intellectual level was that of a three to five-year-old.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
54. Patricia Bailey & Joseph Sanfillipo, Contraception in the Adolescent, in CONTRACEP-
TION 105 (1993). In a case controlled study conducted in Latin America, cervical cancer
risks appeared to be associated with prolonged use. Short-term use of this product appears
to be associated with a lower incidence of cervical cancer. Id.
55. Id.
56. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 38, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970). Catherine's
epilepsy is tenuously controlled. Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney
for Catherine's mother (February 27, 1995). Her medical condition is so fragile, that the
slightest cold, or change in body temperature could cause her to have seizures. The severity
of Catherine's epileptic condition was not a matter of dispute. Id.
57. Malcolm C. Pike & Darcy V. Spicer, Oral Contraceptives and Cancer, in
CONTRACEPTION 67 (Donna Shoupe, et al. eds., 1993). While there are many types of oral
contraceptives, the side-effects associated with the one referred to in the accompanying text
have been linked with the use of "combination-type" oral contraceptives which are the most
commonly used. Each pill contains both an estrogen and a progestin. Id The alternative
pill, the "minipill," contains progestin only. Id. at 95.
58. Catherine's mother was primarily concerned with potential drug interactions with
her other medication and how they could detrimentally affect Catherine's health. Telephone
Interview with Marta Engdahl, Esq., Attorney for Catherine's mother (Aug. 11, 1995). See
Martha J. Morrel, Hormones and Epilepsy Through the Lifetime, EPILEPSIA 33 (Supp. S49-61
1992).
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By comparison, the tubal ligation procedure carries with it minimal, if
any, danger to Catherine's health.59 "Physicians as a group are generally
in favor of sterilizing developmentally disabled individuals and often
encourage the operation. '' 60 A recent study found that women who have
had tubal sterilizations were two-thirds less likely to develop ovarian cancer
than other women.6' Ovarian cancer kills 12,000 women in the United
States every year.62 Only thirty-nine percent of women who become
afflicted with ovarian cancer will survive more than five years. 63 This
provides a compelling argument for women who are sure that they do not
want to have children.64 Even before this study was conducted, however,
another study which was designed to gauge women's satisfaction after
having undergone the tubal ligation procedure revealed that ninety percent
Hormones influence brain function from gestation throughout life and may affect
the seizure threshold by altering neuronal excitability. Estrogen enhances and
progesterone diminishes neuronal excitability experimentally. . . . Hormonal
effects in the CSN [Central Nervous System] also depend on the region of the
brain in which the hormone acts. Sites of action for most steroid hormones
include the hypothalamus and limbic cortex, providing a mechanism for
modulating behavior and endocrine function. Seizure patterns may change at
certain life stages, perhaps as a result of alterations in hormones.... In some
women, fluctuations in hormones over the menstrual cycle appear to increase
seizure vulnerability, probably reflecting changes in relative amounts of estrogen
and progesterone.
Id. at S49.
59. See RowE & SAVAGE, supra note 53, at 47. The side effects for tubal ligation are
reportedly negligible. There may be minor post-surgery discomfort. Id.; see also HAAVIK
& MENNNGER, II, supra note 26, at 109 ("Complications of the operation are rare but
include hemorrhage, complications of general anesthesia, electrocoagulation bums, and
perforation of the uterus, bowel, and occasionally other organs."). One study of 2000 tubal
sterilizations reported a complication incidence of 3.9%, with hemorrhage being the most
frequent complication. Id. at 110.
60. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 113. A survey of 652 professionals
and parents of retarded children revealed that 85.8% either favored or strongly favored
voluntary sterilization for mentally disabled persons. Id. at 114.
61. Linda Carrol, Beyond Birth Control: Women Who Never Considered Tubal
Sterilization Might Be Thinking Twice After a Study Shows It Offers Some Protection Against
Ovarian Cancer, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1993, at 61.
62. Id.
63. IcE
64. See id. ("Several doctors said [] that the new study presents a powerful argument
for the operation if a woman is sure she will not want to have children in the future."). Dr.
Robert C. Wallach, director of gynecologic oncology at the New York University School of
Medicine, reportedly said, "'I'm very happy that we have this potential preventative measure
for one of the worst diseases we treat."' Id.
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were satisfied with their operation and would elect to repeat it if they had
to do it over again.65 In the unlikely event that Catherine's mental or
physical condition changes, and she can experience childbirth in the absence
of the aforesaid risks, the sterilization may be reversed.66
E. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Johnson, writing for the dissent, focused his attack on the
majority's conclusion that Catherine's sterilization was the least restrictive
means of contraception available to her.67 Citing our country's history of
the eugenic sterilization of mentally disabled persons,68 the dissent
emphasized the need to impose the least restrictive alternative test.69
Adhering to the "clear and convincing" standard, Justice Johnson stated that
the evidence failed to show that the tubal ligation procedure was in
Catherine's best interests. 0 In stating that the court "may only consider
the best interests of the incompetent ... [and] not the interests or conve-
nience of that individual's parents, guardian, or of society, 71 Justice
Johnson unveiled his skepticism towards the majority's interpretation of the
best interests test. He reminded the court that its best interests determination
was not to be based on a balancing test of the pros and cons associated with
the various contraceptives.72 Instead the court must find that other
65. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 113. The sample was taken from 147
women who received counseling two to three months before sterilization. Five percent of
the women indicated that they would not repeat the operation, and five percent were
uncertain. Id.
66. See Victor Gomel, Tubal Reconstruction: Reversal of Female Sterilization By
Microsurgery, in FEMALE STERILIZATION 85, 85 (1980) ("Microsurgery offers the best chance
for a successful reversal of sterilization and a normal intrauterine pregnancy resulting in a
live birth."). Studies have shown that the procedure is reversible 80.8% of the time. Id.
67. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 440 (Pa. Super.) (Johnson, J., dissenting), stay
granted, 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1995).
68. See infra part HI.
69. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 441 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
70. Il at 442 (Johnson, J., dissenting). He based his opinion, in part, on the possibility
that new or safer methods of contraception may be available in the future. He also rejected
the argument that the mere chance of side affects associated with other alternative
contraceptives was a sufficient basis for rejecting a less intrusive method in favor of
sterilization. Id. at 444 (Johnson, J. dissenting). While medical testimony indicated that
other contraceptives had potential side affects, or potentially negative interactions with
Catherine's anti-epileptic medication, this was not proven with certainty. Id. (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
71. Id. at 440 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
72. Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d at 445 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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contraceptives have been proven unworkable, and that the sterilization
procedure is the least significant intrusion necessary to protect Catherine's
best interests.73 Finally, he accused the majority of neglecting to address
Catherine's constitutional rights, specifically, her right to bodily integrity
and reproductive autonomy.74
Ill. THE ORIGIN OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION AS A PRODUCT
OF THE EARLY EUGENICS MOVEMENT
The term eugenics was coined by Sir Francis Galton who, in 1883,
defined it as the "study of the agencies under social control that may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically
or mentally." 5  Eugenics encompassed two different classifica-
tions-positive and negative-with essentially the same objective.76
Positive eugenics encouraged procreation between mates who shared the
most desirable genetic traits.77 This was assumed to ensure that future
offspring would be blessed with the optimal genetic makeup. Negative
eugenics was concerned with "curbing the fertility" of those who were
predicted to bear undesirable offspring.7 Included in this group were the
mentally ill, the mentally and physically handicapped, degenerates, and the
diseased.79 One of the tools of negative eugenics was compulsory steriliza-
tion. o
Predicated on Social Darwininst Herbert Spencer's "survival of the
fittest" doctrine, the eugenics philosophy was designed to engineer a better,
more capable society."1 The objective was to spread the message that
undesirable human traits were, in fact, "hereditary, and that good citizens
had a duty to promote the reproduction of fit stock and to discourage or
prevent reproduction of the unfit." 2 Further, "[t]he eugenists believed that
73. kL (Johnson, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 441.
75. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE
AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 356-57 (1937).
76. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE: A HISTORY OF COERCIVE
STERILIZATION 2 (1988).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. J.H. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION: THE HISTORY OF THE SEXUAL STERILIZA-
TION MOVEMENT 129 (1932).
80. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 2.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 11.
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slow evolutionary progress was in the natural order of things," and such
progress was halted by society's efforts to protect "the socially inadequate
from extinction."83
The controversy started with Charles Darwin's On the Origin of
Species,84 which theorized that the idea of natural selection 5 was not
always "natural," and was sometimes the result of man's interference with
nature. 6 Though Darwin's viewpoints expressed in his book were not
based on any scientific evidence, they were influential nevertheless, because
of his sound reputation.87 In 1900, the laws of heredity developed by
Austrian monk Gregor Mendel helped further lay the groundwork for the
Eugenics movement. 8 Mendel's research on the crossbreeding of peas
resulted in the discovery that inherited traits were actually inherited in the
form of a pair of determiners (later called genes), one from each parent.8 9
What scientists today characterize as dominant and recessive genes
originated from Mendel's research.' Mendel hypothesized that it may be
possible to predict one's genetic composition based on the dominant and
recessive gene pools of one's parents.91 These discoveries were thought
to have provided society with a justification for considering the use of
compulsory sterilization as a means of cleansing the gene pool.
One of the earliest proponents of compulsory sterilization was Dr.
Robert Rentoul.92 His theory of sterilization was legitimized on a medical
and social basis. Because it was assumed that diseases, idiocy, and socially
deviant characteristics were inheritable, sterilization was argued to be an
efficient means to eliminate the possibility of the affliction of such traits on
future offspring.93 During the period from 1912 to 1916, several books
83. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1426 (1981).
84. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
85. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 5. Darwin's concept of "natural selection" served as
the genesis for Spencer's subsequent "survival of the fittest" doctrine. Id.
86. IdL
87. Id Few eugenists were actually trained geneticists. Id.
88. DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 356.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. See generally id. (providing a detailed explanation of Mendelian genetics).
92. See generally ROBERT RENTOUL, PROPOSED STERILIZATION OF CERTAIN MENTAL
AND PHYSICAL DEGENERATES-AN APPEAL TO ASYLUM MANAGERS AND OTHERS (1903);
ROBERT RENTOUL, RACE CULTURE, OR RACE SUICIDE? A PLEA FOR THE UNBORN (1906)
(both advocating compulsory sterilization of the mentally disabled).
93. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 11.
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theorized that mental retardation was largely hereditary, and was the root of
social evils.94 Estimates of the number of cases of retardation which were
attributable to heredity ranged to ninety percent and greater.95 While no
conclusive modem research has been performed in this area, several studies
have attempted to identify the likelihood that mental retardation may be
passed down to one's offspring.96 Three studies in particular97 indicated
that, in the event that one or both parents are mentally disabled, the
likelihood that the offspring will inherit the condition is roughly eleven
percent. 98
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, however, society was
ultimately convinced that mental disabilities were inheritable and the
"mother of crime, pauperism and degeneracy."99 It was said that:
The feebleminded are a parasitic, predatory class, never capable of self-
support or of managing their own affairs. They cause unutterable
sorrow at home and are a menace and danger to the community.
Feebleminded women are almost invariably immoral, and if at large
usually become carriers of venereal disease or give birth to children
who are as defective as themselves .... Every feebleminded person,
especially the high-grade imbecile, is a potential criminal, needing only
the proper environment and opportunity for the development and
expression of his criminal tendencies."
"Involuntary" or compulsory sterilization found its beginning as a
punishment for convicted criminals, rather than as strictly a eugenic
94. See DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 358, 359 (naming some of most celebrated
publications, including: CHARLES B. DAVENPORT & FLORENCE H. DANIELSON, THE HILL
FOLK (1912); ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK, THE JUKES IN 1915 (1915); ARTHUR H. ESTABROOK
& CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, THE NAm FAMILY (1912); ELIZABETH S. KITE, THE PINEYS
(1913); and MARY S. KOSTIR, THE FAMILY OF.SAM S xTY (1916)).
95. Id. at 357.
96. HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 286.
97. Id. The following studies established a likelihood of 11% that a child will inherit
a mental disability from his parent if one or both are mentally disabled: Brandon, 1957;
Scally, 1968; Shaw & Wright, 1960. Id. When one parent is mentally disabled and there
is already one mentally disabled child in the family, the recurrence risk rises to nearly 20%.
Id.
98. Id.
99. DEUTSCH, supra note 75, at 359.
100. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
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measure. 10  In 1855, the Kansas Territorial Legislature legalized the
castration of any black or "mulatto" convicted of rape, attempted rape or
kidnapping of a white woman."4 Towards the end of the nineteenth
century, the European theory of "degeneration" or "eugenics" found its way
to the United States. 3
Prior to 1900, however, support for sterilization was quite limited."°
Surgical procedures like castration resulted in asexualization, disturbing the
hormonal balance, and various other psychological and physiological
effects.' '5 These undesirable side effects forced those who supported such
measures to justify them on the basis of their punitive or therapeutic value
in addition to their eugenic benefits."° Along with the discovery of less
intrusive surgical procedures0 7 came a more powerful justification for
sterilization to be used for solely eugenic reasons. Dr. Harry Sharp's
discovery of the vasectomy as a safe, inexpensive and quick medical
procedure revolutionized eugenic thinking." The procedure did not affect
the libido, despite its ultimate aim of preventing fertilization.1 9 Between
1899 and 1907, Sharpe performed 465 compulsory sterilization operations
101. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 49-50; see also LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 51
(explaining that history includes various cultures who used compulsory sterilization for one
reason or another).
Apostate Jews, who dared revert to Judaism, were in the Middle Ages castrated;
negroes in the pre-Civil War days were castrated at times as a punishment or as
a method of developing more sturdy workers; Mohammedans frequently castrated
young boys for purposes of maintaining their harems; and the choir boys in the
Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, until forbidden by Pope Leo
XIII, were made eunuchs before puberty so that they might retain their soprano
voices as they grew to adulthood. The ancient peoples-such as the people of
the Bible, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Chinese, the Hindus, the Greeks, the
Persians, and the Romans-castrated their captives, criminals, and slaves for
penal purposes.
Id.
102. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 49.
103. Id.
104. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1429.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (explaining various types of sterilization including the salpingectomy-cutting
and tying the Fallopian tubes-and the vasectomy-cutting and tying the vas deferens).
These procedures require comparatively minor surgery and have none of the side effects of
castration. Id
108. See TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 50.
109. Id. (explaining Sharp's view that "each man 'is in no way impaired for his pursuit
of life, liberty and happiness, but is effectively sterilized"').
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on male inmates at the Indiana State Reformatory."' Sharpe's perceived
success in eugenics served as a prelude for its ultimate legislation.
"Probably the first explicitly eugenic legislation in the [United States]
was Connecticut's 1896 law preventing marriage to, or sexual relations with,
the eugenically unfit.""' The first American eugenic sterilization bill,
introduced in 1897 by the Michigan legislature, was never enacted." 2 On
April 9, 1907, Indiana became the first state to enact legislation which
allowed compulsory sterilization of the feebleminded."' Other states were
quick to follow." 4  One of the best examples of how determined some
states were to carry out such laws is reflected by the sterilization laws of
Kansas, first passed in 1913.215 Kansas' first sterilization law made it a
crime for any managing officer of a state institution to fail to recommend
the sterilization of any inmate unfit to procreate." 6 Any officer failing to
do so was fined up to $100, or imprisoned up to thirty days, or both." 7
The 1924 passing of Virginia's sterilization statute is of particular
significance because it was the first statute of its kind to ultimately be
deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States."' The
Virginia law was written in such a way so as to avoid any constitutional
infractions." 9 "The [Virginia] legislature did not intend sterilization to be
a punitive measure, but rather,[as] a measure in 'the best interests of the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 51. The statute allowed for the procedure to be
performed if it was determined that there was no probability of the victim's mental
improvement. Id.
114. Id. Washington enacted a compulsory sterilization law for convicted criminals in
1909. Id; see also HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1922). California was the third state to enact legislation for compulsory sterilization in April
of 1909. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 51. Its motive was primarily eugenic, and partly
punitive. Connecticut followed with its compulsory sterilization statute passed in August,
1909. It, too, was primarily eugenic. Nevada approved a sterilization statute in March,
1911. Iowa passed legislation in March, 1911; New Jersey in April, 1911, North Dakota in
March, 1913. IM at 65. Several other states followed suit. d; see also HARRY H.
LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 7 (1930) [hereinafter
LAUGHLIN, LEGAL STATUS] (stating that by January 1, 1930, 23 different states had enacted
eugenical sterilization statutes of one type or another).
115. TROMBLEY, supra note 76, at 65.
116. I&
117. Id.
118. LAUGHLIN, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 114, at 7.
119. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1436.
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patients and of society.' z120 In April of 1927, the landmark case of Buck
v. Bell' was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. In
that case, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-
minded for the state of Virginia, had requested and performed a sterilization
procedure on Carrie Buck. 122  Buck was believed 123 to be a mentally
disabled daughter of a mentally disabled woman, both of whom lived in the
same institution."2 The proponents of eugenics and compulsory steriliza-
tion used the Bucks as a confirmation of their theories of heredity. Carrie's
mother had registered a mental age of less than eight on the Stanford
revision of the Binet-Simon test, while Carrie had a mental age of nine."
120. Id. (quoting, in part, 1924 VA. AcTs ch. 394).
121. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
122. See LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 97.
123. Subsequent literature revealed that Carrie Buck was not mentally ill or retarded.
See Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 336 (1985)
(quoting a letter received from Paul A. Lombardo of the School of Law at the University of
Virginia).
As for Carrie, when I met her she was reading newspapers daily and joining a
more literate friend to assist at regular bouts with the crossword puzzles. She
was not a sophisticated woman, and lacked social graces, but mental health
professionals who examined her in later life confirmed my impressions that she
was neither mentally ill nor retarded.
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Paul A. Lombardo, Associate Professor & Director
of The Center For Mental Health Law at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry & Public Policy at
the University of Virginia, and a leading scholar of Buck v. Bell (August 23, 1995) (stating
that: "Carrie exhibited no difficulty in speaking with me. The clinicians who had
interviewed and evaluated her found no evidence of mental retardation.").
124. LANDMAN, supra note 79, at 97.
125. Id. at 98; see also HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 286 (discussing the statistical
probability of mentally disabled parents birthing mentally disabled offspring). The Stanford-
Binet is one of the most commonly used instruments for evaluating intellectual functioning
in the mentally disabled. It seeks to identify patterns of intellectual functioning which it then
compares to other individuals' of the same age. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 229 (Michael
Kindred et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter Kindred].
[Intelligence] [t]est performance might indicate differences in mental capacity
among [people] who "have had an equal opportunity to learn certain types of
cognitive, linguistic and mathematical skills and to acquire certain types of
information; if they were equally motivated to learn these skills and to acquire
this information; if they are equally motivated to exert themselves in a test
situation and equally familiar with the demands of the test situation; if they were
equally free of emotional . . . and biological . . . difficulties which might
interfere with their performance."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Their relationship as parent/child served to show that mental disabilities
were transmitted genetically, and could be prevented through sterilization.
At trial, Buck's attorney argued that Virginia's sterilization statute was
a violation of Carrie Buck's constitutional right of "bodily integrity," and
consequently a deprivation of "life" without due process of law. 2 6 He
also attacked the statute on the ground that it violated the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7 In an
eight-to-one decision, the Court supported the sterilization statute."n
The lone dissenter, Justice Butler, neglected to provide a written
opinion." 9 Speaking for the majority, Justice Holmes held that the
procedural aspects of the statute satisfied the due process arguments and that
the uniform application of the statute to all members of the class of mentally
disabled people in state institutions complied with equal protection 30
Justice Holmes said of Carrie Buck:
"[H]er welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization."
• . . It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.13 1
Currently, the holding in Buck v. Bell has not been overturned.
Nonetheless, most scholars suggest that the case would be overruled, if
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States today.32  Having
established the historical context of compulsory sterilization, this casenote
will proceed to analyze the C.W. case on a factual and constitutional basis,
arguing that the operation was required out of medical necessity and
ultimately served to uphold Catherine's constitutional rights. As shall be
seen, the aforementioned eugenic or punitive justifications for the procedure
are nonexistent in this case.
126. Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1447 (citations omitted).
127. Id. (citations omitted).
128. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
129. See Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1450.
130. Id.
131. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted).
132. See Cynkar, supra note 83, at 1456.
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IV. THE MODERN STATUS OF STERILIZATION
Currently, there are ten states which still have compulsory sterilization
statutes. 33 Just twenty years ago, there were over twice as many such
statutes."M Some jurisdictions have banned the sterilization of the mental-
ly disabled altogether. 135 There are three factors which have helped shape
society's current sterilization laws: 136  "the discrediting of the eugenic
theory, the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive
privacy, and the changing conception of mental retardation."' 137
With the erosion of the scientific community's support for eugenics
came society's rejection as well. Elizabeth Scott notes: "[rieports of
widespread sterilization in Nazi Germany led to increased criticism of
eugenic sterilization laws.' 38 By the 1960s, involuntary sterilization was
often deemed an unjustified intrusion by the state on an individual's liberty
and privacy. 39 Moreover, the evolution of the constitutional right of
reproductive privacy has spawned a greater interest among lawmakers to
133. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-49-205 to -304 (Michie 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 5701-5716 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3909
(1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972); N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 35-39 to -43 (1994);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.225 to .295 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-6-101 to -6-116
(1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8705-8712 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2975 to -2977
(Michie 1994).
134. Estacio, supra note 37, at 417.
135. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 817 n.31 (1986). "No person with developmental
disabilities who has not given consent shall be sterilized." Id. (quoting COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 27-10.5-128(2) (Supp. 1985)). In 1981, the Colorado Supreme Court carved out an
exception to allow sterilization of mentally disabled minors. Id. (citing In re A.W., 637 P.2d
366, 375 (Colo. 1981)). "A California law prohibiting sterilization of all persons under
conservatorship, CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356 (1981) was struck down in 1985 in Conservator-
ship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). Several courts have effectively banned
sterilization by refusing to allow sterilization in the absence of statutory authority." Id.
Federal law prohibits governmental funding of the sterilization of minors or mentally
incompetent persons who are incompetent to consent to the operation. See infra text
accompanying note 163.
136. See Scott, supra note 135, at 809.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 811.
139. Id. The right to reproductive privacy in the 1960s and 1970s has affected the
constitutional analysis of sterilization laws. Id. n.17. Because the eugenic sterilization laws
infringed a fundamental right to privacy and procreation, the laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to the means they seek to achieve. This contrasts to
the rationality review previously used by the court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Scott, supra note 135, at 811.
1342 [Vol. 20
323
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Adler
address the reproductive rights of the mentally disabled."14 It is well
estab-lished that normal adults and mature minors are entitled to avoid
unwanted pregnancies via contraception or sterilization.'41 There is a
consensus within the legal community that mentally disabled persons are
entitled to the same right of reproductive privacy as normal people.'42
This relatively newfound sense of legislative acceptance for the mentally
disabled reflects changes in society's attitudes as well.' As a result,
today's programs for the mentally disabled strive to encourage the person
to live as independently and self-sufficiently as possible." This is
formally recognized as "normalization.""
"Normalization," or "habilitation" refers to the "mainstreaming" of
mentally disabled individuals."4 The constitutional right to habilitation
for the mentally retarded was first articulated in the landmark case of Wyatt
v. Stickney,'47 in 1972. a14 The court held that a mentally retarded person
had an "'inviolable constitutional right to habilitation."' ' The term was
originally intended to describe the bundle of constitutional rights which be-
longed to mentally disabled persons who were confined to institutions. 50
Though the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet recognized
habilitation as a constitutional right,5 the right is grounded in the legal
doctrines of substantive due process, equal protection guarantees, and the
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Today's laws concerning involuntary sterilization are designed to
protect the interests of the mentally disabled rather than those of soci-
ety.'53 There are primarily two types of tests used when a state considers
permitting an involuntary sterilization procedure, the substituted judgment
140. Id. at 812.
141. Id. at 813.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 814.
144. See Scott, supra note 135, at 815.
145. Id.
146. See Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 8, Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super.
1994) (No. 91-2970).
147. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
148. Kindred, supra note 125, at 385.
149. Id. at 400 (quoting Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 390).
150. Id. at 386-87.
151. Id.; cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 331 (1982) (holding that mentally
disabled persons have a fundamental right to minimally adequate training).
152. Kindred, supra note 125, at 390.
153. See Scott, supra note 135, at 807.
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test, and the best interests test.- 4 Both tests proclaim to preserve the
rights of self-determination of the mentally disabled. 55 The substituted
judgment test is frequently used in cases where the individual was, at one
time, competent to make decisions.'56 It allows a court to render a
decision consistent with that of the patient, were she competent to do
so." 7 In its consideration, the court will examine any evidence which
tends to indicate the individual's intent.'58 The difficulty with the substi-
tuted judgment test is that the court cannot always infer the patient's intent.
Consequently, most courts have relied on the best interests test.
Courts which use the best interests standard are motivated by the
interests of the person who is mentally disabled and perhaps not competent
to make a well-informed decision.'59 Of the two tests, the best interests
standard accommodates itself to the particular needs of the individual, as
opposed to the substituted judgment test which arbitrarily attempts to guess
whatever the individual's preference may be. For the foregoing reasons,
most states use the best interests test in determining whether or not to grant
authority to perform the involuntary sterilization procedure. 60
Due to the problems of consent, lack of implementation of the laws,
and a growing movement supported by civil libertarians, the incidence of
reported sterilization has fallen in the last several years.161 In addition, the
1974 decision of Relf v. Weinberger, 62 prohibiting the use of all federal
funds for the sterilization of minors or incompetent persons, further
stagnated the number of sterilization procedures. 63 The cumulative result
154. William A. Krais, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of
Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
333, 334 (1989).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 343.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 344.
159. Krais, supra note 154, at 345.
160. Id. at 353.
161. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108.
162. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C. 1974), vacated by 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
163. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108. The Relf court held that the
family planning sections of the Social Security Act and Public Health Service Act did not
authorize the federal funding for any person who, under state law, was incompetent to
consent. Ref, 372 F. Supp. at 1196. The court further held that federally assisted family
planning sterilizations are only permissible with the voluntary, knowing and uncoerced
consent of persons competent to give such consent. Id. at 1202.
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of this has been the limited accessibility of sterilizations for many women
who want them."
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Right to Privacy Cases
The genesis of the Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutional
right to privacy dates back to 1891 in the case of Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford,65 where Justice Gray stated: "No right is held more sacred or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others. . . ."'6 He continued, "'The right to
one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone.""
67
In 1927, Justice Brandeis alluded to the right to privacy in his famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States.6s In the dissenting opinion, Justice
Brandeis argued that the makers of the Constitution "sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations.', 169  He continued to say that the makers of the constitution
"conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone--the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."'7
In a succession of modem cases beginning with the landmark case of
Griswold v. Connecticut,' the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
fundamental right to privacy. In Griswold, the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute which prohibited the use, distribution, and exchange of
knowledge concerning contraceptives." Justice Douglas, delivering the
opinion of the Court, stated that the statute exerted a "destructive impact"
on the right to marital privacy.'73 The Court's recognition of the funda-
mental right to marital privacy was legitimized as the derivative of several
164. See HAAVlK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 108.
165. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
166. Id. at 251.
167. Id.
168. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. Id. at 486.
173. Id. at 485.
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other fundamental constitutional guarantees.174 The Court explained that
these various guarantees have "penumbras formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." 175  The penumbras
which collectively generate the marital right to privacy include: the right of
association in the First Amendment; the prohibition against the quartering
of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner,
in the Third Amendment; the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, in the Fourth Amendment; the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and a part of the Ninth Amendment which provides that "'[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."",
176
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of the United States extended
Griswold to apply to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.1"7 The
Court held that a statute prohibiting the use and distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried individuals was violative of the Equal Protection Clause
because the same type of prohibition was deemed unconstitutional as applied
to married persons. 178  The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.' 79
In 1973, in perhaps one of the most controversial cases of the century,
Roe v. Wade, 8' the Court held that the right of privacy is "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy." '' The Court held that a woman has a fundamental right to get an
174. Id.
175. Id. at 484.
176. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
177. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
178. Id. at 453.
179. Id.
180. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. Id. at 153. The Court's support for Roe appears to be waning. In 1992, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the Court
rejected Roe's trimester framework which placed the fetus' viability at or near the last
trimester. Due in part to advances in medicine, and to a more conservative court, the new
"pregnancy timeline" is solely a function of the pre and post viability of the fetus. Viability,
defined as the point at which the fetus is presumed to be capable of a meaningful life outside
of the mother's womb, is also the time at which its interest becomes sufficiently compelling
so as to warrant protection under the Constitution. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. The state may pro-
hibit an abortion after the fetus becomes viable, provided that it does not endanger the health
of the mother. ld. at 163. Due to scientific advancements, viability occurs earlier than
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abortion prior to viability of the fetus, and subject to restrictions after
viability.
I s2
Again in 1973, the Court in Doe v. Bolton 13 held that the "right [to
privacy] includes the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for,
'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape
his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleas-
es.,,,184
Having established the constitutional backdrop against which Cather-
ine's right to privacy lies, this note will proceed to argue that there exists
an unenumerated fundamental right to sexuality, implicit in the Constitution.
B. The Fundamental Right to Sexuality
1. Right to Privacy Theory
Sexuality itself has been defined to encompass many concepts: male-
ness/femaleness, sensuality, sense of self, ego, perception of self in
relationship to the world and to others, and expressing or receiving an
expression of sexual interest.185 The activity of sex is perhaps the world's
oldest recreational activity.'86 The average American adult has sex fifty-
seven times a year, and over ninety-seven percent of adults have had
intercourse at least once.1" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the
United States has never explicitly recognized the constitutional right to
sexuality, or sexual expression.' However, the Ninth Amendment has
been interpreted to establish that United States citizens have certain
previously. The time during which the woman may undergo an abortion unrestricted by the
state has lessened accordingly.
182. Id. at 164.
183. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
184. Id. at 213 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
185. ROSALYN K. MONAT-HALLER, UNDERSTANDING AND EXPRESSING SEXUALITY,
RESPONSIBLE CHOICES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILrIES 1 (1992).
186. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre-and
Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1660 (1991) [hereinafter Constitutional
Barriers].
187. Constitutional Barriers, supra note 186, at 1660-61.
188. The Court has noted that it "'has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults."' Briggs v. North Muskeegon Police Dep't, 563
F. Supp. 585, 589 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17
(1977)), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), and cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985).
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fundamental rights, even though unenumerated in the Constitution.' The
right to sexuality should be recognized as a fundamental constitutional right
because it is both implicit in the rights to privacy and First Amendment self-
expression, and inherent within the meaning of "life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness." Thus, Catherine's constitutional right to sexuality will
continue to be violated, even though permission to perform the tubal ligation
procedure may be denied.
The Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut"9 was the beginning of the process by which the Court, over
a period of twenty years, would carve out an expansive body of sexual
privacy law. 9 ' The Court held that a state cannot prohibit married
couples from receiving information about contraceptive devices because it
would violate the couple's right to marital privacy.'92 The Court's ruling
logically implies that non-procreative sexual intercourse is inherent within
the institution of marriage, and therefore protected under the doctrine of
marital privacy. This carries with it the inevitable presumption that each
married individual is entitled to freely engage in sexual relations with his or
her spouse free from state interference. The Court, reflecting the unex-
pressed wishes, needs, and desires of the populace, has expressed the right
to sexuality in a seemingly camouflaged asexual manner. The specific
language in the opinion does everything but come out and say that the state
may not interfere with a couple's right to sexual expression. For example,
Justice Douglas stated that the law, "operates directly on an intimate relation
of husband and wife. . ."" One's imagination need only go so far in
considering the implications of the phrase "intimate relation." While Justice
Douglas does not literally state that the law interfered with the couple's right
to have sexual intercourse, it is illogical to exclude this interpretation from
among the limited possibilities. Even if the phrase refers to something
exclusively cerebral or spiritual, this does not negate the fact that sexual
expression is another mode of intimate relation between husband and wife.
It is frightening to think of the day when the Court may decide for us what
distinguishes permissible intimate relations between husband and wife from
that which is impermissible.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg stated that the law
prohibiting contraceptives dealt with "a particularly important and sensitive
189. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980).
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW 19 (1993).
192. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
193. Id. at 482.
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area of privacy-that of the marital relation and the marital home."1 94
Though vague, the nature of his language indicates the Court's persistent
tendency to circuitously express this constitutional right to sexuality.
Justice Goldberg then quoted Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman,"95 stating:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
[law] forbids.., but the intimacy of husband of wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected. 96
This language reflects the Court's endorsement for non-procreative
sexual expression between husband and wife, but a rejection of sexuality in
other contexts. It also underscores the extent to which the Court serves as
a "moral mouthpiece" for society-manifesting attitudes and behavior which
society deems appropriate through its rulings.'97 Ironically, eight years
later, Griswold was cited in the case of California v. LaRue 98 where
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated: "I have serious doubts whether the
State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating any sexual act
between consenting adults.1 99
Griswold was subsequently extended to apply to unmarried persons as
well as married persons, in Eisenstadt v. Baird.2°  Justice Brennan's
opinion in Eisenstadt probably generated more confusion about sexual
194. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
195. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1960).
196. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
197. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the issue concerned the constitution-
ality of a sodomy statute as applied to homosexuals. In upholding the statute, Justice White
explained that fundamental rights deserving constitutional protection must be "'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"' id. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)), or "'deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition,"' id. at 192 (quoting Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 503 (1977)). While the Court upheld the statute five to
four, Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, states his contention that the statute was
unconstitutional by touting the mental health community's newfound acceptance for
homosexuality within the area of mental health: "[d]espite historical views of homosexuality,
it is no longer viewed by mental health professionals as a 'disease' or disorder." Id. at 203
n.2.
198. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
199. Id. at 132 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
200. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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privacy for the unmarried than any other Supreme Court opinion."' Such
is the case because Justice Brennan never clarified whether the Court's
ruling was based on the notion of associational intimacy as implied in
Griswold,'0 or solely on the right of one's accessibility to contraceptives.
In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a statute which prohibited the use
of contraceptives among unmarried persons, on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3 The Court held that
the need to distribute contraceptives is just as great among unmarried
persons as it is for married ones.1°4 One can reasonably infer that the
corollary to the right of accessibility to contraceptives necessarily translates
into the right to engage in non-procreative intercourse, both for married and
unmarried persons.205 Through the incorporation of Stanley v. Geor-
gia,2°6 and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 7 the Court constructed an individual
right to privacy strong enough to be applied against other regulations which
prohibited abortion, fornication, and homosexual conduct.208
201. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 528 (1983).
202. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
203. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
204. Id. at 450.
205. See Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Necessarily implicit
in the right to make decisions regarding childbearing is the right to engage in sexual inter-
course."); see also Constitutional Barriers, supra note 186, at 1664 ('The privacy right rec-
ognized in Griswold and Baird was not merely the right to use contraceptives; without the
corresponding right to engage in sexual intercourse such a right would be meaningless," and
"[tihe interest protected in these cases is the right to have sex free of governmental control
and to do so with or without contraceptives."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216-18
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating, "prior cases make [it] ... abundantly clear...
[that] individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and 'The essential 'liberty' that
animated the development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely
embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others consider
offensive or immoral.").
206. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). While based on the First Amendment, the Court held that
the mere private possession of obscene material by an adult may not made criminal by the
state. Id. at 568.
207. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). On the basis of equal protection, the Court struck down a
statute which allowed for the sterilization of persons convicted three times for felonies
showing "moral turpitude," but which did not apply to other "white-collar" crimes like
embezzlement. Id.
208. See LEONARD, supra note 191, at 25.
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In 1986 the Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick,2" upheld an anti-sod-
omy 210 statute as applied to homosexuals.211 In so ruling, the Court held
that prior privacy cases could not be construed to confer a right to
homosexual behavior.1 The Court fell one vote shy of deciding that the
Constitution provided an unenumerated fundamental right to homosexual
conduct. 2
3
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the case was
not about homosexual conduct, per se, but rather, the "'right to be let
alone.' 214  His particular characterization of the matter at issue enabled
him to persuasively argue that the right to sexuality is implicit in the right
to privacy.215 Justice Blackmun reminded the Court "'that a certain
private sphere of individual liberty [should] be kept largely beyond the reach
of government.' 21 6 He stated that "sexual intimacy is a 'sensitive, key
relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of [the] human personality.' 2 17 Further, "the right
of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or
her own home seems to ... be the heart of the Constitutions's protection of
privacy. ' ' 1
Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in Bowers, later conceded
that he may have made a mistake.219 He stated, "[w]hen I had the
opportunity to reread the opinions a few months later, I thought the dissent
209. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
210. The statute provided that "[a] person commits the offense of sodomy when he
performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)
(1984)).
211. Id. at 189.
212. Id. at 194. But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993)
(holding that criminal statute prohibiting consensual homosexual activity violates fundamental
right of privacy).
213. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187.
214. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's
claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy.").
216. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
217. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
218. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L LJ., Nov.
5, 1990, at 3.
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had the better of the arguments., 2' The ramifications of his admission
are too far-reaching for the purposes of this discussion. Of paramount
relevance, however, is that the decision would have entitled sexual activity
between consenting adults to protection under the Constitution. As Justice
Blackmun stated in the dissenting opinion, "[w]hat the Court really has
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.' '2
Arguably, it also would have laid to rest the confusion underlying the
Court's holding in Eisenstadt.2 2 In holding that the Constitution confers
protection upon sexual activity between consenting adults, it discounts the
theory that Eisenstadt merely stood for the right to accessibility to
contraceptives; instead, it lends credence to the view that Eisenstadt stood
for the right to associational intimacy.
The notion of sexuality as a constitutional right has been addressed on
a state level as well. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Common-
wealth v. Bonadio,223 held that a statute prohibiting "deviate sexual
~~221intercourse ' 'z A was unconstitutional.2z  The court rejected the argument
that the state was empowered to enact the statute vis-a-vis its Tenth
Amendment police power.226 Instead, it ruled that the statute's only
purpose, which was to regulate the private conduct of consenting adults,
exceeded the valid bounds of the state's police power, and infringed upon
the individual's constitutional rights to equal protection.227 In limiting the
state's ability to unduly interfere with the constitutional rights of its citizens,
the court cited the philosopher John Stuart Mill, who once said:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually, or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection... [Tihe only purposes for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
220. Id. (quoting Mr. Justice Powell in telephone interview as he elaborated on his
regretted ruling).
221. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
223. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
224. Id. at 49. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as, "sexual intercourse per
os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual
intercourse with an animal." Id. at 49 n.1 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (1973)).
225. Id. at 50.
226. Id. at 49-50.
227. Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50.
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his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral is not a sufficient warrant.'
Perhaps one of the most telling of all sexuality cases that fall within the
framework of the privacy doctrine is the Supreme Court of New Jersey case
of State v. Saunders.' In Saunders, the court struck down an anti-
fornication23" statute, holding that it was unconstitutional. 231 The court
held that sexual activities between consenting adults are protected within the
right to privacy. 32 The premise for the court's ruling was that a decision
to engage in consensual sexual activity was at least as intimate and personal
as those involving decisions on whether to use contraceptives. 233  Of
particular significance in Saunders, was the introduction of behavioral and
social science data to establish the psycho-sexual significance of non-marital
intercourse, and the frequency and acceptance of such behavior.' An
expert witness 235 had testified that:
the sex chive is instinctive, and is, a biologic force that is a central fact-
or, not only in personality development, but also at the practical office
level of treating problems .... When this drive is involuntarily pro-
scribed, guilt and anxiety problems can arise and frequently create resid-
ual problems many years later. 1 6
228. Id.
229. 381 A.2d 333 (NJ. 1977).
230. Fornication is defined as: "sexual intercourse other than between married persons."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 653 (6th ed. 1990).
231. Saunders, 381 A.2d at 339.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 340. Saunders was not the first state court to hold that fornication was
protected by the right to privacy. See also State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (1976).
In Pilcher, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a statute barring acts of sodomy between
consenting adults of the opposite sex was unconstitutional because it invaded their
fundamental right to privacy. Id Similarly, in Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp.
449, 459 (1979), the court held that private sexual activity between consenting adults is
within the zone of privacy protected from unwarranted government intrusion. Id.
234. See Richard Green, Fornication: Common Law Legacy and American Sexual
Privacy, 17 ANGLO-AMER. L. REv. 226, 229 (1988).
235. Richard Green, the expert witness who testified in Saunders, authored the law
review article from which the accompanying text was taken. See also RICHARD GREEN,
SCIENCE AND THE LAW (1992) (discussing many issues involving the relationship between
sexuality and the Constitution from legal, as well as psycho-sexual and medical perspectives).
236. Green, supra note 234, at 229-30.
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Justice Bedford, the trial judge in Saunders, later commented that while
the impact of this testimony was minimal in his ruling, the nature of the
evidence could be useful in these types of cases.237 Justice Schreiber, a
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice who wrote the concurring opinion in
Saunders, stated in an interview after the case that his decision was
primarily based on the notion of privacy.238 He said, "if [sexual] conduct
is such that it doesn't affect anybody else, no third person is affected, or the
state isn't affected, then we're getting into the zone of privacy. 239
The advancement and consideration of this type of evidence in other
lower level court decisions could profoundly affect the future of the modem
privacy doctrine. To the extent that such evidence leads to analogous
rulings in other courts, the Supreme Court of the United States may have
incentive and support to re-evaluate its position concerning privacy law as
it relates to the notion of sexual expression between consenting adults.
2. First Amendment Right to Self-Expression Theory
The concept of sexual expression has found its way to the Supreme
Court in other contexts as well, notably that of the First Amendment. Over
the past twenty years, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled on
the constitutionality of various regulations on nude dancing.2' In Califor-
nia v. LaRue,241 the Court held that live nude dancing may be entitled to
constitutional protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments under
certain circumstances.242 Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated that
"nothing in the language or history of the Twenty-First Amendment
authorizes the states to use their liquor licensing power as a means for the
deliberate inhibition of protected, even if distasteful, forms of expres-
sion." '43 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, said that "once it is recognized
that movies and plays enjoy prima facie First Amendment protection, the
standard for reviewing state regulation of their component parts shifts
dramatically." 2" Marshall's statement implies that sexual expression,
which would be protected under the First Amendment within the context of
237. Id. at 231.
238. Id. at 232.
239. Id.
240. Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REV. 177, 287 (1991).
241. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
242. Id. at 118.
243. Id. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 130 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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artistic expression in a play or painting, for instance, may be entitled to
similar constitutional protection in other contexts.
Eight years later, in Schad v. Mount Ephraim,2 45 the Court struck
down a zoning ordinance which prohibited the existence of all nude dance
clubs.2 The Court held that nude dancing is not without its First Amend-
ment protections from official regulation.247 Because the zoning ordinance
was held violative of the First Amendment right to self-expression, it was
reviewed under higher scrutiny which required the zoning ordinance to be
narrowly tailored to advance a sufficiently substantial government inter-
est.24 The Court held that the ordinance was overbroad,249 and not
based in furtherance of a substantial government interest.' Justice White,
delivering the opinion of the court, stated that "'Nudity alone' does not
place otherwise protected material outside the mantel of the First Amend-
ment.
2 51
Ten years later, the Court was again confronted with the constitutional-
ity of nude dancing in Barnes v. Glen Theater 52 Until Barnes, however,
the Court had not explicitly clarified whether nude dancing was protected
expression.5 3 In Barnes, the Court held, in a five to four decision, that
a statute proscribing totally nude dancing was not violative of the First
Amendment.' Specifically, the Court held that nude dancing, though
expressive conduct, "falls within the outer perimeters of the First Amend-
ment."2"5 In arriving at its decision, the Court relied on the test estab-
245. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 66.
248. Id. at 68.
249. The statute was held overbroad because it excluded all types of live entertainment,
including non-obscene nude dancing that is otherwise protected by the first amendment. Id.
at 76.
250. The court rejected Mount Ephraim's claim that permitting the live entertainment
would have conflicted with its plan to create a commercial area that caters only to the
immediate needs of its residents. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72. It also concluded that Mount
Ephraim lacked any evidence in support of its claim that live entertainment posed problems
otherwise avoidable by other permitted uses. Id. at 73. Finally, the court held that there was
no evidence for the borough's contention that live entertainment was incompatible with the
uses which were already permitted by the borough. Id. at 75.
251. Id. at 66.
252. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
253. See Leading Cases, supra note 240, at 287.
254. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563.
255. Id. at 566.
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lished in United States v. O'Brien,2 56 which has been applied to regula-
tions imposed upon symbolic speech. The Court stated that a regulation will
be upheld under O'Brien "if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. 25 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the purpose of the
statute was to "protect societal order and morality, 258 and that was within
the state's Tenth Amendment police power to regulate for the public health,
safety, and morals of the state." 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by
holding that the statute indeed furthered a substantial government interest,
and that this interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression2
because the dancers were still permitted to express erotic messages provided
that they wore pasties, and G-strings.261
Writing for the dissent, Justice White argued that the statute was
content based, and only served to prohibit nudity that fell within the specific
context of nude dancing.262 As a content based statute, it warranted strict
scrutiny. Justice White proceeded to argue that the majority had fallen prey
to its subjective biases in rejecting nudity when it occurs in strip bars, but
protecting it if within a ballet:
While the entertainment afforded by nude ballet at Lincoln Center to
those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by
judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in
substance from the dance viewed by the person who ... wants some
"entertainment...., 263
Justice White stated the element of total nudity in this type of dancing
served to elicit "emotions and feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the
256. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
257. Id. at 377.
258. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568.
259. Id. at 569.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 571.
262. Id. at 589 (White, J., dissenting).
263. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank,
501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974), affd in part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922 (1975)).
1356 [Vol. 20
337
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
1996]
spectators. '  Finally, Justice White stated that "generating thoughts,
ideas, and emotions, is the essence of communication."265
The dissenting opinion in Barnes, falling one vote shy of the majority,
lends support to the view that sexuality, as a form of self-expression, should
be entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amendment. If four
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States agree that nude dancing
in strip bars is worthy of constitutional protection, it is hard to reconcile
how the act of intimacy as a means of expressing love, togetherness, and
one's sexual identity, between two consenting adults, is not worthy of as
much protection. To be sure, the potentially negative secondary effects
stemming from nude dancing bars are non-existent with private sexual
relations between consenting adults.266 With the exception of sex crimes
such as rape, sexual assault, child sexual abuse, or public acts of nudity, the
government has no legitimate interest to advance. To the extent that any
given sexual act does not infringe on the participants' or other persons'
rights, it should not be subject to the state's Tenth Amendment police
power.
Sigmund Freud once said that "sex is not something we do, it's
something we are."'267 Sexuality has been defined to be everything that
has to do with being a man or woman.2 Said to be inextricably woven
with one's personality,269 the concept of one's sexual identity encompasses
three components.27 "The first is the core awareness of belonging to one
of two categories of persons-male or female.""27  This component
264. Id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
266. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1988) (holding that zoning ordi-
nance designed to reduce concentration of nude dancing bars was rational means for state to
reduce crime and protect property values).
267. BENJAMIN A. KOGAN, HUMAN SEXUAL ExPRESSION 2 (1973).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3.
270. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
271. Id.; see also RONALD A. LATORRE, SEXUAL IDENTrY 15 (1979). This belief is
largely dependent on both the person's perception of his or her body image and on the
messages received from significant others. Id. This is arguably the most important sub
category because it is mainly subconscious and can affect the development of other areas.
Id. One's physical gender does not necessarily translate into a congruent sense of self.
Some individuals are so discontent with having been born male or female, that they even-
tually undergo a sex change. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 52. They are known as
"transsexuals." The notion of transsexuality serves to emphasize the degree to which one's
sense of maleness or femaleness can be independent of and override one's physical make-up.
To the extent that it is a function of one's mind as opposed to the body, it lends support to
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"permeat[es] nearly all behavior."2' Studies have indicated that the emer-
gence of this characteristic occurs as early as thirteen months of age.27 3
The second component relates to the core of one's gender-masculinity and
femininity.274 One's sense of masculinity or femininity is also manifested
early.275 Masculine and feminine behavior generally develop together with
the self-concept of maleness or femaleness.27 6  The third component
concerns sexual orientation." One's sexual identity-the selection of
male or female sexual partners, or sexual orientation-is so profound that it
is commonly used to actually define the person.
the argument that one's sexual identity or sense of sexuality is inherently cognitive, and not
just merely a physical response. As such, it should be protected to the same extent as other
forms of self-expression. No psychological or physiological explanation has been offered to
conclusively resolve why some males and females are transsexual. Id. at 102.
272. GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
273. Id. The age at which this feature becomes psychologically integrated is not known
with 100% certainty, but some evidence suggest that the recognition of two classes of
humans based on gender, occurs as early as thirteen months. Id.
274. See id at 52; see also JANET T. SPENCE & ROBERT L. HELMREICH, MASCULINITY
& FEMININITY, THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, CORRELATES, & ANTECEDENTS 4 (1978)
("Men and women are typically assumed to possess different temperamental characteristics
and abilities-distinctive sets of attributes whose existence is used to justify the perpetuation
of the society's role structure or whose inculcation is believed to be necessary if members
of each sex are to fulfill their assigned functions."). Evidence suggests that sex-role differ-
entiations are highly shapeable. Id. at 5. Various environmental factors including political,
sociological, and economic forces have been determined to play a part in the shaping of
one's sense of masculinity or femininity. Id. To the extent that this is mental and not physi-
cal, and to the extent that it is manifested through one's sexuality, it lends additional support
to the argument that sexual expression is a form of cognitive expression, and should,
consequently, be entitled to First Amendment protection. See also Susan R. Walen & David
Roth, A Cognitive Approach, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALrrY, supra note 186, at 335.
In one longitudinal study, a pair of identical twins was observed for research concerning
gender development. One infant, due to an accident at circumcision, lost his penis. He was
reared as a girl, and his brother was reared as a boy, each successfully developed a different
gender role. See GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
275. GREEN, supra note 235, at 51.
276. Id. at 52; see also LATORRE, supra note 271, at 26 ("By the age of four or five
years, almost every child says that when he grows up he will be a parent of the appropriate
sex [i.e. daddy if he is a boy and mommy if she is a girl]."). Children as young as three
have been found to make fairly accurate distinctions between male and female types of
activities. GREEN, supra note 235, at 52.
277. GREEN, supra note 235, at 53.
278. Id. at 53. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ('The court recognized in Roberts, 468 U.S., at 619, that the 'ability independent-
ly to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty' cannot truly be exercised
in a vacuum; we all depend on the 'emotional enrichment from close ties with others."').
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The foregoing psychological construct lends support to the argument
that sexuality is a physical product of sophisticated cognitive processes. The
various components or stages of psycho-sexual development all underscore
the extent to which one's sexuality is a function of the mind279 as opposed
to the body. In essence, it is a manifestation of one's inner self, identity,
and emotions. Nonetheless, one must be careful not to dismiss it as an
exclusively cerebral function. A number of noted psychologists have
incorporated sexuality into hierarchical models of development, where it is
classified as a human need, in the absence of which psychological problems
may ensue.28 °
As a manifestation of one's emotions, feelings, identity, self, gender,
and sense of eroticism, sexuality is the embodiment of human self-
expression at the most fundamental level. Similar to art, speech, and other
forms of expression, sexuality is worthy of First Amendment protection. To
the extent that it involves consenting adults and does not infringe on another
person's rights, it is no less a form of communication than any other, and
should be treated as such.
C. Right to Habilitation
In Wyatt v. Stickney,2"' the court held that mentally disabled persons
who are confined to institutions have a constitutional right to "adequate and
effective treatment."2"2 The court mandated a list of minimum constitu-
279. See, e.g., Walen & Roth, supra note 275, at 335 (exploring various cognitive
theories for sexuality and sexual development); see also, Igor S. Kon, A Sociocultural
Approach, in THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, supra note 186, at 280 ("Human sexuality
is not a simple biological given and cannot be explained solely in terms of reproductive
biology or in terms of instinctive behavior.").
280. See RICHARD M. LERNER, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
310-18 (1986) (describing Erikson's eight stages of personality development, a psychological
life cycle model, within which sexuality plays integral part); see also Lisa A. Serbin & Carol
H. Sprafkin, A Developmental Approach, Sexuality from Infancy Through Adolescence, in
THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, supra note 186, at 163 (explaining how various cognitive,
social, and affective phenomena involved in sexuality are interrelated throughout the
developmental process).
281. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
282. Id. at 390. In support of its holding, the court cited a resolution entitled: "Dec-
laration on the Rights of the Mentally Retarded." Id. Adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 27, 1971, the resolution read in, pertinent part: "[tihe
mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical therapy and to such
education, training, rehabilitation, and guidance as will enable him to develop his ability and
maximum potential." Id, at 391.
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tional standards for adequate habilitation8 3 of the mentally retarded.284
Of notable relevance was the right to a "humane psychological and physical
environment. ' '285  Specifically, the standards require that "residents shall
have a right to dignity, privacy and humane care,' 286 and that "the institu-
tion shall provide, under appropriate supervision, suitable opportunities for
the resident's interaction with members of the opposite sex. 287
In Youngberg v. Romeo,2 8 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that mentally disabled persons have constitutionally protected liberty
interests to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from
unreasonable bodily restraints, and "such [minimally adequate] training as
may be required by these interests. 28 9 In Youngberg, a mentally disabled
man who had been committed to a state institution, was involuntarily
restrained for extended periods of time as a result of his violent behav-
ior.2'° The Court remanded the case to the district court to balance the
patient's liberty interest with the state's interest, so that they might
determine whether the physical restraints imposed on the patient were
excessive, and whether they fell short of the minimally adequate standards
of habilitation to which the patient was constitutionally entitled.
VI. APPLICATION
A. Catherine's Right to Privacy
While in the community living arrangement, Catherine is under
211
constant supervision. Some testimony indicated that she is checked
every ten minutes.2" While it is necessary to monitor Catherine's precari-
ous medical condition, this degree of oversight was also explained to be
"primarily to prevent sexual activity."'2 93 This implies that the overriding
283. The court defined "habilitation" as: "[t]he process by which the staff of the
institution assists the resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which enable him to
cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his environment and to
raise the level of his physical, mental and social efficiency." Id. at 395.
284. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 395 app. A.
285. Id. at 399.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
289. Id. at 324.
290. Id. at 310.
291. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 9, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 10.
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concern is that Catherine may become pregnant.294 However, a number
of sexually related incidents were cited in the record to have occurred
despite this unrelenting supervision.295 On one occasion, while visiting
Catherine at her group home, her mother noticed a young man standing
outside Catherine's door while she was undressing.296 Another time, a
male resident who lived in the group home was seen leaving Catherine's
bedroom, and she was found in bed crying, with her nightgown raised.2
These incidents underscore the inadequacy of her supervision, and raise the
concern of how many incidents may have gone undetected.
Finally, medical testimony indicates that Catherine's hymen is not
intact and she does not have a virginal tract.29 This fact, together with
Catherine's overly affectionate nature,2 99 clearly indicates that, short of a
live-in guardian, no amount of supervision could adequately guarantee her
complete sexual abstinence.
This type of unceasing supervision imposed on Catherine constitutes an
ongoing infraction on her fundamental constitutional right to privacy.
Common to all of the aforesaid right to privacy cases is the inherent right
to be let alone.3° Yet, because of the fear that Catherine may become
pregnant, she never has more than ten minutes free from intrusion.01 The
sterilization procedure would eliminate the possibility that Catherine could
ever become pregnant, and there would be no need for the constant
interference with her right to privacy. Her right to privacy would be
restored to the extent that her supervision was not medically necessary." 2
No contraceptive could provide this guarantee without causing harmful side
effects.303
294. See supra part II.A.
295. See supra part II.A.
296. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 10, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
297. Id. Catherine indicated that the male resident had touched her breasts and hips.
Id.
298. Id. at 4.
299. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
300. See supra part V.A. The precise parameters for the right to privacy have never
been defined. Consequently, the Supreme Court is afforded greater flexibility in its
interpretation and application of the concept. Though Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and Bolton
do not explicitly recognize the right to be let alone, it is implicit in the right to privacy.
301. Brief for Appellee/Respondent at 9, Estate of C.W. (No. 91-2970).
302. Id. at 9-11.
303. See supra part II.D.
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B. Catherine's Right to Sexuality
It has been said that "sexual activity for the mentally handi-
capped-whether heterosexual, homosexual or masturbation-is abhorrent to
people, even though there is enlightened clamor for understanding the
handicapped at home and in the community. ' '3 4 Historically, the preva-
lent view has been that mentally disabled persons "should not be allowed to
engage in any sexual activity whatsoever.'30 5  The time has come for
society to recognize that, as human beings, mentally disabled persons are
entitled to develop, express, and enjoy their sexuality to the same extent as
anyone else.3°  Catherine is no exception. Up to this point in her
life,30 7 she has been deprived of her fundamental right to sexuality. She
has had neither the opportunity to decide whether to engage in sexual
relations, nor the ability to express herself sexually if she so wished.0 8
It is known that developmentally disabled persons "need more
opportunities to learn how to relate appropriately in social and sexual
situations."3" Under the appropriate level of guidance and direction,
Catherine should, to the extent that she is able, be permitted to enjoy a
sexual relationship with a male whose level of intellectual functioning
approximates her own. This would preserve her fundamental right to
304. George W. Lee, The Sexual Rights of The Retarded-An International Point of
View, in SEXUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 58 (Medora
S. Bass et a]. eds., 1973) (quoting Dr. J.M. Kahn from the August 1972 issue of the British
Medical Journal).
305. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 8.
306. Id.
307. That is, up until the time of Catherine's sterilization.
308. Due to Catherine's cognitive limitations, no exploration was made into whether she
could in fact consent to sexual activity. See Telephone Interview with Marta Engdahl, supra
note 58. Catherine's sexual partners could potentially face criminal charges pursuant to 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3121(4) (Supp. 1995) ("A person commits a felony of the first
degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse.., who
is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of consent."); see also 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 311 (c)(2) (Supp. 1995), which provides:
Ineffective consent-Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law
defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: ... it is given by a
person who by reason of ... mental disease or defect... is manifestly unable
or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the
nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense[.]
Id. This note will not address the ramifications of Catherine's ability or inability to consent.
Though it is certainly worthy of further consideration, it exceeds the scope of this discussion.
309. HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 26.
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sexuality, and minimize the possibility of her being infected by a sexually
transmitted disease, and/or being sexually exploited.3'0
C. Catherine's Right to Habilitation
As a result of the deprivation of Catherine's right to privacy and
sexuality, her right to habilitation is undermined as well. As held in Wyatt,
Catherine has a constitutional right to a humane psychological environ-
ment.311 One may inevitably conclude that, without the tubal ligation,
Catherine is not living in a humane psychological environment. With the
exception of the evening, when Catherine goes to sleep, she never has more
than ten or fifteen minutes to herself. While this is necessary to prevent
Catherine from becoming pregnant, it could nevertheless be avoided if she
were permitted to be sterilized. Even if one does conclude that such
treatment is not inhumane, it still invariably frustrates her right to privacy,
as provided within the context of habilitation.
Catherine's lack of opportunity to engage in sexual relations further
undermines her right to habilitation.312  The essence of habilitation is
"making available to mentally retarded patterns and conditions of everyday
life which are [as] close as possible to the norms and patterns of the
mainstream of society. 31 3  Implicit in the concept of habilitation or
normalization is the recognition that the mentally disabled are sexual
beings.1 4 Without the tubal ligation, Catherine is not free to engage in
a healthy intimate relationship. As provided in Wyatt, Catherine should
have the opportunity to interact with members of the opposite sex. 315
310. If Catherine was not given the appropriate level of guidance and supervision, there
would exist the danger of sexual abuse by males who were functioning at higher intellectual
levels. There would also exist potential health problems with respect to the transmission of
sexual diseases. By requiring Catherine, and her mate, to be subject to some degree of
supervision or guidance in the beginning of their relationship, the potential onset of health
related problems would be minimized.
311. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. 387, 399 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
312. See discussion supra note 282 (describing the creation of the "Declaration on the
Rights of the Mentally Retarded"); see also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 381 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (holding that mentally ill persons who are confined to institutions have a
constitutional right to "adequate treatment," including "suitable opportunities for the patient's
interaction with members of the opposite sex"). Subsequently, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), the Court extended its prior holding to apply to the mentally
disabled as well as the mentally ill. Id
313. RowE & SAVAGE, supra note 53, at 10.
314. See HAAVIK & MENNINGER, II, supra note 26, at 8.
315. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 399.
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Finally, the Court in Youngberg held that a court must show deference
to the judgment exercised by qualified professionals with respect to the
particular issues of habilitation.316 Sufficient psychological evidence exists
to lend support to the contention that the deprivation of Catherine's privacy
and sexuality interests restricts her healthy psychological development,
thereby undermining the chief objective of habilitation.317
VII. CONCLUSION: BALANCING TEST OF CATHERINE'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The world's historic fascination with eugenics31 8 demands an inquiry
into any potential infractions on Catherine's constitutional rights which may
result from the sterilization procedure. In Youngberg, the Supreme Court
applied a balancing test consisting of the mentally disabled person's various
liberty interests weighed against the legitimate interests of the state
9
.
31
The Court stated that "[b]ecause the facts in cases of confinement of men-
tally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and
circumstances of the case before the court. '320 This type of pragmatic
approach ensures that the Court's decision is narrowly tailored to the
particular needs of the mentally disabled person. The court must be careful
not to lose its objectivity as a result of the temptation to compensate for its
historical prejudices against the mentally disabled.32' In a case such as
this, it is particularly important for the court to use the "totality of the
circumstances" approach because the sterilization procedure was sought
strictly out of medical necessity. Catherine's mental disability was only one
factor to be considered among many.
With that in mind, we may proceed by first identifying the various
interests involved. The state's interests include the following: first, the
protection of Catherine's right to privacy with respect to the decision of
whether to undergo the sterilization; and second, the preservation of her
right to procreate. Pitted against the state's foregoing interests is Catherine's
mother's interest in protecting her daughter's following constitutional rights:
first, her right to privacy with respect to her right to be let alone; second,
316. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
317. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
318. See supra part III.
319. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
320. Id. at 319 n.25.
321. See supra part III.
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her right to sexuality; third, her right to adequate habilitation; and fourth, her
right to continuation of life.3"
We may begin by examining the state's interest in protecting Cathe-
rine's right to privacy. Her privacy interests have been invaded to the extent
that the permission to perform the operation may be issued absent her
consent. In analyzing Catherine's rights to privacy, it is vital to do so in
light of her mental disability. Because of Catherine's level of cognitive
functioning, it is necessary for her mother and others who care for her to
aggressively assert her best interests for her. To the extent that she is
unable to care for herself or make well-informed decisions, they have a duty
to compensate by acting as surrogate decision makers.3" As a result of
Catherine's disability, her life is necessarily regulated and protected by those
around her.
322. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that during the second trimes-
ter of pregnancy, the state may protect its interest in the mother's life and health, by
regulating an abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to same. Id. at 163-64.
The Court further held that during the third trimester, the state must allow the mother to
abort her viable fetus if it is for the purpose of preserving her life or health. Id. at 165-66.
Four years later, in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 677 (1977), the Court upheld
its ruling in Roe, which held that, even after viability, the state may not regulate or proscribe
abortion if it interferes with the mother's right to life or health. Id. at 686. In providing that
the mother's right to life supersedes that of her viable fetus, the Court has revealed its
primary interest in taking whatever means necessary to protect a woman's right to continued
life and health. Id. While Roe and Carey involved different scenarios than this case, they
are analogous because of the overriding interest in protecting a pregnant mother's maternal
life and health. However, Catherine's mother is not afforded the liberty to wait until her
daughter becomes pregnant, because of Catherine's fragile epileptic condition. Rather, her
mother must ensure that her daughter avoids the potentially irreversible, life-endangering
situation which could arise, were she to become pregnant. To the extent that a potential
pregnancy could put Catherine into a life-endangering situation, her mother has an interest
in protecting her daughter's right to continued life by way of the tubal ligation procedure.
The right to life itself is arguably the most fundamental of all constitutional rights. A
decision to deny Catherine's mother the authorization to permit Catherine's sterilization
would trivialize Catherine's right to life, and consequently, leave her and those who cared
for her in constant peril.
323. See Scott, supra note 135, at 841.
Some mentally disabled persons are not competent to make reproductive deci-
sions for themselves. A decision about sterilization made on behalf of an
individual in this category violates no interest in reproductive autonomy; when
a person is incapable of making her own decision, others must determine whether
sterilization is in her best interest. . . . The desirability of the procedure may
depend on nonreproductive considerations such as medical risks and benefits,
human dignity, privacy, and family continuity....
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In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,324 the Supreme Court
of the United States held, in a five to four decision, that the parents of a
woman who had fallen into a persistent vegetative state as a result of a car
accident, had the right to exercise their daughter's constitutional right to
refuse continued artificial nutrition and hydration procedures if there was
clear and convincing evidence to indicate that their daughter would have
chosen to, were she so able.325 The Court's decision indicates that a
showing of clear and convincing evidence regarding an incompetent person's
intent may permit a guardian to assert her rights for her. While this may be
characterized as a substituted judgment, it is predicated exclusively on the
best interests of the disabled person who is incapable of asserting his or her
own rights.
In this case, while the facts may be different, the ultimate objective is
the same-to protect the best interests of Catherine who is incapable of
making such a determination on her own. Cruzan implicitly stands for the
proposition that a guardian may assert the best interests of his or her child
in the event that the child is incapable of doing so.326 Consequently,
Catherine's mother should be permitted to make certain types of decisions
for her despite her theoretical lack of consent, because it is in her best
interest.327 The overriding concern for Catherine's life dwarfs the de
minimis privacy intrusion which she would suffer as a result of the tubal
ligation procedure.
Catherine's right to procreate must be precisely defined in view of her
medical predicament. It cannot be emphasized enough that the tubal ligation
procedure was strictly being sought as a means through which Catherine's
mother could protect her daughter's right to continuation of life. The
laparoscopy should therefore be considered in the same light as any other
medically necessary procedure. As stated earlier, one must resist the
temptation to analyze the issue within the central context of Catherine's
mental disability. Her mental disability was not the motivation for the
procedure. Her medical condition was. Catherine's mental disability only
becomes relevant to the extent of its limitation on her autonomy, her
324. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
325. Id. at 284-85.
326. See id.
327. See supra part II.C.
328. See A. JEFFERSON PENFIELD, FEMALE STERILIZATION BY MINILAPAROTOMY OR
OPEN LAPAROSCOPY 7-9 (1980). The tubal ligation procedure is relatively simple. It
consists of a belly-button size incision through which the Fallopian tubes are burned or cut
to prevent the ova from entering the uterus. Id.
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heightened dependability on those around her, and the distorted context of
the fundamental rights which have been consequently implicated.
The potential life-endangering risks facing both Catherine and her
fetus, were she to become pregnant, necessarily place her right to procreate
in a different light than that of a healthy woman who has no such risks. In
Cruzan, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, argued that the state's
proclaimed interest in protecting the incompetent person's right to life,
which was being artificially sustained, was abstract.32 9 He stated that be-
cause of the person's irreversible vegetative state and the fact that such a
person is incapable of thought, emotion or sensation, the state's interest in
protecting that life is quite different from protecting that of a healthy
person.330 Catherine's right to procreate is also abstractly defined because
of the virtual impossibility that she could ever carry her pregnancy to term.
As a result, the state's interest in protecting her right to procreate becomes
lessened accordingly, especially when considered against Catherine's other
fundamental rights which would be upheld as a result of the tubal ligation,
such as her rights to privacy, sexuality, habilitation, and life.
While it is highly improbable that Catherine's mental or physical
condition will change, the theoretical ramifications of her sterilization and
their relationship to her fundamental right to procreate should nevertheless
be addressed. In the event that Catherine was empowered to rear a child,
she would have a number of options available to her. First, she could adopt.
This would enable her to avoid the physical complications associated with
pregnancy. Second, she could have the effect of the operation surgically
reversed.33 ' Alternatively, she could give birth through the use of in vitro
fertilization.332
To the extent that Catherine is entirely dependent on those around her,
the need to salvage any degree of freedom which she may otherwise have,
should prevail over any accompanying de minimis infractions which she
may incidentally suffer. The tubal ligation procedure would remove the
329. 497 U.S. at 272 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
330. Id. at 313-14, 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
331. See PENFIELD, supra note 328, at 98. Catherine's fallopian tubes could be
reconstructed to give her the capability to become pregnant again, by either minilaparotomy
or open laparoscopy. The success rate for the reversal of the tubal ligation procedure is
approximately 82%. Id.
332. A procedure in which ova are removed from the woman's ovaries and fertilized
in a petri dish using a donor's sperm. The fertilized egg is then transferred into the woman's
uterus. Id.
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threat of pregnancy, and consequently eliminate the need for the relentless
privacy infractions which Catherine continuously endures. To the extent
that her supervision is not medically necessary, Catherine could finally have
the opportunity to be let alone in peace to think, to muse. She would also
gain the opportunity to enjoy a sexual relationship with someone of the
opposite sex. While these rights are oftentimes taken for granted by most,
they are long-awaited, and far overdue freedoms for Catherine. With them,
she would no longer be left to simply "exist" with the constant threat of
death looming over her.
After twenty-six years, Catherine could finally begin to live life as a
human being.
Robert Randal Adler333
333. J.D. candidate, January 1997, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lie detection is not a new concept. In fact, it has been said that more
than 4000 years ago the Chinese would try the accused in the presence of
a physician who, listening or feeling for a change in the heartbeat, would
announce whether the accused was testifying truthfully.' Still others
believed that dunking, a hot-iron-on-the-tongue, and other truth revealing
1. W. Thomas Halbleib, Note, United States v. Piccinonna: The Eleventh Circuit Adds
Another Approach to Polygraph Evidence in the Federal System, 80 KY. L.J. 225, 229
(1992).
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techniques would uncover suspected liars.2 Today, we rely on polygraph
machines to serve this function. Although great strides have been made in
the area of lie detection since the days of dunking and hot-iron-on-the-
tongue tests, many argue that the polygraph is nothing more than a
nervousness calculator which operates under assumptions and theories which
are no more accurate than the tests of ancient times. As a result, the
theory of lie detection has remained a controversial and much debated topic.
To further complicate matters, courts are faced with the responsibility of
having to decide whether polygraph results are worthy of admissibility when
used in nontrial contexts such as suppression hearings, prison disciplinary
hearings, and probation revocation hearings.4 In Florida, the concern over
the admissibility of polygraph5 results is not a new issue. However, it
remains a controversial and unsettled area of law in all courts. Florida
precedent holds that polygraph results are inadmissible for purposes of
determining guilt at trial.6 Nevertheless, many Florida courts have allowed
polygraph results to be admitted upon the agreement of the parties7 and as
a condition of probation.' In addition, many Florida courts allow the
polygraph to be used in civil trials for investigative purposes.9 As a result,
2. Id. at 229-30. In addition to dunking and hot iron tests, Halbleib notes that native
Americans are said to have required a suspected liar to chew rice and then spit it out. Id.
at 230. If the rice stuck to the accused gums, he was pronounced a liar. Id.
3. See Hart v. State, 633 So. 2d 1189, 1189 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), abrogated
by Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1995).
4. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 908.
5. As defined in Barron's Law Dictionary "polygraph" is:
[A]n electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records
certain physiological changes in the human body which it is believed are
involuntarily caused by the subject's conscious attempts to deceive the
questioner. Once the machine has recorded the subject's responses to the
questions propounded by the operator, the operator interprets the results and
determines whether the subject is lying.
BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY 358 (3d ed. 1991).
6. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952).
7. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1988); Jones v. State, 453 So. 2d
226, 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
8. See Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
9. When the polygraph is used for investigative purposes, it is usually done in the
context of an employment setting. Thus, since no criminal conviction is involved, the
decision whether to require submission to polygraph testing is a matter left to the discretion
of the employer. See generally Swope v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 159 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (addressing the distinction between public and private employees in
terms of discharge for failure to take a polygraph). But see Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,
427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla.) (holding that the unreliability of polygraph results precludes the
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court decisions in Florida concerning the admissibility and use of polygraph
results are diverse, inconsistent, and apparently irreconcilable.
This article will address these inconsistencies and their impact on the
future of polygraph admissibility in Florida courts. Beginning with Part II,
this Note provides a brief overview of the development of the law
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence, specifically the
polygraph, along with the current approach used by Florida courts in
addressing this issue. Part III presents a discussion on the use of polygraph
testing as a condition of probation and its effect on the probationer's
constitutional rights, specifically, his right against self-incrimination. In Part
IV, the basic principles underlying the polygraph's operation are examined
along with the many factors involved in obtaining an accurate polygraph
reading. Recommendations for achieving consistent and reliable results are
discussed in Part V, and Part VI concludes with a discussion concerning the
issues that arise when polygraph results are admitted in Florida courts.
II. A LOOK AT THE LAW
A. Background
As early as 1923, beginning with the seminal polygraph case, Frye v.
United States,"0 and continuing through the present day, the issue of
polygraph admissibility has remained an issue fraught with controversy,
uncertainty, and peril. At the forefront of this quandary is the divergence
of opinion regarding the reliability of polygraph results along with the fact
that such results have yet to enjoy general acceptance within the scientific
community." In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit countered the trend' of per se
dismissal of a police officer for failure to take the test), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983).
10. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under Frye, in order for evidence to be admissible,
it must be based on principles which are sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. Iad at 1014.
11. Id at 1013-14. This landmark case is known for the promulgation of the "Frye Rule
of per se inadmissibility," more commonly known as the "Frye test" or "general acceptance
approach." In Frye, the results of a systolic blood pressure teft were held inadmissible based
on a lack of recognition and general acceptance within the scientific community. 11 at 1014.
Although the results of polygraph testing were not at issue in Frye, Florida courts apply this
approach when considering the admissibility of scientific evidence and have required, in
terms of the polygraph, that the party seeking to introduce the evidence make a preliminary
showing that the underlying methodology of such evidence is generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community. Accord Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Fla. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952). See
generally Mark R. Kapusta, Daubert Versus Flanagan Comparing Standards for the
Feld 1371
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inadmissibility of polygraph results with its decision in United States v.
Piccinonna.z As a result of Piccinonna, the Eleventh Circuit became the
first in the federal system to follow an approach to polygraph evidence that
had been adopted more than a decade earlier by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court.13 Under the Piccinonna approach, the results of polygraph
testimony are admissible to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a
witness at trial. 4
More recently, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,5 the
Supreme Court of the United States expressly rejected Frye's stringent
general acceptance test and adopted a more flexible approach based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 The Court reasoned that the Frye test had
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Florida State and Federal Courts, FLA. B.J., Dec.
1994, at 39; see also FED. R. EvID. 702 (to be admissible, scientific knowledge must have
sufficient reliability or trustworthiness and there should be proof that the principle supports
what it purports to show, i.e., that it is valid).
12. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
13. The approach adopted by the Piccinonna court first appeared in Commonwealth v.
Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. 1978), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d
35 (Mass. 1989). Interestingly enough, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overruled
Vitello in Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989), which was decided less
than three months after the Eleventh Circuit decided Piccinonna. It should be noted that
under Vitello, the use of the polygraph for purposes of impeachment or corroboration was
limited to the testimony of the defendant, whereas in Piccinonna, the use of the polygraph
was broadened to include impeachment or corroboration of the testimony of any witness at
trial. For additional discussion on the Vitello and Piccinonna opinions, see Halbleib, supra
note I, at 259.
14. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536-37.
15. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
16. Id. at 2794. In Daubert, an action was brought by parents and their minor children
who were born with serious birth defects, alleging that the birth defects had been caused by
the mother's ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug distributed by Dow. Id.
at 2791. The plaintiffs sought to introduce the testimony of a scientific expert who had
compiled data which indicated that Bendectin could cause birth defects. Id. This testimony
was excluded by the district court because it was based upon principles which were not
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific field. Id.
at 2792. These principles were based upon conclusions drawn from animal cell studies, live
animal studies, and chemical structure analyses. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, citing the Frye decision. Id. at 2792. The United States Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and expressly rejected Frye's general acceptance test.
Id. at 2799. In issuing the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun characterized the general
acceptance test as a rigid requirement which was "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the
Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion
testimony."' Id. at 2794. For further discussion on the Daubert and Frye opinions, see
Kapusta, supra note 11, at 38-40.
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been superseded by rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which had
become effective some fifty years after the Frye decision.17 It would seem
likely that Florida courts would follow in the footsteps of the Daubert
decision since Florida Statutes section 90.702 is virtually identical to
Federal Rule 702.18 Nonetheless, in Flanagan v. State, 9 the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the approaches advocated by both the Piccinonna
and Daubert courts and reaffirmed its commitment to the Frye "general
acceptance" test for the admissibility of scientific evidence.2"
In Florida, polygraph results have been held inadmissible to prove the
guilt or innocence of a defendant since 1952.21 However, Florida courts
have allowed polygraph results to be admitted upon the stipulation of both
parties In addition, many Florida courts have advocated the use of
periodic polygraph examinations as part of a probationer's sentence2 3 In
17. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Under the Daubert approach, federal judges ruling on
the admissibility of expert scientific testimony must engage in a two-part analysis. First, the
judge must determine whether an expert's testimony reflects scientific knowledge based on
whether their findings are derived by the scientific method and whether their work product
amounts to good science. Id. Second, the judge must determine whether the proposed
testimony is relevant and that it logically supports a material aspect of the party's case. Id.
at 2796. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence may be
admitted in the form of an opinion from a qualified expert).
18. See Kapusta, supra note 11, at 39.
19. 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993).
20. liL at 828. Regardless of the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert, the
Florida Supreme Court in Flanagan stood firm on its position that the Frye test should be
strictly adhered to when the admissibility of scientific evidence is at issue. As the court
noted: "We are mindful that the United States Supreme Court recently construed Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence as superseding the Frye test. However, Florida continues
to adhere to the Frye test for the admissibility of scientific opinions." Id. at 829 n.2
(citations omitted). This is a particularly important point since Florida's own rule regarding
expert testimony was patterned after Federal Rule 702. See FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1994)
(providing that scientific knowledge is admissible in the form of expert testimony if it will
assist the trier of fact).
21. See Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1952).
22. See Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1988); Jones v. State, 453 So. 2d 226,
227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that results of polygraph, absent consent by both
parties, are inadmissible).
23. The courts of other jurisdictions have approved the use of the polygraph as a
condition of probation despite the fact that the results of such a test are inadmissible at trial.
See, e.g., People v. Miller, 256 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Ct. App. 1989); Mann v. State, 269 S.E.2d
863 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). See
generally State v. Victoroff, 770 P.2d 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that polygraph
examinations are a valid condition of probation and results are admissible in any future court
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fact, many Florida courts have required that a probation candidate agree to
submit to these tests before probation will be granted.24 Thus, a direct
conflict exists between Florida's refusal to recognize the validity of
polygraph results and its willingness to accept the results of such tests in
certain situations.
B. Admissibility by Stipulation: A Whole New Evidentiary
Question
The Supreme Court of Florida first rejected the admissibility of the
polygraph over forty years ago in Kaminski v. State.25 In this case, the
prosecution sought to introduce the results of a polygraph examination for
purposes of rehabilitating a witness whose credibility had been shaken and
upon whose testimony the State's whole case depended.2 6 The court held,
in response to the use of the polygraph for purposes of bolstering witness
credibility, that such a mechanical device could not substitute "for the time-
tested, time-tried, and time-honored discretion of the judgment of a jury as
to matters of credibility. ' 7  The Kaminski decision, however, has not
served to keep all polygraph evidence out of court. In Codie v. State,"8 the
Supreme Court of Florida changed its position and held that the results of
a polygraph examination could be admitted upon the agreement of both
21parties. In Codie, the defendant agreed to submit to a polygraph
examination after he was charged with two counts of robbery." Prior to
administering the test, the State Attorney advised Codie that the results of
these tests would be admitted into court regardless of whether he passed or
proceedings); Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on
Defendant's Submission to Polygraph or Other Lie Detector Testing, 86 A.L.R. 4th 709
(1991) (discussing the use of the polygraph as a condition of probation and the defendant's
right against self-incrimination). But see, e.g., State v. Travis, 867 P.2d 234, 236 (Idaho
1994) (holding that the results of a polygraph examination are admissible in probation
revocation hearing despite the fact that the results indicate that the defendant was deceptive
in answering questions concerning whether he had been involved in sexual activity with
minors).
24. See Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Hockman v.
State, 465 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 339.
26. Id at 341.
27. Id
28. 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975).
29. Id. at 756.
30. Id.
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failed.31  Since Codie failed the test, the results were admitted.32  In
upholding both the trial and appellate court decisions, the supreme court
concluded that the evidence was admissible against Codie since he had
freely and voluntarily agreed to waive any objection to admissibility prior
to the administration of the test.33 Thus, based on Codie, trial courts are
given broad discretion to admit the evidence if the parties stipulate to the
admissibility, scope, and use of the results prior to the administration of the
examination.34
Although the stipulation approach ensures that evidentiary objections
will be avoided, it does not ensure that the results obtained from such an
examination will be reliable and trustworthy. Furthermore, once the parties
stipulate to the admissibility of polygraph evidence, they are bound by the
results regardless of their effect. For example, in Butler v. State,35 the
defendant was offered the opportunity to submit to a lie detector test as a
means of proving his innocence in a series of rapes.36 A pretrial agreement
was entered into whereby the State agreed not to prosecute if the results of
the polygraph examination indicated that the defendant was telling the
truth.37 On the other hand, if the results of the test were unfavorable, the
results would be admissible at trial.3" The defendant passed the test and
the State initially dismissed the charges.39 However, the defendant was
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Codie, 313 So. 2d at 757.
34. For detailed discussion on Florida law concerning the admissibility of polgraph
results through prior stipulation, see for example, Davis v. State, 520 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1988);
Carron v. State, 427 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1983); Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d
187 (Fla. 1983); Codie, 313 So. 2d at 754. These cases support the admission of polygraph
results by agreement; however, the proposition that the polygraph is too unreliable to warrant
its use in judicial proceedings in the absence of such agreement is maintained. See Delap,
440 So. 2d at 1242, wherein the court stated:
The use of a polygraph examination as evidence is premised on the waiver by
both parties of evidentiary objections as to lack of scientific reliability. The
evidence fails to show that the polygraph examination has gained such reliability
and scientific recognition in Florida as to warrant its admissibility. The Florida
rule of inadmissibility reflects state judgment that polygraph evidence is too
unreliable or too capable of misinterpretation to be admitted at trial. However,
the court does recognize that the parties may waive their evidentiary objection.
Id. at 1247.
35. 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
36. Id at 422.
37. l
38. Md
39. Id. at 423-24.
Feld 1375
356
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
later indicted on the same charge, and was found guilty despite his prior
agreement with the State.4° On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the
lower court's ruling and held that the State was bound to abide by the
agreement that it had made with the defendant.41 The court reasoned that
such an agreement constituted a pledge of public faith and as such it should
not have been repudiated.42 However, in issuing its opinion, the court
noted that although the State is free to choose its procedures and weapons
of prosecution, it is a questionable situation when the State enters into
contracts where the decision to prosecute is removed "from the hands of the
traditional authority and delegate[d] to the conscience of a scientific
device-a device which may not be infallible. '43 Thus, although the court
remained convinced that polygraph results were unreliable for purposes of
determining guilt, it allowed the results to be admitted based on the prior
stipulation of the parties.'
Similarly, in State v. Davis,45 the court was required to dismiss the
charges against a defendant after he passed a polygraph examination.4 6
Here, as in Butler, the defendant was offered the opportunity to submit to
a polygraph test in order to prove his innocence.47 In this case, however,
40. Butler, 228 So. 2d at 424. In order to avoid its agreement with the defendant, the
State claimed that its approval of the agreement was not obtained by the court. Id. Although
the court held that the polygraph results were inconclusive, it dismissed the State's claim on
the ground that the State had been aware of the agreement and of the questions that would
be asked of the defendant. Id. at 425. In addition, the State made no objection to the
administration of the test until after it was given. Id.
41. ld. at 424.
42. Butler, 228 So. 2d at 424 (citing State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966)).
43. Id. at 425.
44. lIa; see also Mullin v. State, 571 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). In this
case, the defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby she agreed to submit to a
polygraph examination in exchange for a waiver of the mandatory sentence and fine
associated with cocaine trafficking. Id. at 1383. Based on hearsay testimony alone, the State
was able to show that the defendant had failed the polygraph examination. Id. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was reversed on the grounds that the hearsay testimony was
insufficient to sustain the trial court's finding. Id. at 1384. The court noted, however, that
had the State been able to legitimately prove that appellant had failed the polygraph, that the
minimum mandatory sentence would be appropriate. Id. Thus, in this case, as in Davis and
Butler, the admissibility of the polygraph is not at issue. Rather, the focal point of these
cases centers on the existence of a plea agreement and the fact that polygraph results
obtained through a plea agreement are binding regardless of the outcome.
45. 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
46. Id at 27.
47. lde at 25.
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the defendant was willing to risk a plea of guilty to a lesser charge if the
test indicated that he was untruthful.4" In return, the State agreed to
dismiss the case if the result indicated that the defendant was telling the
truth.49 Furthermore, both parties agreed that neither party would be bound
if the results were inconclusive." After the administration of the test, the
State sought to repudiate its agreement based on conflicting opinions
between the first and second polygraph examiners."1 The first examiner
opined that the defendant was telling the truth and the second examiner
opined that the results were inconclusive. 2 However, in accordance with
the parties' original agreement, the trial court quashed the indictment against
the defendant based on the opinion of the first examiner. 3 On appeal, the
Second District held that the agreement by the State to dismiss the case
against the defendant was a pledge of public faith, and was therefore binding
and enforceable." Thus, the decision to dismiss the case against the
defendant was affirmed.
Conversely, in Madrigal v. State,55 the State did not waive the
defendant's sentence despite its prior agreement.56 In this case, the
defendant agreed to undergo several polygraph examinations in order to
assist the State in a homicide investigation. 7 After the examinations were
administered, the State sought to repudiate its agreement based on the
defendant's failure to reveal to the polygraph examiner all that he knew
48. Id. A plea agreement was entered into whereby the State would reduce the
defendant's charge from first degree murder to manslaughter if the result of the polygraph
was not in the defendant's favor. Id
49. Davis, 188 So. 2d at 25.
50. Id.
51. Id at 25-26.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. The court decided to follow the opinion of the first examiner based upon the
agreement entered into by the State and the defendant whereby both parties agreed to select
the person that would administer the test, who in this case, was Deputy Gill. Davis, 188 So.
2d at 26. Although Deputy Gill opined that the defendant was telling the truth, he later
admitted that the results might not be accurate and that the opinion of the second examiner,
Powell, might be correct. Id. However, Powell testified that his findings were not based
upon any reexamination of the defendant, but upon his disapproval of one of the techniques
used by Gill. Id. Nevertheless, the court held the agreement to be binding based upon the
parties' original choice of polygraph examiners. Id.
54. Id at 27.
55. 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Id at 393.
57. Id.
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about the perpetrators of the homicide. 8 In support of its position, the
State claimed that the contract with Madrigal had been breached although
it presented no evidence other than the opinion of the polygraph examiner
to substantiate its conclusion. 9 On appeal, the Third District Court of
Appeal held that the State Attorney and the trial court were justified in
concluding that the defendant had violated their agreement.' Thus, the
defendant's sentence was upheld.61 Here, as in the Fourth and Second
Districts, the Third District was not only willing to admit these results for
purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but it relied
on the validity of them in upholding the defendant's sentence. More
importantly, all of these courts were willing to admit and abide by the
results of these examinations despite their failure to be recognized within the
scientific community as being accurate, trustworthy, and reliable. Thus,
based on the validity of the agreements entered into, these courts were
willing to admit the results of the polygraph tests regardless of the negative
impact that such results could potentially have on the lives of the defendants
and irrespective of the standards for admissibility as set forth in Frye.
Likewise, many Florida courts have disregarded the Frye standard of
admissibility in imposing polygraph testing as a condition of probation.
This abandonment of the Frye standard is of particular importance in the
context of the probationer since his very freedom is dependent on a
favorable polygraph reading.
Il. AIN'T MISBEHAVIN': THE POLYGRAPH AS A
CONDITION OF PROBATION
The most recent Florida case to address the use of the polygraph as a
condition of probation is Cassamassima v. State.62 In Cassamassima, the
defendant was convicted of lewd assault on a child and was required to
submit to a polygraph at six-month intervals as a condition of his proba-
tion.63 In a five-four en banc opinion affirming the lower court's ruling,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a defendant may be required to
58. l&
59. Id. In this opinion, neither the Madrigal court nor the State addressed the reasons
why the polygraph examiner had concluded that the defendant was less than truthful in his
responses. As such, it can only be inferred that the opinion of the examiner was enough to
justify the court's decision.
60. Madrigal, 545 So. 2d at 394-95.
61. Id. at 395.
62. 657 So. 2d 906 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Id. at 907.
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take a polygraph at reasonable intervals and to respond to questions that
concern noncriminal conduct so long as the results of the polygraph are not
offered in evidence. 4 The court reasoned that the polygraph condition was
justified by the circumstances of the particular offense and on the informa-
tion available to the court which suggested that polygraphs offer a "deterrent
to reoffense. ' 6 1 In holding that the polygraph is a valid condition of
probation, the court vacated its earlier decision in Hart v. State' where it
struck the condition of mandatory polygraph testing from the probationer's
sentence. In Hart, the defendant pled nolo contendere in a lewd act case
and was sentenced to six years in prison and five years probation with
submission to periodic lie detector tests as a condition of probation. 67 On
appeal, the court reasoned that such tests were unreliable for forensic6' use,
and that it was an improper delegation of the trial court's fact finding
64. Id at 911.
65. Id The trial judge's opinion reads as follows:
The Court imposes the special condition based on research which shows
that this is a valid and effective deterrent to reoffend and is both valid and
effective in dealing with denial that are critical in dealing with evaluation of
rehabilitation of sex offenders and in large part because sex crimes, particularly
with children, are secret crimes as to which it is very difficult to make an
effective... detection or an effective way to monitor whether we are having a
violation of either the Community Control or the probation.
A yes answer to either of those questions or a no answer which indicates
deception would form the basis for a violation of community control or
probation in this case.
Id. at 909.
66. 633 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). See generally FLA. STAT. § 948.03
(1994) (providing that a probationer may be subject to a variety of requirements, such as
mandatory drug or alcohol testing, so long as the condition is reasonably related to the
offense, to the rehabilitation of the defendant, or to the protection of the public); see also
Nichols v. State, 528 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1988) (discussing permissible
conditions of probation); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979). But see Gomez-
Rodriqueq v. State, 632 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that special
condition that defendant refrain from consuming alcoholic beverages be struck as being
unrelated to cocaine offense); Grate v. State, 623 So. 2d 591, 592 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (striking condition that appellant not enter any bar or consume alcohol); Peterson v.
State, 623 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that no nexus exists
between prohibiting appellant's consumption of dangerous substances and the appellant's
offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon).
67. Hart, 633 So. 24 at 1189.
68. "Forensic" is defined as belonging to the courts of justice and indicating the
application of a particular subject to the law. For example, FORENSIC MEDICINE is a
branch of science that employs medical technology to assist in solving legal problems.
BARRON's LAW DICrIONARY 195 (3d ed. 1991).
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authority to rely on the results of these tests to establish whether a crime
had been committed. 69 By reversing its decision in Hart, the Fifth District
Court of Appeal joined other Florida courts in assuming the validity of
polygraph examinations despite general adherence to per se inadmissibility
under Frye.
In Hockman v. State,70 the Second District Court of Appeal also
approved of the use of polygraph testing as a probationary condition.71 In
this case, as in Cassamassima, the defendant agreed to submit to regularly
scheduled polygraph examinations as a condition of probation.72 However,
as a result of three missed examinations, due to the defendant's inability to
pay for the tests, the trial court held that the terms of probation had been
violated.73 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed this decision,
concluding that the State had never proved that the defendant had the ability
to pay for the polygraph tests. 74  Thus, the issue in this case was not
69. In Hart, Justice Griffin urged that:
[i]t is improper delegation of a court's fact-finding authority to rely upon some
nervousness-calculator to establish whether a crime has been committed. That
determination should be made after an accusation, proof through actual witnesses
(not graph-readers) and an opportunity to cross-examine as to truth, present
counter-witnesses, and otherwise defend.
Hart, 633 So. 2d at 1189 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
determining the validity of polygraph results, the Hart court relied on Davis v. State, 520 So.
2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1988), and Jones v. State, 453 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that lie detector tests are unreliable for forensic purposes). However, later
in the same opinion, Justice Griffin stated:
In concluding that the use of the polygraph has been effective in deterring sex
offenders who victimize children, the trial court evidently has information and
a frame of reference that we do not have .... I do know that such criminals
pose peculiar detection and recidivism problems for the criminal justice system.
I also know that the sheer volume of perpetrators of such offenses seems to have
overwhelmed our system's ability to effectively monitor and supervise these
criminals during their probationary term.
Since offenders on probation for such sex crimes are already expected to
report to their probation officer and answer questions such as the two framed by
the court, the requirement of answering those questions in connection with a
polygraph does not seem an impermissible burden if it serves any useful
purpose.
Hart, 633 So. 2d at 1190; see id. at 1189 (listing the questions that may be asked of a sex
offender during a polygraph examination).
70. 465 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
71. IM at 621.
72. Id. at 620.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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whether submission to polygraph testing was a valid condition of probation,
but whether the defendant had the money to pay for them. Although the
appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling, it did note that the use of
the polygraph as a condition of probation was valid in the absence of any
objection by the defendant.75 The court reasoned that since the defendant
never contested the validity or imposition of the polygraph as a probationary
condition, he effectively waived any error by the lower court in imposing
the condition.76
In Cassamassima, however, no waiver occurred since a timely objection
had been made.7 Nevertheless, the court held that such a condition was
proper and justified by the circumstances of that case and by the fact that
Cassamassima did not intend to reject probation if the court insisted on the
use of polygraph testing as a requirement of his probation.78 As a result,
Cassamassima was faced with a situation in which he would have to choose
between no probation at all or probation with the attached condition that he
submit to periodic polygraph examinations. In this type of situation, it is
not clear whether the defendant is able to make a clear and rational choice
concerning his alternatives, primarily since his options are limited to either
accepting the conditions as set forth by the court or incarceration. This take
it or leave it situation renders the defendant's decision making process one
riddled with constitutional crisis. On the one hand, the defendant gains his
freedom, but on the other hand he loses his rights with regard to any
behavior that may be deemed as violating the terms of his probation. Thus,
it appears that the probationer has little, if any, real choice in the matter.79
75. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 915 (referring to Hocknan, 465 So. 2d at 619).
76. Id. On appeal, the court recognized that the appellant may have stipulated to the
polygraph as a condition of probation as part of a plea negotiation or she may have simply
failed to object to the condition at the time of its imposition. Id. Regardless, the appellant
never objected to the condition in any subsequent proceeding. Id. See generally Payne,
supra note 23 (discussing the use of the polygraph as a condition of probation).
77. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 916 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 913 (Harris, J., concurring specially with the opinion of Griffin, J.).
79. In addressing the issue of whether a probationer has a choice in accepting the terms
of his probation, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Bentley v. State, 411 So. 2d 1361
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1982), in a unanimous, per
curiam opinion:
When, at sentencing, the trial court proposes the conditions under which
it will offer probation, the defendant should at that time seriously consider the
matter and if he feels the conditions lade him with burdens too grievous to be
borne, the defendant should forthrightly object to them at that time and place.
... If he feels the proffered probation with conditions is more onerous than the
maximum confinement permitted by law, he should reject the tendered offer of
1996] 1381
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IV. THE POLYGRAPH AS A SPECIAL CONDITION OF PROBATION:
Is THERE REALLY A CHOICE?
A. The Effect of the Probationer's Waiver
In State v. Heath,80 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a proba-
tioner's agreement to accept probation effectively waives his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege with regard to noncriminal conduct regardless of whether an
express agreement to do so is made with the court.81 In Heath, the
defendant challenged a requirement that he periodically answer questions
from his probation supervisor regarding his whereabouts and conduct as
violating his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2 In
quashing this order, the supreme court recognized that probation itself would
be impractical if the probationer was not required to respond to certain
questions from his probation supervisor.8 3  However, the court also
recognized that an implied waiver based on the acceptance of probation does
not waive a probationer's Fifth Amendment rights relating to "specific
conduct and circumstances concerning a separate criminal offense. 8 4 In
this instance, a probationer is free to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, if
appropriate.8 5  The problem with this approach, however, is that if a
probationer asserts a Fifth Amendment privilege, it is likely that he will be
drawing attention to the fact that he may be concealing prohibited conduct.
Under this type of situation, the probation supervisor is free to increase the
level of supervision of the probationer.8 6 Furthermore, an answer which
probation. This is not unfair because the predicament leading to his dilemma
is a matter of his own making and the trial judge is acting for organized society.
... If the trial court is adamant that the conditions are necessary, the defendant
should either refuse probation or accept it as offered.
Id. at 1364.
80. 343 So. 2d 13 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 14-15.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id.
85. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 910 (citing Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1369
(I th Cir. 1982)).
86. See Hart, 633 So. 2d at 1190 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
As Justice Griffin explained:
A 'false' answer may not be a basis to violate the offender's probation, but it
certainly would offer a reasonable basis for the probation officer to enhance his
supervision of the probationer and prevent further crimes. Or, perhaps, through
investigation or more careful scrutiny, admissible evidence that the probationer
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indicates deception may form the basis for a probation violation. As the
trial judge in Hart noted, "[a] yes answer to either of [the] questions [asked]
or a no answer which indicates deception would form the basis for a
violation of community control or probation in this case.""7  Thus, by
utilizing his constitutional right against self-incrimination, the probationer
is subjecting himself to further scrutiny and possible further punishment in
the form of increased supervision.
B. The Right Against Self-Incrimination: A Contradiction in
Terms
It is not surprising that the use of the polygraph as a condition of
probation has raised Fifth Amendment objections. However, as noted by the
Cassamassima court, these objections have usually been rejected by the
courts on the ground that intrusion into the area of self-incrimination when
undergoing a polygraph examination is no greater than the requirement that
a probationer answer truthfully at all other times during a probation
inquiry. 8 However, the use of a polygraph for these purposes cannot be
analogized with a questioning process in which the probationer is confronted
face to face with his supervisor. This is especially true since the polygraph
works by measuring physiological responses which may reveal dishonesty
has, in fact, violated the terms of his probation by perpetrating further sex
crimes could be uncovered. In other words, failing the polygraph would simply
alert the probation officer that the probationer needs attention. As a means of
husbanding the system's badly overtaxed resources, this might help monitor the
probationer.
Id.
87. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 909. The probationer was required to undergo
polygraph testing at least once every six months for the first two years and then once every
year thereafter. Id. During these examinations, the probationer was required to answer
whether he had been alone with a child since his last polygraph or since sentencing and
whether he had any manner of sexual contact with a child. Id.; accord Hart, 633 So. 2d at
1190 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting a false answer may not
be a basis to violate offender's probation, but it would offer a basis for the probation officer
to enhance supervision).
88. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 910 (citing Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1370
(I lth Cir. 1982)). In further support of this proposition, the Cassamassima court referred to
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984),
wherein the Court explained that a "probationer may not refuse to answer a question just
because his answer would disclose a probation violation; he may only refuse to answer if a
truthful answer would expose him to prosecution for a crime different from the one of which
he was already convicted." Id. at 911 (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 442-43).
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based on the nervousness of the subject rather than on an actual reading of
untruthfulness. s9
V. TRUTH OFTEN REVEALS ITSELF, BUT NOT ALWAYS
In order to obtain accurate polygraph results, it is crucial that several
conditions be met. Of these conditions, the subject's testimony constitutes
only one of the factors. The qualifications and prior experience of the
polygraph examiner are crucial factors in the process since a large part of
making an accurate reading relies on the subjective impressions of the
examiner. As the supreme court noted in Davis, factors which contribute
to the results of a polygraph test are the skill of the operator, the emotional
state of the person tested, and the fallibility of the machine.9' In fact, it
has been argued that the polygraph does nothing more than register
physiological correlates of anxiety, which is not the same thing as con-
sciousness of guilt or lying.92 Thus, a fundamental problem with poly-
graph testing is its inability to make correct and consistent determinations
of a subject's truthfulness.9" This predicament is of particular importance
to the probationer since his continued freedom rests upon the accuracy and
reliability of the polygraph in determining whether he has been truthful. In
order to more thoroughly understand the many variables involved in a
polygraph reading, it is necessary to discuss the basic principles of
polygraph operation and how any one of the factors that contribute to this
process may individually cause the reading to yield a different result.
A. Basic Principles of Operation
A polygraph operates based on certain assumptions, mainly that an
individual will undergo physiological changes in blood pressure, respiratory
89. See infra text accompanying note 101.
90. See generally KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5169 (1978) (discussing the role of the examiner in the polygraph process); see also State
v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. App.) (noting that testimony given by one
polygraph examiner revealed that much of the outcome of a polygraph test depends upon the
examiner), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1966).
91. Davis, 520 So. 2d at 573.
92. For an overview of how polygraph results may be unreliable for purposes of
determining guilt or innocence, see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206 (John W. Strong ed.
1992). See also Halbleib, supra note 1, at 230-32 (discussing the mechanics of the polygraph
technique and the role of the examiner in ensuring an accurate result).
93. See generally Note, Lie Detectors in the Workplace: The Need for Civil Actions
Against Employees, 101 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1988).
1384 [Vol. 20
365
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
1996]
rate, and galvanic skin responses. 4 It is believed that these responses are
triggered when an examinee knowingly makes a false statement.95 The
arguments in favor of the machine's reliability and validity are based on
tests which allegedly prove its correctness in a percentage of cases.96
Unfortunately, the results of the studies vary greatly." Moreover, there is
no readily available clear-cut proof to substantiate the accuracy of these
results."8
It has been suggested that factors other than conscious deception can
cause deviant responses from an examinee.99 For example, frustration,
surprise, pain, shame, and embarrassment, as well as other responses
incapable of analysis, can cause the examinee to respond in a manner which
would trigger a negative response."°  In fact, studies have shown that
examinees can successfully use countermeasures to create false negatives
and thus clear themselves of suspicion.01 Alternatively, an examinee
94. Farmer v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla. 1983).
95. Id. The Farmer court notes that there are four theories operating behind the alleged
validity of the polygraph: 1) the conditioned response theory where questions elicit
emotional responses related to the subject's past experience (the more traumatic the
experience the greater the response); 2) the conflict theory which operates on the assumption
that incompatible reactions, (to lie or tell the truth), create physiological disturbances; 3) the
punishment theory which is premised on the belief that the subject's fear of detection and
punishment will create a physiological response; and 4) the arousal theory which ignores any
emotional basis and operates under the theory that various stimuli will cause detection. Id.
See generally BARLAND & RASKIN, DETECTION OF DECEPTION, ELECrRODERMAL ACTIVITY
IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 445 (W. Prokasy & D. Raskin eds., 1973).
96. Farmer, 427 So. 2d at 190.
97. Id; see Paul C. Gianelli, Forensic Science: Polygraph Evidence, 30 CRIM. L.
BULL. 262, 270-73 (1994). Gianelli notes that some researchers claim a polygraph accuracy
rate of 95% or higher, while others report results as low as 64%. See also McKenzie v.
State, 653 So. 2d 395, 397 (1995), review denied, 661 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1995) (noting that
a study done for the United States Department of Justice concluded that the accuracy rate of
polygraph testing is only 90%). But see CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
22 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5169 (Supp. 1994) (noting that the estimated
chances that a polygraph will yield accurate results, when introduced in court, are no better
than 50-50).
98. Farmer, 427 So. 2d at 190.
99. Id. at 191.
100. Id.
101. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1538 (1lth Cir. 1989), aft'd, 925
F.2d 1474 (1991) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally
supra note 93, at 806 (noting that a truthful subject may become very nervous and fearful
when asked certain questions and thus may be erroneously labeled as deceptive whereas a
subject who is lying may be adept at controlling his emotions and/or his physiological
responses and thus may be erroneously labeled as truthful). But see Halbleib, supra note 1,
Feld 1385
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could tell the truth while thinking of something painful which could cause
the truthful response to appear on a polygraph as a lie."° In addition to
these concerns, perhaps the most crucial component in the polygraph mix
is the skill of the polygraph examiner. The examiner must subjectively
interpret the graphs that are produced by the machine in order to determine
whether the examinee has offered deceptive responses.0 3 In addition to
graph interpretation, the examiner will also evaluate the examinee's
demeanor, attitude, and responses to comments and questions.1°4 It is
based on these subjective evaluations that the examiner is able to make
preliminary judgments regarding the truthfulness of the examinee."°5 Even
if the scientific theory behind the polygraph is proven valid, the evidence
obtained therefrom is of dubious value if the expert who interprets the
results lacks the requisite skills."°6 Thus, the use of the polygraph tech-
nique is dependent upon the ability, experience, education, and integrity of
the examiner himself."7 Indeed as one author notes, "'[a] properly tuned
piano is an instrument upon which it is theoretically possible to play the
'Moonlight Sonata,' but whether we get that or 'Chopsticks' depends upon
who is seated at the keyboard.""
'A
0 8
Based on these findings, it would seem that Florida courts would avoid
using the polygraph for any purpose, particularly in the context of determin-
ing guilt. However, the courts that impose the polygraph as a probationary
condition rationalize its imposition on the assumption that it will instill
within the mind of the probationer a fear of detection, thus causing the
at 233. Halbleib analogizes an examinees ability to fool the polygraph with the poker
player's ability to fool his opponents:
Any poker player knows that if his mouth goes dry, his voice trembles, his face
blushes, and he begins to sweat every time he tries to bluff his way into a big
pot, he probably will lose. Good players learn to control and manipulate these
physiological signs to their benefit.
Halbleib, supra note 1, at 233.
102. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1539 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
103. See Hableib, supra note 1, at 232.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5169
(1978).
107. Halbleib, supra note 1, at 232.
108. See Cassamassima v. State, 657 So. 2d 906, 914 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(quoting GRAHAM, JR., supra note 106, § 5169).
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probationer to refrain from further criminal conduct."°  However, the
possibility still exists that the probationer will not fear detection or that even
if he does fear detection that he will be able to control his emotions and/or
responses so that he can escape suspicion. Moreover, even if the probation-
er is detected as being untruthful, this finding will be inadmissible against
him in terms of criminal prosecution."' Thus, it is questionable what real
benefit, if any, is realized from such an exercise.
B. Psychological Deterrent or Waste of Time
In determining conditions of probation, it is the duty of the court to
fashion such conditions so that they will serve the purpose of rehabilitating
the defendant."' Section 948.03 of the Florida Statutes establishes that
probationers may be subject to a variety of requirements that would
significantly interfere with their rights or liberties in other contexts "[sio
long as the condition is reasonably related to the offense, to the rehabilita-
tion of the defendant or to the protection of the public ..... 12"
109. See Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Mann v. State,
269 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1980)). As one commentator notes:
To deter certain types of behavior, any factor which would cause that behavior
is not an absolute, but merely another factor for consideration. In the final
analysis, it depends not on whether the polygraph machine works, but on
whether the subject 'believes' that it works. It is society's belief that a person
will fear being found out if a wrong is committed. This is a theory that is
instilled early in life based on notions of morality and the norms of society.
Thus, if the subject operates under these beliefs, the polygraph is much more
likely to yield an accurate result.
Interview with Randolph Bracchialarghe, Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern Univ., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Aug. 23, 1995).
110. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); Owens, 681 F.2d at 1362;
State v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
Ill. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 912-13 (citing Bentley, 411 So. 2d at 1364).
112. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 909 (citing Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 909
(Fla. 1979)). See generally FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (1994). In Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d
1368 (Fla. 1991), the court stated:
As a general rule, a condition of probation that burdens the exercise of a legal
or constitutional right should be given special scrutiny. However, a defendant
cannot successfully challenge every aspect of a prior order of probation simply
because it infringes on some such rights. Most sentences and orders of probation
have that effect, if only because they restrict liberty to some extent.
Id. at 1371; accord Owens, 681 F.2d at 1366 (holding that conditions of probation are not
necessarily invalid simply because they affect a probationer's ability to exercise constitution-
ally protected rights). See United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979), in
which the Supreme Court adopted a test to determine whether a condition of probation
1996] 1387
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The Supreme Court of Florida applied this rationale in Biller v.
State," 3 where it struck a condition of probation from the defendant's
sentence on the ground that it was unrelated to the rehabilitation of the
defendant." 4 In that case, the defendant was prohibited from using or
possessing alcoholic beverages as a result of his conviction for carrying a
concealed firearm and a concealed weapon. 15 The trial judge reasoned
that the condition was rehabilitative in the sense that it would prevent the
defendant from being in a position in which his judgment would be
impaired."' The Fourth District Court of Appeal acknowledged that there
was nothing in the record suggesting any relationship between the defen-
dant's behavior and the use of alcohol." 7 Nevertheless, the district court
upheld the challenged condition by concluding that it was within the trial
judge's discretion to require the defendant to abstain from the use or
possession of alcohol as a tool in the defendant's rehabilitation."' In
quashing this order, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that a special
condition of probation will be upheld only if it has a relationship to the
crime of which the offender is convicted, is related to conduct that is in
itself criminal, or when it forbids conduct which is reasonably related to
future criminality." 9  The court concluded that a special condition of
probation will only be upheld if the record supports at least one of the
imposed pursuant to Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1987), is unduly intrusive on
constitutionally protected freedoms: "Consideration of three factors is required to determine
whether a reasonable relationship exists: (1) the purposes sought to be served by probation;
(2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be
accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Tonry, 605 F.2d
at 150 (quoting United States. v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
923 (1978)).
113. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
114. Id. at 735.
115. Id. at 734.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Biller, 618 So. 2d at 734.
119. Id. at 734-35. The Biller court based its opinion on the decision of the Second
District Court of Appeal in Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
which held that constitutional rights of probationers are limited by conditions of probation
which are desirable for purposes of rehabilitation. Id. at 734 (citing Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d
at 9); see, e.g., Stonebraker v. State, 594 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Wilkinson
v. State, 388 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (supporting the proposition that in
order to be valid, special conditions of probation must be related to the crime for which the
probationer was charged).
[Vol. 201388
369
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
1996]
circumstances as stated above."m In Biller's case, there was no connection
between the use of alcohol and the crimes with which he stood convict-
ed. 21  Moreover, the use of alcohol by adults is legal." Therefore,
since no nexus existed between the offense for which Biller had been
convicted and the use of alcohol, the condition was stricken from his
sentence."z In Cassamassima, however, the court concluded that a direct
relationship did exist between the administration of the polygraph and the
future rehabilitation of the appellant.2" However, as Justice Thompson's
dissent points out, no scientific evidence exists that would substantiate the
polygraph as a deterrent against repeat offenders."z  In fact, as Justice
Thompson noted, such a theory was speculative at best.126
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the questionable character of the polygraph in terms of
reliability and accuracy, it is essential that at minimum, certain safeguards
be implemented. 27 These safeguards include standardizing the methods
120. Biller, 618 So. 2d at 735.
121. Id. at 734.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 910. Although the Cassamassima court held that the
polygraph is a valid condition of probation, it did not offer any specific facts which would
support the polygraph as being a successful deterrent against repeat offenders. The court did,
however, rely on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Owens, 681 F.2d at 1370, wherein the
court held that such a condition "clearly is reasonably related to [the offender's] probation
in that it deters him from violating the terms of his probation by instilling in him a fear of
detection." Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 910.
125. Id. at 917.
126. Id. In a considerable dissent, Justice Thompson, writing on behalf of himself and
Justice Sharp, reiterated the criteria set out in Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 7, which was adopted
in Biller, 618 So. 2d at 734, in concluding that the polygraph examination is invalid as a
special condition of probation because no nexus exists between the offense of lewd assault
on a child and the condition of having to submit to polygraph testing. Cassamassima, 657
So. 2d at 916. As Justice Thompson observed:
It is incongruous to allow one probationer to consume alcohol (a drug) while on
probation when the probationer was convicted of selling cocaine or PCP (drugs)
based on the conclusion that there is no nexus between the crime and the
condition of probation, and yet to compel another probationer to pay for a
polygraph examination which is not related to the crime committed and which
cannot be used as a basis for a violation of probation ....
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 119; see also cases cited supra note 66.
127. See generally Brian C. Jayne, Applying Polygraph Methodology to Monitor
Probated Offenders, Criminal Law & Urban Problems, Apr. 19-20, 1991, at *1-8, available
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used by polygraph examiners as well as implementing quality control
measures to assure that equanimity is achieved.1 21 Quality control mea-
sures may provide a source of feedback for examiners who may have
become lax in their procedures and who may need updating on current
techniques. This helps to ensure that the highest possible accuracy rates are
achieved. 9 However, even if quality control standards are met there is
still a need for uniformity in the many variables that comprise the polygraph
technique. This is a particularly problematic area since there has been little
controlled research concerning these different variables. 30 In the absence
of any statistical data to support the individual controls, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to reach a truly accurate result. To further complicate matters,
even if a study did show that one variable produced a higher accuracy rate
than a second variable, there is no way of knowing what it is about the first
variable which caused this result.'3 ' Thus, the process is imperfect and it
can only be concluded that any result obtained therefrom is equally
imperfect.
VII. CONCLUSION: To BE OR NOT TO BE;
THAT IS THE QUESTION
Although the polygraph has made progress in its journey toward
judicial legitimacy, the journey is far from being over. 132  Based on the
imperfections of the process, the polygraph is really no more accurate than
an elaborate guessing game. By allowing its use, for any purpose, within
a judicial setting, courts are condoning an almost russian roulette situation
in which the consequences for the player could be grave. Moreover, by
allowing the results of polygraph examinations to be admitted by stipulation,
Florida courts are intensifying the confusion that already surrounds the issue
of polygraph admissibility. The thrust of this argument lies in the fact that
in PLI, 159 PLI/Crim 625.
128. See supra text accompanying note 95.
129. Jayne, supra note 127, at *6.
130. Id.
131. Id. Jayne lists a few of the many variables involved in the polygraph technique:
1) instrumentation; 2) required documents; 3) pretest interview; 4) question formulation; 5)
chart recordings; 6) chart interpretation; 7) report writing; and 8) policy guidelines. The
author notes that many of these categories involve a subjective evaluation. Id. at *7. Ideally,
quality control should be based on objective assessments and it is in this area that most
disagreements concerning different techniques arise. Id. at *8.
132. See generally Halbleib, supra note 1 (discussing the polygraph's odyssey toward
judicial legitimacy).
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the results of such an examination become no more scientifically valid or
reliable by virtue of the parties stipulation than they did prior to such
agreement.
Moreover, by allowing these results to be admitted, the door is left
open to a virtual "Pandora's Box"133 of potential issues that will need to
be addressed by the courts.134 Thus, rather than adhering to a uniform
system of admissibility, or inadmissibility as the case may be, the courts
have allowed an accepted standard of per se "inadmissibility" to be reshaped
into one that suits the needs of the parties in each individual case. Thus, the
inevitable question becomes one of reconciliation. Specifically, how can the
use of the polygraph as a condition of probation be reconciled with the
broader view that the results of such a test are unreliable, unscientific, and
inadmissible for purposes of determining guilt? This query has no answer,
at least not yet. As a result, this area is left wide open to mixed interpreta-
tion and broad misapplication. As Justice W. Sharp pointed out in
Cassamassima, "[t]he guilty can fool them and the innocent can flunk
them."' 35  Thus, the potential exists for the guilty to be freed and the
innocent to be punished. Although sentencing advocates recommend use of
the polygraph when doing so fits the needs of their clients, there must be
some assurance that offenders will be controlled in the community and that
some rehabilitative benefit will be realized. At present, no such evidence
exists. Based on this lack of clear and convincing evidence, it is apparent
that a court of law should be the last place in which to rely on the results
of such a questionable process. 36 In the final analysis, if anything is
133. According to Greek mythology, Pandora was the first mortal woman, who in
curiosity opened a box, letting out all human ills into the world.
WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICrioNARY 1025 (2d ed. 1986).
134. See Halbleib, supra note 1, at 236-48 (discussing the issues of relevancy, unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, probative value, due process, and compulsory process with
regard to polygraph admissibility). It is also of value to note that the United States Supreme
Court held in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987), that the Arkansas evidentiary rule
categorically prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony did not pass
constitutional scrutiny. Halbleib, supra note 1, at 247-48. As a result, it is not a far fetched
possibility that Florida courts may be faced with this issue to resolve at some future time.
This is especially true in the context of prior stipulation. If Florida courts are willing to
admit polygraph results based on the parties' stipulation, what is there to prevent these courts
from ruling that hypnotically refreshed testimony may be admitted under the same
circumstances?
135. Cassamassima, 657 So. 2d at 914 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
136. On behalf of the court, Justice Grimes stated in Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828, that:
"a courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct scientific
experiments. If the scientific community considers a procedure or process unreliable for its
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certain, it is that the search for truth is best left to the wisdom of judges and
to the sensibilities of jurors.
Terry Jane Feld
own purposes, then the procedure must be considered less reliable for courtroom use." i
(citing Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193-94 (Fla. 1989)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The City of North Miami ("City") has a new policy, Regulation 1-46.'
This regulation informs anyone who smoked within the past year not to
waste her time applying for a job with the City because regardless of her
existing abilities, she will not be considered a qualified applicant.2 This
policy contains inconsistencies because it does not prohibit the applicant,
once hired, from smoking on the job. It also does not prohibit current
employees from smoking. In City of North Miami v. Kurtz,3 the Supreme
Court of Florida addressed the issue of whether the City may have a
regulation that prohibits smoking prior to, and as a prerequisite for
employment.' This comment focuses on the court's decision in that case
and resulting ramifications in the State of Florida.
The City claims this regulation was established to reduce costs to
taxpayers and to increase the productivity of its workers.' The goal of this
regulation was to "gradually reduce the number of smokers in the City's
work force by means of natural attrition."6 The City attempted to demon-
strate how costs to taxpayers will be reduced. It submitted evidence
indicating that employees who smoke cost the City more than those who do
not.' Accordingly, the City claims these interests justify the intrusion into
Kurtz's privacy!
In contrast, Arlene Kurtz claims the City is invading her right to privacy
by enforcing this regulation; therefore, this regulation is unconstitutional
under the federal and state constitutions.' She believes that since she has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in her own home and her private life, the
City's interests are insufficient to outweigh those expectations. 10 She
claims that whether she smokes off-duty is irrelevant to the kind of job
1. Regulation 1-46 provides: "All applicants must be a-non-user [sic] of tobacco or
tobacco products for at least one year immediately preceding application, as evidence [sic]
by the sworn affidavit of the application [sic]." Answer Brief of Respondent at 4, City of
N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995) (No. 92-2038).
2. Id.
3. 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
4. Id. at 1026.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1027.
8. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
9. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (hold-
ing that Regulation 1-46 violated Kurtz's right of privacy), rev'd, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla.
1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (1996).
10. Id
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sought." She further claims that this regulation is intrusive because it
permits City employers to enter her private life to determine if she is a
suitable employee based upon their own subjective standards.'
In an examination of the court's opinion, this comment first discusses
the specific facts of this case and the trial history which eventually brought
the case to the Supreme Court of Florida. Second, it discusses an individ-
ual's right to privacy, which grants freedom from governmental intrusions
arising from both the federal and state constitutions. Third, the comment
reviews the stringent test that must be proven by the state to allow an
intrusion into a person's privacy. This section examines how the elements
of the test were applied by the court. Fourth, this comment takes a brief
look at how two other states deal with the privacy issue and why Florida
ought to follow their lead in practice.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. The Facts of City of North Miami v. Kurtz
In 1989, the City was accepting applications for a clerk-typist posi-
tion. 3 Arlene Kurtz desired a clerical job with the City, so she submitted
an application. 4 In December, 1989, she passed the examination for all
prospective applicants 5 and was deemed a qualified applicant.' 6 Three
months later, the City passed Regulation 1-46,"7 which requires each
applicant to sign an affidavit verifying that she has not smoked for at least
one year prior to being hired by the City.'
Two months after this regulation was passed, the City notified Kurtz of
an opening for a clerk-typist. 9 However, she was told at her interview that
the City no longer considered hiring applicants who had used tobacco or
tobacco products within the past year.2' Kurtz informed the interviewer
11. Answer Brief of Respondent at 20.
12. Ia at22.
13. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
14. Md.
15. Iai
16. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5. The fact that Kurtz was qualified for the position
of clerk-typist was not disputed by the City. IU
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
20. The reason that the City would not hire applicants who have used tobacco or
tobacco products within the past year was that the regulation passed just two months earlier
1996] 1395
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that "she was a smoker and could not truthfully sign an affidavit to comply
with the regulation."21 The interviewer proceeded to tell Kurtz that she,
as well as all other applicants, would not be considered for a city job unless
she remained "smoke free" for one year.22
B. Procedural Posture
Kurtz sought a judgment declaring the regulation unconstitutional and
injunctive relief enjoining the City's enforcement of the regulation.23 After
cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found for the City and
held that the regulation did not violate the United States or the Florida
Constitution.24
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment
and determined that an individual's privacy rights are invaded when the City
requires a person to refrain from smoking for one year as a prerequisite to
being considered for employment. 2' The court found that the City's
claimed interests were insufficient to outweigh Kurtz's right to privacy.26
The court stated, "Regulation 1-46 violates article I, section 23, of the
Florida Constitution as the regulation constitutes an impermissible intrusion
into Kurtz' private conduct and has no relevance to the performance of the
duties involved with a clerk-typist."'27
After the district court issued its decision, it certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance:
DOES ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITU-
TION PROHIBIT A MUNICIPALITY FROM REQUIRING JOB
APPLICANTS TO REFRAIN FROM USING TOBACCO OR
TOBACCO PRODUCTS FOR ONE YEAR BEFORE APPLYING
FOR, AND AS A CONDITION FOR BEING CONSIDERED FOR
EMPLOYMENT, EVEN WHERE THE USE OF TOBACCO IS NOT
RELATED TO JOB FUNCTION IN THE POSITION SOUGHT BY
THE APPLICANT? 28
prohibited such hiring.
21. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 902-03.
26. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 901.
27. Id.
28. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied., 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
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The court answered the preceding question in the negative and found that
Kurtz was not afforded protection by the United States Constitution nor by
Florida's explicit constitutional privacy provision.29
IH. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Right of Privacy Implicit in the United States Constitution
There is no explicit right to privacy in the United States Constitution.3
Rather, "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion."3 Since the right to privacy is not explicit,
the Supreme Court struggled with the idea of how far privacy should be
extended, as illustrated through a line of cases dealing with the issue.
The first case to recognize this fundamental right to privacy was
Griswold v. Connecticut.32 In Griswold, the Supreme Court established a
right of privacy for married couples to be free from governmental intrusion
in deciding whether to use contraceptives.33 The Court cleverly framed the
issue as follows: "[W]ould we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contracep-
tives?"34 The obvious answer of "no" allowed the Court to establish a
right of privacy in the marriage relationship and demonstrate the absurdity
of an absence of such a right.35
The Court expanded the right of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird.36 It
stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."37 This case is significant because it
29. IL
30. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
31. Id. In Griswold, the Court held a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of
contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy. Id. at 485-86. Griswold was the first
case to recognize a fundamental right of privacy; however, this particular case limited that
right to marital relationships. Id. at 486.
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id. at 485.
35. Id. at 486.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning conviction for distributing contraceptives to
unmarried persons and allowing individual right to privacy).
37. Id. at 453 (alteration in original).
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extended the right of privacy to individuals and no longer limited it to
married couples.
Shortly after the Eisenstadt decision, the Court further broadened the
right of privacy in Roe v. Wade.35 In Roe, the Court first reaffirmed the
implicit right of privacy in the United States Constitution.39 The Court
then found that the right of privacy includes a woman's right, although not
absolute, to determine whether or not she will terminate her pregnancy."
Finally and most importantly, in 1969, the Court decided Stanley v.
Georgia.4 In Stanley, a man was arrested for possessing obscene materials
in his own home.42 The Court found that a statute which punished mere
private possession of obscene material was unconstitutional.43 Although
Stanley deals with obscenity, the case stands for the proposition that a man's
home is his castle. To illustrate, the court stated that "a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch."44  A person's right to privacy-to be let
alone from governmental intrusion-is "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man. 45 While not explicit in the
United States Constitution, other cases decided by the Court following
Stanley also recognized the basic right to be free from governmental
intrusion in the privacy of one's own home.46
While the right to be free from governmental intrusion in one's home
is merely implicit in the United States Constitution, several states have
attempted to provide that right greater strength by adding explicit privacy
provisions in their own state constitutions. 47 Florida is one of the states
providing such a right.
38. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (including woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy in realm of right to privacy).
39. Il at 152.
40. I1 at 153.
41. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (holding statute criminalizing possession of obscene
material in privacy of one's home is unconstitutional).
42. Id. at 558. The Georgia statute under which he was charged was "knowingly
hav[ing] possession of ... obscene matter." Id.
43. Id. at 559.
44. Id, at 565.
45. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
46. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (recognizing that zone of
privacy protected by Stanley does not extend beyond the home).
47. See, e.g., John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and
the Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775, 799 (1994).
1398 [Vol. 20
379
: Nova Law Review 20, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Stewart
B. Florida's Explicit "Right to Privacy" Provision
Florida has an explicit privacy provision in its constitution.48
Florida's privacy provision, Article I, section 23," however, has not been
given the power that was intended when it was adopted in 1980.0 It has
been observed that "all too often privacy plays second banana to competing
interests,""1 even though the purpose of this provision was to provide more
protection. The drafters' intent is illustrated by their rejection of "the use
of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted' before the phrase 'governmen-
tal intrusion' in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible."' 2
By deleting those words, the drafters avoided the application of the weaker
levels of judicial scrutiny and provided for a strict scrutiny analysis when
determining violations of an individual's privacy rights." When drafting
the amendment, the Florida legislators' intended to maintain the ideal that
"an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to
lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable
48. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23. Florida's explicit privacy provision, article I, section 23,
provides the following: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section
shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law." Id. For a listing of other states that also have explicit privacy provisions,
see Sanchez, supra note 47, at 799.
49. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)
(holding that subpoena of bank records without notice to account holders did not violate their
privacy interests); Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that section 23 does not foreclose press from obtaining and
releasing court records concerning state senator's divorce); Goldberg v. Johnson, 485 So. 2d
1386, 1388 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that terms of settlement agreement and
guardianship documents detailing estate of Shepard Broad Law Center benefactor, Leo
Goodwin, Sr., were available to public, overriding his right of privacy).
51. Sanchez, supra note 47, at 800.
52. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548. See also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla.
1989) (Ehrlick, C.J., concurring) (holding that even though privacy interests were indicated
when State gathered telephone numbers through use of pen register, State proved compelling
interests and accomplished its goal through least intrusive means available); In re T.W., 551
So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (holding that woman's constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy extends to minors).
53. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
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governmental interference."54 The State of Florida, therefore, must satisfy
a hefty burden in order to override an individual's right of privacy.
IV. TEST FOR STATE INTRUSION INTO PRIVACY
A. What Triggers a Violation of Privacy? A Threshold Question
The proper standard of review for a claim of an unconstitutional
intrusion into one's zone of privacy under the Florida Constitution was first
enunciated in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.55 That
standard is now a well-established test used in each privacy claim arising in
Florida. 6 First, since the right of privacy is fundamental, the state must
have a compelling interest.57 This shifts the burden of proof to the govern-
ment to justify its intrusion upon a person's privacy interest.5 8 This burden
is only met by first "demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a
compelling state interest and [second, that it] accomplishes its goal through
the least intrusive means."59  For a justified invasion, no governmental
alternatives must have been available.
B. The Intrusion
The Florida Constitution's privacy provision provides that citizens will
be free from governmental intrusion.6 By this provision, Floridians
supposedly have their privacy interests protected. The people could
reasonably believe that the government cannot intrude upon their personal
lives.
In City of North Miami v. Kurtz, however, Regulation 1-46 prevents
applicants from smoking on their own time, even in their own homes, for
a minimum of one year before they may be considered for a governmental
54. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting) (holding that
Florida constitutional privacy amendment does not apply to vendors of obscene material)
(quoting Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989)), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1250 (1991)).
55. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
56. See Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260; Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 157; In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
at 1191; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983)
(holding that Florida Bar requirement that applicants must disclose medical treatment records
does not violate their right of privacy).
57. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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job.61 This regulation -allows governmental employers to take a peek inside
the home and life of Kurtz, as well as other possible candidates for
governmental employment. Since the regulation permits governmental
intrusion, whereas Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution forbids
such intrusion, they directly Conflict. However, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that this regulation is perfectly valid and does not violate the
privacy provision.62 The court's message to Floridians is that it is
permissible for the City to demand to know if its applicants participated in
legal, off-duty conduct on their own time.
On the other hand, some believe, and courts have held in prior cases,
that the government should be limited to only that information it genuinely
needs to know.63  To illustrate, in Grusendorf v. Oklahoma City,64 the
court allowed a regulation prohibiting smoking before and during the
particular employment.65 There is a significant difference between the
facts in Kurtz and the facts in Grusendorf. Kurtz merely applied for a job
as a clerk-typist. Contrarily, in Grusendorf, the plaintiff was a firefighter.6
For a job with duties of a firefighter, where people's lives depend upon a
person's ability to perform, it is necessary for the employee to be in top
health. Therefore, a requirement that the individual not engage in unhealthy
behavior like smoking is a justified intrusion. In contrast, Kurtz's
applied-for position of clerk-typist lacks those stringent health and
conditioning requirements, and people's lives do not depend on it. Thus, the
regulation appears to be an unjustified intrusion into Kurtz's private life.
If the government is permitted to intrude into an applicant's private life
to determine if she smokes where the prohibition is not related to the job
sought, one cannot help but wonder where the line will be drawn. There are
no set limits or guidelines for what an employer may demand to know by
claiming that it is in the City's interest. There is, however, an extraordinary
61. See supra note 1. Regulation 1-46 does not directly state, "no smoking in your
home or on your own time." However, those are the obvious implications since it prohibits
all smoking for one year at any location in order to be eligible for a city job.
62. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
63. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, FLA. B.J., Jan.
1981, at 12, 13.
64. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that no-smoking off-the-job rule did not
violate rights of employee).
65. 1l at 543.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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amount of activities which are hazardous to one's health and may be the
target of employer regulation.68
For instance, because drinking beer could lead to alcoholism and liver
problems, and eating eggs could lead to high cholesterol and heart disease,
these activities could be banned by employers concerned about health
insurance costs. 69  However, although these interests could legitimately
relate to insurance claims, these types of bans by employers would probably
fail because these activities are socially acceptable. ° In many cases,
people drink beer and eat eggs as a part of their daily regimen.7' In
addition,
under the City's analysis, it could regulate when its employees or
prospective employees go to bed at night, what they eat for breakfast,
what kind of cars they drive, where they take their vacations and what
hobbies they engage in, all in the interest of making sure that those
employees meet some ideal of health and fitness and thus cost the City
less money to insure.72
Other prohibitions that employers might claim would help reduce
insurance costs for the taxpayers are activities that pose great health risks
but lack significant utility, such as consuming foods containing caffeine or
alcohol, participating in activities such as skiing, scuba diving, and
68. Some of the many acts that are hazardous to our health that could be possible targets
of employer regulation include the following activities:
Skiing, football, boxing, skydiving, and swimming are activities where a person puts
safety at risk.... Medical experts agree there is no dietary reason for adding salt to
foods. Yet many people do and subsequently increase their risk of hypertension and
other circulatory diseases. Sunbathing often leads to skin cancer. A higher risk of
coronary disease is associated with high cholesterol consumption. Automobile driving,
mining, and bridge construction often result in injuries and fatalities.
Walter E. Williams, Cigarettes and Property Rights, in CLEARING THE AIR 39, 40 (Robert
D. Tollison ed., 1988).
69. Elizabeth B. Thompson, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty Smoking Ban for
Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 491, 520 (1990).
70. Compare possible interests claimed by the City due to harm from drinking beer and
eating eggs with the harm from smoking. Smoking is looked down upon more and more in
society. While few people give much concern to those who drink beer and eat eggs, there
are employers who do not allow smoking on the job, and there are restaurants that either ban
smoking or maintain a separate section for smokers. This results in a stigmatization of
smokers, and it illustrates the discriminatory focus of Regulation 1-46.
71. Drinking beer and eating eggs are just as much a part of many people's daily
lifestyles as smoking. However, the City chose to focus its prohibition only on smoking.
72. Answer Brief of Respondent at 21.
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motorcycle riding, or engaging in sexual activity with numerous partners.73
The idea of governmental control over its employees' off-duty lives74
belittles the fact that an employer purchases only an employee's labor, not
the employee (or in this case, a prospective employee).75 Allowing this
intrusion puts Florida's constitutional privacy provision to shame because
that which is expressly prohibited is actually being permitted.
Practical problems may arise from enforcing this regulation and allowing
the intrusion. One possible problem is verification of compliance with the
regulation. Verification of an off-duty ban may result in a deeper intrusion
into one's privacy.76 For instance, one possible verification procedure that
would result in more intrusion is a demand that an individual take a
polygraph test to determine if she lied about not smoking.7  Another
intrusive way to verify compliance is by looking into the employee's
medical records to determine if she has any symptoms associated with that
type of prohibited conduct.78 These two examples demonstrate the fact that
verification is one problem which may result from allowing this intrusion.
Another possible problem resulting from this intrusion is concern over
whether the government will be able to compel conduct of its employees
and prospective employees in addition to banning it.79 For instance, it is
a frightening concept to imagine that the government could compel a person
to exercise, to eat certain foods, or to go to bed at specific times, all in the
name of reducing insurance costs and increasing productivity. While the
idea may seem a bit of a stretch to some, at one time the idea of the
Supreme Court of Florida granting the government permission to enter into
a person's home to determine if she is engaging in lawful, off-duty conduct
was also considered a stretch.
These potential problems illustrate that the Kurtz decision could easily
lead to an increase in governmental power and a corresponding decrease in
73. Bernard J. Dushman & Lewis L. Maltby, Whose Life is It Anyway-Employer
Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 645, 646 (1994) [hereinafter
Dushman & Maltby].
74. The idea of governmental control over its employees' lives includes sole intrusion
into a person's private life to determine if she is smoking, as well as any of the other
possible prohibitions mentioned.
75. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 658.
76. See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad
Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 940,961-62 (1987) (providing analysis of problems
with verifying compliance with such regulation).
77. Id. at 962.
78. ld.
79. Thompson, supra note 69, at 520-21.
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citizens' rights.80 This intrusion is simply too much to bear, especially
when the prohibited conduct fails to relate to the job sought. Citizens of
North Miami who desire city jobs lost their right to participate in a specific
form of lawful, off-duty conduct. The Supreme Court of Florida held this
intrusion was justified because the state had compelling interests.
C. The City's Lack of a Compelling State Interest
1. Introduction
In City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 1 the Supreme Court of Florida found
the City's stated interests compelling, thereby justifying its intrusive behav-
ior.82 A state's interest only becomes compelling when "definite harm to
specific individuals that either has occurred," or will occur, is recogniz-
able. 3 The City claims two compelling interests in this case: a reduction
of costs and an increase in productivity. 4 The City has the burden of
justifying its intrusion into the private lives of its applicants.85
2. Reduction of Costs
The City claims it has a "compelling interest in saving money for
taxpayers by employing only healthy applicants. 8 6 In Kurtz, the City cites
to evidence which states that "a high percentage of smokers who have
adhered to the one year cessation requirement are unlikely to resume
smoking."8" Thus, the City concludes that the interest is compelling
because employees will be healthier, thereby costing the taxpayers less
money.88
80. This gives employers more economic power to control more than what is rightfully
theirs to control. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 658.
81. 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
82. Id. at 1028.
83. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 270 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Long v.
Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
84. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1026.
85. Id. at 1027. This intrusion has been thrust upon Kurtz even though it does not relate
to the job, and she (and all other applicants who are being intruded upon) has no guarantee
of ever getting the job, even after she is forced to quit smoking for a year. Id.
86. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
87. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
88. Id.
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Usually, one would probably consider reductions of costs to the
taxpayers from health insurance a compelling interest. In fact, the Supreme
Court of Florida did just that in this case when it allowed a privacy intrusion
due to the City's claimed compelling interest in saving the taxpayers'
money.' 9 However, under the circumstances in this case, this interest
cannot be deemed compelling because it does not relate to Kurtz's ability
to perform her job. The interests will not be deemed compelling "[u]nless
an employee's off-work activity has a direct bearing on his or her ability to
perform job-related tasks or significantly interferes with business opera-
tion."'
The City claims that a compelling interest will be served by monitoring
the health of its prospective employees.9 However, this argument is
flawed because the City is not concerned with the actual health of its
employees. Since the compelling interest here is saving the taxpayers'
money by hiring healthy employees, the subject of Kurtz's health must be
examined.92 The City admits, however, that it did not even bother to
inquire into Kurtz's health.93 In fact, once Kurtz stated that she could not
truthfully sign the affidavit, 94 the City immediately turned her down
without even questioning her health.95 In truth, the City does not even
begin to examine any prospective applicants (even if they are the most
qualified) if they have used tobacco in the past year.9" The process of
waiting until after hiring to determine the health of employees, thereby
supposedly satisfying this interest, divests the City of qualified applicants
and forbids all applicants who smoke from demonstrating just exactly how
healthy they are.
Even though the City claims to be concerned with reducing health
insurance costs by refusing to hire smokers, current employees and
prospective employees who have not smoked for a year are permitted to
"light up" on the job.97 If the regulation's goal is to reduce costs by hiring
only non-smokers because they are healthier, the City's compelling interest
is defeated by the fact that once employees begin to work, they may smoke
89. Ma at 1028.
90. Rothstein, supra note 76, at 963.
91. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
92. Her health should be examined to determine if she would be a healthy employee.
It was already determined that she was qualified. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
94. Itd at 3.
95. Id
96. Id at 5.
97. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
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on the job as often as they please. Ironically, the place where workers may
smoke, in the workplace, is precisely where the regulation should be
enforced. The workplace is the one arena where employers may control
conduct, because that is where the regulation will have an effect on other
employees. The workplace is the one place with which employers must be
concerned. The current regulation deprives smokers of the opportunity to
demonstrate whether they are inflicted with any preexisting conditions that
may cost the City more money for health insurance.98 Therefore, the
City's interest in saving money for taxpayers cannot be deemed compelling.
3. Increase Productivity
The City's second claimed compelling interest is that the regulation will
increase productivity.99 Before this case reached the Supreme Court of
Florida, the Third District Court of Appeal held such an interest insufficient
to outweigh Kurtz's privacy interests.'0 The court reasoned that "the
regulation constitutes an impermissible intrusion into Kurtz's private conduct
and has no relevance to the performance of the duties involved with a clerk-
typist."' 01 In other words, her lawful, off-duty conduct has no relevance
to her performance on the job, nor her productivity once she begins to work.
When considering this particular interest, it is important to examine how
the City claims productivity will be increased. The City suggests that since
they employ healthier employees, productivity will increase due to lack of
illness and absenteeism."° On its face, this appears to be valid reasoning.
However, when this regulation as applied is closely examined, it clearly
does not support the City's stated interest because it permits on-the-job
smoking. 3 There is no rational correlation between a regulation designed
to increase productivity by refusing to hire smokers, and then subsequently
allowing them to smoke on the job. These two concepts clash and surely
do not support the City's interest.
Another important aspect of this second interest is the type of employees
the City will hire so that it may "increase productivity." As already estab-
lished, the City's regulation forbids hiring smokers. However, "[t]he effect
of the regulation is ... that a less-qualified-non-smoker may be hired by the
98. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
99. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
100. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993),
rev'd, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (1996).
101. Id. at 901.
102. Answer Brief for Respondent at 11.
103. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
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City, while a more-qualified smoker would not even be allowed to
apply."'' It is extremely unlikely tyt the City can increase productivity
when there is a great possibility tha it will hire less-qualified workers.
There is no clear correlation between increasing productivity and refusing
to hire qualified smokers. Furthermore, excluding all qualified smokers
forces the City to choose from a limited number of applicants-only those
who do not smoke. 5 Once the non-smokers are hired, however, they
may at any time decide to become a smoker and smoke on the job. This
anomaly illustrates the City's claimed interest of increasing productivity
through this regulation is not supported by the evidence, and is therefore not
compelling.
D. Other Less Intrusive Means Available
1. Introduction
The only time a state interest can override personal privacy interests is
when it is impossible to fulfill it by any less intrusive means' °6 If the
state actor does not use the least intrusive means, the privacy interests are
not overcome and will, therefore, prevail over the state interest.'07
In Kurtz, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the City used the
least intrusive means. °8 It held that the regulation was the least intrusive
for three reasons. First, it does not prohibit smoking on the job. Second,
it does not affect current health care benefits of employees. Third, it
gradually reduces the number of employee smokers through attrition."°
Each of these reasons, however, fail as the least intrusive means available.
104. Answer Brief of Respondent at 6.
105. The City does not refute that Kurtz is qualified. Id. at 5.
106. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla.
1985); see also Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid, & Assoc., Inc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83, 96
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), quashed sub. nom by Shevin v. Byron, 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1980).
107. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 77 (Fla. 1983)
(Adkins, J., dissenting).
108. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029.
109. Id.
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2. Allowing Smoking on the Job
First, the court claims that one reason Regulation 1-46 is the least
intrusive to privacy interests is because it allows smoking on the job."0
In fact, "the regulation only applies to job applicants and does not affect
current employees. Once an applicant has been hired, the applicant is free
to start or resume smoking at any time."'' This, however, lacks the status
as the least intrusive means.
In contrast, the regulation actually seems very intrusive because instead
of regulating conduct at work, it only intrudes into the applicants' conduct
at home and in private. While in some cases this type of regulation may be
reasonable, and even least intrusive, in Kurtz's situation, it fails to be both
reasonable and least intrusive.
For instance, when the off-duty regulation in Grusendorf v. Oklaho-
ma"2 is compared with the regulation in Kurtz, the meaning of the term
"least intrusive" manifests. In Grusendorf, a regulation was held to be the
least intrusive because the regulated job was a firefighter, an occupation
which has mandatory health requirements upon which citizens' lives
depend." 3 However, in Kurtz, the job was merely secretarial and had no
mandatory health requirements.1'4 Since the job for which Kurtz applied
does not have an obvious mandatory health requirement upon which lives
depend, the respective regulation does not appear to be the least intrusive.
In addition, it is understandable to the reasonable person that
[b]etween the hours of nine and five, the average person's life is not her
own. Her employer can tell her what to do, and when and how to do
it.... [However, flew would want to live in a society in which they
were subjected to employer control twenty-four hours a day."'
It is logical, and even practical, for one to assume that the employer may
prohibit on-the-job smoking as part of the rules. That way the City could
choose from the most qualified applicants and then enforce the no-smoking
policy during working hours. The City, however, chose to travel a different
route in this case, and in doing so, gave itself permission to control any
prospective employee's life twenty-four hours a day. Certainly, allowing
110. Ud
111. Id. at 1026-27.
112. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 542.
114. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1026.
115. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 646.
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smoking while on-the-job and prohibiting it while off-the-job is an under-
inclusive policy that does not employ the least intrusive means.
3. Health Care Benefits
The second reason the court accepted for the regulation being the least
intrusive means was that it does not affect current health care benefits of
employees." 6 Even though the City claims to be concerned with health
care benefits, Regulation 1-46 limits itself to the prohibition of smoking,
which is just one aspect of life that may cause a person harm. The City
fails to address why hiring bans on people with other health conditions that
will affect the health care costs"' is any different than smoking, or more
importantly, why they too are not prohibited. Hiring others that may either
have a serious health condition, or may participate in dangerous activi-
ties"' which could result in high costs to the taxpayers, is not prohibited
by this regulation. The City claims to be concerned about health care
benefits of employees, yet it only focuses on a single possible cause of harm
while failing to address numerous other risk factors. This appears to be
discrimination directed at smokers, and it certainly does not appear to be the
least intrusive means available.
Also, this reasoning fails as the least intrusive means when dealing with
health care benefits because other alternatives are available for health care
which the City did not consider. For instance, the employer could allow
insurance options." 9 The City could give all applicants, smokers and non-
smokers alike, the option of waiving insurance coverage."2 In the present
case, Kurtz already had her own health insurance; therefore, she would not
have been a burden on the taxpayers because they would not be providing
her with health care.'
Next, the City could implement a premium increase for insurance of
employees who smoke." This type of alternative would also eliminate
any excess cost to the taxpayers. Any insurance cost increase would be paid
for by the smoker herself, which results in a less burdensome alternative.
116. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029.
117. Other conditions that may affect health care costs include, but are not limited to:
obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and cancer. See Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
118. These dangerous activities include, but are not limited to: unsafe sex, alligator
wrestling, skydiving, and excessive television watching. Id. at 6.
119. Il at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
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Another alternative, one which the City already initiated, is a smoking
cessation program."z The City's own expert witness testified that these
programs, "[if] properly implemented, can have up to a 40 percent
effectiveness rate."' 24 However, the City failed to discover if this program
was a success before implementing Regulation 1-46.25 Had the City
given the program some time to demonstrate its efficiency, or even
attempted to establish if it was at all successful, it may not have had to
resort to this regulation. The City had no idea whether this program was
cost-effective nor whether the program could save money. 26 Clearly, this
would have been another less intrusive alternative available.
Finally, the City's own evidence demonstrates that "most of the costs
associated with employee smoking (lost productivity, secondhand smoke,
ventilation and maintenance costs for segregation of smokers) can only be
eliminated by a prohibition on on-the-job smoking."'27 The simplest and
least intrusive means to deal with this issue would have been to ban on-the-
job smoking. A ban of on-the-job smoking would help reduce smoking-
associated costs and provide equal opportunities between the smokers and
the non-smokers alike. In contrast, the effect of this regulation is the
prevention of smokers from having a chance of obtaining any city job.
4. Reduction of Smokers Through Attrition
The final reasoning the court found to support its finding that the
regulation is the least intrusive means is that it reduces the number of
smokers through attrition.' The number of smokers in society today is
staggering. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, thirty-
three percent of men and twenty-eight percent of women in the United
States are smokers.'29 The City hopes for a gradual reduction in the
number of smokers by imposing a flat ban on hiring them for governmental
jobs.
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Answer Brief of Respondent at 10.
128. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
129. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., INC., WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
CONCERNING SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (1986).
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There is, however, a serious flaw with the reasoning that this regulation
will reduce the number of smokers through attrition. This defect is
illustrated by the following situation. Suppose an applicant, Avis, desperate-
ly needs the job so she struggles and succeeds in quitting smoking for one
year. The City then hires Avis. Since the City permits on-the-job smoking,
and because smoking is known to be a highly addictive behavior, the
chances are very likely that the same person who quit for one year will
resume the habit once in the presence of other smokers during the average
work day. Thus, Avis starts smoking again, thereby not reducing the
number of smokers on the work-force, but rather, increasing it. This
probable scenario fails to support the City's claim of least intrusive means.
These alternatives prove that the City did not use the least intrusive
means available when it implemented this regulation. In contrast, it invaded
Kurtz's right of privacy under the Florida Constitution by allowing the
government to prohibit legal, off-duty conduct to determine if an applicant
will be considered for a city job."3 Florida should begin to look at the
purpose of its own privacy amendment..' and also examine how other
states deal with similar amendments for suggestions on how to handle these
types of regulations.
V. SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER STATES FOR DEALING WITH
PRIVACY
A. Introduction
As illustrated by Kurtz, Florida courts are reluctant to take Article I,
section 23 at face value." For an idea as to how privacy issues should
be handled, two other states' privacy amendments shall be reviewed. This
review will demonstrate how courts in those respective states deal with
privacy issues arising from state regulations.
B. Alaska's Explicit Privacy Provision
Alaska, like Florida, has an explicit privacy provision in its constitu-
tion.' The Alaska Constitution, Article I, section 22, provides that "[t]he
130. The applicant only receives consideration for the job. Remember, there is no
guarantee that she will even be hired. This illustrates the severity of the intrusion into an
applicant's privacy.
131. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
132. See Sanchez, supra note 47.
133. See Sanchez, supra note 47, at 799.
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right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."'1
This amendment is very similar to Florida's privacy amendment because
they both recognize the same basic ideal. 135  However, privacy amend-
ments, solely on their face, do not demonstrate what effect they have on
society. It is their interpretation and power given by the courts that allow
these amendments to have an effect on society at large.
A significant case allowing an examination of what the Alaska
constitution's privacy amendment means to Alaskans is Ravin v. State.
136
In this case, a man was initially convicted for possessing marijuana in his
own home.137  In Ravin, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that no
adequate justification exists for the State's intrusion into a citizen's right of
privacy by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for
personal consumption in home; thus, possession of marijuana by adults at
home for personal use is constitutionally protected. 38 The court relied on
Alaska's privacy amendment and previous United States Supreme Court
cases 139 to determine that an individual has a right of privacy to do as he
pleases in his own home."'
This case is similar to Kurtz because they both involve the prohibition
of smoking. However, the substance smoked in Ravin was illegal. 4 '
Even though it was unlawful, the Supreme Court of Alaska still found that
as long as it was done in the privacy of one's own home, the State lacked
the ability to intrude. 142
The State of Florida should expand its constitutional horizons and look
upon Alaska as an ideal example to follow. Alaska drew the line of state
intrusion into the home at the threshold of the front door. In Kurtz,
however, the Supreme Court of Florida has allowed government employers
to open that door and barge in, thereby giving them permission to forbid all
applicants for a city job from lawfully smoking in their own homes. 43
134. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22.
135. The ideal recognized in both the Florida and Alaska constitutions is being free from
governmental intrusion.
136. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
137. Id. at 496.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 498-99 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S 557 (1969)).
140. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
141. The illegal substance smoked in Ravin was marijuana. Id. at 496.
142. Id. at 504.
143. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
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The Supreme Court of Florida should follow Alaska's precedence and
enforce Florida's privacy amendment to protect lawful, off-duty conduct that
takes place at home, outside of the working arena. Florida must not permit
the government to intrude upon a person's private life, as did the Kurtz
court. 1" Instead, Florida should follow the court's rationale in Ravin and
protect lawful, off-duty conduct that is irrelevant to the performance of
one's job and takes place in one's own home. To further exemplify
Florida's lack of protection of privacy, Rhode Island's privacy provision will
be considered.
C. Rhode Island's Explicit Privacy Provision
The State of Rhode Island also has an explicit privacy provision. This
provision, however, is more direct in its protection. 141 It "prohibits
employers from refusing to hire or otherwise discriminate against employees
for the lawful off-duty use of tobacco products."' 46 Thus, Regulation 1-46
would not have been upheld in Rhode Island. In addition, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Virginia also bar employers from discriminating against
employees based on lawful, off-duty behavior such as smoking. 47
Florida should follow these states and provide stronger protection for its
citizens. For instance, Rhode Island's amendment 148 clearly provides
protection to smokers from discrimination. In contrast, Florida's privacy
amendment has not received much support or enforcement, as illustrated by
the decision in Kurtz. Floridians need more privacy protection before the
State may intrude into more serious and personal aspects of private lives.
For instance, more 'protection is necessary before intrusions into lawful
sexual behavior, a woman's plans for procreation to eliminate family leave,
as well as what religions are practiced by applicants are permitted. 14
9
Kurtz may have opened the door for such intrusions. Thus, Florida ought
to protect its citizens by following the lead of other states. It should imple-
ment a stricter privacy provision, or at least as a bare minimum, apply the
144. Id. at 1029.
145. See Deborah S. Crumbley & Gregory A. Hearing, Where They Smoke, They May
Get Fired: An Overview of Significant Workplace Smoking Issues, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at
108.
146. Id.
147. Lisa Frye, "You've Come a Long Way Smokers": North Carolina Preserves the
Employee's Right to Smoke off the Job in General Statutes Section 95-28.2, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1963, 1978 n.102 (1993).
148. See Crumbley & Hearing, supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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strict scrutiny standard the way it was intended. This will give the Florida
Constitution's privacy provision its maximum potential of protection of
privacy for Floridians.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kurtz was denied an employment opportunity because of what she
lawfully did in the privacy of her own home. Even though she smokes at
home, she is willing to abide by any on-the-job smoking prohibition."
Nevertheless, the City only forbids off-duty smoking, leaving the right to
smoke on-the-job intact. This regulation is extreme and should fail to
satisfy the strict scrutiny test that would justify such an intrusion, as it is
merely a pretext for the main "problem" that the City wants to address. The
City's main flaw in designing this regulation is that it fails to address this
real problem: the City does not want smokers on its payroll. Instead of
limiting the conduct of every possible applicant, the City's regulation should
have taken the form of an on-the-job smoking ban. This type of prohibition
is more acceptable because it would not control what the citizens of Florida
may do on their own time, in their own home, as well as any other time
they are not on the clock.
This is an apparent case of the government attempting to control private
lives of citizens. In Kurtz, the Supreme Court of Florida invites such
intrusions. Such precedent by the court opens the door to greater intrusions
than just allowing the City to implement this regulation. Florida's privacy
provision must receive the protection that was originally intended before the
right to privacy is just a memory of what could have been.
Deborah Lynn Stewart
150. Answer Brief of Respondent at 4.
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